Cao Siyuan on Constitutional Rule and Inter-Party Democracy

Cao Siyuan, “Constitutional Rule and Inter-Party Democracy”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
Cao Siyuan (1946-2014) was a liberal scholar and government insider with significant ties to Zhao Ziyang (1919-2005), at least in the 1980s.  He graduated from the provincial Party School of his native Jiangxi in 1968, and later earned a degree from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1982. He subsequently worked at various times and in various capacities for the Central Party School, the State Council, and the National Economic Reform Commission, among others.  He advocated privatization of the economy, respect for the constitution, and was particularly identified with China’s first bankruptcy law (to the extent that one of his nicknames was “Bankruptcy Cao”). 
 
As the 1989 protests in Tiananmen grew in intensity, Hu Jiwei (1916-2012), former editor of the People’s Daily, entrusted Cao with the task of organizing an emergency meeting of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, with the hopes of defusing the impending crisis.  In the process, Cao offended members of the top leadership, and was arrested prior to June 4.  He was incarcerated for roughly a year.
 
Presumably because of his status and connections, Cao eventually returned to his former pursuits, and, as the interview translated below suggests, became part of the wave the liberal “activism” that characterized the period leading up to the Xi Jinping era (Foreign Policy recognized the legal activist He Weifeng, whose views are similar to Cao’s, as one of the 100 top global thinkers in 2011).  In the text translated here, Cao remains hopeful that the Communist system can reformed from within if the existing constitution is respected and if Party Congresses at all levels can exercise their functions as genuinely democratic organs and not rubber stamps. 
 
In other words, the problem as Cao sees it is not Communism, but rather dictatorship; Stalin and Mao distorted and subverted Marx and Engel’s original vision, giving the “executive branch” way too much power.  Cao insists that there already exists a latent division between legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Chinese system, and proposes concrete reforms that could make the latent division work.  In spite of everything, Cao remains optimistic, like Yu Keping (of Democracy is a Good Thing fame), and unlike Ren Jiantao (in the immediate pre-Xi Jinping era, at least).
 
Cao is notably more optimistic than the participants in the Internet discussion, who seem in general to hold out little hope that China can change, or believe that change will only come if an enlightened leader emerges, like Jiang Jingguo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek who is credited with the democratization of Taiwan, Gorbachev, or…Xi Jinping!  This reminds us how much reformist energy once existed within the Party itself.  Cao was surely a Party member when he graduated from the Party School in 1968, and if he perhaps was expelled from the Party in 1989, he spent his life among China’s political and intellectual elite.  It is quite jarring to read exchanges like those translated below and remember that this was a mere decade ago.  I have no doubt that many people continue to share ideas like Cao’s, whatever “ideological discipline” Xi Jinping has attempted to impose.  Perhaps this is why such texts can still be found on sites like Aisixiang.
 
It is hard to tell exactly what format this “discussion” took, or who the other participants were.  The China Academic Forum Chat Room 中国学术论坛聊天室, where the exchange took place, apparently still exists, but it is difficult to tell exactly what it is.  In this discussion, the host is not identified, and the exchange is quite jumbled, with people talking over one another; it looks like the transcription of a Zoom chat run by a host who does not know what he is doing.  There’s a sort of charming informality to it, and Cao repeatedly invites people to contact him and shares his gmail address online.  It nonetheless makes for interesting reading and Cao’s views are ultimately quite easy to grasp, despite the cross-talk and technical detail.

Favorite Quotes
 
“Cao:  Since the Twelfth National Congress in September, 1982, and especially since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee in September of 2009, the CCP has accomplished a great deal in improving Party building. Looking forward to the upcoming 18th National Congress, to be held in November 2012, we need to push forward the reform of the decentralization of powers within the Party on the basis of systematically summing up domestic and foreign experience, so that the Party makes fewer mistakes and successfully achieves its mission. To this end, I propose the following reform plan as a basis for future research.
 
I recommend that the Party Congresses at all levels become the main institution of power of the Party organization.  These Party Congresses at and above the county level (or lower) shall elect three institutions at that same level: the Party Congress Standing Committee, the Party Executive Committee, and the Disciplinary Inspection Committee. Their respective responsibilities are summarized as follows:
 
1.  Decision-making power.  Party Congresses at and above the county level should implement a permanent system of Party representatives (who will serve five-year terms).  This will be a full-time job, for which representatives will receive a full salary.   The salaries of the Party representatives will be paid by the corresponding Party organizations at the same level. In order to improve efficiency and reduce expenditures, the number of Party representatives must be drastically reduced. There should be some 300 deputies to the National Party Congress, about 30 county Party deputies, and so on for provinces and cities.
 
Party Congresses at all levels elect the Standing Committee of the Party Congress, which is the permanent body of the Party Congress (responsible for preparing and convening the meetings); its number is one tenth of the number of representatives of the Party Congress, with a chairman, and a vice-chairman, who handles the daily affairs of the Standing Committee and organizes investigation and research.”
 
“Hrabal:  For the coming ten years I’m pinning my hopes on Xi Zhongxun’s son, Xi Jinping.
 
Cao:  You’re not the only one.”

Links to other texts on the site
 
For links to texts about the CCP, click here
 
For links to texts about constitutional rule, click here

For links to texts about democracy, click here   

    
Translation
　　
Host:  Good evening everyone, let's start tonight's web chat by welcoming our guest, Cao Siyuan!
　　
Cao:  Thank you!  Greetings, everyone!
 
Host:  Cao Siyuan is a scholar from Beijing, director of the Beijing Siyuan Merger and Bankruptcy Consulting Firm, and head of the Beijing Siyuan Social Science Research Center, which provides counseling services in various political, economic, legal and ideological fields. He has previously worked for state-run pharmaceutical companies, local Party schools, the Central Party School, the State Council Research Center, the General Office of the State Council, and the National Economic Reform Commission. He was named one of the "50 Famous People Influencing China in the New Century" by Asia Week and one of the "Notable People in Asia" by the Far Eastern Economic Review. To date, he has published 32 books and more than 980 articles, amounting to some 8.9 million characters in all. Among them are eight books on political reform: China's Strategy for Political Reform (1999); Outline of China's Political Reform (2003); Revising the Constitution (2003); Global Constitutional Trends (2004); Comparing National Constitutions (2006); What You Need to Know about Citizens and Constitutions (2006); The History of Constitutional Rule in Seven Countries (2008); and East Asia’s Transformation (2010). Since 1997, he has been invited to lecture as a visiting scholar in more than thirty institutions of higher learning in the United States, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Korea, and Hong Kong, among others. In 1988, he was invited by the U.S. Department of State to visit the United States to study the U.S. bankruptcy system, the congressional system, and federal institutions. 
　　
So we are honored to have Mr. Cao Siyuan as a guest tonight, a popular thinker民间思想者.[2]  I am confident he will address interesting topics tonight.  Now I would like to ask Mr. Cao to give us his talk, after which everyone can ask their questions via the Internet.
　　
Why Not Dance 何不跳舞:  Welcome Prof. Cao, what topic are you going to address today?
　　
Cao:  My topic is that the reform of China's political system needs a two-pronged approach, consisting of constitutional rule and inter-party democracy.　　
 
Why Not Dance:  Is this different from the existing political system?
　　
Cao:  Of course it is.  At present we are living under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and our reforms should be leading to the establishment of a socialist constitutional regime.
　　
Mu 慕:  Has the discussion session started?
　　
Why Not Dance:  So current regime reforms are one-pronged?
　　
Cao:  The current reforms have no “prongs” at all.  We are doing nothing about the constitution, nor are we serious about inter-party democracy.
　　
Why Not Dance:  So what you mean is that rights to political participation should be accorded to many more parts of society?
　　
Mu:  Is there a solution for China in the next five to ten years? Or do the existing system’s chronic problems mean that things will eventually come to a head?
　　
Cao:  There is a way out!
　　
Why Not Dance:  Don’t we have the system of People’s Congresses now?  Surely there’s both good and bad about that?
　　
Cao:  Of course, but the system is far from what it should be.
　　
Mu:  What’s the solution?
　　
Cao:  Constitutional Rule and inter-party democracy.
　　
Mu:  This looks like the most realistic thing to wish for.
　　
Plain-clothed Minister 布衣卿相:  An online friend of mine told me that his mother used to go to the Party's democratic life meetings and the opinions raised during the meetings would be discussed.  Now, basically, the leaders decide everything. What used to be an equality among Party members has become an inequality between the top and bottom. So, his mother rarely goes to the meetings any more.  To put it bluntly, the example my internet friend is talking about shows that we are moving backward.
 
Why Not Dance:  It looks to me like inter-party democracy is going to be difficult.
　　
Cao:  Everyone has to pitch in!
　　
Mu:  With everyone working away from home, they can’t participate in basic elections in the places they came from.  Given this, can we manage to obtain voting rights in the places where we live?
 
Cao:  Voters should be allowed to vote where they live and work, not necessarily only in their hometowns.
　　
Why Not Dance:  But I’ve never voted at all.  Usually the Party’s democratic centralism emphasizes centralism and ignores democracy.
　　
Cao:  Voting has to become a system, because leaders who are not elected cannot do their jobs effectively.
 
Host:  Let me ask participants to let our guest speak first so that our discussion can be more meaningful.  Mr. Cao, would you please express your own views on the issues.　　
 
Cao:  With the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China to be held this year [2012] comes a great opportunity to reform the Party. Therefore, among the many possible topics concerning the reform of the political system, I will focus today on the reform of the CCP’s own system, or the question of how to realize the issue of inter-party democracy.　　
　　
Mu:  This is our wish, but will the authorities move in this direction?
 
Cao:  We will have to push them.
 
Why Not Dance:  Prof. Cao is surely right about that!
　　
Mu:  Is there any possibility of a wise leader appearing?  Someone like Jiang Jingguo who could lead China in the direction of a democratic republic?
　　
Cao:  Yes, there is.
　　
Why Not Dance:  At present, our country is truly a Party-State country, so reform will necessary require a separation of the two.
 
Cao:  That’s correct.  Today’s reality is that the Party Committees decide things at every level, which in fact, the entire people should be participating.
　　
Why Not Dance:  When you talk about the entire people participating, would this be different from democracy in the West?
　　
Cao:  Friends, let me ask a question:  who leads the Party Committees?
 
Why Not Dance:  Of course they are led by democratic organs.
 
Mu:  At present, it’s you-know-who who decides everything.
　　
Cao:  In fact, it should be the Party Congresses that lead the Party Committees.  Their work should be investing power in the Party Committees and then supervising them.
　　
Mu:  Given how overpowering the state apparatus is, there is no group that dares to step up and defend our constitutional dreams.
 
Hibiscus 木槿:  It’s nothing but talk. 
　　
Mu:  Even the media doesn’t dare do special reports on the issue.
　　
Cao:  It’s still one step at a time!
　　
Mu:  My feeling is that it would be better to start with basic rights like demonstrations, assemblies, and freedom of speech.
　　
Why Not Dance: Democratic institutions are like juries in court cases.
　　
Host:  Prof. Cao has an online article related to this.[3]　　
 
Mu:  We first need to secure our freedom of speech, so we won’t be blocked or suppressed.
　　
Host:  What we are talking about today are constitutional rule and inter-Party democracy.
　　
Cao:  My focus is on inter-Party democracy.
　　
Huang Chao 黄巢[4]:  What is constitutional rule?  What is democracy?
　　
Cao:  Constitutional rule means that the law as stipulated in the constitution is a prerequisite for government action, that democratic politics are the core of politics, the rule of law is the foundation, and the protection of the people’s rights is the goal.
　　
Why Not Dance:  In fact, I think that there are difference forces within the Party balancing one another out.
　　
Huang Chao:  What is inter-Party democracy?
　　
Cao:  Some people believe that the Party Committees are the sole source of leadership, but in fact, with inter-Party democracy, the three types of power are separated.
 
Huang Chao:  Can you provide a simpler definition of constitutional rule?
 
Why Not Dance:  In the reforms you are talking about, who should be pushing things forward?  What are the three types of power to be kept separate in inter-Party democracy?
 
Cao:  First, Party Congresses exercise decision-making power.  Second, the Party Committees have the power of implementation.  Third, the disciplinary committees have the power of supervision.
 
Mu:  If these three powers are kept separate within the Party, then it should solve the problem of a single leadership.
 
Why Not Dance:  Right now, the Party is the leader, so talking about focusing on inter-Party democracy is very important.
　　
XDX:  If the Party were to implement inter-Party democracy, it would be easy for this to produce factions, and I wonder if this would speed up the break-up of the Party?
 
Huang Chao:  In my understanding, constitutional rule means that the constitution constrains the behavior of all parties in the country, allowing the government to rule according to the law, and allowing political parties to compete on a level playing field.  They all have the right to be selfish and must assume the responsibility of being punished [in case of engaging in wrongdoing], and all have the opportunity to govern fairly.
 
Cao:  In the era of Marx and Engels there was a separation of powers, and it was not the case that everything was decided by the Party Committee; but with Stalin, and later on with Mao Zedong, decision-making power, executive power, and the power of supervision were all concentrated in the hands of one person, and there was no democracy at all!
 
Huang Chao:  Why are you talking about the three powers again?  What are they?　　
 
Why Not Dance:  First, the Party Congresses have decision-making power.  Second, the Party Committees have the power of implementation.  Third, the disciplinary committees have the power of supervision.  Prof. Cao already talked about this.
 
Cao:  The three powers are:  decision-making power (legislative power), the power of implementation (executive power), and the power of supervision (judicial power).
　　
Huang Chao:  So the three powers are legislative, executive, and judiciary. Are these to be separated?  Looks to me like we are a long way off.
　　
Cao:  One of favorite pursuits of Stalin, who destroyed checks and balances and concentrated the power of life and death in his hands, was the elimination of dissidents and the killing of innocent people. Lenin's former colleagues Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Likov, Pidakov, and others in the Politburo of the Communist Party were executed as "enemies of the people." According to statistics, of the 24 members of the Party Central Committee that carried out the October Revolution on the political front, 14 were killed by Stalin; of the 60 members and political commissars of the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee who led the October Revolution on the military front, 54 were killed by Stalin; of the 15 members of the First People's Committee, 9 out of 13, excepting Lenin and Stalin, were executed in the name of the revolution; more than 1.2 million other Communists were arrested, many of whom were sentenced to death or to prison. 
 
Why Not Dance:  This separation of powers is not absolute, but requires an organic unity.
 
Qiuwen:  Are these three powers universal?
 
Huang Chao:  If we can separate the three powers, then they can mutually constrain one another.
　　
Why Not Dance:  That’s right.  Once the powers are separated then things can no longer be done according to one person’s will.
　　
Cao:  The problem now is not how to unify the powers, but that they are not separated at all.  Who, might I ask, was supervising Mao Zedong?
 
Why Not Dance:  But look, things are already a lot better than when Mao was alive, and we no longer worship the rulers.
　　
Qiuwen:  The secretary of the disciplinary committee still has to obey the secretary of the Party Committee.
　　
Why Not Dance:  This is progress we’ve made after learning the lessons of experience.
　　
Huang Chao:  When everybody has the time, they should go on Wikipedia and check out what is constitutional rule, democracy, and the separation of powers.
　　
Qiuwen:  The courts and the leadership of the Procuratorate also have to obey the Party Secretaries.
　　
Cao:  That goes against the legal order.
　　
Host:  Could I ask all participants to address what Prof. Cao is saying?  Thank you.
　　
Mu:  I’m still at the office and have to head home, so I’ll let everyone else talk.  But there is one thing I want to say, which is that in terms of inter-Party democracy, we are being way too conservative.  It’s like hoping for an enlightened ruler to emerge when you’re living in a despotic society.  But this hope is really slim, because those in the ruling circles would rather fight to the death, and once they seize power they will carry out a cruel despotic dictatorship.
 
Hibiscus:  I agree.
 
Cao:  China’s three great disasters were:  the 1957 anti-rightist campaign, which identified more than three million rightists, the three red flags of 1958-1960, which identified more than three million right opportunists, and in which more than forty million people starved to death, and the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1967, in which more than one hundred million people were struggled, and more than twenty million died.
　　
Mu:  What seems the most possible to me is that we expand the scale of the CCP, so that every Chinese person becomes a Party member.  Then when we talk about inter-Party democracy, it might be more realistic. 
 
Hibiscus:  Ha!  That’s not realistic.　　
 
Qiuwen:  It’s easy to talk about reforming the political system…　　
 
Cao:  None of these extremely important decisions was passed by the highest decision-making organs—the CCP Party Congress—but instead they were decided on by the Central Committee and Mao Zedong.
 
Mu:  If we did that then we’d have at least seven or eight hundred million Party members, and then if we tried to carry out inter-Party democracy, might it not be possible?　　
 
Cao:  We can’t rule it out.
 
A Knowledgeable High Official 知性大官人:  Seven or eight hundred million?  Then we’d all be slaves!  Wouldn’t that be worse?　　
　　
Cao:  At present there are 85 million Party members, and if they could all speak out, so that the Party Congresses could exercise their functions, it would be a great improvement in the work of the entire Party. 
 
Qiuwen:  Political movements under Mao were as cruel as under the emperors, and he placed himself on the dragon throne. 
 
Huang Chao:  Why was Mao successful?　　
 
Qiuwen:  “Long live Chairman Mao” was why.　　
 
Mu:  As for inter-Party democracy, I always feel like it’s a cover, a ruse, designed to make us believe that the Party leadership is righteous and legitimate. 
 
Huang Chao:  In fact, Mao was once an extremely frustrated intellectual. 
 
Why Not Dance:  So you think that behind inter-Party democracy and the equilibrium of the three powers everything is still in the hands of one group of people? 
 
A Knowledgeable High Official:  Huang Chao succeeded, and Mao succeeded.  The only difference is that Mao held onto the country for a longer period of time.　　
 
Huang Chao:  Political ambitions are difficult to achieve through normal and fair competition in society. 
 
Yishouou:  I agree that inter-Party democracy is a sham, because if it is democracy, then it is not just inter-Party democracy, but belongs to the whole people.　　
 
Qiuwen:  Mao ruled for a long time in part because of political campaigns.　　
 
Cao:  Mao ruled for a long time because he was a dictator.　　
 
Mu:  I still feel like well-meaning people can apply to the Party, and put an end to Party dominance from the inside.　　
 
Cao:  Exactly!
　　
 
Why Not Dance:  There’s a lot of Party members, but they are not all from the same class background.　　
 
Mu:  In other words, if we could increase the number of different elements in the Party, making inter-Party life more plural and diverse, or making even factionalized, then this might be a good thing.　　
 
Why Not Dance:  That’s right.　　
 
Hibiscus:  Surely that’s impossible.　　
 
Cao:  We might as well give it a try.  If the Eighth Party Congress had implemented the permanent system of Party Congresses and separated decision-making and executive powers, meaning that Mao Zedong could only hold the leadership of one of the two central decision-making bodies or executive bodies, and the Cultural Revolution had to be considered by the National Party Congress and local Party Congresses at all levels once a year, would the unprecedented catastrophe have been possible?  Would it have lasted so long? 
 
Mu:  At present there are some establishment intellectuals who are truly doing precisely this.  Although they remain quite weak, I believe that as increasingly exercise their right to speak, it will bring some reforms.　　
 
Cao:  Well said.  We have to keep working.　　
 
Huang Chao:  In situations of unfairness, even the most talented people cannot achieve their political ambitions through normal channels of social competition. 
 
Cao:  For example, were there any structures in place allowing leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Liu Shaoqi to mutually supervise one another?  Unfortunately not.  Because of the lack of such mutual constraints on the exercise of power, even when Mao Zedong went so far as to commit the error of personally launching and leading the Cultural Revolution, Zhou, Zhu, and Liu were incapable of stopping him, and Liu was even struggled to death.  If Mao, Zhou, Zhu and Liu had not been concentrated in the Central Committee led by Mao, but rather had served separately as the chairman of the Party Congress, the secretary of the Central Executive Committee, the chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the director of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, meaning that four organizations and four leaders could have exercised mutual supervision, could Mao have been as free and unconstrained as he was, allowing his wife, Jiang Qing, to be appointed to the important position of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, thus dominating the entire party and the people of the entire country? 
 
Mu:  That’s all hypothetical, and history worked out in its own way.  Someone like Mao, with his intelligence, talent, and thirst for power, would never willingly cede his power to anyone else, otherwise he would have been too perfect.　　
 
Cao:  A fair environment depends on the proper people fighting to carry out changes in the system, and we cannot wait any longer for this.
 
Shuke:  Might heaven send us a Gorbachev?　　
 
Huang Chao:  Do you believe we might wind up with an even more frustrated intellectual, now that Mao is gone?　　
 
Cao:  Anything is possible.  We have to use our imagination. 
 
Huang Chao:  The key is China’s political system. 
 
Yishouou:  China has already had its Jiang Jingguo, sadly enough.　　
 
Cao:  Since the Twelfth National Congress in September, 1982, and especially since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee in September of 2009, the CCP has accomplished a great deal in improving Party building. Looking forward to the upcoming 18th National Congress, to be held in November 2012, we need to push forward the reform of the decentralization of powers within the Party on the basis of systematically summing up domestic and foreign experience, so that the Party makes fewer mistakes and successfully achieves its mission. To this end, I propose the following reform plan as a basis for future research.
 
I recommend that the Party Congresses at all levels become the main institution of power of the Party organization.  These Party Congresses at and above the county level (or lower) shall elect three institutions at that same level: the Party Congress Standing Committee, the Party Executive Committee, and the Disciplinary Inspection Committee. Their respective responsibilities are summarized as follows:
 
1.  Decision-making power.  Party Congresses at and above the county level should implement a permanent system of Party representatives (who will serve five-year terms).  This will be a full-time job, for which representatives will receive a full salary.   The salaries of the Party representatives will be paid by the corresponding Party organizations at the same level. In order to improve efficiency and reduce expenditures, the number of Party representatives must be drastically reduced. There should be some 300 deputies to the National Party Congress, about 30 county Party deputies, and so on for provinces and cities. 
 
Mu:  I’ve learned a lot from this discussion, which has allowed me to see that we are not alone in our struggle, and that at least there are brave people like Professor Cao who are quietly trying to move things forward.
 
OK, I’ve got to go.  Mom is calling me home for supper. 
 
Cao:  OK.  Let’s keep in touch.  My email is [email protected].　　
 
Mu:  Ok.  My name is Lan Xiaotian廉小天.  If I have any questions I’ll send you a message. 
 
Why Not Dance:  Learning is all about keeping in touch and listening.　　
 
Cao:  Party Congresses at all levels elect the Standing Committee of the Party Congress, which is the permanent body of the Party Congress (responsible for preparing and convening the meetings); its number is one tenth of the number of representatives of the Party Congress, with a chairman, and a vice-chairman, who handles the daily affairs of the Standing Committee and organizes investigation and research.　　
 
Huang Chao:  In China, we might say that democracy has changed its stripes, and when you are the master, I am the people. 
 
Cao:  This turns things upside down, because the people should be the masters, and the officials should be public servants.
 
The responsibilities of the Party Congresses at all levels will be roughly the same as those described in the current Party constitution, but one additional item is to be added: an annual congress will be held to review the work of the Executive Committee of the Party at the same level and urge it to strictly implement the decisions of the Party Congress. In emergencies, the Standing Committee of the Party Congress can convene an extraordinary congress.
 
Representatives of the Party Congresses have the right to vote to recall the main leading cadres of the executive agencies and disciplinary inspection agencies according to certain procedures, but they have no right to intervene in their concrete activities. At the same time, they are also subject to the restrictions of all Party members and voters. Such a separation of powers and system of checks and balances is precisely conducive to enhancing the vitality of the Party and its influence among the people. 
 
Mu:  I hope our country will become better and better, that democracy will no longer seem so distant, and that there will be fewer and fewer incidents of violence. 
 
Cao:  As long as we work together, this is a prospect that can be achieved.
 
Two:  Executive power. Party Congresses at all levels will elect seven to nine members to make up the Executive Committee of the Party at the same level, with one secretary and one deputy secretary. These Executive Committees will be the rough equivalents of the current Standing Committees in terms of numbers and powers. At present, the leadership of the Party Committee at all levels is actually held by the Standing Committee, and the ordinary members of the Party Committee only attend the plenary session once in a blue moon, becoming nothing but an ornamentation, but once these reforms are implemented, they will exercise their proper functions. 
 
The Executive Committee of the Party at all levels is responsible to the Party Congress and reports on its work and accepts the deliberations of the Congress. The day-to-day work of the Executive Committee must report to the Standing Committee of the Party Congress at the same level in a timely fashion.  
 
The Party's executive organs are not unilaterally subject to the supervision and control of the decision-making body; they can protest against the decision-making body and bring their concerns to the next Party Congress for reconsideration if they finds that a decision is wrong or lacking in the course of its implementation. This gives the Party room to revise and improve on its major decisions. 
 
Three:  Disciplinary inspection. Party Congress at all levels elect the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the Party at the same level, which is composed of five to seven members, with one director and one deputy director. 
 
The main duty of the Discipline Inspection Committee is to conduct disciplinary inspection of the leading Party cadres at the same level (including Party Congress delegates, Executive Committee members, etc.), but has no right to interfere with their daily work; Discipline Inspection Committees at all levels also lead the work of Party Discipline Inspection Committees at all levels beneath them. 
 
Discipline Inspection Committees at all levels are responsible to and report to the Party Congress at the same level, and major issues can be reported up the chain to higher levels or even to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. 
 
Shuke:  I would like to ask who the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection reports to. 
 
Cao:  It should be the National Party Congress, and not the Party Center. 
 
Shuke:  Discipline Inspection Committees at all levels are responsible to the Party Congress at the same level and report on their work, but such supervision cannot be independent.  How should we exercise supervision? 
 
Cao:  The power of supervision should be with the Party Committee and not the Party Congress.　　
 
Befuddled 醉生梦死:  What kind of supervision can there be if judicial, legislative, and executive powers are all invested in the CCP? 
 
Cao:  This is the point of reform! 
 
Befuddled:  People die for wealth like birds die for food.  Chinese people value money more than life. 
 
Cao:  If politics doesn’t change, the world will be unfair, and it will be hard to make money too. 
 
Befuddled:  It’s not just money, Chinese people also value power more than life. 
 
Cao:  Everyone has their own ambitions, and the senior leaders also rely on the people to achieve theirs. 
 
Hrabal[5] 赫拉巴尔:  Professor Cao, everyone knows we have to reform, but are the top levels committed to this?  Is there a time table?  What kind of reforms are needed?  Where do we start?  My feeling is that our thinking is so set in its ways, that polarization at all levels is so extreme, and that the top leadership is so closed to the idea that nothing is really pushing reform forward, which means that there is no way to get it done.　　
　　
Hanren:  The road to reform in Chinese politics is really difficult.　　
 
Cao:  Nothing in this world is easy!　　
 
Shuke:  There’s no need for Disciplinary Committees at all levels; this power should be centralized.　　
 
Cao:  That won’t work, because who will supervise the center?　　
 
Shuke:  Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption is highly efficient precisely because it is independent.  
 
Befuddled:  As long as poor people can get by then we’re ok.  What’s the point of constitutional rule and democracy?  You can’t eat them. 
 
Shuke:  As long as there is only one Party, then no one can supervise the center! 
 
Cao:  Real life tells us that executive power is the most important, as is the possibility that it will be overused and do damage.  For this reason, a key goal of reform should be to supervise and constrain the executive power of the Party in its every day work.  So in my reform plan, the decision-making power of the Party, lodged in the Party Congresses, changes from empty to real, the Party’s disciplinary organs achieve independence, both of which will be beneficial to the realization of the important items mentioned above.
 
Hanren:  Without mass elections, constitutional rule is fake. 
 
Shuke:  No matter how you reform the Party, you still won’t be able to exercise supervision over the center, unless you establish a constitutional court or a senate.　　
 
Cao:  If the constitution is important, then the Party will naturally have to carry out its activities according to the constitution. 
 
Shuke:  China’s most important problem is separating the Party from the government.  As things stand, in a county-level Party Committee, there is one secretary and six vice-secretaries. 
 
Cao:  China still does not have a constitutional court, but I intend to see that one is set up. 
 
Shuke:  If we really want reforms, the first step is to make financial reporting transparent.  This would put an immediate end to wealth with shady origins.  This would naturally shrink and streamline government organs.　　
 
Cao:  Bravo!  Since the three powers are to be separated and serve as checks against one another, it is self-evident that members of the three bodies cannot hold part-time positions in the other organs. If any of the delegates to a Party Congress is elected to serve in the Party's executive organs or disciplinary committees, he or she should resign as a delegate during his or her term of office to avoid conflicts of interest. In the past system, delegates were mere ornaments serving a five-year term to appear at one single meeting, so having part-time jobs here and there made little difference.  But once the system of Party leadership is reformed, and decision-making power, executive power, and supervisory power are separated to serve as checks and balances against one another, then delegates to Party Congresses will work full-time for a full salary, and serving on an executive committee or a discipline inspection committee would be very inappropriate. 
 
Worried 着急啊:  Professor Cao, you worked on bankruptcy, and I read your book a few years ago.  I have also heard you interviewed by the BBC and by French media (there was no Internet at the time).  I was once talking about you with Zhang Yue 张越, the CCTV news anchor, and she said that you and she were both from Jiangxi!  But after the spring and summer of 1989, news about you became scarce, but then recently I saw on the Internet that you were making a lot of speeches.  I have always kept my eye on you! 
 
Cao:  Thanks for your concern.  We can keep in touch by email.  My address is [email protected]. 
 
Shuke:  If we streamline institutions, then we can shut down certain government agencies or transfer their functions.  For example, we could get rid of the Urban Management Bureau 城管局. 
 
Hrabal:  Can China carry out the separation of the three powers? 
 
Cao:  Undoubtedly!  Let us imagine if the Eighth National Congress of the CCP, held in 1956 and 1958, had implemented the permanent system of Party Congresses and the separation of decision-making and executive powers, so that Mao Zedong could only hold the leadership of one of the two central decision-making bodies or executive bodies, and the Cultural Revolution had to be reviewed by the National Party Congress and local Party Congresses at all levels once a year. Could that unprecedented catastrophe have gone on for so many years? 
 
The reform plan dealing with the separation of powers within the Party and the implementation of checks and balances is just a basic outline, and is rather simple.  I bring it up here to solicit the opinions of friends and interested people, and I will gradually refine it on the basis of their criticisms and corrections.  Once the reform plan nears maturity, we will also need the Party center to go through the process of amending the constitution. 
 
Shuke:  In healthy legal institutions, bad laws should be gotten rid of, and the law must be forward-looking and enforceable. 
 
Ciqin:  What will you do if the central authorities ignore you? 
 
Xxxxx:  Given the political selfishness and political inertia at the top, and the weak awareness of political democracy and the legal system at the bottom, what should be done? 
 
Cao:  Continue to call for our common betterment! 
 
Host:  Netizens, today’s discussion is going fairly well, but time is running out.  Please limit your questions to the things that we need to discuss.  Thank you!
 
Cao:  We can look at 18 issues to tell us which direction constitutional rule is moving around the world. 
 
Where is China going?  This is a question of common concern to me, my friends, and my readers.
 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who is revered by Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, famously said, "The tide of the world is turbulent; if you follow it, you will prosper; if you do not, you will perish.” In order to reform China's political system, we cannot help but follow the world constitutional trends; and to clarify the direction of these trends, we must carry out a comparative study of Chinese and foreign constitutions.
 
I had the privilege of conducting a comparative study of the constitutions of China and 110 other countries based on the 1997 edition of the Complete Book of World Constitutions by China Qingdao Press, which produced interesting results. I would like to share some of these results with those who are interested.
 
What is a constitutional trend, after all?  Although it is not something that can be seen or touched, it is nonetheless a sort of developmental tendency that can be calculated.  I did a survey based on 18 questions and 110 countries, and the percentages speak for themselves in terms of what the mainstream is.　
 
56% of national constitutions provide for referendums;
66% of countries have constitutions that provide for the independence of judges;
67% of countries have a constitutional oversight body;
69% of countries recognize or do not prohibit dual citizenship;
69% of countries have a president as head of state;
71% of heads of state are also commanders of the armed forces;
74% of countries have constitutions without a preamble;
75% of countries permit local autonomy;
76% of countries have directly elected parliaments (or representative bodies);
81% of countries have constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of the press;
85% of countries do not include the names of individuals in their constitutions;
87% of countries do not include the name of any doctrine in their constitutions;
91% of countries have constitutional guarantee clauses assuring freedom of the press;
94% of countries have a separation of powers;
95 percent of countries endorse transparency;
95% of countries do not recognize any political party as having political privileges;
98% of countries have constitutions that guarantee human rights;
99% of countries have no constitutional provision for any dictatorship.　　
 
Hrabal:  For the coming ten years I’m pinning my hopes on Xi Zhongxun’s son, Xi Jinping. 
 
Cao:  You’re not the only one.　　 
 
Xxxxx:  Can you imagine what things will be like in ten or twenty years?　　
 
Cao:  It is possible that China will implement constitutional democracy, using constitutional trends as a mirror to evaluate the pros and cons of such a step.
 
If the constitutional trends of most countries on the eighteen questions I just talked about indeed reflect world constitutional trends, we can say that the constitutional amendment adopted by the Chinese People's Congress in March 2004, which added a paragraph to Article 33 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China that "the state respects and protects human rights," initially followed world constitutional trends.  On other issues, it shows the gap between the Chinese constitution and world constitutional trends as well as the general direction of China's constitutional reform. 
 
Befuddled:  Most Chinese people place their faith in enlightened rulers and honest officials.  It is sad that this remains true down to the present day.　　
 
Hrabal:  Surely that has changed, in that people don’t believe that any more.  All they want is to live a good life.　　
 
Cao:  The world trend toward constitutional rule began in 17th century England and matured in the 18th century in the United States and Europe, so it has been popular for some centuries. The four basic principles that make up this trend—the separation of powers, multi-party competition, universal suffrage, and freedom of the press—have gradually gained popularity in the international community and become a gauge by which people judge the merits of political systems. Isn't this true? Moscow changed its flag twice in the last century.  The red flag was raised in 1917, and on August 22, 1991 Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree replacing the hammer and sickle red flag with the historical Russian flag (which is white, blue and red) and reintroducing it as the national flag of Russia. Of course there are many different opinions about this, and different criteria can lead to opposing judgments.   By contrast, the four basic principles behind world constitutional trends are clear. 
 
Befuddled:  It looks to me like you’ve done your homework, because you reply really quickly to all of our questions.
  
Cao:  1.  The Bolsheviks successively eliminated their "fraternal parties:" the Mensheviks, the Kadet Constitutional Democratic Party, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and the Leftist Socialist Revolutionary Party. Starting in 1921, Russia changed from a multi-party system to a one-party state, which is obviously a historical regression.
 
2.  The Russian regime after 1917 evolved in a direction counter to the constitutional principles of the separation of powers and checks and balances, and followed an arc of development from "all power to the Soviets" and "all power to the Bolsheviks" to "all power to the Party General Secretary.”   This created a highly centralized dictatorship, and the Red Terror enveloped the entire country. In the six years from 1935 to 1941 alone, 20 million people suffered political persecution, seven million of whom were shot, an average of more than one million people per year.
 
3.  Although the constitution of the former Soviet Union proclaimed a system of universal and equal direct elections, in practice the candidates were appointed by the ruling party and then handed over to the voters who gave them all an equal number of votes, and those who were not on the list of candidates could not be elected at all. Elections became an insulting farce year after year, decade after decade. 
 
4.  The lack of press freedom in the former Soviet Union was known throughout the world, to the point that after Khrushchev fell from power he had to listen to the Voice of America to keep up with the news, which is a wonderfully ironic commentary on the denial of constitutional principles.
 
Guersi 古尔思:  So you are saying that the deciding elements are intellectual and cultural?  
 
Puy6841:  There is also the issue of those who stand to benefit from the existing system. 
 
Cao:  The anti-constitutional trend in Soviet Russia lasted for more than seventy years but finally generated huge anger and resentment. At the last minute, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, through former Soviet Vice President Gennady Yanayev (1937-2010) and other high-ranking officials, staged a coup d'état on August 19, 1991, in an attempt to save the critical situation. However, the masses, fearing a return to the horrors of one-party monopoly of power, the slaughter of people, the controlled elections, and the stifling of press freedom, did not support the August 19 coup, which failed within three days. The masses of citizens and their representatives rejected the anti-constitutional political system, so much so that the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in which the Communists held a majority, adopted a resolution at its emergency session on August 29, 1991, by an overwhelming majority of 283 votes in favor, 29 against and 52 abstentions, to halt the activities of the CPSU throughout the country. History finally declared that the restoration of the Russian tricolor flag in 1991 was a progressive move in line with world constitutional trends. Following this line of thinking, it is not difficult to evaluate the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe that soon followed, events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan since the new century, and the possibility of such events in the future. Therefore, using constitutional trends as a mirror can help us distinguish positive historical changes from negative historical changes. 
 
Guersi:  Might I ask what are the main forces still standing in the way? 
 
Cao:  We must take constitutional trends as the benchmark, and plan aggressively. 
 
Guersi:  Since people seem really interested, I wonder if we might extend the time for discussion? 
 
Cao:  Whether in China or in the former Soviet Union or in the countries of Eastern Europe, the awareness of the need to reform the political system has reached the point of "in the absence of reform, the Party and the country will perish.” But finally how one should change, what frame of reference should be used, and how to design and build a new political system for the future, are all big questions that need to be studied in depth. Concretely, what kind of political system should China put in place? According to certain people, the key is that the system should be "rooted in the vast fertile soil on which the Chinese nation has been living and developing for thousands of years." What is this fertile soil? Everyone knows that it is the feudal imperial system! China is the most developed country in the history of the world in terms of imperial rule, and anyone who wants to do a doctoral dissertation on the subject of "emperors" must absolutely come to China. However, the fertile ground of feudal absolutism is not the glory of the Chinese nation, but instead the very reason for China's enduring political backwardness. Whoever is interested in styling himself an emperor can feel free to feel good about all of this. This may be the subtext to some people’s musings about China’s “unique national character.” But the vast majority of Chinese people have had enough of the weight of the imperial tradition. If a country's political system can only be rooted in the backward inertia of the past few thousand years, how can it move forward? How can we talk about national revolution, social change, and "keeping up with the times"?  Were Yuan Shikai and Zhang Xun's right after all [when they sought to restore the emperor in the early Republican period]! 
　　
Xxxxx:  Do liberal thinkers like you not identify with the proposals of New Authoritarianism, or can you not help but identify with them?　　
 
Cao:  I need to think that over a bit more before answering. 
 
Host:  Netizens, we are coming to the end of our discussion, and it looks like had become increasingly heated.  I wonder if our guest might want to attempt a summary of the discussion to this point, after which everyone can continue to talk freely for as long as people want to. 
 
Cao:  Obviously, the political modernization of late-developing countries can only absorb the wisdom of humanity’s political civilization and follow the path of the separation of powers and checks and balances rather than that of centralized autocracy, as more than 90% of countries do. Jade can be created from the stones of other mountains. Awareness of world constitutional trends can teach us a great deal. For example, more than 70% of the world's large countries have federal systems, while more than 70% of non-federal countries grant some level of local autonomy, which is also a useful reference for the design of China's state structure. How to deal with the relationship between the central and local governments has been a knotty problem in China for thousands of years. At present, aside from the idea of autonomy for areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, many people are unaware that some degree of local economy exists in China. Drawing on the rich experience of the overwhelming majority of countries in this regard, it would be beneficial to continue to look into issues of local autonomy, which might help us further deal with ethnic issues. Thus, only by taking world constitutional trends as a beacon can we cut through the fog, see the future, understand the real needs of contemporary political reform, prioritize these needs, and gradually strive for victory. 
 
Xueyuan 学远:  Regime structure is truly important.　　
 
Guersi:  The core of the traditional system of imperial power was family inheritance of political power.  We don’t do this any more, and instead hand down power through social stratums.  Might this be the key?
 
000:  Power is neutral.  If you use it well you can benefit the people, but it you don’t you can poison society.  The key is the allocation of power and the constraints imposed. 
 
Xueyuan:  In today’s context, the key is to start with culture. 
 
Puy6841:  The march of historical progress is not linear, and everything has a process, which is all the more true when a country like China with a deep traditional feudal thought tries to transition to a democracy. 
 
Xueyuan:  Democracy is a good thing, but it is really not appropriate for China at the present time.  Revolution requires bloodshed, so revolution is not appropriate for China at the present time either. 
 
Cao:  Those who are interested can visit my blog at http://caosiyuan.blog.ifeng.com/. 
 
Shuke:  OK.  China’s feudal thinking can’t be all that deep-rooted, otherwise there would have been no 1911 Revolution, nor could Taiwan have made the transition to a democratic society under constitutional rule. 
 
Guersi:  If family succession of power has become succession via social strata, then can monarchy evolve to constitutional rule? 
 
Cao:  Our talk today has been very lively, and what impresses me the most is that all of the participants show a mindset of taking the initiative, which is important because historical progress depends on us.  There is hope both for constitutional rule in China and for inter-Party democracy. 
 
Shuke:  We have to get rid of our thinking and national characteristics marked by feudal despotism. 
 
Xxxxx:  Thank you.  I checked out your blog today, and found a lot of good stuff. 
 
Guersi:  What the CCP is following if the traditional political path of “inner sageliness, outer kingliness 内圣外王.”[6]  Does the inter-Party democracy you are advocating go against this? 
 
Cao:  There’s a difference. 
 
Puy6841:  That’s a despotic, centralized way of thinking, isn’t it?  Ever since Yuan Shikai, all of those who have held high political positions have been unable to complete the transition to democracy, because institutional protections are lacking. 
 
Shuke:  This is basically because the higher levels have absorbed the lessons from the Ming and Qing about self destruction, lol. 
 
Puy 6841:  Of course, this doesn’t account for Jiang Jingguo.　　
 
Hrabal:  Forget “inner sageliness and outer kingliness,” these days even the head of a village takes himself as an emperor. 
 
Shuke:  If Sun Yatsen had not opposed Yuan Shikai, then according to Yang Du’s (1875-1921) calculations, China would have had a constitutional monarchy, which is a kind of democracy. 
 
Hrabol:  In the old days, because of the influence of the Confucian tradition, there were some local officials with conscience, but I challenge you to find any now. 
 
Cao:  Thanks to the host.  Thanks everyone! 
 
Shuke:  Culture is made up of habits, which can be changed.  Look at Taiwan, Japan, South Korea.
　　
Thanks, Professor Cao.  I hope you talk to central authorities a lot, and speed up the pace of reform.  As the proverb says—reform in five years or die after ten.  The Qing government moved too slowly.
 
Cao:  OK.  Send me an email if you want to at [email protected].  We’ll halt today’s discussion here.  Thanks everyone! 
 
Host:  Thanks to our guest, and thanks to all those who participated.
​ 
Notes 

[1]曹思源, “宪政国家与党内民主”, Internet discussion held in the China Academic Forum Chat Room 中国学术论坛聊天室 on February 13, 2012, between 7 and 9 p.m. 

[2]Translator’s note:  I am not sure of the meaning of minjian 民间 here.  It often means “grass roots” or “non-governmental,” but as the host’s introduction to Cao suggests, Cao has spent his entire career—with the exception of his year in jail—among China’s movers and shakers.

[3]Translator’s note:  The host provides a link which is no longer valid, but the text referred to, or one very similar, appears to be available here.

[4]Translator’s note:  Huang Chao (835-884) led an important rebellion in late Tang times.

[5]Translator’s note:  The reference is to Bohumil Hrabal (1914-1997), a well known Czech writer.

[6]Translator’s note:  This is a Confucian idea, often identified with the Gongyang tradition, which insists that while inner moral perfection is the first step toward sagehood, a true sage strives to become a king so that he may bring benefits to the people.