Gao Quanxi and Huang Jisu on Left and Right in China

“Left and Right are Getting Along Just Fine,” interview with Gao Quanxi and Huang Jisu, in Xiao Sanza, Standing with the Hedgehog.[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
This text translated here is related to the Xiao Sanza piece I translated last time on Trumpism and the future of China from the edited 2021 volume American Order.  Reading up on Xiao Sanza, I learned that he had published two volumes of interviews with leading Chinese intellectuals:  Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  Conversations with Contemporary Chinese Thinkers 左右为难：中国当代思潮访谈录 (2012), and Standing with the Hedgehog 站在刺猬这一边 (2016)。Although I was previously unfamiliar with Xiao and the two volumes, I ordered them through interlibrary loan and found them to be highly impressive. For reference, I have included the table of contents for both volumes at the end of this introduction.
 
The more recent volume includes a contribution by Gao Quanxi 高全喜as well as a long interview with Gao and the left-wing sociologist and playwright Huang Jisu 黄纪苏, in which the two discuss their understanding of left and right in China and elsewhere.  I decided to translate the interview in the hopes of understanding how Xiao and Gao wound up being fervent Trump supporters shortly thereafter, to the point of launching magazines and publishing edited volumes on Trumpism.
 
Unfortunately, I found no smoking gun in the text translated here; there is considerable discussion of America and American politics, but Trump is not mentioned, nor does the theme “America is in decline” stand out.  Gao is a very conservative liberal, in the sense of classical liberalism, but nothing in his answers—or Xiao Sanza’s questions—suggests that the two were headed toward a full-bore embrace of Trump as the savior of Western civilization—and thus the world as we know it.  I will keep looking.
 
Nevertheless, the interview remains a compelling read for other reasons.  Gao delivers an impassioned condemnation of Chinese authoritarianism and advocates for the implementation of the rule of law, which would safeguard the rights of all Chinese citizens, including Gao himself. The conversation occurred in early 2016, and Gao's candor on topics that could potentially threaten his "negative freedom" is remarkable in comparison to most Chinese intellectuals.  Huang Jisu is a leftist who despises the New Left, calling them statists who are flirting with fascism.  I suppose that there are many on the left in China who share his views, but I have not run into many of them.  The exchange is quite spirited and worth reading as an example of how some Chinese intellectuals think when nationalism is not on the table—neither Gao nor Huang takes pains to fly the flag, perhaps because both know that they do not have the ear of those in power.    
 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place (ISBN 978-7-5334-5944-4)
 
Li Zehou 李泽厚, The Enlightenment is not Complete, Improvement is not Surrender 启蒙尚未完成，改良不是投降

Liu Junning 刘军宁, No Matter How Much More We Emphasize Freedom, We Are Not Going Overboard 再怎么强调自由都不过分

Xu Youyu 徐友渔, We in No Way Rule Out Cooperation 我们一点都不排斥合作

Xu Jinlin 许纪霖, The Most Important Thing is to Rebuild Society and Ethics 最重要的是重建社会和伦理

Xiao Gongqin 萧功秦, Secular Rationality is More Worthy of Optimism than Utopianism 世俗理性比乌托邦式更值得乐观

Wang Hui 汪晖, Destroy the New Dogma, Face the New Problems 打破新教条，面对新问题

Hua Bingxiao 华炳啸，The Most Important Thing is to Let Constitutional Rule Get to Work 最重要的是让宪政运转起来

Chen Ming 陈明, “The More We Leave the Past Behind, The Worse the People Are 变古越尽，便民越堪”

王小东 Wang Xiaodong，不要把民族主义魔鬼化 Don’t Demonize Nationalism
 
Standing with the Hedgehog (ISBN978-7-5442-8371-7)
 
Part 1:  Thought 思想

It is so Painful to Think of Li ZeHou  想起了李泽厚悲怆无尽

A Brief Glance at Contemporary Thought in China中国当代思想界的一瞥

Left and Right are Getting Along Just Fine 左右不为难

Gao Quanxi, The Left Wing is a Poem, the Right Wing is an Essay高全喜，左派是诗，右派是散文

Five Arguments about Intellectuals 知识分子五论

On Yang Du’s Dream of Upright Officials (?) 论乾清官梦中行走杨度

Professor Yao Yang, Are Economics the Same as a Novel? 姚洋教授，经济学等于小说吗？

Wu Xiaobo Suggests a Possible Stance for Intellectuals 从吴晓波看知识分子的可能姿势

Part 2:  Culture文化

Tu Wei-ming, Without Critical Spirit, Confucianism is Dead 杜维明，没有批判精神，儒家就死了

Qiu Feng, Treat Tradition with Compassion 秋风，温情对待传统

A Letter to Confucius致孔夫子的一封信

Do Not Deify Nan Huaiqin 不要神化南怀瑾

Written for the Living Gu Hongming 写给活着的辜鴻銘

Enough of Western Learning, Let’s Turn to the East 学罢西洋掉头东

Ma Weidu is Hurting 马未都很痛苦

This Priest Says:  Buddhism Will Not Allow Us to Sit and Wait to Die这个和尚说，佛教不是让我们坐以待毙

Part 3:  Society 社会

Wu Jinglian, Let’s Destroy the “Party-State Big Business” 吴敬琏，打破“党国大公司”

Hua Sheng, What is Household Registration? 华生，户籍何物?

Qin Hui, Set the Peasants Free 秦晖，让农民自由起来

Jiang Ping, What I Can Do is Cry Out 江平，我所能做的是呐喊

Zhang Qianfan, Reforms of the Judicial System are Going Backward张千帆，司法改革走了回头路

The “Anti-monopoly Law” is a Dog that Won’t Bite “反垄断法“是不咬人的狗

Yan Buke, Huge Changes Can Happen Overnight 阎步克，短期内，巨变几天可能

Part 4:  Citizens 公民

Have the Entrepreneurs Woken Up?企业家醒了吗？

The Appeal of Liu Zhenyun 刀笔刘震云

That Wild Guy I Know我所认识的那个野汉子

Clear Words from the Frank Zhou Lian 清清爽爽的周濂明明白白地话
 
Translation
 
Introductory Remarks
 
In 2012, I published a book entitled Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  Interviews on Contemporary Thought Trends.[2]   In this book, I strongly criticized the spirited arguments, and occasional fights, between the left and right in China's thought world. At the time, I expressed my disapproval of the indecent language used in some of these salons and the lack of courtesy that was commonplace. Nevertheless, I also observed certain trends toward convergence, indicating that radical ideas were becoming less popular.
 
On January 27th, 2016, my friend Pei Jun 裴君[3] asked me to organize a debate between intellectuals on the left and the right, and I wondered if such a thing was possible in today's China. As expected, Huang Jisu later informed me that no such debate could be held at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, where he works. Nonetheless, I decided to give it a try. To my surprise, both Gao Quanxi on the right and Huang Jisu on the left immediately expressed their willingness to engage in a broad dialogue as soon as they received my invitation. And thus, we achieved something that seemed nearly impossible.
 
Neither Gao Quanxi nor Huang Jisu is an extremist in the intellectual groups to which they belong, and the main reasons for this are: first, they are thinkers who possess a sense of history and present-day realities, which implies that they are not fundamentalists. Second, as idealists, they speak straightforwardly and express their views candidly.  As the Buddhists put it, “a straightforward mind is the place of worship, a straightforward mind is the Pure Land 直心是道场,直心是净土.”[4]  In fact, a straightforward mind is the result of painstaking efforts.
 
Effective governance is a result of discussing and negotiating various issues, and the conversation between Gao and Huang perfectly exemplifies the possibility of seeking common ground while respecting mutual differences. Although Gao and Huang hold different beliefs, their sincere approach enables them to identify a considerable amount of common ground, which they both acknowledge.
 
In fact, what we call left and right are both part of modern thought, and both are opposed to authoritarianism.  It is obvious that left and right should unite to fight against authoritarianism. Those who support the Qin system 秦制[5] in word or deed, whether they call themselves left-wing or right-wing,  have nothing to do with real leftists and rightists, and in this sense, there is no conflict between left and right, nor should there be.
 
Interview
 
Xiao Sanza:  We have a rare opportunity today. As we all know, in recent years, it has been almost unimaginable for Chinese intellectuals on opposing sides of the political spectrum to come together and engage in meaningful discussions, and the partisan divide in the intellectual community is out of control. However, the exchange we are having today is a truly open and honest one between the left and the right, which is a kind of miracle, as well as a symbol of hope. Let me take a moment to introduce the two professors who are joining us today.
 
Huang Jisu is a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a renowned sociologist, but he is better known as a playwright who has written many famous plays, such as “The Accidental Death of an Anarchist 一个无政府主义者的意外死亡,” “Che Guevara 切·格瓦拉,” and “Walking on the Great Path 我们走在大路上.”   He is currently writing another play, yet another reflection on contemporary Chinese society.  Huang Jisu has his own literary style, combining playfulness, humor, and anger, and those who are interested might read his collection of essays entitled Keeping a Distance from the Elites 与精英保持距离. In a broad sense, Mr. Huang is a representative of the New Left.
 
Our other guest is Gao Quanxi, who earned his doctorate at the age of 26, and was formerly a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.  Presently, he is the director of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences at Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics [Beihang]. He has written many books, each one different from the other, and I have read some 14 of them. His main research interests are in political philosophy and constitutional law, and he is a representative of Chinese liberalism, and of the right wing.
 
Let us now move on to our formal discussion. Mr. Huang, I would like to begin by asking you to define leftism and its specific subdivisions within China. Could you also provide an overview of the general ideas of the left? Lastly, I am curious to know which category of the left you identify with?
 
Huang Jisu:  So, Xiao Sanza asks me what the left is. Our venue today is divided into three sections—left, right, and center—and for public toilets, it’s usually men on the left and women on the right, so it’s all a mess. Of course, this has nothing to do with the “left and right” we are talking about.  While there are many different standards and definitions of leftism, my own criteria and definition are quite simple. Leftists are those who advocate for social equality and oppose economic polarization. They tend to have a certain personality or mindset, which is characterized by being soft-hearted and unable to tolerate the sight of others in a helpless or defenseless position. I would call them emotional leftists. Of course, this is an oversimplification, and many leftists can be very aggressive in debates. However, this trait is a general one that I have observed.
 
As we are aware, China has experienced a growing divide between the rich and the poor over the past few decades. At the beginning of the reform and opening, the Gini coefficient was around 0.3, whereas today it stands at almost 0.5. This growing inequality has gradually shaped the divisions within China's intellectual world. In the 1980s, most people held right-leaning views, except for the "old leftie newspapers." However, in the 1990s, major reforms were implemented in health care, education, and state-owned enterprises, leading to the layoffs of around 40 to 60 million workers. At the same time, some individuals rapidly accumulated wealth, causing the gap between the rich and the poor to explode overnight. This social reality gave rise to the left, and the New Left is a reflection of this phenomenon.
 
As for me, I consider myself an emotional leftist. I remember when I was in elementary school, our teacher criticized some classmates for holding their noses and running away when the farmers were spreading manure. This left a deep impression on me. Even today, when I come across a manure truck, I tend to slow down a bit. I have always taught my children not to stare or make a fuss when they see people with disabilities, as it can be very hurtful.  I agree with the humanitarian socialist education of the Maoist era. When I worked in the countryside, I encountered the kindness of the peasants, despite the difficulties of their lives. Consequently, I had a hard time accepting the attitudes of the elite towards the common people at the bottom of the social hierarchy. These are the roots of my emotional leftism.
 
Xiao Sanzha:  So what do you think are the fundamental differences between left and right?
 
Huang Jisu:  According to the definition I presented earlier, it is straightforward to differentiate between left and right.  But the situation in China is indeed more complicated, because labels often don’t fit realities.  There are "leftists" who, in my opinion, are already extreme rightists, and are flirting with fascism; by contrast, there are some "rightists" that look more like leftists. Today's labels are becoming ever more absurd and ridiculous. Therefore, it is crucial to focus on the substance of someone's beliefs rather than relying solely on labels, which can be deceptive. If necessary, I can elaborate further on this topic later on.
 
Xiao Sanza:  So to sum up, Professor Huang's understanding of the left comes down to two things: the first is their emphasis on equality, and the second is their emotional identification with the powerless.  Mr. Huang also mentioned a very important point, which was that after the mid-1990s, divisions within Chinese society led people to see their interests in ways that were divided and complex. Under these circumstances, what we had been calling the “Enlightenment” groups[6] came to be divided into two major schools of thought, a development that I think was inevitable.  Next, I would like to ask Professor Gao to explain what the right is.  And perhaps you could tell us if you divide up left and right in the same way as Huang Jisu.
 
Gao Quanxi: Let me add a bit to what Jisu said. First, the left-right split comes to us from Western political thought and can be traced back to the French National Assembly held right before the outbreak of the French Revolution, in which the king presided from the center, with the Third Estate, which included everyone from peasant farmers to the wealthy bourgeoisie, to his left, and the feudal nobility and the church to his right. This is where right and left came from. Since then, with the historical evolution of Western society, class identity and political identity have gradually weakened, while ideological positions have grown stronger, and in the present-day Western context, left and right are mainly focused on social policies, as in the case of the Republican and the Democratic parties in the United States, where, relatively speaking, the Republican Party leans to the right and the Democratic Party leans to the left.  This sums up the division between left and right in the contemporary West.
 
As to the essence of this division, I basically agree with Jisu’s view, meaning that the left favors equality and the right favors freedom. In terms of politics, the left favors big government and democracy, while the right favors small government and a free republic. In economic terms, the left emphasizes welfare policies (the welfare state), and the planned economy, while the right emphasizes the market economy and free competition.  For example, on the question of progressive taxation, the left advocates higher taxes so that social welfare can benefit everyone, while the right advocates abandoning progressive taxation, limiting the government’s power to tax, and emphasizing the economic function of the market.
 
Of course, both the right and the left are in favor of a minimum level of welfare for the disadvantaged, but there are differences in whether the government should implement expanded welfare. This is where things stand in the West, and it is basically clear to both the left and the right, so there is no fundamental difference between the left and the right in the West today when viewed from a Chinese standpoint.  Both left and right accept freedom, democracy, constitutional rule, and the rule of law.  Of course, in Western societies, there are also some extremes on both left and right, such as the revolutionaries who advocate Marxism, the radicals who advocate anarchism, as well as the rise of Neo-Nazis, but they are not mainstream. The difference between the mainstream left and the right is mainly at the level of economic policy. This sketch provides a basic overview of the Western left and right in terms of ideological and political theory, as well as their social psychology and institutional foundations.
 
But in China’s thought world, there is a paradox about the distinction between left and right. The terms come from the West, but the criteria used to distinguish left from right are very different in China. In a certain sense, many Chinese rightists might be considered leftists in the West, and many leftists might be seen as rightists. Therefore, the situation is complicated and paradoxical if we judge China exclusively by Western standards. From this point of view, we cannot apply these standards directly to China.
 
To my mind, the distinction between left and right in China's intellectual circles today is roughly this: China's social system and its social nature are leftist, and it is a society ruled by a Chinese Communist Party which is in turn guided by Marxist ideology; in other words, it is a socialist system with Chinese characteristics. It is not a liberal democratic constitutional system in the Western sense, nor is it a modern society with a full market economy, but a left-wing social system.
 
Therefore, in this context the criteria for distinguishing left and right in the Chinese intellectual world are very different than in the West. Broadly speaking, those who defend the market economy, the rule of law and democracy, especially liberal constitutionalism and the legal protection of individual rights, as well as those who advocate further reform and opening and convergence with the West basically belong to the right and are called liberals, although we can further divide the right up into what we call liberal constitutionalists, liberal leftists, and so on.
 
Regarding the left, the situation is more complicated, where it can be divided into two factions: old leftists and new leftists. The old leftists adhere to traditional Marxist ideology, which used to be the mainstream official doctrine but has become increasingly marginalized over time. The new leftists, on the other hand, emerged in the 1990s and oppose Western capitalism and the official policy of reform and opening. They are critical of Chinese capitalism and the elites that have emerged as a result of the reform policies. While the old leftists call for a return to the Cultural Revolution, the new leftists advocate for a "Chinese path" that emphasizes the leadership of the Party and a Party-State system different from Western democracy. However, this stance has evolved over time, and the new leftists now champion the China model and strongly identify with the present system. As a result, they have lost their critical nature and have become more statist than truly leftist.
 
Professor Huang Jisu's ideology differs from the statist New Left mentioned above. He is more concerned with the hardships of the lower class and economic equality, and he sympathizes with the poor. His ideology is a natural, emotion-driven leftism that prioritizes egalitarian and humanitarian values, which is distinct from the statist New Left.
 
So, to sum things up, let me repeat that the right favors the market economy, democracy, and the rule of law, while the left favors equality and justice, social welfare, but there are divisions within the left, from the old left that advocates a return to the past, also known as the Maoists, to the New Left, which was originally critical of China's reform and opening, but in recent years they has become integrated into the official Chinese system, defending it and losing their critical stance. Huang Jisu and others represent a grassroots left wing, which, unlike the New Left, maintains a critical attitude toward Chinese capitalism and what they see as the polarization of the rich and the poor brought about by capitalism.

In terms of my personal ideological views, over the years, I have been a firm advocate of the market economy, reform and opening, and especially of liberal democracy and constitutional government under the rule of law. As a legal scholar, I believe that the key solution to China's problems is the construction of the rule of law, that democracy and the rule of law are mutually complementary, and that building a state under the rule of law is the true solution for China.
 
In addition, I also have discovered something interesting, which is that in China’s intellectual world, those on the left—both new and old—and those on the right work in different disciplines. Those who study literature, philosophy, and sociology tend to be leftists, while those who study economics, law, and history tend to be rightists. There are certain reasons for this. In the process of reform and opening, Chinese society has had to build both a market economy and a society based on the rule of law, two things that traditional Chinese society did not have.  For this reason, those working on the economy and on law belonged to new fields of knowledge closely connected to reform and opening, but these fields were seen by the left as right-leaning.
 
Furthermore, I would like to add one more point. Earlier, Jisu mentioned the emotional aspect of leftism, which made me think of a common saying in the West that you may have heard: "If you weren't a leftist when you were young, then you have no heart" - meaning that you lack empathy - "but if you remain a leftist after you grow up, then you have no brain," meaning that while everyone has compassion, it is more important to be able to make rational judgments, because empathy alone cannot change society.

Everyone wants a humane society, one that is equal and just, but achieving such a society requires institution building. Your ideals can only be realized through a legal system and a set of social policies. If you are still driven purely by emotions, you may be a good person with compassion, but your understanding of society may be incomplete, and it is impossible to create a good society through emotion alone.
 
Xiao Sanzha:  Professor Gao has just raised the topic of left and right in the West and how people of different ages perceive them. I would like to inquire about Professor Huang's opinions on these matters since I suspect he might have a different perspective.
 
Huang Jisu:  I’ll take the two questions one by one. Just now Professor Gao characterized China’s social system as “leftist,” with which I do not agree. Can a society where the top 1% of households owns 1/3 of all property and the bottom 1/4 of households owns 1% of all property be "leftist?"  Shouldn’t we say “rightist?”  Our society was once "leftist" or even "ultra-leftist," for better or for worse, but that’s a thing of the past now. At least in terms of socio-economic fundamentals, it is difficult to say that it is still "leftist."

As for the idea that the New Left has become the "China Model" faction, Professor Gao's factual description is mostly accurate. However, I would like to add something based on my own understanding. The term "New Left" has two meanings: one broad and one narrow. In the narrow sense, it refers to "liberal leftism" or academic leftism heavily influenced by Western academic theories, as advocated by Gan Yang 甘阳. The threshold for entry into this group is high, so those with less impressive intellectual credentials may not be able to join. In the broad sense, the New Left refers to all sorts of leftist grassroots ideas that fall outside of the old left, such as those involved with Utopia.[7] I am using the term in the broad sense.
 
Regarding the "China model" and the nature of Chinese society, the official version has always been that China is at the "primary stage" of socialism, which is meant to be transitional and to be followed by the intermediate stage and then the advanced stage. Before 2008, China's political elite believed that the advanced stage would be the United States or the West, even though they might have said something else in public. This is why they sent their successors to the Harvard School of Government to be educated. They believed that sooner or later, China's superstructure must conform to the economic foundation of capitalism.
 
However, the 2008 economic crisis in the West, and the fact that China's economy was the only one in the world to survive relatively unscathed, was a significant event that may have changed the way some political elites understand the "primary" stage. They may now think that China's economic and political structures are no longer "primary," but instead "advanced." They may also believe that the Chinese economic and political landscape does not represent "temporary housing," but rather their own well-built house that will last a century.[8] The "China model" New Left is the theoretical expression of this new understanding and feeling.
 
The China Model crowd did not entirely originate from the New Left, but instead represents the confluence of nationalism, conservatism, and the New Left. Among these three, the New Left was originally the most critical on contemporary domestic issues, but it has increasingly abandoned its critical stance and now serves as a force for ideological stability. In the process of maintaining stability, some of those involved have further lost their left-wing feelings - assuming they had them initially. They often use words like "bitterness" and "desperation," but they increasingly describe the poor at the bottom of society as an "unruly mob" or even as "garbage people." When I mentioned "emotional leftism" a few minutes ago, it was in response to these changes.

As for the notion of “having a heart at 30 and a head at 40,” this was really popular 15 or 16 years ago, when liberals criticized the New Left for being too simple and radical. I haven’t heard it so much in the past few years, and the reason is funny—or "paradoxical," as Professor Gao put it:  many of those who were New Left back then have become conservative and realistic, while many of the liberals at the time have become radical and romantic. The two groups changed places, and it was the turn of the statist, conservative, stability-favoring "left" to ridicule the liberals, saying that at the age of 60, they are acting like 30-year-olds.  For example, they make fun of the liberals as the “touchy-feely party,” or as the “Indie pop” group who is asking for the “soul of China to pay them a visit.”  Of course, radicals and conservatives have points in common and points where they differ.
 
When Liberals criticize the New Left for being “all heart and no head,” they are saying that they are not rational. There is indeed something to this. Many of those in the New Left who support the Cultural Revolution are used to simplifying complex history, employing this logic to praise the Chinese Revolution indiscriminately. This is no different from the many liberals who reject it out of hand.  There is some deliberate vilification at work here among such liberals. For example, they keep saying that the New Left advocates absolute equality, but I don't know of any serious New Leftist who advocates absolute equality. Nor have I heard of any serious New Leftist advocating a completely planned economy, and completely rejecting the market economy. It is ignoble to depict people as more radical than they are.  
 
I might add that when liberals say that the New Left are merely spouting Western ideas, and applying Western book learning to the Chinese situation, this is also a bit of intentional over-generalization for the sake of vilification. Some of the more academic leftists among the New Left do sound a bit foreign, but they do not represent the whole group. Moreover, when liberals ridicule the New Left’s critique of Chinese capitalism by saying it is like distributing condoms to ten-year-olds,[9] the analogy doesn’t really hit the mark.   The nature of the capitalism produced by power in China is already mature, a ten-year-old with the vitality of a twenty-year-old.  But we already know all this.
 
Xiao Sanza:  So it seems that our two professors are in basic agreement on their definitions of left and right. The left is more concerned with equality, while the right is more concerned with freedom. As for the rule of law, constitutional government, and market economy, which Professor Gao just mentioned, the basic role of all of these is to ensure freedom. There is nothing wrong with liberalism’s emphasis on freedom, but I have read many arguments suggesting that liberalism pretty much ignores equality, or that liberals simply avoid talking about it.  But China's current society is indeed a society of inequality, a society in which the gap between rich and the poor is huge. Given this, I would like to ask Professor Gao to tell us how he sees equality? How can we achieve equality? Also, in terms of freedom, I find that many liberals simply mouth the basic ideas, saying that we need to be free without discussing concretely what we need to do to get there. What are your thoughts?

Gao Quanxi:  It might seem that we have reached a consensus that the right values freedom while the left favors equality. However, if we probe a bit deeper, I do not entirely agree with this view. In a sense, both liberals and rightists are concerned with equality, but they approach it differently. Liberals question what constitutes true and false equality, and what the nature of equality is. On the other hand, the left's emphasis on equality appears to be primarily focused on economic equality, especially in terms of salary, income, and certain government policies. They are more concerned with outcomes, such as how much a person or family earns compared to others, insisting that the differences should not be too great.
 
The question then becomes, why does economic inequality exist? Here, liberals do not solely focus on economic equality in terms of outcomes, but rather on the deeper reasons behind it, such as political and legal equality. These are the most crucial factors to consider when addressing inequality. In my opinion, these deeper aspects of equality are more important than economic equality.
 
Why do I say that the right is not only concerned with freedom, but also with equality? Because freedom is about individuals, i.e., the individual's right to be free from abuse at the hands of state power.   In other words, as long as what I do does not violate the law, no one can interfere with me, and especially not government authorities.  This is negative freedom. But how can individual freedom be realized? This touches on the issue of political and legal equality. The right to freedom requires a set of institutional guarantees, and this set of institutions requires first and foremost that everyone be basically equal in political and legal terms. The reason that there is so much inequality in Chinese society and that the wealth gap is so shocking is not because of the Chinese market economy, but because of the political inequalities that create the market inequalities. 
 
For example, one of the most basic political inequalities is the administratively imposed urban-rural divide 二元格局, i.e., the household registration system for urban and rural residents and the huge inequalities this leads to.  Is this an economic question or a political question?  If you are a peasant who leaves your village to come to the city without an urban household registration, you can’t get a job, your kids can’t go to school, and in trying to make a living you run into a series of huge economic inequalities and injustices.  In today’s China, this is the greatest inequality, and obviously it is above all a question of political and legal inequality.  The right pays more attention to this issue than the left, so does it make sense to say that the right doesn’t care about inequality? 
 
Another example is the question of voting rights.  We are citizens, and all have the right to vote and to be elected, but the current system has not really implemented equal voting rights.  Rural dwellers have fewer chances to vote than other groups, but even for city dwellers, one person-one vote is not a right that is freely available to everyone.  In our lives, many economic differences are in some ways related to politics, whether we are talking about the People's Congress or the government or any number of public functions that produce economic inequalities, by which I mean that the economic inequalities produced by political inequalities are huge.
 
And while it may look like the inequalities produced by the market economy are real, in fact they are only a very small part of the inequalities found in Chinese society, and the true source of many of the most important economic inequalities can be traced to political and legal inequalities.  And this in turn means that we will reduce the inequalities between individuals only when we strengthen China’s democracy and rule of law and build a market economy and a nation that respect the rule of law and genuinely protect private property rights.
 
In this sense, guaranteeing individual property rights, democratic elections, and reforming the system of hiring government officials, are not unrelated to the issue of inequality. These are ideas and stances that the right-wing champions, which point us towards establishing individual agency with genuinely equal rights on the basis of the constitution. The foundation for any equality requires equal personhood in political and legal terms. Therefore, the right-wing is not unconcerned with equality. In fact, it is even more concerned with equality than the left, as it emphasizes political and legal equality. 
 
The right-wing's approach to economic equality is different from that of the left. According to the right, individual differences in ability, talent, opportunity, and social background should determine the economic situation of each person through market forces. Forcing equal outcomes in a society of individual differences is, in fact, the greatest inequality. It is normal to have socio-economic inequalities due to differences in opportunities, abilities, and resources. What we should oppose are inequalities caused by monopolies created by political power, kinship, and other privileges. Inequalities that result from differences in abilities and opportunities are acceptable. Liberalism emphasizes equal opportunities and qualifications and is not concerned about unequal outcomes. The market economy and free competition are designed to stimulate people's competitiveness, leading to economic development and institutional innovation throughout society. If outcomes are predetermined so that people earn the same amount regardless of effort, why would anyone work hard?
 
 Of course, liberalism is not heartless, and it also advocates a system that provides baseline security, so the poor can benefit from welfare and preserve their dignity. But you can't say, "I'm poor, but I still want to sit around all day and stuff my face.”  If you don’t contribute to society, what right do you have to stuff your face?  It is enough for the basics to be covered, allowing you to live with dignity.  Therefore, it is normal for the pursuit of wealth and creativity to lead to economic inequality. However, economic inequality is not the same as political and personal inequality. In politics, in law, in filing a lawsuit, in voting, a poor man's vote is the same as a millionaire's vote. So the idea that the right favors freedom and the left favors equality is not really accurate in a strict sense.  The key issue is what you mean by equality. In today’s China, economic inequality is mainly determined by political and legal inequality. For example, privilege is the biggest political inequality, which of course leads to economic inequality.
 
In addition, when talking about the left there is the question of social criticism. For example, leftists such as Huang Jisu are, in my opinion, sincere leftists whom I respect and whose works contain serious social criticism. No society is perfect, and we need a critical spirit based on idealism. Sincere leftists are full of compassion and aspire to an ideal society, and such leftists deserve respect in the West as well as in China. The problem in China today is that there are too many fake leftists who are not sincere, and this is particularly true of the New Left. They are not sincere. Their criticism is always directed at the West, while they sing the praises of the Chinese system.
 
In addition, I don’t agree with everything Jisu just said. The left is generally critical, both in the West and in China. There is nothing wrong with being the gadfly that find faults in society, because a society always needs people who find faults. But it is not enough just to be critical; the left is critical without being constructive or proposes solutions that are often unworkable in terms of how to build a good society, a just society where equality has genuinely been achieved. This has been the case ever since Marx, who “sowed dragon seeds and reaped only fleas.”[10] The left has ideals, and sincere leftists deserve respect, but the left cannot conceive of a set of constructive economic, political and legal programs, and if they simply rely on revolutionary theory, it will be a disaster. This has been the case throughout history in China and elsewhere. The problem in China is that neither the old left nor the New Left can come up with good set of policies having to do with the economy, reform, and the legal system.
 
Finally, I would like to make one more point regarding how we understand the nature of Chinese society.  Jisu and I differ here, and this difference is generally shared by others on the left and the right. He thinks that China is a capitalist society, while I think that China is, in a sense, still an authoritarian society. He thinks that the bad things of capitalism and the bad things of socialism together constitute the social characteristics of China today, while I think that legally, politically, and in terms of social control, China’s system is still the same leftist system we have always had. On the economic level, it is true that we see the emergence of a sort of Chinese capitalism, but there is also authoritarianism, and the question is, which is the most fundamental? 
 
For example, on the question of corruption and cronyism, is the major player the one with the power or the one with the money? Everyone knows it is the one with the power. When it comes to the market economy, the heart of things remains the state-owned enterprises, which the private economy complements. Looking at the structure of the social system and the legal system, I study constitutional law, and it is obvious that China's constitution (the 1982 Constitution) remains a socialist constitutional system, including Party leadership, the four basic principles, and the people's democratic dictatorship, which means that our society is not a capitalist society.
 
Theoretically, China remains in essence a socialist society with Chinese characteristics. I understand this differently than those on the left. Many leftists think that China is a capitalist society, or to use the language of the Cultural Revolution, they talk about a capitalist restoration, but this is not the case. China is still a socialist society led by the Communist Party, a society in which the ruling party continues to hold great power. Of course, in the Chinese economy, we find a market economy, private entrepreneurs, a stock market, and wealth inequality, but it is far from being a modern capitalist society and remains instead a socialist society with Chinese characteristics.
 
Xiao Sanza:  Liberals usually argue that if the starting point is fair, or equal, and if the rules of the game are fair and everyone plays by the same rules, then they can live with the outcome.
 
Gao Quanxi: But there has to be a minimum level of guarantees or social assistance, so that the basic material needs, and the basic dignity of the poor are assured, and everyone should be equal in political and legal terms.  This is a bottom line the right and the left can both accept.
 
Xiao Sanza:  The premise of liberalism is that everyone should start from the same place, but such fairness is impossible to achieve in real life. For example, even if we abolished the household registration system, students living in poor mountainous areas and students living in the urban areas of the north would remain far apart in terms of the educational materials available to them, and the quality of teachers would also vary.  How do we deal with this?
 
Gao Quanxi:  Let me fill things out a bit. First of all, from the point of view of liberals like Hayek, for example, the point is to limit the power of the government, which means that economic relief and social welfare should basically be left to society, and the government should do as little as possible, or nothing at all, except in special circumstances such as disasters - social welfare should mainly be left in the hands of society. This is how things work in the West and in traditional Chinese society.   In Western societies there are Christian churches and other charitable organizations, and in China there were things like Buddhist monasteries that performed the function of social relief. Such social mechanisms can provide basic relief to the poor and displaced.
 
Of course, as society develops and economic conditions improve, even a liberal like Hayek will not object to the idea of the government providing basic relief, that is, the government can be responsible for a basic social welfare system. In short, it is necessary in any social community that there be some mechanism for dealing with poverty or people's inability to work because of disability, sudden illness, and so on. Liberals have never objected to that. Liberals have never objected to welfare policies such as subsistence allowances. What they oppose are the policies of the European welfare states or Roosevelt's New Deal, which, by focusing too much on individual welfare, stifle economic dynamism and lead to a general economic decline in society.
 
Liberals like Hayek were strongly opposed to welfare implemented through the executive power of government, which violates the creativity of individuals and the free disposition of private property rights. I agree, especially in China, where it is imperative not that we all enjoy the abundance of wealth, but that we work together to stimulate the spirit of struggle to create it.
 
As for the second issue, we can take the income of basketball player Yao Ming as an example. I think there should be a theoretical discussion about what we mean by outcome equality and what we mean by procedural equality. If Yao Ming's income comes from his special talents and what the market gives him, and he has earned his income fairly in a procedural sense, then I think that is acceptable because it is not a case of undue inequality, but rather the result of any number of differences, which is theoretically consistent with the principles of economics. We often have an egalitarian understanding of the equal starting point. This is not true, and such an equal starting point has never existed.  Everyone is special and there are always differences.  Reducing the inequality of the starting point is a gradual process, and there are some difficulties that can never be solved, and we will just have to accept that this is how human beings are.   I think we should be wary of dogmatic idealism here.
 
Speaking of which, the other day I was talking to a professor at Peking University about this, and he pointed out that when he and I were in college, poor students still made up 30 to 40 percent of the student body, and they got there by studying hard, which means that their grades were good enough to get them into Peking University or Tsinghua. Nowadays, children from poor families make up less than 10% of these students. Why is that?  Because without economic resources, you cannot go to a good middle school or a good high school, so how can you get into the best universities? From this point of view, society as a whole has regressed. At the beginning of the reform and opening up, poor families could get into good universities just by their grades, but not anymore.
 
I don’t have a magic solution to this problem, because this is not a problem of education per se, but a social problem. Chinese society has become rigid, and if we want to break through this rigidity, should we use a revolutionary approach, where we destroy everything and rebuild a better educational system?  I think if we do this, we would make things worse. 
 
I think that in an era of rapid change, we should adopt an empirical approach to making things better. Liberals tend to favor empiricism over idealism, in other words, since there is no ideal model for a society, we can only choose the less bad system.  From a liberal perspective, China’s system today, including the educational system, is of course not a good system. It is not even as good as what we find in a capitalist society or in China’s traditional society, but when we compare it to the educational system during the Cultural Revolution, it is less bad. The inequality of educational resources should be gradually overcome through the establishment of a set of procedures to eventually resolve the issue. Radical changes that aim to establish a completely equal society often end in disaster. In short, the root of China's educational problems lies in society and in politics, not in education itself.
 
Xiao Sanza:  I also believe that the human world is destined to be imperfect, and that radical plans to realize heaven on earth will end up in hell if imposed on us against our will, as any number of historical examples illustrate. But the point of the question I just asked is, once we have established constitutional rule, will we still need to take steps to correct the inequalities that history has left us?
 
Gao Quanxi:  Of course, everything has its historical origin.
 
Xiao Sanzha:  Professor Huang, you are an advocate of equality, and there is an article in one of your books which deals with the topic of equality that made a deep impression on me, but after I read that article, I realized that I didn’t really understand how we were going to bring about that equality. It seems like we complain about how unequal we were in the past, and how unequal we still are now, but surely the key is how to achieve equality.
 
Huang Jisu: What Professor Gao just said was very interesting and got right to the heart of the matter. I would like to add the following:

First, human society is indeed a "real" society, but it is also an "ideal" society.  The ratio may be 80/20 or 90/10, which means that we can't fly, but we can still jump.  It was this idealism quotient of 10 or 20% that propelled humanity from its primitive state to the establishment of civilization.  The same idealism explains why we find servants buried in the tombs of the Shang nobility, and why we no longer do such things.
 
Second, I agree with Professor Gao that the left has not presented a comprehensive set of constructive proposals.  This is because the history it is dealing with is a history of failure.  The USSR and Eastern Europe fell apart, and China had to implement reform and opening, so the left has had to digest this failure, which will take time.  So it will be awhile before the left comes up with a comprehensive solution, which is normal.  In fact, it would not be normal if it presented a comprehensive solution, most of which would be nonsense. Capitalist society, on the other hand, is there already.  We don’t have to explore it, just download it.
 
Third, on the relationship between freedom and equality, Professor Gao was very clear and concrete. I like this kind of discussion where everything is on the table and we don’t pull punches (lit., “fishing in clean and not muddy water”).  I don't like the way some liberals, seeing that people are worried about inequality, make vague statements pretending they love equality to win the hearts of the people. In the same way, I don't like the fact that some leftists speak out of both sides of their mouth on the question of democracy, now talking about “consultative democracy,” the next time “mass democracy,” and then later “vertical democracy 垂直民主.”[11] Why don’t they have the guts to say what they mean?   Professor Gao divides equality into an equality of outcomes and an equality of opportunities (procedures, starting points), and says straight out that he prefers equality of opportunity. He also states that he agrees with baseline equality, meaning aid in the event of disasters or disabilities. He also makes a distinction between different kinds of inequalities, such as the inequalities caused by the market and natural human differences, and those created by political power. Following his careful analysis, I would also like to add my two cents.
 
First of all, if you look at history, there is no question that equality of opportunity is greater today than it was a thousand years ago, and even greater than it was two thousand years ago. I'm afraid that the magnitude of change in terms of equality of outcome is much less than in terms of equality of opportunity. I don't know how my liberal friends understand this difference. Theoretically, you would think that as opportunities or starting points become more equal, outcomes should also become more equal. Think about it: you've got the same running shoes, the same diet, the same training, the same drive, and the starting gun has been replaced by a flashing light-you'd think the athletes would all arrive at the finish line at the same time. 
 
In fact, the differences between the athletes are getting smaller. But the result remains the same in the sense that there are still gold, silver, and bronze medals. The same is true in human society, which leads me to believe that the differences we are born with explain the huge gap between rich and poor.  I have my own thoughts on this, but will not go into them here.
 
Next, Professor Gao believes that differences in wealth caused by the market are reasonable and should be accepted. My view is different. I think a certain amount of difference is acceptable, but if the difference is too big, something has to be done. All countries in the world do this, but to different degrees. This kind of intervention is deeply rooted in human nature: on the one hand, we want to be unequal, to be different, and to stand out. On the other hand, we also want to be equal, and no one wants to be left behind or sink to the bottom. These are two sides of the same coin, and I don’t need to say much more about it.
 
Professor Gao brought up the example of the stock market, which I find interesting, but the example of the casino is more relevant. Part of the marketplace involves gambling, but the marketplace is not exactly the same as a casino. Why should people accept the rules of the casino and be willing to lose the money they choose to gamble? If the marketplace were the same as the casino, who would accept such a marketplace? Gambling is considered "fair" by some, but in many places, it is outlawed. The lottery is actually gambling, but it's not illegal in China because the banker is the government.
 
Because of what we call "the rules of the marketplace," a singer may earn 400,000 RMB (approximately 58,000 USD) after tax for a single song, while a movie star in a TV series takes home a few million. The singer and the movie star surely think that the market is good and that the laws of the marketplace are completely normal. They did not steal or rob from anyone; the market set the prices, and people willingly paid their money. So what’s the problem? Some people may just be jealous, but the laws of the marketplace are merely one standard, and not the ultimate standard. The ultimate standard is people, their interests, their basic desires, and their values.
 
What I am talking about here is a pure market, not the one with Chinese characteristics, and I find the pure market problematic as well. Many of my liberal friends like to say that China has not yet reached the point of a pure market, so there’s no point in talking about it. I think we should talk about it because that is where we want to wind up. Let’s be clear about things now.
 
They say that power creates monopoly. True enough, power creates not a few monopolies. But don’t we also see monopolies in pure markets with private capital? Many people, whose wealth is supposed to be considered "clean," send their children to prestigious foreign schools from a very young age. Is this not monopolizing the best paths of social mobility? Is this not harming equality of opportunity and equal starting points? No matter where wealth comes from, once a certain amount accumulates, it will naturally create monopolies. Why not discuss these issues?
 
I think Gu Zhun[12] 顾准 (1915-1974) was remarkable not only because he understood the problems of his era, but also because he foresaw the problems that would come after Mao. He is what I call a true thinker.
 
But I sympathize and even to a considerable extent agree with Professor Gao's and many liberals' critique of power.
 
Another thing is what Professor Gao says about the left’s being for radical change. Sadly enough, this is indeed a characteristic of the left today, although some of them may just be mouthing off. In any event, I don’t go in for high-flying proposals to change the world.  My hope is to change society gradually, one step at a time, and I always remind elites to dial it down a bit and not to push society toward the path of revolution. In fact, it is not very meaningful to simply advocate freedom and equality in general, whether you’re on the left or the right. We should look at their proposals on specific issues.

Professor Gao says that liberals are more in favor of the rule of law and the left prefers politics. In fact, the left has always favored the rule of law, but in reality the law often doesn’t work, and the cost is extremely high. This is just how things are.  I have a relative who was in hospital for a problem with his eyes, and the doctor made a mistake and my relative wound up blind.  The attending doctor clearly said that it was their responsibility, but the hospital won’t admit it.  Ok, you can sue, but their lawyer says, “this is my job, and you can’t outspend us, and the medical malpractice appraisal committee favors the hospital.”  When migrant workers don’t get paid, where do they find the money for a lawyer?  Where do they find the time for the legal process and for multiple appeals? I think China should become a society governed by the rule of law, and I hope it will become such a society in the future. As for right now, law should do what it can, and politics can handle what the law can’t.   Sadly, politics can’t be relied on.
 
Gao Quanxi: I think Jisu is a genuine Chinese leftist, and while we have some differences, a true leftist can sit at the same table with Chinese liberals and talk about things.  For example, we have a lot in common in terms of building civil society and our understanding of social change. The situation in China today is that it is difficult for the left and the right to sit down together and discuss the issues. Pan Wei 潘维 (b. 1960), Wang Hui 汪晖 (b. 1959), Wang Shaoguang 王绍光 (b. 1964), and Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元 (b. 1963) [well-known leftists] have difficulty sitting down with people on the right like Liu Junning 刘军宁 (b. 1961), He Weifang 贺卫方 (b. 1960), Xu Youyu 徐友漁 (b. 1947), and Zhang Weiying 张维迎 (b. 1959), even if they went to the same schools or even lived in the same dormitories.
 
Xiao Sanza:  Professor Gao, you still did not answer the question about how to bring about freedom. 
 
Gao Quanxi: The freedom I'm talking about is not freedom in the philosophical sense; freedom in the philosophical sense is something no one can interfere with, because you are free to think even if you are in prison. The freedom I am talking about here is freedom in the political sense, that is, freedom under the law. This freedom means that, within the limits of the law, no one can infringe on the exercise of my rights. For example, my private property, my private sphere, cannot be violated by others, especially by public authorities. When it comes to this kind of freedom, the problem is usually government power. It is not hard to understand the concept of individual civil rights in a civil law context; it means that people cannot take my things or cheat me in the economic sphere.  The problem is what to do when my private rights are violated by the power of the government in the public sphere. This is where the value and meaning of freedom really come into play. This is where freedom matters, in my opinion:  how do I guarantee my basic private property rights, my basic right to free speech, and so on. As long as these rights are not guaranteed in the public sphere, any talk about freedom is meaningless. For this, we need a legal system. Especially a constitutional system to restrain the public power of the government and the police. How to achieve freedom, in the final analysis, is by strengthening the rule of law, and implementing constitutional government. What we call visible and tangible freedom means ensuring that everyone has basic rights, not subject to violation by others, especially the government.

Having said that, I would like to clarify a common misconception. For example, there are TV shows about law that are often viewed as depicting the rule of law. However, in my opinion, these shows are nonsense, and their content is primarily about the police catching thieves and punishing criminals, which has little to do with the true rule of law in the modern sense. The true rule of law serves to constrain the government, and limiting government power is the essence of the rule of law. In ancient times, the rich and the kings would catch thieves and punish swindlers, but this is far from the rule of law. The rule of law concerns how the government or the police justify the abuse of public power, such as forced demolitions and arbitrary fees. To sum up, I believe that in Chinese society, we still predominantly understand the law from a traditional standpoint, and we need society as a whole to increase its awareness of the rule of law and embrace the concept of rights.
 
In the current situation, how can freedom be achieved? First, the government's main function should be to provide public goods and legal guarantees for society, while matters such as economic development should be left to society as much as possible. Society is a spontaneous order where individuals can fully express their creativity, which will lead to the unleashing of society's potential. It is crucial to understand that spontaneous organizations in society are not always political, but mostly social and centered around hobbies and mutual aid, such as playing bridge, mah-jong, dancing, hiking, and so on. These are all social organizations, and many community organizations represent a kind of social public life, organized around mutual hobbies, and not for profit. Why should the government control them so strictly? In addition to making a living, people have emotional, ethical, and social lives. The government should retreat from these areas and give society the freedom it deserves.
 
Second, in the public domain regulated by the government, the government must act according to the law, and areas that the government should not regulate should be handed over to society.  The Party should manage its Party members and cadres according to Party discipline, and in this way, society will enjoy the freedom that comes with the rule of law.

As for the idea of freedom, I would also like to emphasize that it does not mean that you can do whatever you want, no matter what it may be, but it is freedom under the law. Freedom is based on obedience to the law, and we have all kinds of laws - constitutional laws, administrative laws, civil and commercial laws, and so on. As long as you obey the law, you have freedom. In order for society to have freedom, we have to implement the rule of law.  Those who are currently in power are proposing a state based on the rule of law, which is exactly the right thing to do, but at present the law remains just words on a piece of paper, and the implementation of the rule of law requires a dynamic mechanism. That mechanism is democracy. This means that the rule of law and democracy are complementary. Democracy means that every citizen can participate in building a society and establishing a government in accordance with democratic principles, so that the government is subject to the supervision of the people.  
 
For example, we all have the right to hold public office, we all have the right to vote and be elected, but we must exercise the right to vote and not treat the ballot as a child's toy. The reason why many people do not value their votes is because they feel that these democratic elections are a sham. I think the Chinese people are not stupid at all, and they know that if they cannot have true democracy, then voting means nothing.  So democracy is a question of real or fake, and the rule of law is a question of implementing it or not. These are the key problems facing China today, and they are the same key problems facing any society in transition. If the problems of the rule of law and democracy are not solved, freedom is just an empty word.
 
Xiao Sanza: In my view, neither of you is an extremist, because there are more extreme ideas on both the left and the right. So now I would like to ask Professor Huang to talk about the development of the left over the last few years and what the current spectrum of thought looks like on the left, and then I would ask Professor Gao to do the same thing for the right.   In addition, I would like to ask you both to identify areas where left and right can reach consensus, because it requires a certain amount of consensus for society to move forward.

Huang Jisu:   The origins of the Chinese left can be traced back to the first half of the 20th century when China was facing the challenges of modernization. The left, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as its core, offered a solution to strengthen and save the country. In 1949, the CCP seized power through an armed revolution, and established its headquarters in Tiananmen Square and Zhongnanhai, marking the institutionalization and bureaucratization of the left. The left reached its zenith during the Cultural Revolution, which was a period of great upheaval and turmoil. However, the Lin Biao incident in 1971 [13]marked the beginning of the decline of the left, and its popularity began to wane. In 1976, the April Fifth Movement[14] was a reflection of the public opinion against the extreme leftist line of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the changes that occurred ten months later were not surprising.
 
Then, in the 1980s, China changed course and embraced the idea of "letting some people get rich first," making social inequality the fundamental driver of the country's development. This idea gained consensus at the time because before inequality became a concern, everyone felt they could compete and succeed. In the 1980s, most people were on the right politically, and Chairman Mao, who is the subject of the current left-right divide, was not a significant factor. Social polarization began with the urban reforms of the mid-1980s, including the responsibility system and the dual-price system, leading to some people being happy and others not. It was not only the ordinary people who were unhappy, but intellectuals as well, as only a few intellectuals had entered the market economy and they were experiencing deteriorating economic situations and social restrictions. Popular slogans at that time included not only "Down with the government opportunists," but also "Down with the private opportunists." Although opportunistic government officials had no legitimacy, ordinary opportunists, such as those selling watermelons on the side of the road or jeans in a night market, had a right to make a living. While their lives were not easy, both the people and the intellectuals wanted to get rid of them. These experiences have shown that people both want and don't want inequality. This is the point at which the left wing began to re-emerge.
 
After 1992 came the great wave of the commodity economy, the privatization 产业化 of education and health care, "layoffs and reassignments, staff reductions and efficiency gains," all of which rapidly increased inequality.  With the new millennium, the dust gradually settled, and those who had made it, made it, and those that hadn’t faced a world with fewer opportunities, meaning that class polarization set in and grew rigid.  Intellectual divisions were inevitable as well.  Over the course of the 1990s and in the early years of the 2000s, the New Left rose in response to all of this.

I have not studied the history of contemporary thought, so I can only give my impressions. In the late 1990s, leftist writers began to publish in Dushu,[15] but it was mixed in with other voices and was quite academic in tone, so the left did particularly not stand out.  At the time, there was also a foreign website called "China and the World 中国与世界," which we all read, and it was quite influential.  Another thing was the opening of the Utopia bookstore—as well as its website—in 2003; its style was clear and direct.  Around 2004, there was the critique of managed buyouts to sell off state assets, and that was when the New Left was at its best in terms of social critique and its social message was at its strongest.  It was perhaps its golden age.   In 2008, the world economic crisis began, while the Chinese economy continued to boom. By then, the nationalist mission for modern China to stand on its own in the world was largely complete.
 
This momentous event – the financial crisis - caused a sharp split in the contemporary New Left. In the past, the socialist and nationalist demands of the left, either as a means or as an end, existed in harmony, even if they were not exactly the same. However, in recent years, a significant part of the New Left has abandoned its class position and sided with nationalism, with some even going so far as to trumpet the arrival of "Chinese imperialism." A significant number of them eventually embraced statism.
 
While it is a truism that a government or state represents the interests of the nation as a whole, it is also true that it represents the interests of certain social groups, and many officials have done more for themselves than for the people. This is a simple fact, and I do not know whether those who say "the national interest comes first" really do not understand it or are simply pretending not to. We must distinguish between statism and nationalism, as there are statists who hold high the banner of nationalism, always looking for "traitors." While there are traitors, those who use this kind of language are too one-sided, as if any criticism of the government or the status quo makes you a traitor.
 
It is unfortunate that domestic issues are endlessly turned into foreign issues, and I hate it when people deliberately confuse the issue in this way. If you're for maintaining stability, isn't it enough to make your case clearly? Of course, there are people who are genuinely confused by certain terms. Today, the New Left in China is still in the process of a violent split, and the future outcome depends on the economic and social situation of the country as a whole. The serious division of interests in Chinese society is behind the split within the left and the divisions within the larger intellectual world in China. If this division of interests cannot be reduced, the intellectual community's efforts to build consensus will be largely unsuccessful, although it may be true that it has already alienated itself from the social groups it represents.
 
Gao Quanxi: Let me answer your question briefly. The first wave of liberalism in China can be traced back to the Republican period, with Hu Shih 胡适(1881-1962) as the main representative. Of course, if we go back even further, there people like Zhang Jian 张謇 (1853-1926), a gentry member involved with the constitutional movement in the late Qing period, or like Song Jiaoren 宋教仁 (1882-1913), a member of the revolutionary KMT, who were perhaps the forerunners of Chinese liberals. In 1930s and 1940s, the mainstream was dominated by the Hu Shih and company, and they made up the first wave of Chinese liberalism. This Hu Shih liberalism was completely wiped out in mainland China in 1949, although it hung on as best it could in Taiwan, where the second wave of liberalism was sustained by people like Lei Zhen 雷震 (1897-1979) and Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919-1969). This second wave, which accompanied Taiwan's democratic and constitutional transformation, is facing an uncertain future now.
 
In mainland China, liberalism was severely suppressed after 1949, and those who were branded right-wingers in the 1950s could hardly be called liberals, since they were little different from the Communists.  Those in the democratic parties were basically left-wing socialists, but at least they supported democracy and the rule of law, so if we take a broad view we can see them as liberals in the Chinese context, and in any case they suffered decades of persecution.  There was no real liberalism in China after 1949.  After China went through the Lin Biao affair, the April Fifth Movement, and the fall of the Gang of Four, reform and opening began in 1979, after which we see the sprouts of liberalism.  This began with the introduction of Enlightenment ideas into China, followed by the opening up of the economy.

Then came the movement to emancipate thought. This is the first wave that Jisu mentioned a minute ago, which took the form of Enlightenment thought, Scar Literature,[16] and Marxist humanism.[17] In the course of these discussions, a broad liberal ideology emerged in which everyone was basically a reformist, opposed the Cultural Revolution, and advocated ideological liberation, reform, and opening. From an academic point of view, this was not yet liberalism in the strict sense, but mainly a set of philosophical and intellectual reflections.
 
In fact, the first wave of liberals in China during reform and opening were mainly economic liberals who emerged with the reforms. Their theories were mainly based on Western neoclassical economics, with a focus on institutions and property rights, and they promoted China's reform and opening, especially on issues such as land contracting in rural areas, township enterprise reform, and the reform of state-owned enterprises. So the first wave of liberalism in China was mainly led by economists, who were liberal in the economic sense, including people like Zhou Qiren 周其仁 (b. 1950), Zhang Weiying 张维迎, and Fan Gang 樊纲 (b. 1953).  There were also the “four meetings and one center 四会一所,” and the Moganshan meeting 莫干山[18], as well as the Jin Guantao (b. 1947) 金观涛, series “Toward the Future 走向未来.”  All of these were in favor of economic reform, which means they were liberals in an economic sense. Although this group has undergone great changes in personnel and ideas, it remains the leader in China in terms of liberal ideas and theory.
 
In the late 1980s, following Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992[19] and the Asian Games in 1990, China's social environment underwent significant changes. The landscape of the Chinese intellectual world, in particular, underwent a transformation. Economic liberalism, which had been central to Chinese thought, began to lose its hold, and the differences between left and right became more apparent. The rise of Confucian conservatism further complicated the situation, leading to a great schism and confusion in the Chinese intellectual community. These changes were closely related to a period of great transformation in China.
 
As economic reform resulted in polarization and crony capitalism, political and legal liberalism began to compete with economic liberalism in terms of social significance. This was due to the fact that China's social system had not undergone a fundamental change, democracy and the rule of law had not been established, basic human rights had not been guaranteed, and constitutional rule had not been fully implemented. As a result, the rights consciousness of the Chinese people began to awaken. This transition from an era of economic reform to an era of rights awakening created a need for progress in political and legal ideas and theories, leading to the emergence of a second wave of liberalism focused on democracy and the rule of law.
 
During this time, legal scholars at the Academy of Social Sciences published a series of books on "rights consciousness," while civil law and property law became increasingly popular fields of study. Political science saw more translations of theories on democratic politics and liberalism. In an era of rights awakening, political economy and democratic politics became the most influential voices in society, overshadowing economic liberalism's focus on freedom and extending liberalism's understanding of freedom to include the broader fields of society, politics, and the rule of law. This shift led to the emergence of political liberalism and the rule of law.
 
We were just discussing the left and right in Chinese society, and it seems to me that although they may not see eye to eye on politics, they still share some common ground on certain economic and social issues. For instance, both liberals and leftists tend to agree on matters of welfare, human rights, and the protection of civil society. They both oppose illegal demolitions in rural areas and advocate for the rights of migrant workers to petition.
 
However, at present, the efforts to find common ground and foster cooperation between the two parties are not mainstream views. In this context, I tend to support sincere leftists like Huang Jisu, who prioritize the preservation of social rights, protection of migrant workers' rights, and building a civil society where everyone participates. In contrast, the New Left with their praise of the China Model and their turn to statism have already turned their backs on China's hard-working masses and are essentially fake leftists who defend statism.
 
It is worth noting that even among the sincere leftists, there are some differences in views. For instance, while Huang Jishu advocates for the rights of the people, some old leftists have mutated into populists or extreme nationalists who advocate for violence and vandalism. Others belong to the Utopia crowd with their Cultural Revolution ideas and worship of Chairman Mao, who denounce everything and are against everything. Thus, while sincere leftists may not represent the mainstream, their rationality and empathy make their ideals worthy of respect.
 
The empathetic left, though few in numbers, is respectable for its ideals. In contrast, the mainstream left is divided between two extremes: the New Left, which has transformed into statism, and the old left, which has mutated into populism. As for the Maoist left, it is a mixture of both.
 
Of course, the right has its own problems, and we cannot rule out the possibility that some economic rightists, like the New Left, have become part of crony capitalism. By comparison, the political and legal right is cleaner. In terms of ideas, this group of liberals, represented by people like He Weifang and Zhang Qianfan 张千帆 (b. 1964) , has basically been silenced. As for people like Qin Hui 秦晖 (b. 1953), Yu Jianrong 于建嵘 (b. 1962), Sun Liping 孙立平(b. 1953), their views can hardly be described as pure liberalism. By Western academic standards, they are considered leftists, but in the Chinese context, they are certainly liberals or rightists, and this is the paradox of the Chinese intellectual community as opposed to the West. These figures advocate for the rights of the poor, for social justice and social equality, and their intellectual resources come mainly from the liberal left in the West, not from liberals like Mises and Hayek. However, from the perspective of their willingness to criticize the Chinese government, it is very different from the leftist attitude of criticizing only the West and the United States.
 
Therefore, if we use a simple criterion to distinguish between the left and right in Chinese intellectual circles, we can say that leftists are those who criticize the West, especially the United States, support the government, and advocate for equality, often calling for a return to the Mao-era approach to equality. On the other hand, rightists are those who advocate for freedom and democracy, criticize the government, and oppose a return to the Cultural Revolution era. I once joked with my friends that one could easily identify the left and right in China by asking two questions: What is your stance on the United States? Are you pro- or anti-American? And, what is your stance on Mao? Are you pro- or anti-Mao? Typically, leftists are pro-Mao and anti-American, while rightists are anti-Mao and pro-American. However, this is an over-simplification, and the reality is more complex when we consider theoretical and intellectual differences between the two groups.
 
Xiao Sanzha:  Recently, economic growth has run into problems, and people are worried. I would like to ask you both, what kind of superstructure is suitable for China's current economic situation? In other words, what kind of superstructure can drive economic development?
 
Huang Jisu: I'm a complete amateur in economic matters and can only speak a little about what everyone is feeling, which is worth what it's worth. The global economy is in decline, and although China has been swimming against the tide for a few years now, it is not an exception.  The basic problem is overcapacity, or what we used to call overproduction, which means pretty much the same thing.   For middle-class families in the big cities, this overcapacity means "I've got a house, I've got a car, I've got a flat-screen TV, I've got a washing machine, I can buy TGV train tickets to anywhere in China, I can buy plane tickets to anywhere in the world, so what else do I need?”  Nothing.   If you don't need anything as a consumer, that means the economy is producing too much, it has too much capacity. 
 
But if we look at a different family, and talk about lower-class families in the big cities, or families that are not in the big cities, or maybe not in the cities at all, can we say they don't need anything?  Of course you can say they don't have "effective needs," which means they don't have money.  So it's obvious that when we talk about the overcapacity and the decline of the Chinese economy, one of the factors is this huge lack of purchasing power in China's social system and in China's distribution of wealth, which is of course unreasonable and unfair.  In other words, part of the root of the economic problem has to do with social relations, class relations.  
 
I have always believed that the basic idea of reform and opening, "let some people get rich first," has indeed given a great impetus to China's development, but now it has exhausted its institutional and cultural energy and is becoming a stumbling block to social and economic development.  If the hundreds of millions of RMB that a rich person pays for a crazy painting were in the hands of people who can barely make ends meet, imagine how much better off small and medium-sized enterprises would be.
 
I would like to take a moment to share my thoughts on democracy and the rule of law, a topic Professor Gao also touched upon. In today's society, politics plays an incredibly significant role, especially in a country like China where politics has a direct impact on the lives of millions. In my opinion, democracy and the rule of law are natural evolutions of human society, stemming from industrialization, urbanization, universal education, and all aspects of modernization. While these concepts originated in the West, China must integrate and adapt them to its unique historical and cultural traditions gradually.
 
Therefore, I believe that the left does not oppose democracy or the rule of law.
However, some conservatives, including the conservative left, may be hesitant or skeptical towards these concepts. They argue that not all positive examples in the world are democratic, and China's rule of law is ineffective due to the prolonged trials. I caution against conservatism, dogmatism, and romanticism, as they hinder progress.
 
Regarding government intervention, I agree that there are situations where the government should stay out. If people express their grievances without the intention to cause trouble, the government should not overreact and seal their apartments. However, some situations require government intervention, such as illegal parking and motorcycles that break traffic laws. We cannot merely call for "small government" without considering each circumstance carefully.
 
Furthermore, we have the People's Congress and the CPPCC in place, and we should allow them to play their role in advising, criticizing, and supervising. We do not need to consult every group of successful individuals seeking to influence the government. Instead, our representatives should focus on protecting the interests of ordinary people.
 
Gao Quanxi:  Recently, translations of the works of the Japanese-American comparative scholar Francis Fukuyama have been published in China. Fukuyama's main point is that a normal state must perform three functions, and if it does so effectively, the state will eventually become strong and stable. These three functions are: state capacity, accountability, and the rule of law.
 
State capacity refers to a country's level of organizational ability. A normal state cannot be divided, with different factions taking over different functions. It must have the capacity to organize production, mobilize resources, and unify basic practices.
Accountability is another important function of a normal state. Fukuyama argues that a state must take responsibility and be accountable for its actions. When problems arise in politics and society, especially major problems, the government should be held responsible, and government officials should be held accountable. This is crucial because if the government fails to do so, then who will?
 
The third function of a normal state is the rule of law. Laws must be enforced, and not merely exist on paper. This implementation of the rule of law establishes social norms and government standards. Policies will not change overnight according to the whims of leaders, but instead will be regulated by law.  By effectively carrying out these three functions, a state can become strong and stable, thereby ensuring the well-being of its     citizens.

Fukuyama’s analysis of Chinese politics suggests that China has always had a powerful state with strong state capacity, which has been dominant throughout its history. The centralized order established by the Qin-Han unification has persisted and evolved into a nation-wide system. Although this has allowed for the organization of national resources and the accomplishment of great feats, such as the 2008 Olympics, APEC blue,[20] and military parades, Fukuyama argues that a modern state requires accountability and the rule of law as well. According to him, these two functions are currently lacking in China.
 
Regarding accountability, the current situation is that the government's responsibilities are unclear, especially if we try to assign responsibility.  If we say that accountability at the central governmental level is problematic, then the local level should gradually step up, for example in terms of the local government’s responsibility for environmental protection, governance, etc.
 
Xiao Sanzha:  Who is going to hold them accountable? 
 
Gao Quanxi:  That's a good question, because government accountability is related to the establishment of the rule of law and democratic governance. One of the most important aspects of the rule of law is the implementation of the People's Congress system, and according to administrative law and administrative procedure, it is this system that is supposed to hold government agencies and government officials accountable. In addition, we need to free up the media, and we need to develop a civil society so that citizens, lawyers, and people from all walks of life can hold the government accountable, so that everything is not managed from within a closed system. 
 
I should add that the citizens are basically absent from the process of holding the government accountable, not to mention the fact that the government rarely loses administrative lawsuits, and the representatives of the People's Congresses rarely participate in exercising their responsibility to hold the government accountable, all of which is related to the weakness of our democratic system and the question of whether those elected to the People's Congresses can truly represent the people.  As Jisu said a few minutes ago, can those who truly represent the broad interests of the people be elected?   So Fukuyama is right when he talks about the lack of accountability and rule of law in China. Although these two components are not directly related to China's economic development, they do provide a healthy institutional environment for economic development, because the economy can only thrive if the rule of law is loosely applied [i.e., because it is accepted by society].
 
If the government is not held accountable, it is easy to imagine the corruption that will occur in the context of large projects. Therefore, it does no good to punish corruption without paying attention to the rule of law and accountability, and no matter how many corrupt officials are caught in the pharmaceutical industry, the food industry, and government ministries, it serves no purpose if we do not establish the rule of law and government accountability and build the necessary institutions.
 
Xiao Sanzha: In fact, in my view all sincere leftists and rightists care about the progress of the country and its future, because they are idealists. But ideals are one thing, and the actual implementation of political reform in China is another. Is there any place for entrepreneurs in the process of institutional change in China? I've heard a variety of arguments on this issue, but not many of them are convincing.  I don’t know what the two of you think.
 
Huang Jisu: Since ancient times, China has had an elite class of leaders. To lead a society, you can't be too selfish, and you have to balance the interests of all parties. I think the scholar-official class did a pretty good job in the traditional period.  And when the Communists fought for the country, if their cadres and soldiers had had their own private agendas, they might not have been able to defeat the KMT and the warlords. The KMT did pretty well after it established itself in Taiwan because it learned from what the Communists had done on the mainland and controlled that kind of corruption pretty well. 
 
After reform and opening, the political elites, who had suffered a lot during the Cultural Revolution, were quite dejected and handed over a considerable part of their cultural leadership to the intellectual elites, in a sense "showing respect for the learned".  In recent decades, the political elite has moved from a position of absolute inferiority to the intellectual elite to a position of relative inferiority, or perhaps even relative equality.
 
What about the economic elite? Frankly, I am not optimistic. The working class has made a tremendous contribution to achieving the basic mission of strengthening the country and enriching the people in modern times, and the contribution of entrepreneurs is not too shabby either.  But not a few entrepreneurs have engaged in tax evasion, bribery, environmental pollution, and exploitation of migrant workers, right?  In addition, people who get money spend it like crazy, indulging in luxuries to satisfy their every whim, and in the eyes of the common people, the children of the rich have engaged in all kinds of embarrassing behavior, so the common people have no more faith in the entrepreneurs than in the political elite. 
 
In China today, money is everything, and such values inspire much envy and emulation.  But the opportunities for people from the lower classes to join the rich are diminishing.  If you want something but can't get it, the consequences can be quite frightening.  That China's rich have become both the model for the Chinese people to emulate and the object of popular anger is an unprecedented risk and a rare opportunity.  I hope that the educated members of China's elite can set a good example and behave better, so that the risk becomes an opportunity that could push society to a better place, instead of causing more people to leave China for elsewhere.  Where will they go, anyway?  Everywhere is about the same. 
 
I said a few minutes ago that everyone both supports and rejects inequality, and that is true everywhere, not just in China.  In Western Europe and North America there are more efforts to achieve equality.  The inheritance tax, which China doesn't want to implement, has been in place there for many years, and the rates were so high for a while that it was like a revolution.  Security is not somewhere else, but in your country or in your heart.  As long as you strive for goodness, you will surely find a way.  Wealthy entrepreneurs are the smartest people in China, and they have made a lot of money that wasn't easy to make, but I'm not the one to tell you how they did it.
 
Xiao Sanzha: Professor Gao, for a long time you have been studying the history of how the great powers set up constitutional rule, so I would like to ask you to share your thoughts on what were the main driving forces in this process of the establishment of constitutional government in various countries.
 
Gao Quanxi: I basically agree with what Jisu said. First of all, it is a fact that the Chinese elite, that is, the political elite, the economic elite, and the intellectual elite, have been in a general state of decline for the past two decades. At present, I would say that they are worse than the traditional scholar-officials. Second, I also agree that China's wealthy could behave a little better.  Right now there is not much to admire because they are all going abroad and taking their money with them.  According to statistics, many of China's elites have basically completed the process of emigration, 99% of whom are entrepreneurs with capital of more than 100 million RMB, which means that they or their children or most of their money have moved abroad.  Given the decay of Chinese society, especially in rural China, we must call on the wealthy to be more noble-minded. But my question is, why can't they?   That is the key to China's problems.
 
Among China's wealthy, or China’s entrepreneurs, and especially China’s private entrepreneurs, there are surely those who pay bribes and commit crimes to get their money, but there are also those who actively participate in social welfare. There are actually quite a few who are interested in building civil society, such as the Society of Entrepreneurs and Equality (SEE 阿拉善公益[21]), Wang Ying's 王瑛 book club,[22] and so on.
 
In recent years, many social welfare organizations have been created by entrepreneurs, but the main problem is the lack of institutional support. The government has not opened up the civic or philanthropic space for entrepreneurs, resulting in a lack of legal protection and no institutional interface for entrepreneurs to provide social care and relief funds. In addition, there are no credible social organizations to ensure the implementation of these efforts. Official organizations, such as Project Hope and the Red Cross, have a poor reputation, are poorly supervised, and do not appeal to entrepreneurs. This creates a challenge for those who want to be more noble-minded but don't know how to go about it. It cannot be that the only way to be noble and generous is to donate to the Red Cross or Project Hope. The key is to establish a social welfare system and, with the support of relevant laws, create a fair platform so that the wealthy elite can choose a mechanism they are comfortable with, make their desired contribution, and act in a noble-minded manner.
 
Another thing along the same lines is that if we want entrepreneurs to engage in social welfare activities, a relaxed, safe and free external environment is a prerequisite. Why do so many entrepreneurs go abroad?  Is it because they are unpatriotic? No, it's mainly because of the environment in China, and I'm not talking about smog and the natural environment, but the political environment, which makes people very worried. When entrepreneurs have no legal protection even for their private property rights, it means they have a huge sense of insecurity and uncertainty.  In such a context, who is going to care about helping poor people?  In fact, Chinese entrepreneurs cannot get away from politics, because their business is closely linked to the huge transformation of Chinese society.
 
I think Chinese society really needs entrepreneurs to make their voices heard and make substantial contributions. This is because a significant part of the economic wealth of Chinese society is in the hands of these entrepreneurs, and reform and opening have greatly served their interests. Now is the time for entrepreneurs to take social responsibility instead of saying business is business and staying out of politics, as if that were really possible.  
 
First, even if you do not want to talk about politics, politics will seek you out, because if China ever abandons political reform and returns to a planned economy, where will you be?  Second, the fact that you have been able to develop a large-scale private enterprise to this point is a result of China's political reform.  In light of this, Chinese entrepreneurs should really think about their responsibilities as entrepreneurs.  I think the key is to push China to make more changes.  If we have seen that the first round of reform was economic reform, then the second round must at least be social reform, which means building democracy and the rule of law, to which entrepreneurs must make their own contribution.

Entrepreneurs have an important responsibility in the future transformation of Chinese society, which they cannot shirk. This responsibility reminds me of the gentry constitutionalists of the late Qing period, who, in a sense, were also entrepreneurs. They participated in social change during the critical period of the constitutional movement and the 1911 revolution and played a crucial role in establishing the Republic of China. It cannot be the case that, more than a century later, China's entrepreneurs are less worthy of those of the late Qing and Republican eras. Some of the entrepreneurs I have met, such as those involved in SEE and the Yabuli Panda House,[23] as well as Wang Ying, give me hope. They were all early adopters of Robert's Rules of Order, implementing democratic rules of procedure in public institutions, or organizing in-depth readings of Western legal and political classics, as Wang did with her book club.
 
They are cultivating the political awareness and legal knowledge of a new generation of entrepreneurs, preparing them for the intellectual, theoretical, and organizational transformation of society in the future. When this large group of entrepreneurs completes their transformation from everyday people to citizens with civic consciousness, there will be hope for China's society. Thus, my concern is not only about making the elite noble-minded, which is a matter of personal morality, but also about whether they can take responsibility for building a civil society and actively participate in the construction of a future China, as the constitutionalists did in the late Qing period.
 
Huang Jisu: Let me add a few words. The entrepreneurial class, or the bourgeoisie, is not made of steel; they are human beings, and as such are influenced by culture. An important influence of culture on human beings is that their social existence does not have a direct causal relationship with their social consciousness, and that their social consciousness can deviate from and even transcend their social existence. I have always believed that a more ideal society is a product both of the natural outcome of competing interests and the active intervention of "dreaming" through culture, religion, and ideology.  I don't think the latter is necessarily more powerful than the former, but at certain important points in history, during breakthroughs and transitions, their enormous influence is visible. 
 
At the current moment, the idea of noble-mindedness as a cultural force should not be overestimated, but neither should we overestimate it. What we talked about earlier, the fact that the values of wealth completely dominate Chinese society, is at the root of many of China's social problems. But it's not clear what to do about it, and let's face it, it's not the working class at the bottom of society that's going to do it.  Do they dare to be content with poverty and strive for virtue 安贫乐道?... Their poverty has been imposed on them by society and the economy, and it's not as if they have much choice in terms of cultural psychology.
 
The bureaucratic class once had its relatively independent value system, but now you see how greedy they are, how they have been completely conquered by the dollar sign. Intellectuals once had the cultural resources to resist materialistic values, but instead of resisting, they compete to pave the way for these values. How many intellectuals today dare to act like intellectuals, dare to be intellectuals? Either they envy the rich or they envy important officials - in fact, an official position is just a coupon to be redeemed. This is mainly because the market has taken over everything, and people are too afraid not to go along with it. 
 
In short, those with little or no money dare not underestimate money and dare not say "no" to the value of wealth.  Only the rich themselves can say "no" to these values, and these are, of course, the enlightened among the rich, the few who want to be a little noble.   What we call trying to do better 向上向善 is not that hard, we just need to rein in our current excesses. At present, many children of the rich go too far, showing off their wealth as if it were a demonstration or a parade, which is irresponsible both to society at large and even to the safety of their own class.   So I hope that more wealthy people will wake up and take the first steps toward a less ostentatious lifestyle.
 
Xiao Sanza:  After listening to your discussion today, I am reminded of a couplet by the philosopher Feng Youlan 冯友兰 (1895-1990):  "Explore ancient culture to enliven the present; perfect yourself to practice moderation 阐旧邦以辅新命,极高明而道中庸."  In fact, extremes on both the left and the right are dangerous, and we must grasp the middle way, whether it is the middle left or the middle right.  As for the question of who should lead society forward, we ended up talking quite a bit about the responsibility of the rich because we were discussing the role of entrepreneurs in the current situation. But it is obvious that it is not enough just to think about the rich, because only when people with a sense of responsibility come together can we really move things forward, and it is unrealistic to rely on any one element. I think this is implicit in what you both said, and I just want to underline it.
 
Question from the audience: I would like to ask both professors how they see China’s future.
 
Gao Quanxi: We need to adopt a dual perspective while analyzing the current situation in China. First, we must conduct an objective analysis instead of indulging in unproven predictions as China's future depends on the competition between various forces. Secondly, we should have specific expectations and a clear vision of where we want to go.

From an objective standpoint, China is at a critical juncture once again, akin to the transition from Qing to the Republic, more than a century ago. There have been significant changes over the past century, including the establishment of CCP rule after the KMT-led Republic, the Mao era with the Cultural Revolution, followed by reform and opening that lasted for over thirty years. At present, China finds itself at a historical turning point. The changes that are coming will not be superficial, but of an epoch-making nature, and we must think about them in the context of China's past century.
Regarding expectations, I hope that China will integrate into the world and embrace the rule of law, democracy, and constitutional governance. We should strive to achieve this outcome to the best of our abilities.
 
Huang Jisu:  We can view China from two perspectives: up close or from a distance. When viewed up close, we can identify many problems and issues, especially for those like me who live in China. It is natural to be critical of these issues. However, it is also important to take a step back and view China from a distance. Doing so allows us to see China's strengths, which can give us confidence. Throughout history, as modern capitalism expanded throughout the world, many nations and cultures have been erased. When the European fleet arrived on the coast of America, the indigenous tribes knelt down before them, believing that they were gods who had come down to earth. However, when the European fleet appeared in the South China Sea, Chinese scholars accurately judged that China and the Chinese people faced the risk of extermination, even if they were wrong about smaller matters, such as believing that foreigners had no knees and thus could not bend. This shows that China is a civilization with a high degree of rationality.

Another example of this is that when the rich go overboard in their taste for luxuries, the Chinese people get angry.  In contrast, when the children of South Asian tycoons get married, they charter a couple of Boeings, fly to Italy and rent an ancient castle, and their fellow citizens don’t care at all.  The poor watch the rich cavorting around with their jewels on their crummy TVs and they don’t bat an eyelid. This shows that Chinese civilization has maintained a strong sense of social justice, even if our movies and television shows are going all out to push South Asian propaganda, hoping that the poor will not be jealous of the rich but instead envy them, or even just admire them. So, seven or eight years ago, I said that China, with its rich history and civilization, its tortuous modern experience, and its strong latecomer advantage, should do pretty well in the face of the changing contemporary world. I still see it that way today. That is why I want to continue to criticize China's problems and urge it to improve in order to live up to this rare historical opportunity. That's all, thank you.
 
Question from the audience:  Professor Gao just talked about how people view the Cultural Revolution and the United States, but not everyone shares this view.  For example, some people see the Cultural Revolution as legitimate and positive, and do not see the United States as the be all and end all, meaning that it is impossible for China to imitate everything about the U.S.
 
Gao Quanxi:   First, how should we view the Cultural Revolution? This is a topic that has attracted a lot of attention lately. My view is that regardless of whether we approve of or oppose the Cultural Revolution, we should allow people to openly discuss and study it. It has been almost fifty years since the event, and the government should have the confidence to allow people to talk about it. Today, the Cultural Revolution has become a symbol, and people use it to talk about other things, but what actually happened during that time? Many people do not know the details.
 
Since the verdict on the Cultural Revolution was issued at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, people should be allowed to discuss and investigate it. By seeking truth from facts and debating the issue, the truth will become clear. Therefore, the biggest problem is not whether we see the Cultural Revolution as good or bad, but rather that the authorities should permit discussion and reflection on this issue.
 
Moving on to the second question, I believe that we should approach the United States without being overly emotional and without blindly opposing or worshiping it. Instead, we should recognize that the United States is a modern country with its own domestic politics and foreign policy.
 
In terms of domestic politics, the United States is a constitutional democracy with a developed market economy where the rights of its citizens are guaranteed. It is important to acknowledge that this system is legitimate and widely supported by the American people.
 
However, in foreign affairs, the United States is a hegemonic state that prioritizes its own national interests. We need to rationally understand that the U.S. military, economy, and technological systems serve American national interests, which can sometimes conflict with China's national interests. As such, competition in international relations is a separate issue.
 
As China further develops its modernization, it is important that we not only focus on economic reform to improve the lives of our citizens, but also actively participate in setting global legal standards through institutions such as the WTO and TPP. This will allow us to express China’s national interests and compete with the United States on a level playing field.
 
However, it is important to acknowledge that China’s domestic system is still a challenge when it comes to earning respect on the world stage. Generally speaking, only countries that are truly democratic and practice the rule of law earn respect in international affairs. Therefore, China's ongoing reforms must aim to make the people the masters of our society, with their citizen rights protected by the rule of law. Only then will we be truly respected abroad and able to compete with the United States over national interests.
 
Notes

[1] Interview with 高全喜 and 黄纪苏, “左右不为难,” in 萧三匝, 站在刺猬这一边 (Haikou: Nanhai Chubanshe, 2016), pp. 31-65.

[2]左右为难——中国当代思潮访谈录 (Fuzhou:  Fujian Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2012).  The title is a pun in Chinese:  the expression zuoyou weinan/左右为难 means “an awkward predicament,” while a literal translation would be “left and right are both difficult,” and much of Xiao’s book deals with conflicts between left- and right-wing intellectuals in China.

[3]Translator’s note:  I don’t know who Pei Jun is, and it might be “Mr. Pei,” as jun/君 is used in this sense in literary texts.

[4] Translator’s note:  i.e., one’s spiritual state is the point of the exercise, salvation itself is a spiritual state.  In the context of the debate Xiao is hosting, he means thinking clearly is the point, not the ideological conclusions at which one eventually arrives.

[5] Translator’s note:  the “Qin system” is shorthand for the Chinese authoritarian system, created by the Qin dynasty in the third century B.C.  Qin Hui’s 2016 book Leaving the Imperial System Behind 走出帝制 elaborates on the idea, although I do not know if Qin himself was the first to use the term.

[6]Translator’s note:  In this context, “Enlightenment” refers to the liberal intellectual trends that broadly characterized the decade of the 1980s.

[7] Translator’s note: “Utopia” refers to a bookstore and a website, both of which bear the name, and both of which defend Mao Zedong and Maoist ideas.

[8] Translator’s note:  “Temporary housing 临时周转房” is that provided by companies or universities for new employees, and is meant to be transitional.  My impression is that this is a topical reference to something occurring in Chinese society at the time and is meant to be humorous.

[9]Translator’s note:  I have no idea what Huang means by this.  Again, it must be a topical reference to something someone said in China at the time.

[10]Attributed to the German poet Heinrich Heine (1797-1856).  I am unfamiliar with the quotation, but the meaning is fairly obvious.

[11] Translator’s note:  See here for a discussion of “vertical democratic meritocracy” in China. 

[12] Translator’s note:  Gu Zhun, trained as an accountant, joined the underground Communist movement in his youth, but was branded a “rightist” after the revolution for daring to speak his mind to senior officials.  His diary was discovered and published in the 1990s, where it was revealed that he “re-invented” liberalism on his own, something that has given great hope to Chinese liberals who sometimes despair of liberalism’s foreign origins.

[13] Translator’s note:  Lin Biao 林彪 (1907-1971), was a general in the PLA and Chairman Mao’s right-hand man during much of the Cultural Revolution—responsible for the idea of Mao’s Little Red Book, for example.  However, in 1971, an airplane taking him to the Soviet Union supposedly crashed in Inner Mongolia after he was found to have been plotting against Chairman Mao.  This incident was one of the first to spark widespread cynicism about the Cultural Revolution in China.

[14] Translator’s note:  The April 5th Incident was a gathering and mass protest that occurred in Tiananmen Square in early April of 1976 in support of Zhou Enlai, who had died some weeks earlier, and against those identified with the leadership of the Cultural Revolution.

[15]Translator’s note:  Dushu/读书 (Reading) was China’s most influential intellectual review at the time.

[16]Translator’s note:  Scar Literature/伤痕文学 explored the suffering of the people under the Cultural Revolution, and was seen as quite daring at the time.

[17] Translator’s note:  At the end of the Cultural Revolution, some Chinese intellectuals tried to save Marxism and point it in a more promising direction by returning to the early Marx and exploring “Marxist Humanism.”  See here for one example.

[18] Translator’s note:  I do not know the precise reference for the “four meetings and one center.”  For information on the Moganshan meeting (in Chinese) see here. Clearly, these all are related to the launching of market reforms in China. 

[19] Translator’s note:  Deng’s Southern Tour marked China’s reembrace of reform and opening, which had been set aside after the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989.

[20] Translator’s note:  This refers to the government’s “climate intervention” which produced clear skies for the 2014 APEC meeting in Beijing.  See here for more information.

[21] Translator’s note:  This is an organization of entrepreneurs joining together to try to reduce sandstorms originating in the Axla Desert, a UNESCO world heritage site in Inner Mongolia. See here for more information. 

[22] Translator’s note:  Wang Ying is a female entrepreneur who set up a popular book club at some point in the 2010s, focused on classical liberalism.  The first year they read nothing but Hayek.  For more information, see here (in Chinese) and here in English (Wall Street Journal video clip).

[23] Translator’s note:  The Yabuli Panda House is connected to the Yabuli Ski Resort, China’s largest, and I assume must be a charitable undertaking organized by Chinese entrepreneurs.