Zhang Weiwei on Telling China's Story

Zhang Weiwei, “It is Entirely Possible to Tell the Story of Chinese Politics in a More Accurate and Exciting Way”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
Zhang Weiwei (b. 1958), head of Fudan University’s China Institute, is surely among the Chinese Communist Party’s favorite public intellectuals.  Although he began his academic career in a conventional way, publishing monographs on ideological trends during the reform era and on cross-straits relations between China and Taiwan, over the course of the 2000s Zhang transformed himself into a major cheerleader for the regime, and has never looked back. 

For the past decade and more, his full-time job has been promoting China through his writings, speeches, and debates, targeting both his fellow countrymen, whom Zhang sees as lacking confidence in themselves and in China, and the world at large, which Zhang addresses in fluent English (he was an English-language interpreter for the Chinese Foreign Ministry between 1983 and 1988).  For those interested in sampling Zhang’s message, many of his talks and debates are available on Youtube. 
 
Zhang’s basic message is that China has succeeded in becoming a great power, and that both China and the West need to grasp this basic, world-shattering fact.  China’s rise means that Western hegemony is over, whether understood in economic or ideological terms.  Zhang’s argument is a mixture of statistics (“80% of poverty elimination in the world over the past few years occurred in China”), anecdotal observations (“in terms of both urban ‘hardware’ and ‘software,’ Shanghai is ahead of New York”), and grand historical claims (“China has succeeded because it is a ‘civilizational state’”). 

I doubt that he has persuaded many people not already convinced of China’s superiority, because he cherry picks his data and refuses to discuss China’s problems (even while admitting that such problems exist), but he holds his own in exchanges with foreign China-watchers.  I suspect “debates” like these do not occur in China; most Chinese public intellectuals I know despise Zhang, viewing him as the Chinese equivalent of Tucker Carlson or Bill O’Reilly, media-savvy ideologues who sometimes pretend to be intellectuals (or at least write books), but there is no upside for anyone in publicly attacking a regime cheerleader like Zhang.
 
Zhang presented some version of his message to the Politburo on May 31, 2021, on the occasion of that organ’s thirtieth collective study session, devoted this time to “telling China’s story well,” and “promoting China’s voice on the global stage.”  The text translated here was published in the Peking Daily on June 21, 2021, and is presumably some version of what Zhang told the Politburo. 
 
It is completely normal that Zhang would be asked to speak to the Politburo, since “telling China’s story well” has been a major theme from the very beginning of Xi Jinping’s mandate, and telling China’s story is exactly what Zhang has been doing all these years.  Indeed, the only real “research” Zhang does is marketing research, looking for data points, arguments, and analogies that will help him sell his product.  Perhaps some of these angles might interest Politburo members, who presumably need to tell China’s story as well.
 
At the same time, China’s Politburo members, the cream of the Chinese meritocracy Zhang praises in his text, surely know China’s strengths and weaknesses better than does Zhang Weiwei.  One wonders if, behind closed doors, Zhang was perhaps more straightforward, admitting that despite (or perhaps because of) China’s ever expanding clout, international views of China have grown increasingly unfavorable during the Xi Jinping era, as a recent Pew survey illustrates.  In the text translated here, however, Zhang strikes a consistently positive note, insisting that interest in China is growing (especially among the younger Internet generation, which is “more open to new experiences”). 
 
If this is the message Zhang delivered to the Politburo, then perhaps the story he was “telling well” was that of Zhang Weiwei and not Chinese politics.  China does indeed have a story to tell, but if it wants the world to listen it will need more than puffery, talking points, and whataboutisms.  Any number of figures translated on this site could tell China’s story in a way the West might listen to, but they are not invited to address the Politburo.

That said, Zhang Weiwei is worth reading, whether we agree with him or not.  His argument is largely shared by many--probably most--Chinese people, which is something we should know.
 
Favorite Quotes
 
“Telling the story of China’s politics well depends to a large extent on whether we can truly deconstruct the discourse of the West, and particularly the mainstream China narrative in Western discourse, and establish our own political narrative. Such a narrative should be a new discourse that combines official, academic, popular, and international discourse, a discourse that can truly be widely disseminated so that it will penetrate into the hearts and minds of the people.”
 
“This paradigm of ‘democracy versus dictatorship’ has in fact long been an ideological tool for the West to foment color revolutions and overturn non-Western regimes. Although this discourse has been able to fool some people and has even led to regime change in more than a few countries, today, as the color revolutions fade, as the ‘Arab Spring’ turns into the ‘Arab Winter,’ and as Western people themselves realize that the Western political model is increasingly problematic, many people around the world have begun to reflect on and even question the Western political model.”
 
“It is not that ‘dictatorship’ is more efficient than 'democracy', but that 'good governance' is more efficient than 'bad governance.'  The success of China's development model proves that no matter what the political system is, it ultimately must result in 'good governance,' the kind of ‘good governance’ which, as the Chinese say, ‘exerts itself to make the country prosperous.’  ‘Good governance' can be achieved by Western political systems or by non-Western political systems, and although China has shortcomings in this respect, it does far better than most countries.  'Bad governance' can also occur in Western political systems, such as Haiti, Iraq, the Philippines, etc.,  it can also occur in non-Western political systems, such as Myanmar.”
 
“We are more than willing to discuss democracy with the West, but such a discussion might proceed as follows:  we might first ask the West how it defines democracy, and if they think the concept can only mean multi-party + universal suffrage, we should point out truthfully that the kind of democracy you are talking about is at best one form of democracy and is not universal. We prefer to talk first about substantive democracy, that is, what formal democracy aims to achieve. Formal democracy is not the same as substantive democracy, just as formal justice is not the same as substantive justice, just as taking an exam is not the same as getting a good grade.”

Links to other texts on this site

For texts related to the theme of ideology, click here.
 
For texts related to the theme of the Chinese Communist Party, click here.
 
 
Translation               
 
 
China's rise is a miracle in human history; never before have so many people changed their destiny in such a short time. This miracle was achieved by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and by their continuous exploration and struggle along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics.  Thus the political story of China should be the most exciting story in the world.

However, things are not so simple. First of all, there are challenges from the outside, especially the never-ending attacks on China by Western discourse, because the West is in a sense more fearful of the rise of Chinese soft power, which could bring to an end the myth of the Western system and the discursive hegemony that the West has constructed over several centuries.

In addition, China also faces internal challenges: many officials and scholars lack the "four matters of confidence."[2]  We talk about politicians running newspapers, politicians running schools, and politicians running media, but there are still too few of such politicians.  Many officials still have the problem of "stereotyped Party writing 党八股 (lit. Party eight-legged essays),"[3] and their words are neither friendly nor convincing.  Many scholars still have the problem of "stereotyped foreign writing 洋八股, (lit. foreign eight-legged essays)," and they can’t open their mouth without talking about ancient Greece, and as a result, they understand neither China nor the world.  The new social media have the problem of "pandering to the lowest common denominator." All of this prevents us from telling China’s political story well.

A lack of ideologically penetrating thinking and discourse is a further difficulty in telling China’s political story well. With the exception of official discourse, our other discourses, such as academic discourse, popular discourse, and international discourse, also fail to meet the needs of telling China’s political story well. In short, the process of building our discourse is still clearly lagging behind the scale and speed of China’s rise.

Still, there is no need for pessimism, because China's rapid rise has shaken the world.  It is a tangible presence that is felt by the people of the world, and there is a growing demand to understand China's rise and its political narrative, so what we need to do is to enhance the quality of our product. In a sense, this is another a kind of supply-side structural reform.

We have every reason to believe that as we do a thorough job of constructing China’s discourse, our ability to tell the Chinese political story will eventually be able to keep pace with China's rise, ultimately becoming a complete story of how China became a modern socialist great power.

For the past few years, I have been carrying out innovative research on Chinese political discourse. I would like to bring together some of my research results and experience in sharing them, and offer some personal views on how to better tell China’s political story.

Telling the story of China’s politics well depends to a large extent on whether we can truly deconstruct the discourse of the West, and particularly the mainstream China narrative in Western discourse, and establish our own political narrative. Such a narrative should be a new discourse that combines official, academic, popular, and international discourse, a discourse that can truly be widely disseminated so that it will penetrate into the hearts and minds of the people.

Destruction comes first, in the course of which construction occurs, and we must promote the construction of a new Chinese political discourse while deconstructing Western political discourse and discursive hegemony. In this process, the following five points are particularly important.

Paradigm shift: Abandon the analytical paradigm of "democracy versus dictatorship" and employ the new paradigm of "good governance versus bad governance"

We need to have an overall grasp of the mainstream narrative of Chinese politics in the West, and we should seek to pull out this discourse by its roots.  In my own research and practice I have found this to be effective, and indeed often subversive and shocking, and of course it is based on a breakthrough in basic theoretical research.

For a long time, the mainstream Western narrative of China’s politics has been based on an extremely shallow and biased analytical paradigm, the so-called "democracy versus dictatorship" argument, where both democracy and dictatorship are one-sidedly defined by the West.

They define the multi-party and universal suffrage system practiced in the West as a democratic system and believe that only by adopting this model can China become a "normal country" and be accepted by the so-called "international community" led by the West. In this discourse, the Chinese political system is portrayed as "authoritarian" and as the antithesis of democracy.

For this reason, the West keeps asking:  when will China carry out political reforms?  If you don't accept this Western political logic, then you are supporting dictatorship. If you don't move towards the Western political model, then you are not carrying out political reform.

This paradigm of "democracy versus dictatorship" has in fact long been an ideological tool for the West to foment color revolutions and overturn non-Western regimes. Although this discourse has been able to fool some people and has even led to regime change in more than a few countries, today, as the color revolutions fade, as the “Arab Spring” turns into the “Arab Winter,” and as Western people themselves realize that the Western political model is increasingly problematic, many people around the world have begun to reflect on and even question the Western political model.

I first shared my main insights on this issue in an international setting in late 2008, when I was on an observation and speaking tour in India. There was a massive terrorist attack in Mumbai that November, but it took India's elite counterterrorism forces nine hours to reach the scene of the attack.

I was giving a lecture on China's development model at the University of Delhi, and during the discussion an Indian scholar asked me:  How would China respond if it encountered such a terrorist attack? I said, "China has not encountered a terrorist attack of this magnitude so far, so it's hard to say, but I can say one thing.  In May of 2008, a massive earthquake hit Wenchuan, China. The epicenter was in a mountainous region of China, far from the country's economic and financial center, but our military began relief efforts within 20 minutes, our leaders were on the plane to the disaster area within 2 hours, and our medical teams covered all of the more than 1,000 affected towns and villages within 3 days, providing direct relief to more than 20 million victims.

The Indian scholar then asked, "Are you trying to prove that 'dictatorship' is more efficient than 'democracy'?"
 
I answered, "No. It is not that ‘dictatorship’ is more efficient than 'democracy', but that 'good governance' is more efficient than 'bad governance.'  The success of China's development model proves that no matter what the political system is, it ultimately must result in 'good governance,' the kind of ‘good governance’ which, as the Chinese say, ‘exerts itself to make the country prosperous.’  ‘Good governance' can be achieved by Western political systems or by non-Western political systems, and although China has shortcomings in this respect, it does far better than most countries.  'Bad governance' can also occur in Western political systems, such as Haiti, Iraq, the Philippines, etc.,  it can also occur in non-Western political systems, such as Myanmar."

When I stopped speaking, the room fell silent, and the chairman noted:  “It seems that we Indians are also thinking about this.”

The paradigm of "good versus bad governance" has now been embraced by many influential Westerners, for example, by Nicholas Berggruen (b. 1961), president of the 21st Century Council, and Nathan Gardels (b. 1952), editor-in-chief of Global Viewpoint, in their book Intelligent Governance for the Twentieth Century.  Global strategist Parag Khanna (b. 1977), author of the best-selling book Connectography:  Mapping the Future of Global Civilization, also affirms this paradigm.

We are more than willing to discuss democracy with the West, but such a discussion might proceed as follows:  we might first ask the West how it defines democracy, and if they think the concept can only mean multi-party + universal suffrage, we should point out truthfully that the kind of democracy you are talking about is at best one form of democracy and is not universal. We prefer to talk first about substantive democracy, that is, what formal democracy aims to achieve. Formal democracy is not the same as substantive democracy, just as formal justice is not the same as substantive justice, just as taking an exam is not the same as getting a good grade.

The Western paradigm of "democracy versus dictatorship" has long been obsolete, and we need to employ the new paradigm of "good governance versus bad governance," according to which "good governance" is essentially "substantive democracy," i.e., the goal that democracy seeks to achieve. In this way, we combine the new paradigm of "good or bad governance" with democratic discourse.

We can begin with the pursuit of good governance, that is, the pursuit of substantive democracy, and introduce a large number of Chinese experiences and practices, discussing how each country explores and practices democratic systems according to its own popular and national conditions, in the process exchanging experiences with each other, learning from one another’s strengths and complementing one another’s weaknesses, thus creating a better model of national governance.

This paradigm shift is very helpful in telling the story of Chinese politics, Chinese political parties, and Chinese governance. It can be a positive and detailed theoretical exposition, or it can be a "down and dirty" tool in discussion or debate, which can shift one’s position from passive to active and produce the happy effect of "the good move that wins the game."

Cross-country comparison: Comparing China's institutional performance with that of three types of countries: developing countries,  countries with transitional economies, and Western countries

International comparisons can only make China's political story stand out more clearly. We can focus on international comparisons of institutional performance.

I focus on this point in my speaking and writing both at home and abroad. My usual method of comparison is to divide the world's countries into three broad categories—developing countries, countries with economies in transition, and Western countries—and then compare China's institutional performance over the past few decades with countries from these three categories in order to draw some solid conclusions.

First, comparisons with developing countries. The achievement of China's political system is greater than those of the rest of the developing world combined, because the biggest challenge for developing countries is all about poverty eradication. Over the past 40 years, according to the United Nations, about 80% of the world's poverty eradication has occurred in China.

When we compare China with countries with economies in transition, especially the former socialist countries and regions of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, the basic conclusion is the same:  China’s overall achievements have surpassed the sum of the achievements of all of these countries. Our foreign exchange reserves alone exceed the combined gross domestic product of these countries and regions.

Prior to reform and opening, the Soviet economy was larger than ours, and now Russia's economy is only the size of Guangdong province.  Russia's industrial structure has not changed much when compared with the Soviet era, and is still based mainly in resources and military industries, while China started from scratch and built any number of newly strong industries.  Russia has a lower life expectancy and a higher Engel coefficient than China.

In comparison with the West, there are actually many places where China is already ahead.

Take Shanghai and New York, for example, two cities that belong to the developed segments of their respective countries. Shanghai's “hardware” has fully surpassed New York's, whether it be the airports, ports, docks, high-speed rail, subway—China’s are the product of a completely different era.  We can also compare “software:”  the median net worth of Shanghai people is higher than that of New York; the life expectancy in Shanghai is 4 years higher than that of New York; urban security in Shanghai is much better than that of New York; the infant mortality rate is lower than that of New York. In fact, the developed parts of China, with a population exceeding that of the U.S., is fully comparable to Western countries.

I'm not saying that we're good in every way. We still have many problems, but today China really does not have to look up to the West anymore.  We can look them straight in the eye, and of course there is no need to look down on anyone.  This should be sufficient to establish our confidence in our chosen path.

In addition, we can also make direct comparisons of the contents of political systems. For example, we can compare the Chinese meritocratic system of "selecting the wise and appointing the capable 选贤任能" with the Western system of so-called popular elections.

In many Western countries, democracy has long since become a kind of "game," in which democracy means the election campaign, the election campaign means political marketing, and political marketing means money, resources, public relations, strategy, image, and acting.  Politicians in such a system do not have to keep their promises; all that matters is that they help to win the election. Many of the leaders produced by this kind of "democratic game," which lacks the notion of "selection and appointment," know how to talk a good game, but few know how to get things done. The legitimacy of the Chinese government's decision-making process and the overall quality of its decisions are far superior to those of the U.S. government.

Chinese and foreigners find horizontal international comparisons persuasive. Frankly speaking, the Chinese model is not perfect, but it clearly wins in international comparisons.

The Cultural narrative: Revealing the deep cultural heritage behind China's political choices

The story of Chinese politics is often more convincing when told through the narrative of cultural traditions. Revealing the deep cultural heritage behind China's political choices will help us better establish the "four matters of confidence," which is an attitude urgently needed to tell China’s political story well. This also confirms General Secretary Xi Jinping's statement that cultural confidence is "a more fundamental, broader, and deeper confidence.”

The claim in my book, The China Wave, that China is a “civilizational state” is part of this effort.  My attempt to present China’s rise and the Chinese path from the perspective of the combination of an ancient Chinese civilization and a mega-modern state is both a statement of objective fact and a new perspective on the cultural narrative of China's political system.

In terms of effective communication, this is more accessible to most people than telling the story of Chinese politics from a purely political or ideological perspective.

For example, regarding the so-called "one-party system," which is not easily understood in the West, and which in matter of fact consists of both one-party rule and multi-party cooperation, we can introduce this from the perspective of China's political and cultural heritage: China is a supersized civilizational country, "the sum of a hundred countries," a country where hundreds if not thousands of countries have slowly integrated throughout history.

Since the initial unification of China by China’s first emperor Qin Shi Huang (259-210 BCE), Chinese political culture has developed the tradition of unifying the ruling group, because otherwise the country might split apart, and the opposition to the division of the country has been one of the most important traditions of Chinese political culture. After the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, China tried the Western multi-party system, but the country soon fell into fragmentation and warlord chaos. The Chinese Communist Party is also a continuation and development of the political and cultural tradition of the unified ruling group in Chinese history, as well as an inheritance and development of the Marxist-Leninist party tradition.

The CCP has profoundly changed the direction and course of development of the Chinese nation over the course of the modern era, has profoundly changed the future and fate of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation, and has profoundly changed the direction and course of development of the world. The CCP today must be the largest and most organized political party in the world.

China has studied some useful experiences from Western political parties and built a strong modern party system, but at the same time has a unique political and cultural tradition. The combination of the two allows us to rise above the serious problems of populism, short-sightedness, and legalism 法条主义 that come with the Western model of party politics.

Of course, there are still many problems in the construction of our ruling party itself, and we need to continuously improve the party's leadership and governance level through comprehensive and strict oversight,  and ensure that the Party continues to be the strong leading core of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

We can also compare the Chinese Communist Party with political parties of the Western model from a political and cultural point of view, where most Western parties are openly "partial interest parties" (which most Western parties themselves do not deny), while the Chinese Communist Party is a "general interest party" representing the overall interests of the people. Most political parties in the Western model are campaign parties that do not take ultimate responsibility for the overall interests of their own people. In contrast, the ruling party in China is ultimately responsible for the rise and fall of Chinese civilization.

The Chinese political narrative can also be interpreted in the context of China's "people-based 民本主义" political and cultural tradition.
 
With its fundamental purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly, and its governing philosophy of building a party that serves the interests of the public and governs for the people, on questions of development, the CCP has always insisted that development is for the people and relies on the people, and that the fruits of development are shared with the people. From its formulation of the "three-step" strategy of modernization"[4] to the realization of its "two centenaries"[5] goal and the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, this reflects to a large extent the Chinese historical and cultural heritage of being rooted in the people, especially the idea and practiced captured in the sentence "the people are the foundation of the country, and if foundation is solid, the country is at peace.”

China's people-centered cultural heritage rejects the idea of the political machine running in place, or marking time (which is one of the biggest problems of the Western political model), and insists that politics be put into practice to improve the people's livelihood, and as development continues, the improvement of people's livelihood includes not only the improvement of material life, but also the improvement of spiritual life and human rights.

Because the CCP is of a piece with the people, and because China's modernization is a modernization for the people, it has stimulated the people's enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity and has brought about an increase in the people's happiness. As a result, the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics becomes wider as it develops, becoming increasingly attractive to the outside world.

China's current institutional arrangements have managed both to preserve China's own cultural heritage and to keep pace with the times in terms of reform and innovation. Based on this knowledge and research, excellent works like "How Leaders Are Made," the video clip[6] produced by Fuxing Road Studio, became popular after being released online.

In discussing the relationship between the roles of government and the market in the Chinese model, we can also start from the perspective of Chinese political and cultural traditions, pointing out that the role of the Chinese government in economic activities can be traced back to Yu the Great’s flood control efforts more than 4,000 years ago and to the "Discourses on Salt and Iron Theory" more than 2,000 years ago.[7] In the relationship between the forces of  politics, society, and capital, we can also trace the indigenous cultural genes of Chinese socialism, such as the tradition of restraining capital.

Explaining many of the arrangements of the Chinese political system from the perspective of Chinese political and cultural traditions will not only help us achieve a deeper understanding of the depth of China's contemporary political system , but will also allow the vitality of our traditional culture to flourish even more brightly. This vitality can both inspire the nation to an even greater love for its motherland and her rich cultural traditions, and more easily impress audiences in other countries.

A modern perspective: Looking at many of China's modernization achievements that are ahead of the West today, and revealing the links between these successes and the Chinese political system, can make the Chinese story more persuasive and compelling

The rise of China is the most dramatic event of the 21st century. Although the Western mainstream media is still doing its best to slander China for ideological reasons, ultimately the truth will out [lit., you cannot cover fire with paper 纸毕竟包不住火]. Wherever you go in the world today, you can feel China's rise.  Chinese products, Chinese tourists, Chinese investments are found almost everywhere.

Likewise, with the spread of the Internet, many foreigners have been moved by the rapid development of China's modernization and impressed by the country's four new inventions[8] (high-speed rail, e-commerce, mobile payment systems, and the sharing economy). China is already significantly ahead of the West in terms of mobile Internet, and only in China can you truly get everything done on your cell phone.

Starting with China's many modernization achievements that are ahead of the West today and revealing the connection between these successes and the Chinese political system can make the Chinese story more persuasive and compelling. This is something that works particularly well with young people, who are naturally attracted to what is new, and since China is bubbling over with new things, explaining the political reasons behind it all can often have prove to be very effective.

Western countries turned the Internet into a political tool to achieve "regime change" in other countries in the name of freedom of information and expression, resulting in the "Arab Spring" and the ensuing "Arab Winter" as well as the refugee crisis in Europe.  The refugee crisis in turn deepened various conflicts in Europe and gave rise to populism, as Europe shot itself in the foot.  In a sense, the new social media has begun to subvert the West's own political ecology, as illustrated by Brexit and the election of Trump in the United States.

By way of contrast, the general policy of China's Internet governance is people-oriented.  As General Secretary Xi Jinping said, "Internet must meet the expectations and needs of the people, accelerate the spread of information services, reduce costs, provide the people with accessible, affordable, and functioning information services, so that hundreds of millions of people have the sense that they are sharing the fruits of Internet development."  "New technology is the fruit of the development of human civilization, and as long as it is conducive to improving the level of social productivity in China and to enhancing the people's lives, we will not refuse it."

Allowing the people to enjoy the many tangible conveniences created by new technological revolutions like the Internet is an important aspect of China's new era of Internet governance, and it is under the guidance of this people-oriented model that China's e-commerce has developed quickly.  Ten years ago the volume of China's e-commerce transactions accounted for less than 1% of the global total, whereas today they account for more than 40% and have surpassed the combined volume of the five countries of the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, France, and Germany. As early as 2018, mobile payments in China were already 90 times higher than in the United States.

With the deepening of globalization and networking, with hundreds of millions of people traveling abroad every year, and with the continuous promotion of the "One Belt—One Road" initiative, more and more foreigners are beginning to understand the great achievements of China's modernization as it has developed in leaps and bounds. These achievements often move ordinary people in foreign countries, especially the young generation, who, like Chinese young people, have embraced the Internet.  They are more open than the older generation and are more willing to learn about the real China.

China's modernization achievements, represented by high-speed rail, 5G, mobile communication, artificial intelligence, etc., have already made a great impression on the outside world. Through research, we can identify the political logic behind these achievements, which is undoubtedly a more effective way to tell China's political story.

Conveying Chinese standards to the world: Behind China’s rise is China’s own set of proven ideas and methods, which we must refine so that they gradually become international standards that can be compared across borders

Systemic competition matters, as does discursive competition, but in the end, competition over standards is the key.

There are three approaches to competition over standards.  The first is the follower’s approach, which means adopting others' standards and following them; the second is the participant’s approach, which means participating in the development of others' standards; and the third is the leader’s approach, which means setting your own standards to influence others and eventually getting them to follow yours. On the stage of international discourse, the West has always pursued the leader’s strategy, promoting Western political standards globally, virtually without competition, until it ran into China.

Behind China’s rise is China’s own set of proven ideas and methods, and we must to refine these ideas and methods so that they can gradually become international standards that can be compared across borders. Socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, which should also be a new era for the rise of "Chinese standards."

We should be good at doing the original research necessary to distill China's successful experience into a discourse that the international community can understand.  The key to this is the distillation and formulation of core concepts.

I have made a number of attempts in this area in the past few years. For example, I summarized the most important feature of the Western political system as "elections," and then, by way of contrast, characterized the main feature of the Chinese political system as "selection + election," and suggested that, based on the comparison of the performance of the two models, that an "election" based society will not be able to compete with a society that combines "selection" and "election.”

I have characterized the Western democratic model of governance as an increasingly populist model (i.e., a model that follows "popular opinion 民意") and the Chinese experience of governance as a combination of "popular opinion" and the "people’s heart 民心" (i.e., representing the overall and long-term interests of the people), arguing that a state that governs by "popular opinion" will not be able to compete with a state that combines "popular opinion" and the "people's heart.”

I summarize Western democracy as an institutional model dominated by a "regime 政体" (i.e., formal democracy), and the Chinese model as a model that combines the "Way of politics 政道" (i.e., substantive democracy) with a "regime" (which is in constant evolution). I argue that a model that focuses solely on the "regime" will not be able to compete with a model that integrates deeper political concerns with regime form.

As the British statesman Winston Churchill famously said, " democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." I think this may be true in a Western cultural context, but it is what the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu called a "least bad policy下下策," which is nothing more than a way for a leader to get out of a tough spot when democracy does not produce optimum results. However, in the Chinese political tradition of "choosing the worthy and naming the competent," the state pursues the goal of "the best possible plan 上上策," i.e., doing its utmost to select the best possible leaders.

This is surely not easy, but we will certainly keep trying. Through innovations in its political system, China has produced an institutional arrangement that combines, to a large extent, a "best possible plan" (electing proven leaders) with a minimalist, "least bad policy" (ensuring that those who should leave leadership positions do so). This goes  beyond the Western institutional arrangement of the "least bad policy."

Americans like to talk about the "separation of powers" when they talk about political systems, but I suggest that the key to analyzing modern politics is not the "separation of powers" (because the legislative, judicial, and executive powers are all in the political sphere), but whether the larger relationship between the forces of politics, society, and capital is conducive to the long-term and fundamental interests of the vast majority of people in a country and the common interests of humanity as a whole.

The greatest challenge facing the American political model is that the power of capital is dominant and can almost completely control the three powers within the political sphere, which is the root cause of many problems such as the financial and social crises in the United States. China stands in stark contrast to this. The power of Chinese capital is in general limited by political and social forces. It is impossible for the 100 richest people in China to sway the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, while the 50 richest people in the United States should be capable of swaying the decisions of the White House.

Capital has no homeland, and in recent years a new phenomenon has emerged: the desire of the forces of capital to seek improvements in their own political systems and social structures has diminished significantly, because through globalization and networking, the source of their greatest profits is often no longer their own country, which a new institutional dilemma facing the West.
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In contrast, although the gap between rich and poor has widened in China, Chinese political forces have generally remained committed to a significant improvement in the living standards of those in need, Chinese social forces have continued the Chinese tradition of egalitarianism, and the mainstream of society has almost always tended to rein in capital. This equilibrium could be the main reason why China has been able to avoid U.S.-style financial and debt crises, and probably the main reason why, for ordinary people, the prospect of the "China dream" has become more exciting than the prospect of the "American dream.

Over time, I have also come up three criteria,  based on China’s experience, by which we can judge the ability of countries around the world to govern: (a) whether a country has the political power to represent the overall interests of its people. China has it; the United States and many other Western countries have long since lost it. (b) Whether the government's ability to readjust and reform is strong or weak. (c) Whether the role of the market and the role of the government can be integrated in a functional way. These three criteria can be used to measure a country's overall competitive ability and its future prospects.

In short, as long as we work on five levels: paradigm shift, transnational comparison, cultural narrative, the modern perspective and Chinese standards, and international representation, we have every possibility to tell the Chinese political story in a more accurate and exciting way, thus providing more Chinese wisdom to enrich the political civilization of humanity.
 
Notes 

[1]张维为, “完全有可能把中国政治故事讲得更透彻、更精彩,” originally published in the Peking Daily on June 21, 2021.

[2]Translator’s note: "Confidence in our chosen path, confidence in our guiding theories, confidence in our political system, and confidence in our culture."

[3]Translator’s note:  “Eight-legged essays 八股文” refers to a formal, elaborate style of writing associated with China’s traditional examination system that over time came to be condemned as an example of “form over substance.”  Mao Zedong wrote an essay entitled “Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing” in 1942.

[4]Translator’s note :  The three-step modernization process was proposed by the 13th Party Congress in October 1987.  Step one aimed to double China’s GNP between 1981 and 1990 and to solve the problem of the people's food and clothing, which was basically achieved in the late 1980s; step two aimed to double China’s GNP yet again between 1991 and the end of the 20th century, and for the people to achieve a moderately prosperous life; step three will aim to modernize China by the middle of the 21st century, with the GNP per capita reaching the level of medium developed countries and the people living a relatively affluent life.

[5]Translator’s note:  I.e., the hundred year anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921/2021, and that of the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949/2049.

[6]Translator’s note:  I highly recommend watching the video, as it is an excellent example of the kind of “friendly propaganda” produced by the regime, both in terms of aesthetics and content.  You do not need to understand Chinese to get the gist of it.

[7]Translator’s note:  Both of these are references to “interventionist” policies by China’s central government.  Yu was a sage king who solved a serious flooding problem by channeling the flow of the water in useful ways instead of attempting to dam it.  The Discourses on Iron and Salt were a series debates held following the reign of Han Wudi (156-87 BCE), which had been marked by considerable government activism and intervention into various markets.  These innovations led to opposition, hence the debates, which were inconclusive; the central government preserved the right to intervene when necessary.

[8]Translator’s note:  As opposed to the four great inventions of China’s classical civilization:  paper, printing, gunpowder, and the compass.