Cao Jinqing, "A Centennial Revival"

Cao Jinqing “A Centennial Revival:  The Historical Narrative and Mission of the Chinese Communist Party”[1]

Interviewed by Ma Ya 玛雅, Journalist for the Guanchazhe (Observer) Website 观察者网
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby

Cao Jinqing (b. 1949) is a well-known professor of sociology (now retired) at East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai.  For most of his career his work focused on rural issues; he won prizes for his 1995 volume Social and Cultural Change in Contemporary Northern Zhejiang Villages 当代浙北乡村的社会文化变迁, based on four years of fieldwork, as well as for his China along the Yellow River  黄河边的中国 (2003), which has been partially translated into English.[2] Later on, he joined the chorus of those praising China’s rise, in works such as China Must Restore its Great Power Status to Match Our Historical Memories! 中国要恢复和历史记忆相称的大国地位! (2013).

The brief interview translated here belongs to the latter part of Cao’s career.  Ma Ya, the journalist who carried out the interview, published an edited volume in 2013 entitled Self-Confidence in our Path:  Why China Can 道路自信：中国为什么能, in which Ma and a handful of specialists discuss China’s experience of economic and social development over the past forty years.  Cao is one of the specialists, and the interview is meant to publicize the book.

I happened across Cao while translating Liang Zhiping’s “Imagining Tianxia,” where Cao is briefly discussed as contributing to the ongoing contemporary construction of an ideology built on tianxia and other ideas drawn from traditional Chinese political philosophy.  While otherwise unexceptional, the text is indeed striking in its wholesale grafting of these concepts onto the contemporary Chinese experience.  Marx, Lenin, Mao, and dialectical materialism have completely disappeared, having been replaced by the mandate of heaven, tianxia, the sexagenary cycle…In short, Cao’s interview is a pithy, concentrated expression of the celebration of the revival of China’s civilizational wisdom, as well as a frank (?) warning to the CCP that they could still lose heaven’s mandate if they do not solve the problems of corruption and greed.
 
Translation

Ma Ya:  The idea of the China Dream has been widely followed and has been understood in many ways inside China and out.  How should we understand the China Dream from the point of view of the narrative of the Chinese Communist Party? 

Cao Jinqing, For the most part, the China Dream goes back to the narratives of nationalism and modernization over the past century.  The China Dream was that, over the course of a century of Party-building, China would establish a universally materially comfortable society, and over the course of a century of nation-building, would build a strong and wealthy, democratic, civilized, and harmonious modern socialist country.  This narrative—the China Dream of the great revival of the Chinese nation—is emotionally powerful to all people who continue to yearn for this revival, including those in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao 两岸三地 as well as to Overseas Chinese. 

Ma Ya:  Since the current leadership of the Central Committee came to power, they have greatly increased anti-corruption activities.  If they cannot solve the problem of corruption, the Chinese Communist Party risks coming up short at the most hopeful moment in the history of the Chinese nation. 

Cao Jinqing:  This is not impossible.  The great function of money in remaking social classes in a market economy is something that the Chinese Communist Party has never dealt with, as well as something that many officials cannot resist.  Pledging to “serve the people” will not be enough to make such officials toe the line, nor to save their own souls.  These officials want to make money, and they find a way to bring monetary values into harmony with their basic human natures, which results in the liberation of many desires that have heretofore been suppressed.  This means that the entire Party and government system is facing the arrival of a world of money, which in turn means that corruption cannot be avoided.

If those who hold power in the Chinese Communist Party are unable to resist the temptation of achieving material gain through the exercise of power, or if, once material interests have become the most important thing, these power-holders seek to privatize these interests, throwing aside the banner of the CCP and of socialism, which has restrained them to a degree in the past, and work only for themselves, without defending the people, then this is a betrayal of the mandate of heaven.  Since our people chose this party, the party must assume this mandate, but there are some who do not assume it.  The Qin 秦 and the Sui 隋 dynasties[3] at one point held the mandate, but they abandoned it, which was a betrayal.  The CCP supplanted the KMT, and spent sixty years 一甲子[4] becoming powerful.  The lonely, century-long, revival of the Chinese nation is almost at its zenith; how can we, at this moment, abandon the heavenly mandate bequeathed to us?   

Ma Ya:  From that perspective, maintaining Party discipline and fighting corruption are the prerequisites for achieving the dream of the revival of the Chinese nation.

Cao Jinqing:  This is a big problem.  If corruption is not brought under control, it is the ruling party itself that will suffer the most.  Xi Jinping said:  “Only if government is honest and clean will it earn the people’s confidence; only if power is wielded in the public interest will it win the people’s hearts.”  Otherwise, we can only rely on continuing economic growth and ever increasing employment opportunities to maintain political power.  Yet relying solely on material factors is a relatively weak approach, and if ever there are major setbacks on that front, things could get extremely dangerous.  For this reason, fighting corruption is absolutely not an empty slogan.  Everyone, no matter how high his position, must be severely punished for any infraction of Party discipline or state law.  This is because this tianxia is not your tianxia; tianxia has confided its stewardship in you.  The heavenly mandate has been given to you, and you cannot act solely in your own interests, and instead must defend the people.

Ma Ya:  When the 18th NPC was held, it was said that we must not follow the old path of inward-looking stagnation, but that we must also avoid the heterodox path of changing our colors.  How should we understand this?

Cao Jinqing:  If we are to avoid the old path as well as the heterodox path, then the right path is that of socialism with Chinese characteristics.  Following this path, we will arrive at the three self-confidences:  self-confidence in our chosen path, self-confidence in our theory, and self-confidence in our system.  The world has never seen a developing country establish its own path toward self-confidence, to say nothing of three self-confidences.  So, what is the responsibility of the CCP as a leading party?  It is to tell the entire body politic where China has come from, where it is now, and where it is going in the future.  In other words, the CCP is leading us as we move forward, and we are following its leadership.  So for the CCP, the objective is extremely important, and defining the direction of our historical development in terms of this objective is extremely important.  If you have an objective, and the people identify with this objective, then they will want to follow you; if they identify with your ability in this matter, then this is called the ability to rule, and this is where your power of leadership comes from.  A leading party must at all costs possess a view of history and a view of the big picture, and must be at the service of this big picture and this future objective.  

Ma Ya:  This is also where is CCP is different from Western parties.  Western political parties represent interest groups, and do not defend the people as a whole.

Cao Jinqing:  This is why I call them representative parties.  In theory, the Western democratic system does not need leading parties, because there is no “overall body politic,” but only interest groups, one after the other.  Political science in the West leans toward empiricism, and popular opinion polls and elections every four years are seen as very important [indicators].  Of course, some thoughtful political scientists have come to the conclusion that this is not the case, because even when the people are properly represented, the system can go against the general interest.  Welfare policies in the West are in need of readjustment, but much time has passed since 2008, and nothing has been done.  No one talks about the general interest, and not a single political party dares to represent the general interest.  In the face of this crisis, Western politicians make a big fuss, but they can’t make decisions, and have wasted a great deal of time that could have gone to readjustment.  When they look at us, they see that our collective decision-makers are capable of identifying the interests of the whole, that we have long-term objectives, and that we can lead our people step by step toward the realization of this objective, but all they can do is look on and sigh longingly. 

Ma Ya:  On the Internet, people have recently been arguing again about the USSR.  Some people do not understand the reasons for and the consequences of the policies that led to the end of the party and the end of the country, and seek to lead the CCP down the road to ruin followed by the CPSU, which shows a complete lack of understanding of history.

Cao Jinqing:  This is why, in my view, the current Chinese regime is assuming its historical mission.  Or at the least it is defending three values with which I identify:  national unity, social stability, and continuing economic growth.  A stable ruling collective body is necessary to China’s present and future.  The CCP is continuing to lead the people to accomplish the important historical mission of social transition.  If this historical mission is still valid, it is because the CCP still has the mandate of heaven.

Ma Ya:  In other words, because the CCP has assumed the important mission of leading the Chinese people to revive an Asian superpower, it is invested with the mandate of heaven?

Cao Jinqing:  The CCP is still responsible for China.  It must first guarantee territorial unity, second maintain social stability, and third assure continued economic growth.  A transition of 1.3 billion people risks running into all sorts of difficulties and disturbances, and there may be setbacks and great danger.  A stable ruling party group will be better at handling the situation.  As long as its objective has been accepted by the majority of the people, it can act with relative confidence.  What Deng Xiaoping said about the benefits of centralized power makes sense to me.  Many developing countries opted for the Western democratic system, and failed as a result, as their governments were unable to implement policies effectively, to say nothing of their incompetence in the face of crises.

Territorial political unity, social stability and ongoing economic growth are questions that many individuals do not think about, because everyone is busy looking after his immediate interests.  This is why having party leadership, having a stable ruling party group and a stable implementation of policy are all necessary to the country’s transition.  This is how the problem should be understood, instead of deciding things on the basis of a so-called majority opinion or the number of votes cast, and then making policy on this basis.  Over the past thirty-plus years, while we have made some mistakes, over all things have worked out quite well.  We have reacted to the negative effects of policy, and worked hard to correct these, and nonetheless, in the context of a social transition as rapid as China’s, we have in general maintained stability, which is also quite an achievement.  So don’t be fooled by some people’s superficial criticism of China as a “dictatorship,” and fail to take seriously the actual content of contemporary Chinese politics.
 
Notes

 [1] 曹锦清, “百年复兴：中国共产党的时代叙事与历史使命,” May 2014, available online at https://www.guancha.cn/cao-jin-qing/2014_05_07_227413.shtml?web .

[2] Cao Jinqing, China Along the Yellow River: Reflections on Rural Society (New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).  For a review, see https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/1039 .

[3] Translator’s note:  The Qin (221-206 BCE) and the Sui (581-618) were short-lived dynasties succeeded respectively by the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and the Tang (618-907), both long-lived.

​[4] Tranlator’s note:  Sixty years is part of the sexagenary cycle, part of the traditional Chinese manner of telling time.