Gao Cheng on Russia and Ukraine

Gao Cheng,  “Is the Conflict Turning Around?  How Russia and Ukraine Think Will Determine How Things Develop Moving Forward”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by Selena Orly
 
Introduction
 
Gao Cheng (b. 1977) is a scholar attached to the Institute for International Relations of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. She specializes on issues in the international political economy, more specifically on topics such as the strategy of rising powers, United States foreign policy, and the East Asian regional order.

The text translated here is a February 28 interview with Gao conducted by the Beijing Cultural Review for a new special feature called “International Observer.” A week earlier, on February 21, the same review published a much longer article by Gao entitled “The Real Reason Why Putin Abruptly Recognized Two Independent Areas in Ukraine." The interview covers the key insights from the article in a more succinct way.

Gao makes three basic points. First, she argues that the Ukraine-Russia conflict is not simply a conflict between two sovereign nation states. History matters, and the ongoing confrontation cannot be understood if abstracted from the long and complex history shared by Russia and Ukraine and their respective views of one other.  Gao’s views as expressed here are very similar to those of Russia and of Chinese authorities in that she questions the legitimacy of the sovereignty of Ukraine and blames the “political immaturity” of Ukraine for much of the problem.

Second, Gao argues that a direct confrontation between Russia and the U.S. or Russia and NATO is highly unlikely. She also thinks that European sanctions are a temporary reaction to the current situation and that the conflict has strained but not fundamentally altered or damaged Russia’s relations with Europe. At the same time, Gao suggests that the U.S. is using the conflict to deepen the divisions between Europe and Russia—which may or may not work—but the American manipulations will only serve to damage Ukraine further.
 
Third, Gao argues that the “spheres of influence” which featured prominently as geopolitical tools during the Cold War era are making a comeback. Like many other Chinese foreign policy commentators, she notes that spheres of influence largely disappeared in the post-Cold War world because of the hegemony of the United States, but Russia and China have the power to demand such rights as well.  She further argues that the root of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was the refusal by the United States to acknowledge Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence.  In her February 21 article, Gao cites the famous American diplomat, George Kennan, to the effect that: "expansion of NATO will be the most fatal mistake in US policy in the entire post-Cold War era."  Again, this positions Gao’s views firmly within the mainstream of those pronounced by the Chinese Party-State.

In summary, Gao’s text—like that of Zheng Yongnian, also available on this site—are representative examples of the writings of establishment intellectuals who support the position of the Chinese government, attempting to give academic credibility to those arguments.  Explicitly or implicitly, these scholars take Russia’s side and put the blame on American hegemony and NATO.  Gao’s text was reprinted on any number of websites after its initial publication by Beijing Cultural Review.

Translation
 
The Deep Roots of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and the Controversy over New "Spheres of Influence"
 
The Thinking of the Countries Involved: Why do Russia and Ukraine Disagree?
 
BCR : Many people are surprised that the crisis in Ukraine reached the present state.  There are many analyses of the situation, mainly focusing on geopolitics, great power relations, etc., as you previously discussed in detail in your article “Major Power Relations in the Shadow of the Ukraine Crisis.”  But what more people are curious about is:  What in the world Ukraine and Russia were thinking to allow things to get to this point? Putin's speech on television has been discussed at great length. What are your views? If we look at things from the perspective of the countries involved, what kind of logic explains their actions?
 
Gao Cheng: Russia and Ukraine have a long history of entanglements. For Russia, Ukraine is truly very special. First of all, in a historical sense, the entire Russian Empire originated in Kiev, which was then called the Principality of Kievan Rus, Rus being Russia, and Kiev being Ukraine. Of course, this does not refer to the Ukraine we know now, but rather to the area around Kiev, to the west of the Dnieper River. As for the western part of what is now Ukraine, the area around Lviv, it was originally Polish territory. What is now the eastern part of Ukraine, that is, to the east of the Dnieper, including the two oblasts now proclaimed to be independent by Putin, as well as areas such as Kharkov oblast and Odessa oblast, were historically part of Russia, and are mostly Russian-speaking, with a large percentage of ethnic Russians.
 
Historically, Ukraine was never a separate kingdom, and for the vast majority of time "Kievan Rus" was united. Russia and Ukraine were artificially created as two separate independent nation-states by the Soviet Union when it was established as a federation, and there are almost no ethnic, cultural or religious differences between them.

Second, from a geostrategic point of view, in Russia's overall strategic thinking, the countries around it are considered to be its core strategic buffer zone, especially the countries of the former Soviet Union. Of course, according to current thinking about international relations, many people feel that this “strategic buffer zone” is unimportant, but in Russia's military strategy and national security strategy, this concept is regarded as crucial. Russia has a unique vision of the world order: Russia is the core, and the immediate periphery is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (the core of which is made up of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the most marginal members the three Baltic states, with Moldova, Georgia and several other Central Asian countries somewhere in between), and next come Russia's other allies.
 
Especially with regard to Ukraine and Belarus, the two Eastern Slavic countries, Russia often does not see them from the perspective of sovereign states in the international system. Russia was patient with NATO's previous eastward expansion into Eastern Europe and the three Baltic states, but in Russia's view, NATO must not expand into core areas such as Ukraine and Belarus. This heightened sensitivity to cultural and military strategic buffer zones is deeply ingrained in Russia's geopolitical perspective.
 
In particular, Russia claims that the eastern part of Ukraine was granted to the country by Russia during the Soviet era.  At the time, of course, Ukraine and Russia were part of one family, both belonging to the same sovereign state, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia actually recognized Eastern Ukraine (including Crimea) as belonging to Ukraine, with Putin and the Russians seeing this as a kind of “dowry.”  But in Russia's view, the recognition of the sovereignty of Eastern Ukraine as part of Ukraine presupposes that Russia and Ukraine are one. But now that Ukraine has turned to the West, and especially since the 2014 crisis, as the regime has actually become something of a Western puppet, this means that the original premise of Russia's recognition of the sovereign subordination of the Ukrainian East no longer exists.
 
So from Russia's point of view, the Ukraine problem is not an international problem at all, but more of a problem of the post-Soviet CIS. When the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia to some extent conceived of the CIS countries as a loose confederation, or an something between an alliance and a confederation. But then Russia's power declined, and with NATO’s eastern expansion, this idea fell through. This is something the Russians have not gotten over since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

So, from Russia's point of view, the problem has to do with the spatial arrangement of the former Soviet Union. In terms of how the Russians are thinking, if Putin can regain the homeland, then his place in Russian history will be second only to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great (and perhaps Stalin) as “an emperor of the ages.” Therefore, the internal logic of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis is difficult to explain if one looks at it from the perspective of the norms of a sovereign state or of international law. These long-standing Russian perceptions and treatment of Ukraine are very different from its treatment of other states outside the former Soviet space.
 
On the other hand, Ukraine is not looking at Russia completely from the perspective of a sovereign state, either. In the history of Kievan Rus, Ukraine was the center of civilization, while Rus was more marginal, because Rus was closer to the east and relatively more barbarous 蛮荒 at the time. But the Rus people’s expansionism was very strong, and after their military rise, the balance of power between the two sides changed, with the center gradually shifting to the Rus' side. So, compared to traditional Slavic spheres of influence such as Belarus, Ukraine is actually not very subservient to Russia, believing that initially it was the original center of the Kievan Rus' civilization.
 
In layman's terms, Ukraine feels like it and Russia are twin brothers. Originally Ukraine was the big brother, but later it became the little brother, and in the latter course of this history, the essence of the entire Ukrainian nation was absorbed by Russia (many heroic figures in Russian history were in fact ethnic Ukrainians), so that step by step it became subordinate to Russia. This cultural mentality also contributed to a certain extent to Ukraine's gradual transformation from being dependent on Russia to becoming an anti-Russian vanguard—but this is not the independence and autonomy of a mature nation-state.
 
Indeed, this is the tragedy of many of the states of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine finds itself where it is today to a great degree because it is an actor without the political maturity of a sovereign state, lacking a true sense of its identity as a nation-state. Because for several hundred years, Ukraine lacked the elements of a nation-state and was passively "transformed" into a sovereign state by the man-made collapse of the Soviet Union only 30 years ago, it indeed lacks the identity and mature behavior patterns that a sovereign nation-state should have, which is reflected in the extremism in popular behavior and attitudes and the rapid transition between these extremes. A clear example of this is that we see anti-Russian sentiment running high in Ukraine today, but just a short time ago, before the crisis in Ukraine erupted in 2014, when a poll asked which country best represented a model of the future international order, public opinion at the time overwhelmingly chose Russia.
 
Looking Ahead:  What Should We Expect to Happen Next?
 
BCR : The situation has been changing extremely rapidly over the past week. According to media reports, today Russia and Ukraine started negotiations. What do you see happening next?  What are the likely outcomes?
 
Gao Cheng: This event is, in essence, a violent Russian backlash against years of NATO eastward expansion, and at the same time, Putin's efforts to restore core areas of Russian interest in the former Soviet space, especially in the peripheral areas where pro-Russian ethnicities dominate or where Russian influence is predominant.

Overall, the Western reaction has been restrained. My basic judgment is that there will not be a direct military conflict between Russia and the United States or between Russia and NATO. NATO and the U.S. will not militarily endorse the breakup of Ukraine, and this is especially true of Europe, and Europe and the U.S. will certainly impose harsher sanctions to isolate Russia politically and damage it economically.

This incident may help the United States not only to contain Russia, but also to further distance Russia from Europe. Now that this result has actually been achieved, the U.S. has absolutely no need to resort to force, and even with the economic sanctions, the cost is mainly borne by Europe, not by the United States. So in this case, the U.S. actually bears no cost, and the biggest loser is Ukraine.

Divisions within Europe over these issues may well grow.  Europe has actually been quite divided on the Russian issue. Traditional continental countries like France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have always insisted on negotiating. After Putin announced his recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, Macron continued to mediate. The great European powers, led by France, aim for strategic autonomy, which the United States cannot accept.  Of course, there are Russia hawks in Europe as well, such as the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Baltic states. This event will provoke an escalation of their Russophobia and serve to constrain the strategic autonomy of the continental powers. Overall, Europe's sanctions and isolation of Russia are passive reactions. In the medium to long term, Russian-Ukrainian relations will not particularly damage the fundamentals of Russian-European relations.
 
BCR: You also mentioned political terms such as "buffer zones" and "spheres of influence.”  Josep Borrell Fontelles (b. 1947), who is High Representative of EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, once said that "the concept of 'spheres of influence' has no place in the 21st century."  For his part, U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders cited the two-century-old Monroe Doctrine as evidence of the hypocrisy of the U.S. refusal to consider Russia's security claims and its insistence on not accepting the principle of "spheres of influence.” How do you see the "sphere of influence" debate in the context of the Ukraine crisis?
 
Gao Cheng: Traditional notions of geopolitics are mainly based on the 19th century European doctrine of balance of power, which emphasizes that great powers have "spheres of influence" and strategic buffer zones based on the power principle, a paradigm of international relations that was considered obsolete for a time after the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was extremely weak for the first decade or so, so in the neoliberal international order shaped by the United States as the unique hegemon, only the United States had the ability and international legitimacy to build alliance systems and establish spheres of influence throughout the world.
 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. gradually encroached on the space and spheres of influence of the former Soviet Union and took control of the regimes of the CIS countries around Russia through political infiltration and color revolutions. While Russia was regaining its strength, it adopted an attitude of tolerance toward the offensive strategy of the United States. But once it had its strength back, Russia began to question the unilateral international order dominated by the United States, and through diplomatic independence and military self-help, it developed a peripheral sphere of influence, breaking the "unspoken rule" that powers other than the United States are not allowed to have such spheres.

In the eyes of the Putin government and of most Russians, the behavior of the United States completely ignores Russia's security concerns and Russia's political demands on the surrounding sphere of influence as a regional power, constantly squeezing and weakening the space Russia requires to live and develop. As the United States and NATO penetrate deep into the heart of Russia's geopolitical security, Russia will absolutely not allow the United States any occasion to make Ukraine into a military bridgehead to contain Russia.
 
With the restoration of Russian strength and the rise of emerging powers such as China, the original geopolitical paradigm has returned, but not at the will of the U.S. liberal establishment elite. The liberal democratic camp's refusal to recognize the geopolitical logic based on the strength of the great powers and its obsession with the "political correctness" of these existing spheres of influence have, to some extent, led to conflicts between the United States and global and regional powers who have the military strength to stand up for themselves.
 
How to understand these "spheres of influence?"  From an offensive point of view, they can be understood as the embodiment of great power chauvinism, but from a defensive point of view, they actually reflect the considerations of the great powers concerning their security interests. "Spheres of influence" are not a legal issue, but a real issue that must be confronted.

At the same time, one cannot simply judge whether a country is strategically offensive or strategically defensive by the toughness of the measures it employs. Russia's rejection of the United States' attempt to create a strategic buffer zone by pushing American military power to the Russian doorstep is a strategic defense against American pressure in the context of relations between the U.S. and Russia.  But when the U.S. crosses the Pacific, projecting its own military power to the doorstep of a country thousands of miles away from the U.S., this is a strategic offensive directed at that other country.

Moreover, when it comes to geopolitics or spheres of influence, most people tend to limit themselves to the perspective of the great powers. But in fact, those medium or small countries that are considered to be spheres of influence also have their own interests, and some can even triangulate so as to maximize their own interests, as in the case of Vietnam, North Korea and Singapore.

Notes

[1]高程, “冲突逆转? 俄乌两国特有的一种思维, 决定下半场命运,” published online by 文化纵横/Beijing Cultural Review on February 28, 2022.