Ge Zhaoguang, "If Horses Had Wings"

Ge Zhaoguang, “If Horses Had Wings : The Political Demands of Mainland New Confucians in Recent Years”[1]

Introduction and translation by David Ownby

Ge Zhaoguang (b. 1950) is a Professor in the National Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies and the Department of History at Fudan University in Shanghai. He is a scholar of immense erudition whose principle focus during his career has been on traditional Chinese intellectual history. Samples of his work available in English translation include books such as What is China? Territory, Ethnicity, Culture and History (Harvard, 2018) and An Intellectual History of China (Brill, 2014), as well as a spate of articles in journals such as Chinese Studies in History and Frontiers of History in China. Ge is also a public intellectual who uses his erudition to challenge some of the bombastic, chauvinistic rhetoric that has accompanied China’s rise.

In this long essay (almost 30,000 words in translation), Ge takes aim at China’s Mainland New Confucians. Inspired by China’s rise, these “Mainland New Confucians,” a group headed by Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang Xiaoguang and others, have cast aside the cultural approach adopted by diaspora New Confucians (Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Tu Wei-ming) to reclaim the political mantle of Confucian scholars of the dynastic age. They argue that reform-era China has succeeded largely in spite of a disastrous twentieth century that saw China fail in efforts to imitate Western Republicanism and Soviet socialism. China has succeeded because of her unique civilization, and can only continue to develop and eventually serve as world example if her Confucian heritage is reaffirmed and integrated into China’s political and social life. Jiang Qing, the “founding father” of the Mainland New Confucians, has been making this argument for some years. More recently, Xi Jinping’s promise to revive the Chinese nation through the realization of the China Dream has prompted like-minded intellectuals to join the cause and provide Confucian content which they hope will appeal to authorities still searching to establish the foundation for a lasting political legitimacy. As Ge notes in his text, Mainland New Confucians now constitute a major intellectual force in China, together with the Liberals and the New Left.

In his essay, Ge does the Mainland New Confucians the dubious honor of taking them seriously. The writings of Mainland New Confucians are full of propositions of breath-taking audacity. Without discussing China’s existing political institutions, Jiang Qing has argued that China needs a tricameral government, with one elected chamber, one meritocratic chamber, and one chamber headed by a descendent of Confucius. Other propositions include the restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of Confucianism as a national religion. Marxism and socialism are regularly condemned in Mainland New Confucian texts as “Western” errors. The Confucian revival—which means many things to many people—is widely popular in China, and is tolerated and at times even supported by the Party-State because of its traditional and authoritarian overtones. Yet if Confucian propositions are taken seriously, they constitute a major challenge to the reigning political and social order, and even a challenge to the very notion of a “modern” China.

This is what Ge Zhaoguang lays bare in his text. His argument, though lengthy, is simple: the Mainland New Confucians have nothing new to offer. They are recycling a naïve, ahistorical, utopian vision of traditional Confucian rule in the hopes of gaining political power for themselves. Their scholarship is shoddy and superficial, and rarely addresses China’s current problems. They are motivated by cultural pride and cultural conservatism, which are broadly appealing to enough Chinese for their soaring rhetoric to gain a certain amount of dreamy traction as nostalgia, or perhaps as a pleasant counterweight to everyday propaganda, but as serious proposals they are no better than anachronisms.

Part of what Ge says is thus that “the emperor has no clothes.” Yet how he says it is as important as what he says. Ge writes as a scholar, not as a polemicist, and the footnotes are almost as long as the text itself. He simultaneously takes the Mainland New Confucians seriously, illustrating the utter impracticality of many of their propositions, and at the same time, shows the Mainland New Confucians what he thinks proper scholarship should look like. I doubt they will be convinced (Ge tells me that they have been unhappy, but silent, since the publication of his piece), but for scholars interested in the rise of the Mainland New Confucians, Ge’s footnotes are invaluable.

To my mind, Ge’s essay is not the last word on the subject (although it has been widely read and discussed in China, reaching tens if not hundreds of thousands of readers). Ge’s text is comprehensive and convincing, but not objective or sympathetic. He writes like a professor criticizing an immature student who has let her pen get away from her. His (usually) gentle sarcasm will certainly sting, but I doubt that the Mainland New Confucians will be deterred. The best among them may well try to think their way past the problems Ge has rightly criticized.

Translating Ge’s essay was a challenge. The text is littered both with many, many citations from the writings of the Mainland New Confucians, and with many classical, Confucian references, which Ge uses both to sarcastic and scholarly effect. The mot juste in English often proved difficult to find. As a result, I left more Chinese characters in the text than I might otherwise do, both to honor Ge’s practice of citing his authors, and to convey the flavor of the classical allusions.

Translation

Author’s Introduction: Three Events in 2014-2016[2]

Over the past few years, three events related to China’s New Confucians have captured general attention in the Chinese thought world. The first was when, at a certain conference attended by all the right people, a speaker argued that “the legislator[3] of modern China is not Sun Yat-sen, nor is it Mao Zedong or Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1869–1936).[4] Kang Youwei 康有为[5] (1858-1927) is the legislator of modern China.” He subsequently noted that Kang had foreseen many things about the modern world and about China, all of which set in motion a “return to Kang Youwei” movement.[6]

The second incident occurred in 2015, when deep differences and divisive arguments took place between Mainland and Taiwan New Confucians, who had originally been aligned. The argument appeared first in the media, but subsequently, in early 2016, Confucians from both sides of the Taiwan straits held a joint meeting. As we can tell from the 81-page transcript they published, the arguments remained quite heated and personal.[7]

The third incident was in 2016, when five “eminences”[8] of the Mainland New Confucians[9] staged a joint performance and in Singapore published a “knock-down drag-out 重拳出击” volume entitled China Must Reconfucianize—New Proposals of the ‘Mainland New Confucians.”[10] In this volume, they fully expressed the their political demands and cultural arguments, not only their aim to reconstruct the legitimacy of the ruling party, but also their “comprehensive plan” for China’s future. As they put it, this was the first “collective Confucian statement since the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ and it calls for a return to Confucianism, a return to the moral tradition, and the Confucianization of China.” [11]

These incidents are all related, and signify at least three things :   first, Mainland New Confucians have already broken away from the influence of New Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan; second, the central concerns of the Mainland New Confucians have shifted from culture to politics; and third, the leaders of the Mainland New Confucians are no longer content to “sit and talk about the Way” in lonely academic settings, but want to take their place at center stage, roll up their sleeves and get to work planning Chinese politics and institutions. In other words, the Mainland New Confucians are no longer satisfied with being a “soul without a body.”[12] They want to bring the two back together.

There is nothing strange about this. From ancient times, Confucians have always hoped to be “the emperor’s teacher” within the imperial court, to “embellish official matters with their knowledge of the classics”[13] on the political scene, or at the least, in a ritual context, to “dress in the dark square-made robe and the black linen cap, to act as a modest assistant.”[14] It is only in the past hundred years, with the gradual integration of New Confucians into modern society, and their acceptance of pluralistic ideas and modern institutions, that they have stopped advocating the “abandonment of the hundred schools,”[15] as they no longer had any direct control over politics or institutions. For this reason, they had little desire to “engage in politics” or “to serve in government” in the first, second, or even third generation of New Confucians.

However, in the past few years, Mainland New Confucians have openly proclaimed[16] that they want to move from a Confucianism of self-cultivation to a political Confucianism, from cultural construction to political participation, which has left many scholars stunned. Of course, what has surprised many is the rather shocking nature of their political proposals. For example, they have argued that if China’s ruling government wants legitimacy, it must establish Confucianism as the state religion. As another example, they argue that the structure of China’s current government is not rational, and that it should set up a tricameral order with a House of Confucian Tradition 通儒院, a House of Commoners 庶民院, and a House of National Essence 国体院.[17] Yet again, they want to discard political ideologies that have come from the West, and replace them with the Confucian “learning of kings and officials.”[18] They also demand that the government return Confucian temple property and restore Confucian rituals, and that they make the Confucian classics the basic focus of elementary and secondary education.

In sum, their goal is to establish a “Confucian state” where politics and religion are one. These slogans, viewpoints and institutional arguments have changed the basic ideas and orientation of modern New Confucians—which after 1949 have been Diaspora New Confucians—with the result that the Mainland New Confucianism has become, like liberalism or socialism, an important participant in mainland Chinese cultural debates, as well as in the design of China’s political system.

As the saying has it, “it takes more than one cold day for the ice to freeze three feet thick.” Looking back on this drastic change, I feel that it, too, did not occur overnight, and must in fact have its own social background and political logic. For the purposes of clarity and concision, I will pass rapidly over the events of the past thirty years or so. A complete discussion of the question would include: the entry of diaspora New Confucianism into China in the 1980s; the “divergences” or “apostasies” of the Mainland New Confucians in the 1990s; and their ultimate rise since 2004. I will begin my analysis rather with the more recent differences between diaspora New Confucians and Mainland New Confucians, and the issues at the heart of these differences.

1. An Intellectual Parting of the Ways: A Mainland New Confucianism that Sharply Distinguishes between Barbarian and Chinese

There is no doubt that Mainland New Confucianism drew its inspiration from diaspora New Confucianism beginning in the 1980s. In the past, they called diaspora New Confucians their “guides,” and both in terms of intellectual capital and academic genealogy the two groups were part of the same heritage and were looking for the same things in similar ways. But during a discussion of universal values at a 2011 conference, a Mainland New Confucian scholar angrily criticized diaspora New Confucians, saying that they were “useless, brainless, gutless losers 很糟糕，没思想,没勇气，没出息.”[19] Of course, such scorn and disdain displeased the Taiwanese New Confucians, who felt that it was nothing more than “chauvinism.” The Taiwanese New Confucian Li Minghui 李明辉 (b. 1953) not only published criticisms of this in the mainland media, but also, in a subsequent dialogue between the two pointedly asked: “Who is going to talk to you if you use language like this?”[20]

In fact, however, what these Taiwanese scholars don’t understand is that today’s Mainland New Confucians have “abandoned the raft to climb ashore,” have “thrown away the net now that they have caught the fish;” in other words, they no longer need anyone to guide them, or anyone to dialogue with. Indeed, the “partner” with which the Mainland New Confucians wish to “dialogue” has already changed. They are not like diaspora New Confucians in the past, who needed the help of Western philosophy to interpret Confucian thought; nor do they need to identify with “universal values” or “democratic institutions,” because they feel that their former teachers “indulged in too much of this universalist dialogue, which always emphasized common elements between Confucianism and Western culture.”[21] Mainland New Confucians think this is harmful, and what Confucianism has to do is to “attack heterodoxy for the harm it does.” As a result, their slogan is “refuse the West, excise heterodoxy.”[22]

This change, from a perspective of searching for points of commonality between traditional Chinese Confucian thought and modern Western universal values, to one of striving to establish clear boundaries between Chinese thought and Western values, is huge. In the description of a young friend of mine, it’s the change from saying “what you’ve got I have too,” to “I’ve got what you don’t.”

Here, we should carry out a brief survey of the evolution of the relations between diaspora and Mainland Confucians over the past few decades.[23] On the stops and starts in the evolution of New Confucianism on the mainland since the 1980s, we might note the many reviews and discussions of a considerable number of scholars.[24] It is worth reminding readers that the diaspora New Confucianism newly entering China in the 1980s both affirmed modern values and sought to promote traditional ideas, and hence was part of the “culture craze” that marked the beginning of China’s period of reform and opening. There was no basic conflict here with the general trend of seeking modernization.

This was especially true since diaspora New Confucianism brought with it a deep sense of social criticism and traditional concerns, as well as new intellectual capital in the form of Kant and other Western philosophers as interpretive frames. It was also seen as positive that these were “imports” from abroad and from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and in addition the successful experiences of the Four Asian Little Dragons served as an empirical proof of their relevance.[25] In addition, in the 1980s, diaspora New Confucians made a special effort to welcome some mainland scholars, Mainland New Confucians with whom they have now parted ways. In short, many people actively embraced this “exotic thought.”[26]

The diaspora New Confucian tradition, whether we are talking about Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-1978), Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995), Zhang Junmai 张君劢 (1887-1969), or perhaps Qian Mu 钱穆 (1895-1990), and including Tu Wei-ming 杜维明 (b. 1940), who has been very influential in spreading the thought of Mainland New Confucians, at the least basically accepted modern values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights, even as they bitterly mourned the fading of China’s cultural tradition. At the same time, they relied on two scholarly techniques to develop Confucian thought further: one was to use interpretations from Western thought (as in the case of Kant); and the other was to recycle concepts from Chinese history (such as daotong 道统 [orthodoxy in the sense of moral and intellectual truth] and zhengtong 政統 [sacred or legitimate political authority]).

For this reason, they truly concentrated most of their efforts on the development of a social ethics, a humanistic spirit and other intellectual resources necessary to sustain their project. As one scholar said it well, “those who advocated New Confucianism were scholars and professors, and their profession was research and scholarship. They hoped that their scholarship could have some benefit for the contemporary world. But most of these benefits would be confined to the minds of intellectuals. In the atmosphere of agitation, exchange, and absorption that characterized the move from traditional culture toward the modern world, they had little hope that their project would yield major results. They had no expectation that their intellectual scholarship could become an ideological scholarship to arm the masses, producing an ‘inestimable’ real-world outcome.”[27]

Clearly, this path, which we might see as “moderate” or “hybrid” is in large measure a cultural theory, based on rational thought.[28] In the eyes of these scholars, even if they mourned the decline and isolation of the spirit of traditional Chinese culture, it was still necessary to respect the universal values of the modern world and those of the international order. Even if these universal values that emphasized democracy, freedom and equality had first been propagated in the modern West, and even if the international system, based on the nation-state, had also been first defined by the West, none of this prevented China from accepting these “good things.”[29]

To use a simple metaphor, if the world were a huge symphony, then should China harmonize with the existing music, or insist on beating its own rhythm? These are two contradictory ways to advance. The diaspora New Confucians chose the first method, while the Mainland New Confucians aim to employ the second. This is why the scholarly Confucian who “sits and talks about the Way” came to be seen by the “institution-building” Mainland New Confucians as people who “drew up battle plans on paper.” They feel that the mere acknowledgement of universal values is a capitulation to “Westernization,” which is “harmful,”[30] and in essence is a matter of “self-barbarization.”

What is “self-barbarization?” We should note that “barbarization 夷狄化” is an extremely heavy accusation, because it signals that a difference is not only a discrepancy in values, but is also elevated to a clash between civilized and primitive, an absolute antagonism between race and culture. Why did New Confucian thought change from “all men are brothers” to a distinction between Chinese and others? Surely it was not just a case of the Mainland New Confucians seeking to distinguish themselves from the diaspora New Confucians? It does not look like it. Instead, the idea of breaking out of the cage of diaspora New Confucian thought, and setting up their own schools and ways of thinking, naturally and gradually emerged from within the Mainland New Confucian movement over the course of the 1990s.[31]

In 1995, Jiang Qing published his Implications of Gongyang Studies 公羊学引论, which clearly announced that his “political Confucianism” was parting ways with the diaspora New Confucianism’s “Confucianism of the heart/mind 心性儒学.”[32] This also seems to be the point at which Mainland New Confucians declared that they were abandoning the academy and entering the political realm. With the publication of Jiang Qing’s “Political Confucianism” in 2003, he even more clearly pointed out that his ideal politics was to “realize a Confucian political system based on ritual spirit, the ideal of the kingly way, the wisdom of unity, the theory of the three ages and the son of heaven.”[33] He argued that only Confucian political thought and political institutions could allow peoples throughout East Asia to “decide on their proper life course, prosper and multiply, while living a Confucian, harmonious, and stable political life.”

Yet what is puzzling is that in the past few years, their arguments have become ever more intense, fiery, and radical. Mainland New Confucians criticize their New Confucian forbearers, from the May 4th forward, for having “abandoned the burden of searching for an institutional basis for Confucian renewal, because all they could see was Western institutions, so that their courage was applied to the sole question of how to renew Confucianism in a way that would fit with Western institutions.”[34] In addition, they issue judgements like: Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, Zhang Junmai and Qian Mu all sought to guide China toward the path of Western science and democracy, a path “that was wholly defeatist for Confucianism.”[35]

Even more worrisome is the fact that they elevate this difference in terms of intellectual orientation to a difference in terms of race or civilization, so that a divergence, which, at the outset, was something that could be discussed, becomes an absolute standpoint that brooks no accommodation. Everyone knows that critiques of “universal values” that discard freedom, democracy and human rights like an old shoe, relegating them all to “the West,” are not hard to find in discourse in mainland China. But the Mainland New Confucians have innovated in linking such thinking to differences between “Chinese and barbarians 华夷之辩.” A self-proclaimed Confucian scholar says that if we “universalize” and accept external values, then “this means that we have barbarized ourselves.”[36]

Why is praising universal values the equivalent of “barbarization”? Surely it’s not just because today’s universal values come from the West? What is hard to believe is that there are still people today who cling to the notion that, “the Chinese, the Western barbarians, the Southern barbarians, and the people of the five directions all have their [unchanging] natures” which means, in other words, “if they are not of my race, then their hearts must be different .”[37] It is even harder to believe is that they add the Western “law of the jungle” to the traditional Chinese distinction between Chinese and barbarian, thus arriving at a subversive viewpoint, arguing that the reason that past New Confucians had no choice but to accept universal values was because in the modern period the West was stronger, meaning that Western principles became those that had to be followed. Even if there was a basic conflict with traditional Chinese values, there was nothing to do but to accept Western values temporarily. They say it is not that Confucians do not want to discuss universal values; what they want is for our East Asian Confucian values to be the “definers” of universal values.

How does one become the “definer” of values? Some New Confucians have an even more shocking view. First, they link China up with Japan, and do not hesitate to evoke the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” of the World War II period. They say that theoretical basis of this co-prosperity sphere is in fact the “Chinese-barbarian theory 夷夏理论” found in the Spring and Autumn Annals, the notion that East Asia shares a common culture and a common race. Not only did Wang Jingwei 汪精卫 (1883-1944)[38] talk about this, so did Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei, which means that it is “not a treasonous theory, because its basic idea is to promote an alliance between China and Japan to resist the Western barbarians.”[39]

In addition, they also cite ancient East Asian history and argue that in the past, East Asian Confucian values were universal values that circulated throughout the known world. Why? Because “at the time China was surrounded only by small countries that could not defeat China, or even dare to slander China, and Chinese values thus became universal values.” They turn a conflict over values into a conflict over races, or a conflict between races into a contest of strength. Clearly, they are not worried about the possible negative outcomes of nationalism. One scholar went so far as to say that it is only because at the moment, “China cannot beat America” that we cannot bring up arguments about “the difference between Chinese and barbarian” outside of China, but once China is powerful, when “no one can defeat us,” then there will be universal respect for our values, which is called “using Chineseness to convert the barbarians 以夏变夷.” They say, “Once China is number one…and has genuine self-confidence, then it can insist on the idea of the difference between Chinese and barbarians.”[40]

As Mencius said, “If we wish to bring peace to the world, in a time like today, who could they turn to but me?”[41] Confucians have always been big talkers, with bold vision. The Neo-Confucians shared this, beginning with Song Neo-Confucians like the Cheng Brothers 從二程 [Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033-1107) and Cheng Hao 程颢 (1032-1085)], Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), and Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1193), all the way down to modern New Confucians like Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan, all of whom had much courage and felt the burden of their times. Yu Ying-shih 余英時 (b. 1930) said it well: “Looking at the intellectual tendencies of the first and second generations of New Confucians, what they hoped to build was an exalted ‘teaching’ that included all cultural activities, and not some ‘school’ that was limited to the intellectual world. They were not content to remain solely a philosophical current. The status of the ‘teaching’ they imagined was probably higher even than the theological achievements of the Western middle ages. Confucianism in traditional China had never achieved this…Even if the New Confucians had, in real world terms, moved far away of the realm where the virtuous ruler controls the world, their ambition to achieve something similar on an intellectual level remained unbreakable.”[42]

Yet we should also admit that the first through the third generations of New Confucians could also reflect logically on world affairs, analyze intellectual values, while remaining open to the notion of adoption of and merging with Western values. They would never have thought that their goal was to become “the uncrowned king 素王,”[43] and the imaginative energy they invested in seeking to rebuild Chinese intellectual and cultural confidence greatly exceeded that of the more recent generations. What today’s Mainland New Confucians want to do is to be the “teacher to the emperor,” to rebuild the national and the world order in political and institutional terms.

To use a comparison with the Western Han that they seem to particularly enjoy, if the early generations of New Confucians wanted to be like Lu Jia 陸賈 (d. 170 BCE),[44] who commented on the Shijing and the Shujing, who wrote the Xinyu, and whose “reputation was known among the high ranking officials at the Han court,” then today’s New Confucians want to be the “sage” Shusun Tong 叔孫通 (d. 188 BCE), who was capable of changing with the times, who understood the important issues of the day, and who directed the emperor in “defining the rituals of the Han rituals.”[45]

This is why Mainland New Confucians say that diaspora New Confucians are “losers.” They criticize Mou Zongsan and the early generation of New Confucians, as well as contemporary diaspora New Confucians like Li Minghui, arguing that they have committed basic errors on this point. They also admit that it is China’s rise over the past few years that has led to the current change in the discourse. There are Mainland New Confucians who are polite about it: “Although in terms of their personality and their achievement, the New Confucians represented by Tang, Mou, and Xu can be seen as milestones, yet today, with the appearance of new problems, it can now be seen very clearly that Confucianism truly must attempt to open a new road.”[46]

So what is the new way forward? In their view, it is to “return to Kang Youwei,” who will lay down the law for China in terms of politics and institutions. As they put it, “For the past hundred years, the mainstream position of modern New Confucianism has basically been occupied by Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan and company. Thus now when we talk about ‘returning to Kang Youwei,’ what we are really doing is seeking another road for New Confucianism.”[47] There are three steps in the identification of this road: first, circumventing or transcending the path chosen by those like Mou Zongsan, moving from a Confucianism of cultivation to a political Confucianism; next, denying Western universal values, and establishing the absolute significance of Chinese Confucianism; and finally, creating a complete set of plans for Confucian politics and institutions, which will be realized in the current era.

I should point out that this “striking out on our own” sort of thinking on the part of the Mainland New Confucians had its own special background at the outset. In this context, we should note the shock and role of the 1989 Tian’anmen incident. This incident, in addition to its effects on the Chinese political situation, also led to extreme changes in the mainland Chinese thought world, as well as constituting one of the reasons that Mainland New Confucians came to part ways with diaspora New Confucians. The mainland political situation is unlike that of Taiwan, and all intellectual theories on the mainland are caught up in a political context where political power is extremely strong and where ideology rules everything; hence these theories cannot but fall in line and be politicized. The few Mainland New Confucians who, in the face of this severe political pressure, tried to express viewpoints that diverged from the mainstream political ideology have been forced to abandon moderate or rational academic methods, which clearly requires a certain courage.

On this matter we should note that just a few months after Tian’anmen, Jiang Qing published his 35,000-character essay entitled “The Present Significance of the Restoration of Confucianism on the Chinese Mainland and the Difficulties Facing this Project,” in the Taiwanese monthly Ehu 鹅湖. This essay, which has been viewed as the Mainland New Confucians’ “manifesto,” in fact can also be seen as an effort by Mainland New Confucians not to identify with mainstream political ideology, and in intellectual terms to try to seek out another standpoint or point of departure. And it was precisely for this reason that this essay was considered a symbol, a symbol that the Mainland New Confucians “already existed as a scholarly group on the Chinese mainland.”[48]

The Mainland New Confucians, having gone through the 1990s the 2000s, and the 2010s, and having parted ways with the diaspora New Confucians, have truly established their own identity. Yet they have taken up an extremist path which they themselves may not clearly understand, driven by the sad memories of the past century, by the mood of excitement generated by China’s current rise, and by the inherent logic of their intellectual narrative.

2. A Political Plan and a Cultural Prescription? The Political System Designed by the Mainland New Confucians for Contemporary China

In the terms used by the Mainland New Confucians themselves, their difference with the diaspora New Confucians is that, while the latter focused on being “inner sages 内圣” they themselves want to become “outer kings 外王.” What does that mean? It means that Mainland New Confucians no longer wish to be limited to the empty exercise of “sitting and talking about the Way,” and instead want to get down to the business of “dividing up the cities and measuring the countryside.”[49] In a criticism lodged by one scholar, in the past, diaspora New Confucians were a handful of university professors talking to one another, and even if they managed to effect a “metaphysical conservation” of Confucianism, this nonetheless led to “the fragmentation of its original institutional existence.”[50] The Mainland New Confucians are completely different, having moved from the domains of culture and thought into those of politics and institutions, and in terms of practice from “cultivating the self and regulating the family” to “ruling the country and pacifying tianxia,” the Confucian logic that moves from inner to outer.

The problem is that the move from inner sage to outer king is easy to talk about, but hard to accomplish. Confucians are accustomed to talking about ethics and morality, about transformation through education, and in terms of institutions, they often talk about ritual and music. When they find themselves out of their depths, they often simply change the names of things or repackage them, and in so doing self-avowed Confucians become in fact closet Legalists, sometimes borrowing resources directly from the Legalists.[51]

Their basic arguments and strategies are as follows.

Based on the theory of “the distinction between Chinese and barbarians,” they argue that China should discard the democratic system imported from the West—even if at present China does not have the Western-style democratic system—and replace it with a Chinese-style triple legitimacy based on “heaven, earth, and man.” They criticize the Western democratic system in which “popular legitimacy dominates.” In Jiang Qing’s words, governments produced through elections “identify only with the current popular sentiment of one country, one people and one moment.” He means that what is chosen by this kind of democratic system is a political regime of only “one country and one people,” and not “all of humanity,” a regime “of this place and time,” and not “of all under heaven and for all ages.” He believes that a government that will “bring peace to ten thousand generations” needs not only popular legitimacy, but also “transcendent sacredness,” “historical culture,” and “popular opinion,” which are the “heaven, earth and man” in his tripartite legitimacy.

Unfortunately, this is either a utopian imagining or an “invented tradition.” In history, we have a hard time finding a monarchy that possessed this tripartite legitimacy. Under the ancient Xia dynasty, “when Yi sought the throne, Qi killed him.”[52] The consolidation of the Zhou dynasty required killings to the point that “the blood ran down the halberd.” The Han was created out of the terrible battles between the Han and the Chu . The Tang finally established stable power through the Xuanwumen purge.[53] The Song cheated orphans and widows and purged family members in order the “don the yellow robe.” The legitimacy that establishes a monarchy is based at least in half on military might. At the present time, we cannot ask the entire world to set up an examination system for China’s sake, nor can we make present-day government conform to past, present, and future demands.

Even less can we pay attention to what Jiang imagines to be the people’s “eternal” wishes, as opposed to those of the present day. Because if political legitimacy is not expressed via the will of the existing citizens, then who can prove that the popular intentions that transcend those of the existing people, as well as the “heaven, earth and man” who bequeath legitimate power to contemporary government, will be eternal, absolute and sacred? The only choice is to recycle old notions of “divine right,” and argue that those who hold power are the sons of heaven, or sages who exercise power in the name of heaven.

We know how legitimacy functioned in traditional regimes.[54] One strategy was to receive the protection of heaven or of some transcendent power; another was to base legitimacy on the effective rule of a bureaucratic system; and a third was to ground it in the power of an individual leader. Although imperial power in ancient China had its own particular character,[55] employing Confucian resources that exceeded those of a normal monarchy, so that it combined political rule, religious authority and cultural order in one, still, in terms of legitimacy it did not go beyond the three strategies just mentioned.   It employed ritual to obtain the recognition of heaven and earth, the universe, and gods and spirits, it relied on bureaucratic power to renew the system and to rewrite history, and it relied on the effective control of military power. Which is to say that its legitimacy arose from its own power, and was neither “eternal” nor as “moral” as in the depictions of the Mainland New Confucians.[56] Rousseau once said that there is no power-holder who is “so great as to be an eternal master, unless he transforms strength into right, and turns obedience into duty.”[57]    But the Mainland New Confucians have imagined a kind of political system that represents both universal, eternal truths and the interests of all mankind. They think that this will allow the power-holder to fulfill Rousseau’s prescription.[58]

So, how will this marvelous plan be put into concrete practice? In Jiang’s imagining, it will occur through the establishment of the three chambers, a House of Confucian Tradition, a House of Commoners, and a House of National Essence.    He says that we should use elections and functional groups to choose the representatives who will establish the “House of Commoners.” Confucian scholars will select and delegate “scholars who master the Confucian classics” to set up the “House of Confucian Tradition.” And the House of the Nation will be made up of descendants of historical rulers and well-known people, in addition to various government officials, religious leaders and university professors, with a descendant of Confucius as head. In Jiang’s theory, the House of Commoners belongs to the category of the “people,” and represents the popular opinion of the present age; the House of Confucians follows “heaven” and thus the will of the intellectual elite, and the House of the Nation belongs to the “earth,” and represents the spirit of the (aristocratic) political tradition.[59]

But are Confucian classical texts genuine truth which will enable us to rule a country? Can the Four Books and the Five Classics still serve today as the basis for examinations and bureaucratic appointments? Are the Confucian elite naturally the country’s highest law-makers? Can Confucian descendants, based on their heredity, naturally serve as the head of the House of the Nation, and be empowered to select the members of that house?[60] In the words of the Mainland New Confucians, “legitimacy decides the relationship between authority and obedience;” so with legitimacy comes “authority” which will lead the people to “obey,” and once the people “obey,” society of course will have “order.”

The problem is that their authority comes from an echo chamber of Confucian leaders, Confucian elites, and Confucian scriptures. They have of course endorsed the government’s strategy of “stability maintenance,” arguing that China cannot solely “rely on economic growth to maintain political stability,” noting that while the current government is effective in economic management, in political terms it still “has not come up with a set of arguments to justify the current order.” The lack of stability means that it lacks the “legitimacy” that Confucianism can provide.[61]

Yet what is paradoxical is that from a scholarly standpoint, this so-called “legitimacy” must have a self-evident source, and only when that source has authority can it serve as the basis for legitimacy. Sadly, Confucian scholars have no way to grant themselves Confucian legitimacy, just as an aristocratic elite has no way to prove that it possesses a natural legitimacy. It’s like the popular saying: “Emperors come and go, maybe next year will be my turn!” Who is the natural-born ruler?

Even ancient emperors had to prove their legitimacy in one way or another: through history (arguing that the former dynasty was evil and that mine is moral); through sacrifices (to heaven and earth to seek heaven’s support); through auspicious omens (the discovery of propitious signs and imperial seals that symbolized heaven’s will); through the movement of phases (like the five elements); or through myths (stories of the emperor’s mysterious birth). So the question is: what is the source of legitimacy for the “unified systems of ritual, music, punishment and politics” that the Mainland New Confucians are offering? Could it be the benevolent dictatorship of old that dressed itself up in Confucian clothing?[62]

Maybe they feel that they don’t have to ask these questions. They are believers, and belief neither requires nor is capable of doubt, but thinkers have to ask questions as times change. In fact, even traditional Confucian scholars had many questions about the ultimate meaning of the universe, society and politics. Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011-1077) once replied to a question from Cheng Yi by saying: “This table rests on the earth, but what does the earth rest on?”[63] The young Zhu Xi once asked his father: “Above our heads are the ‘heavens,’ but what is above the heavens?”[64] If heaven and earth are finally not self-justifying sources of ultimate meanings, then we need to ask: where do these three legitimacies come from?

It is perfectly clear that the Jiang’s three chambers do not come completely from the traditional Confucian model. Indeed, it looks as if there have been some secret goings-on in which the designers have consulted Western political institutions. The “trinity” composed of daotong, zhengtong, and xuetong (the Confucian consensus) is modeled on the three divisions of powers in Western political design [executive, legislative, judicial] with their mutual supervision and constraints.[65] So how can they thump their chests and proclaim that only this system can “bring about the ‘long reign of peace’ for which the Chinese people yearn, without the fear that ‘stability will override everything else?’”[66]

Even if I understand that theirs is a sincere proposal to the authorities, it remains nonetheless pure wishful thinking, and it is in no way clear that it will necessarily result in a good political system. Where is the proof that this system has the three legitimacies of heaven, earth and man? Where is the sacred authority hidden above the clouds?

Since the New Confucians provide no details, allow me to make some guesses. I have noticed that some things that the Mainland New Confucians covered up in the past they now say openly. One scholar admitted that the “monarchy 君主制” was a fairly important part of the institutional basis of a Confucian political system: “The relationship between monarch and servant defines the political hierarchy in Confucian rule, and is the most important of non-familial relationships.”[67] Surely the idea is not for China to return to the imperial era and restore the monarchical system?

As noted above, some Mainland New Confucians finally played their trump card, which was that Chinese thought and politics should return to the person they consider to be the “legislator of modern China,” Kang Youwei, and that we should start over again from where he left off. In their opinion, the most important reason to “return to Kang Youwei” is because modern China has been constructed on the basis of the “borders” and “ethnic structures” of the great Qing empire, and if we want to maintain Qing—rather than Ming—borders and ethnicities, and “carry out its Republican transition,” then the only choice is to adopt Kang Youwei’s notion that “the best plan to save China is to first seek to avoid chaos, and afterwards seek to establish a government.”

In that case, how is chaos to be avoided? The Mainland New Confucians say that Kang Youwei had already thought through issues such as “foreign pressure, minority rule, large territory, and ethnic complexity,”[68] and came to the conclusion that, in the transition from Qing China to Republican China, there was no basis for national identity and thus no way to consolidate the people’s hearts. This is why Kang proposed his theories of “monarchical rule” and “state religion.” Or, more clearly, the monarch was to serve as the common ruler of the various ethnicities, maintaining a multi-ethnic empire, and Confucianism was serve as the national religion or a civil religion, which could “become a symbol representing state consolidation and national identity.”[69]

Above all, Kang Youwei, in the context of massive changes in the modern international system, first proposed a “constitutional monarchy” that would preserve the great Qing empire, and later on, after the establishment of the Republic, when “the trend toward republicanism seemed to be irresistible,” he proposed a republic with a titular monarch with limited powers 虚君共和. His efforts to preserve the monarchical system were because “after the 1911 Revolution, China immediately faced a crisis of division…and for Kang Youwei, the point of having a monarch with limited powers was to allow the modern Chinese state to assume the expansive territorial borders of the great Qing empire. In other words, Kang felt that the ‘monarchical republic’ could not only facilitate China’s transition to a modern nation-state, but could also speed the absorption of the various ethnicities into this nation-state.”[70]

How to protect this multi-ethnic state carried over from the Qing empire? This is a genuine question worthy of discussion.[71] But, maintaining a unified China, reducing conflicts among the ethnicities, and establishing a modern national identity, should be accomplished on the basis of justice, freedom and democracy. What other path is possible to promote identification with the system, to honor the “citizen” status of all individuals, to provide all citizens with safety, happiness and self-respect, leading them in turn to self-consciously assume their status as citizen and identify with the country?

Surely modern China cannot return to Kang Youwei, to the Qing dynasty, and rely on the Qing emperor’s various institutions like the Six Ministries, the Lifanyuan 理藩院 [Department for the Administration of Outlying Regions] or the Shenjing Military Governor 盛京将军 to rule the empire.[72] Can it really be as the Mainland New Confucians imagine, that to maintain the great territory of the empire and its many ethnicities we must necessarily rely on a Confucian elite, and that we demand that the various ethnicities accept “Confucianism” as the key to maintaining unity?

Surely it cannot be, as they imagine, that Kang Youwei’s plan will not only protect the unity of the great Qing, but will also, following China’s rise, “transcend China’s boundaries,” leading to the creation of a new tribute system 新五服制,[73] with China’s capital as the center, accomplishing not only the “unification of the interior” but also the “integration of the exterior,” in which China once again pacifies her neighbors and the world?[74]

According to what some “New Kangists” (or the Kang Youwei faction 康党) say, the key to the remedy proposed by Kang Youwei was the “monarchical republic.” Who will occupy this exalted position? They ask and answer their own question: “Who has the qualifications to be this monarch? Either the Qing emperor, or a descendant of Confucius.”[75] Another scholar said straightforwardly that one of Kang Youwei’s signal contributions was his proposition that modern China needed a “monarchical system.”[76] Their reading is that Kang Youwei saw late Qing China as “a sheet of loose sand that needed a traditional authority, and only an authority recognized by both the army and the people would be capable of keeping China unified.”

Whether China opted for a constitutional system or for Confucianism, in either case “monarchical power would be required to achieve this ideal.”[77] For this reason, Kang Youwei “struggled side by side with the Guangxu emperor,” which allowed him to “stand out from the crowd ,” as his “vision pierced the heavens while his feet remained on solid ground.”[78]

Another Kang Youwei worshipper said very frankly that, in his opinion, the problem solved by the “party-state theory” shared by both the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party was only that of the “organizational and mobilizational force needed to integrate the atomized individual into a larger whole,” while “the significance of the monarchical system to modern China was that it spoke to a sacred force that overrides individual free will and the will of the people, as well as the hierarchical principles by which the individuals were organized.”[79] These ideas of “overriding individual free will” and “a sacred force above the will of the people” are another way of talking about an emperor who represents the will of heaven and who rules the world. And “the hierarchical principles by which the individuals were organized” refers to the lineage system linking ruler to servant and father to son.

In Jiang Qing’s 1995 “Introduction to Gongyang Studies,” he repeatedly criticized the fact that traditional scriptures had “absolutized,” “eternalized,” and “sacralized” the monarchical system, that they had “unconditionally protected monarchical rule,” and argued that the “new scriptures 今文” tradition represented by Gongyang studies “does not acknowledge that the current system possesses limitless legitimacy and absolute authority.”[80]

As for the Mainland New Confucians who claim to believe in the Gongyang tradition, why after twenty years have they completely changed their standpoint and their tone on the monarchical system? We’ll address this point again below. In fact, rather than beat around the bush and hide things in theories and technical language, it would be better if they simply said what they mean: that today’s China needs a “monarch” to symbolize heaven’s will, whether it be an “empty monarch” or a “true monarch,” he must both represent political authority as well as the sacred will and Confucian truth. That today’s China needs to build an orderly, hierarchical society which naturally requires “Confucianism” as a religion to nourish the people’s hearts.

So, does this not mean that today’s China needs neither freedom, nor democracy, and especially not equality?

3, Climbing a tree to catch a fish? Or following a winding path to a hidden treasure? A “Confucian State” and “Re-Confucianization”

As noted above, another key reason that Mainland New Confucians call for a “return to Kang Youwei,” in addition to his advocacy of a monarchical system or a “constitutional monarchy” for modern China, is the notion that China must “re-Confucianize” or establish a “Confucian state.” On this point, all Mainland New Confucians (and even some who are not Mainland New Confucians) seem to agree, whether they are Kang Youwei partisans or if they have some reservations about him. For example, Kang Xiaoguang once drew a new blueprint for a future China, and argued that the “soul 灵魂” of this new blueprint “is Chinese Confucian thought, and not Western Marxism or liberalism, and for this reason I call this future plan the ‘Confucian state,’ and the process of the construction of this Confucian state is thus ‘Confucianization.’”[81]

The book China Must Reconfucianize, written by the five stars of the Mainland New Confucians, conveys this ideal and this ambition. Yet it is problematic that, setting aside Kang Youwei’s arguments from nearly a century ago, even today we still have not seen a complete plan for how the Mainland New Confucians will build their “Confucian state” where politics and religion are one.[82] Of course, from their scattered pronouncements it seems clear that this “Confucian state” will, in fact, not be new. Simply put, it will more or less restore the family, society and state of traditional China, return to the structure, order and customs of the traditional era. As they put it themselves, the foundation of the Confucian system is “in political terms, the monarchy and the examination system, in educational terms, the system of academies, and in social terms, the lineage and the family.”[83]

It won’t hurt to draw some general conclusions from their various arguments as to what kind of social structure and ethical order they are imagining for contemporary China. First, they propose that in the countryside we should rely on lineages, rebuild ancestral temples, and restore ritual systems. One New Confucian scholar has said that village democratic elections should be abolished, and in their place we must “restore the traditional ritual rule and the model of rule by seniority.”[84] Second, rebuilding lineages requires the transformation of families, because in the absence of the basic building block of the family, there will be no lineages to speak of. But families require husbands and wives, and from the Mainland New Confucian point of view, modern families built on the basis of “love” are no better than “the way of concubines ,” and the only correct family form is the traditional ideal in which the “man handles the outside world and the woman the inside world.” Third, they emphasize that the man is the master of the family, and that the woman should stay at home. “A man might have been a slave, but can rise to be a general,” but a woman’s “will 志” should be centered on motherhood and on being a helpmate to her husband, and the “way of womanhood” is to produce future generations. In case of divorce, the woman does not share in the family property.[85]

In other words, they are planning, on the foundation of the family, lineage, and lineage community of traditional Chinese village society, to rebuild, according to Confucian concepts, a society that Francis L. K. Hsu (1909-1999) and Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 (1910-2005) described in terms of “the father-son axis 父子主轴,” “the differential mode of association 差序格局,” “the ritual order 礼制秩序,” and “gender hierarchy 男女有別.”[86] They hope to realize Mencius’s vision of an order characterized by: “affection between father and son, righteousness between ruler and minister, the proper divisions between husband and wife, the precedence of elder and younger, and the faithfulness of friends.”[87] When they displace this order from the “family” to the “state,” extending the “father-son” relationship to the “ruler-servitor” relationship, they arrive at the social ethics and the political order of the Confucian traditional ideal with all of its hierarchies intact.   A New Confucian scholar explains that the modern critique of the traditional monarchical order as being “purely a relationship of the respected to the despised,” is a complete misunderstanding, because the monarchical system grew out of the family system, and hence “the relationship between ruler and servitor is infused with feelings of justice and grace.”[88] They believe that the Confucianism or the Confucian nation that they advocate can only be constructed on this kind of social basis.

This is an ideal, imagined future society, built on Confucian historical memories of ancient times. The Mainland New Confucians view this kind of traditional Chinese village order as a beautiful way of life, and aim to regulate the lives of today’s Chinese people according to the Three Bonds and the Five Constants 三纲五常 (or the Three Bonds and the Six Disciplines 三纲六纪), and on this social basis, build their so-called “Confucian state.” Jiang Qing once said that he completely agreed with Kang Xiaoguang’s point of view regarding the “Confucian state,” arguing that “we should reestablish Confucianism as the state religion.” He also said that in order to make Confucianism the state religion, we need to prepare three systems: the doctrinal system (scriptures and education), the ideological system (the political wisdom that resolves the problem of legitimacy), and the social system (customs and rituals).[89] But in a society built around the “customs and rituals” they are imagining, will modern values like equality, freedom, democracy or human rights find their place?

In a vague way, we can see here that there truly is an inheritance, a connection between Mainland New Confucians and the older diaspora New Confucians. For example, in his 新事论 [New Treatise on Practical Affairs], Feng Youlan noted similar thoughts on the family and on women, saying that women should return to the home. Mainland New Confucians later picked this up.[90] Yet they have gone even further than Feng Youlan, and when they talk among themselves, they not only demand that women return to home and hearth, but also bring up Gu Hongming’s 辜鸿铭 (1857-1928) defense of concubinage, in which he used the metaphor of the single teapot and multiple teacups. This is prejudicial and humiliating for women, to the point that even women scholars who enjoy discussing issues with the Mainland New Confucians have said that they simply cannot accept this kind of extreme argument.[91]

To realize this kind of ideal society, they further demand that China bring about this future “Confucian society” through education. As they see it, the steps toward “Confucianization” are as follows: first, “and the key, is to include Confucianism in the national educational system; national studies courses should be added at all levels, from elementary schools through universities,”[92] “classics-reading classes 读经科” should be restored in elementary and middle schools, and “classical studies 经学科” should be restored at the university level, as a basic educational requirement;[93] second is to select the worthy and the talented from among the Confucian scholars. “Those who hope to work in politics can be certified only after tests on the Four Books and Five Classics, in the same way that those who serve as judges must pass a test on national law.” Party and government cadres at all levels must also take the Confucian classics as the principle object of study,[94] so as to “rebuild a model of Chinese political-religious rule in a modern context;”[95] third is to restore state sacrifices to Confucius, to rebuild lineage ancestral temples throughout China, and to restore the common worship of the plaque bearing the characters “heaven, earth, monarch, parent, teacher 天地君亲师” in the homes and temples of Confucian believers, in lecture halls and meeting places.

It is not difficult to see that the goal of this kind of proposal to completely Confucianize China is turn China into a Confucian state, and the key to this transformation is of course that Confucianism become the “state religion,” after which Confucianism would readily become the “learning of kings and officials.” Jiang Qing has said that “the idea of ‘establishing Confucianism as the state religion means, under today’s historical conditions, writing the Way of Yao, Shun, Confucius and Mencius into the constitution, or in other words to clearly state in the constitution that ‘the Way of Yao, Shun, Confucius and Mencius is the root from which China will built its nation.’ This is to facilitate the completion of the modern restoration of ‘Confucian state politics.'”[96] Yao Zhongqiu has also said, “The country needs ‘the learning of kings and officials’, so as to cultivate social leadership.”[97] What is “the learning of kings and officials?” Yao Zhongqiu says, somewhat subtly, that it is that “study of classics and history 经史之学”[98] which aims to provide guidance to statesmen. Jiang Qing is clearer, saying that “the learning of kings and officials ” is the “ideology guiding the nation!”[99]

Yet in Kang Xiaoguang’s formulation, becoming the ideology guiding the nation is still not enough, it must instead be absolute religious belief. He recalls the glorious history of Confucians, and not without emotion writes that “in all of history, Confucianism was the most successful religion. The emperor was its pope, the entire government its church, and all government servants its believers. The common people also wanted to receive Confucian education. This was an extremely successful theology, a system in which religion and moral transformation were combined.” All along, what Kang wanted was not just that Confucianism become the “state religion,” but instead to have China become a theocracy, a country in which government officials, gentry, and the common people are completely unified in political, religious, and academic terms.[100]

“I’m only selling ancient medicine 药方只贩古时丹.” The only conclusion we can come to is that the future ideal society imagined by the Mainland New Confucians has nothing new to offer. Over the course of the modern period, China’s social structure, political system, and way of life have all experienced massive changes, yet the political resources they use to imagine China’s future come only from China’s past, and their institutional plans completely exclude sources other than Confucianism. In terms of thought, culture, and ideology they are mired in the Confucian Four Books and Five Classics, which is why their future blueprints reflect only visions of the past. As Hobsbaum said, this is a “newly ’reinvented tradition’ built with old materials so as to realize a quite modern dream.”[101]

But if their diagnosis of today’s society, supposedly chock full of the “malaise of modernity” is simply that “it’s sick,” and the prescription they have written to cure it is simply “restore ancient times,” can this really bring society to shake off its malaise, can this bring Confucianism back from the dead?[102] In fact, they too are aware that having gone through “massive changes unprecedented in three thousand years,”[103] the social basis on which the Confucians are relying on gradually disappeared after the late Qing-early Republican period. The monarchy has collapsed, the examination system has been abolished, village lineage society gradually disintegrated in the modern period, Confucian values declined day by day—in a word, traditional Confucian ideals have been more or less destroyed. This is why they feel that “China” is no longer “China.” Jiang Qing once said, with great emotion, “Alas, of all of the changes China has suffered over the past five thousand years, none is worse than the disappearance of Confucians. The problem of China without Confucians is not just that Confucian values no longer rule, but is rather that China’s national character no longer exists. And if China’s national character no longer exists, then China is indistinguishable from any other run-of-the-mill country.” Since China is no longer “China,” Jiang cries: “Come back, Confucians! You are the hope of China’s future.”[104]

But if we follow these designs, what will the future “China” be like?

4. “Playing the occasional false note”: The Fantasy World of Mainland New Confucians

As a student of history and documents, I have no desire to quibble with the historical and documentary errors committed by these “aspiring kings,” even if these errors are obvious and ridiculous.[105] For the most part, they seem not to care if their history and documents are correct or not. In their interpretation of Confucian classics and Confucianism, they first reverse the tide of the modern tendency to read “classics” as “history,” and instead defend the sacred character of the classics and replace modern academic study with interpretations and righteous pronouncements based on absolute belief.

Second, because their goal in citing the classics is to insert their message into today’s reality and to influence politics, they often indulge in extreme interpretations, either removing the texts from their historical context or providing a forced reading. Third, because they see Confucianism as an object of belief, they adopt the absolute standpoint of true believers, in the process producing a sort of inverted orientalism. In other words, in order to resist and counter Western culture, institutions and values, they go to great lengths to praise anything “Eastern” that they think has been influenced, endangered, or criticized by the West.

As a result, they wind up defending all aspects of traditional Confucian culture, institutions and values, whether or not they are really Confucian, and whether or not they are appropriate for modern China. Of course, I have attempted to engage sympathetically with their political standpoint and their current preoccupations, and will not engage in scholarly overkill with regard to the historical and documentary errors they make. At the same time, I feel that I must alert the reader that what most stands out to me when they talk about the ancient Confucian tradition and modern politics, is their earnest desire to change today’s world, their undisguised sense of urgency and concern. Why are they so anxious, so excited, so tense?

In the past few years, I have noticed certain news items that the Mainland New Confucians and their fellow travelers constantly bring up. One was Xi Jinping’s November 26, 2013 visit to and talk at Qufu, the home of Confucius. Another was Xi Jinping’s September 2014 talk on Confucianism and traditional culture at the International Confucian Association. A third was Xi Jinping’s May 4, 2014 visit to Beijing University to look at the “Confucian archive” and to have a “close chat” with its director, Tang Yijie 汤一介 (1927-2014).[106]

I don’t know precisely what “original intention 初心”[107] might explain these gestures by China’s leader, and would like to believe that they express a positive attitude toward traditional Chinese culture. But in the eyes of the Mainland New Confucians, it is like the historical change from Han Wenjing’s embrace of Huang-Lao Daoism to Han Wudi’s choice to follow Confucianism, in other words a great transformation in the flow of history and political direction. To their way of thinking, now is the time for Dong Zhongshu to enter the scene for a “conversation between heaven and earth.”

After carefully analyzing this process of transformation by the ruling party, a Mainland New Confucian scholar offered the following emotional summary: First, in the early 1990s, the ruling party “positively promoted ‘national studies,’ after which it also took the ‘revival of the great Chinese nation’ as its chief political objective, and hence naturally proceded to rethink its attitude toward Confucianism.” Next, the government invested widely in “Confucius Institutes” abroad, circulating the idea that Confucius is a positive image and cultural symbol in today’s China. All of this “quietly changed the official evaluation of Confucius,” illustrating that the ruling party “plans to rebuild the legitimacy of its rule on a Confucian basis.” Next was the report of the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee, which described the Chinese Communist Party as “both the loyal inheritor and promoter of China’s excellent traditional culture, and the guiding force and developer of China’s advanced culture,” which, to Mainland New Confucians, meant that “the CCP hopes to resolve conflicts between culture and politics, and the antagonism between our political tradition and our moral tradition.”[108]

Thus these three quite significant gestures by the leader of the ruling party in 2013 and 2014 were, to the Mainland New Confucians, extremely good news, meaning that the realization of the “China Dream” had brought about “a sustained change in the cultural position of the CCP leadership, from its earliest, anti-tradition stance, to today’s situation where Confucianism is basically recognized. There is also a consciousness of a cultural revival; the process of conservatization, which began in the 1970s without deep self-consciousness has now leapt toward a political self-consciousness.”[109]

“Leapt” is a very descriptive term. Perhaps the Mainland New Confucians believe that they can catapult onto the political stage? In fact, they should read their history. Dong Zhongshu attracted the attention of Han Wudi when he submitted his memorial proposing to “abandon the hundred schools and revere only Confucians,” but his career hit a bump. He was pushed aside by Zhufu Yan 主父偃 (d. 126 BCE) and Gongsun Hong 公孫弘 (201-121 BCE) and spent the rest of his days at home.[110] Nonetheless, Dong Zhongshu, a symbol of those who promoted Confucian political ideology, has ever since stimulated the Confucian scholars' enthusiasm for politics and institutions.

In the words of Cheng Hao, “Were it not for my Confucian obligations, I would be happy to remain in the mountains.”[111] The predecessors of the Mainland New Confucians imagined similar things. Liang Shuming once said, with great confidence, “if we do not serve, how will they live?”[112], although after being severely criticized by Mao Zedong and sent back to school in Chongqing, he could only sigh and ask “Has man a future？”[113] But for the Mainland New Confucians these are not lessons to be taken seriously, because during Liang Shuming’s time, Confucianism was in dire straits, it “flowers and fruits fading and falling,” its “wandering soul adrift from its body,”[114] and even if Confucianism had developed somewhat abroad, it was not really a success.

But things are different now. “Great opportunities are to be had in China’s economic and political reforms,” and China’s economic miracle has meant that “the national self-confidence behind the miracle objectively created genuine possibilities for the development of Confucianism,” while China’s political reform also “needs more thought resources to serve as the foundation on which to unify the entire country.”[115] This is especially true as this is an age of great changes. It is just like the time when China changed suddenly from Han Wendi 汉文帝 (202-157 BCE) and Han Jingdi 汉景帝 (188-141 BCE), who followed Huang-Lao Daoism, to Han Wudi, who adopted Confucianism, in that leaders have appeared who encourage and even support Confucianism.

So the Mainland New Confucians feel that this is the time for them to “roll up their sleeves” and meddle in politics, design institutions, transform society. All they have to do is to wait for the ruling party and the government’s attention. Thus they sincerely counsel that the use of Confucianism “should be done in a sincere and appropriate manner,” and subtly reproach the current government for “lacking methods employed by dynastic emperors.”[116] Others all the more urgently argue that today’s Confucians are “not like the liberals, and would never think about wanting the CCP to lose power. All we want is for the CCP to adopt a new philosophy of rule, nothing more than ‘abandoning Huang-Lao, cleaving only to Confucianism.’”[117]

But even if the times change, histories are often similar. China since the Qin-Han era has been characterized by the exaltation of the emperor and the belittling of the officials. The source of all authority lay with the emperor, and while Confucians could be a general in the field or a minister at court, the most he could hope for was to “find the ruler that would implement the Way.” Without the emperor’s support, there was no point in talking about any “change.” For this reason they lacked the self-confidence of the Tang poet Li Bai 李白 (701-762): “Look up at the sky, big smiles as I leave home/How can I be compared to the disorganized weeds?”[118] They share more of the hidden bitterness of Liu Yong 柳永 (987-1053) of the Song : “It was only by chance that my name did not appear on the golden register of successful scholars.”[119]

The Mainland New Confucians don’t have the confidence of the Song scholars that they will “jointly govern all-under-heaven” with the emperor, and can only “wait to be called at the golden gate” before entering the political realm. It’s not surprising that they are always saying that “Xi Jinping is a step above (Deng Xiaoping), because he talks about the China Dream, and the great revival of the Chinese nation,” or that “Xi Jinping…has a Confucian air about him, and has the most Confucian cultivation among the highest leaders of the ruling party.” Or even, “As the leader of the ruling party, Xi Jinping could not be any better, and with another step forward, he will become the leader of the Chinese nation.”[120]

Let’s take another look at China Must Reconfucianize, which just came out in 2016. Following the full-length essays by the five “luminaries,” we find Hong Kong journalist Ma Haoliang’s 马浩亮 “Xi Jinping, the Red New Confucian” added as an important appendix, together with three essays chosen by editor Ren Zhong to serve as an “Afterword”: “Xi Jinping Commemorates Confucius, and Relaunches the CCP Search for Legitimacy, “Why Xi Jinping Criticizes ‘De-Sinification’,’”and “Why Xi Jinping Commemorates Confucius.”[121]

In the afterword we find the sentence “The wheels of history churn, the wind drives the clouds back and forth; the smell of restoration is exceptionally sweet.” In fact, the hidden meaning in their repeated mention of the leader of the ruling party is surely worthy of close attention. In the Tang dynasty poet Li Duan’s 李端 (737-784) “Playing the Zither 听筝” we find the following: “To win the attention of Zhou Yu 周郎/周瑜,[122] sometimes a false note does the trick,” meaning that an intentional false step can help to attract the attention of the object of one’s affections.

What is their true motivation in repeatedly referring to the leader of the ruling party as “Confucian?” What I particularly noticed were two sentences in Jiang Qing’s “The Confucian Road Forward.” He first says that “because Confucians are ‘this worldly 入世法,’ they are destined to engage in politics so as to transform them. This means that they can only realize their moral ideals of governing the country and bringing peace to tianxia by acting within the context of current historical reality. For this reason, Confucians do not maintain an attitude of complete resistance or refusal to cooperate with politics.”[123] Hence the government and the Confucians should see themselves in a situation of “win-win.”

And if this first statement might seem somewhat murky, he continues with another that is perfectly frank: “History tells us that the government uses Confucians and that the Confucians use government. The history of Chinese politics and the history of Chinese Confucianism is precisely the history of the torturous development of this mutual exploitation.”[124]

I don’t know if this “mutual exploitation” means “seeking out the ruler to curry favor 邀君希宠” or “finding the ruler that will implement the Way,” but it is quite rare to see political ambitions expressed so frankly.

Five: Conclusion--Repeating the Same Mistakes? Will History Repeat Itself?

Surveying the writings of the Mainland New Confucians, we note that they began their friendly departure from the diaspora New Confucians in the 1990s, and went on to set up their own “political Confucianism” based on the Gongyang textual tradition. In 2004, Jiang Qing invited Sheng Hong 盛洪 (b. 1954), Chen Ming, and others to his Yangming Academy 阳明精舍 in Guizhou, where they lectured on the topic of “Confucianism’s contemporary fate,”[125] which dove-tailed with the "2004 Declaration on Culture" launched by Xu Jialu 许嘉璐 (b. 1937) and others at the "Cultural Summit Forum" of the same year, initiating the trend known as "cultural conservatism."

More recent texts mentioned at the beginning of this article, such as “Returning to Kang Youwei,” “Lectures by Confucians from China and Taiwan,” and “China Must Reconfucianize,” illustrate how Mainland New Confucianism has shifted from cultural to political concerns, from the exposition of morality and ethics to the design of government institutions, from intellectual theories to ideology, gradually joining liberalism and socialism as a force that cannot be ignored in mainland Chinese politics in the 21st century.[126]

There is really no need for a scholarly explanation of the rise of the Mainland New Confucians that would link them to the historical or intellectual genealogy of pre-Qin Confucians, Han classical studies, Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism or 20th century New Confucians (including those of the diaspora). Instead, we should put them in the context of contemporary Chinese politics and thought so as to understand the background for their emergence and their current motivations. One Mainland New Confucian repeatedly reminded the Taiwanese New Confucians that the Mainland New Confucians were different from those from Hong Kong and Taiwan: “We Mainland New Confucians are first and foremost engaged in thinking about current issues. We sprouted and grew in the space between the revolutionary narrative of the left and the Enlightenment project of the right, and only in the course of this process did we gradually come to understand that philosophical advances since the ‘May Fourth’ all contained presuppositions concerning the centrality of the West. The validation of the values of Confucian culture is process of practice. It cannot come about because of similarities with a Western philosopher or philosophical system, and will require instead engagement with problems in Chinese society and resolutions concerning the cultural functions Confucianism needs to fulfill. It is this situation that has forced us to come out.”[127]

In fact, the background to the Mainland New Confucians is today's politics and society. Their concerns are present-day concerns, real concerns about today’s China. This is what forced the rise of the Mainland New Confucians and their friendly parting of ways with the diaspora New Confucians. The question is, what is “forcing” them? Clearly it is trends in contemporary China. Most of the Mainland New Confucians are hoping to “find the ruler who will practice the Way,” and there is an obvious attention to trends in their political blueprints and institutional thinking.

In their recent statements, they talk constantly about China’s economic growth and national power. They see China as being “in second place gazing at the top spot” on the world scene, which they understand as not only the miracle of “China’s rise,” but also the miracle of the “return of the Confucian soul.” “China, whose national power is burgeoning, should carry forward China’s moral tradition, and reconstruct a Confucian worldview which ‘sees the entire world as one family.’ This conceptual system will maintain justice and peace in a world beset by conflicts and collusions on all sides.”[128] Faced with this newly reshuffled world order, they ask: “Is this one world or two? Can China and the United States govern this world together? China is rising, and once she passes the United States, what will the world be like?” They truly seem to believe that if the 19th century was Britain’s century, and the 20th century that of the United States, then the 21st century is “China’s moment in world history,”[129] which will also be the time for “Mainland New Confucians” to take the stage.[130]

Have the Mainland New Confucians taken the stage? In China’s ancient history, the most celebrated moment when Confucians “took the stage” was when Dong Zhongshu submitted his memorial on heaven and man in the Western Han period, proposing that “the hundred schools be abandoned” and replaced by the Confucians, which subsequently established the ideological basis for Chinese Confucian politics. As noted above, Dong Zhongshu is a model admired and followed by contemporary Mainland New Confucians, or as a Mainland New Confucian scholar put it “The New China most resembles the Han dynasty, in that the founder was commoner-born.”[131]

This is their historical vision. They repeatedly talk about the territorial expansion under Han Wudi, and obviously feel that the situation in today’s rising China is evolving in the direction of the Han-period change from Han Jingdi’s Daoist embrace of “rule through inaction” to Han Wudi decision that to “subdue the barbarians on the frontiers and build the economy at home” required an exclusive adoption of Confucian methods. “When the rulers have tried all possible paths, finding that none of them works, then they will be forced to return to Confucianism.”[132] The Mainland New Confucians liken themselves to Dong Zhongshu, who waited for Han Wudi’s invitation and then worked with him to build the “system of joint rule of the emperor and the scholars,” and thus “changed the mandate.”[133] Subsequently he “used the centralized bureaucratic system to set up the examination system, creating the scholars as enduring social elites.”[134]

Is today’s China really at a transition point like that between Han Jingdi and Han Wudi? Maybe so. It may be true that in the thought world of today’s China, the Mainland New Confucians have come to join the liberals and the socialists, each of which will attempt plan China’s future path. As a “this-worldly” group, we can understand that the New Confucians are not content to remain part of tradition, nor to engage in idle chatter about the Way.

The problem is that they are caught up in the tumultuous changes in China’s politics, linking up with nationalism and statism, and seeking inspiration from political power and ideology. In domestic forums, they talk constantly about state power, while at the same time they rely on the approval of certain “international scholars” seeking to establish themselves in intellectual circles abroad by making nice to the left.[135] They have perhaps forgotten that Confucians with true political judgement and insight throughout the ages have found that they had to keep their distance from political power, or, in other words “if you are devoted to the study of what is right, then you cannot distort your study with worldly pursuits.”[136]

And even if they want to seek political power and material gain, they should examine the fate of Confucians in the Former Han dynasty. Because even if Dong Zhongshu had his moment, to the emperor he was just one scholar, and despite his “mastery of the five classics,” his final fate was “a life of study and writing.”[137] The one who truly earned imperial favor and rose to the positions of “chancellor, enfeoffed as lord of Fengping 丞相，封平津侯,” was Gongsun Hong, who schemed to remove Dong Zhongshu from his position. Gongsun, "a suspicious man, outwardly magnanimous but inwardly scheming,”[138] “ a master of documents and government affairs, who knew how to embellish them with the techniques of Confucianism [without being a sincere Confucian himself].”[139]

In truth, there are some clear-headed scholars among the troops of the Mainland New Confucians, calm, well-intentioned voices amidst the noisy clamor. One scholar, who perhaps considers himself a Confucian, has noted with considerable concern that there are things that one should be vigilant about while politicizing and institutionalizing Confucianism: “Does an institutionalized Confucianism not run the risk of taking the old path of Confucianism under the dynasties, creating yet again a Confucianism that is closely integrated with state politics or even a theocracy?”[140]

A non-Confucian scholar once reminded them, in the course of a discussion, that they might first think about the question of “what is China?”[141] If we admit that China is multi-cultural and multi-ethnic, then using Confucianism is “offering an essentializing solution.” Moreover, Confucians must engage in free competition in the intellectual market-place, and absolutely cannot “appoint themselves as the highest authority,”[142] which can only lead to a dead end. Moreover, Confucians must “keep a certain distance from politics or the construction of political institutions,” and proposals to insert Confucianism into the constitution or to build a “Confucian Chamber” are nothing but “crazy anachronisms.”[143]

What is sad is that the ever more excited Mainland New Confucians, in the ever expansive age of China’s rise, seem no longer able to accept such bitter medicine.

Notes

[1] 葛兆光, “异想天开：近年来大陆新儒学的政治诉求,”originally published in the Taiwanese journal 思想 [Thought], no. 33 (2017): 241-285; available online at http://www.aisixiang.com/data/104951.html .

[2] This is a talk I gave at a Harvard University panel discussion on “Contemporary Chinese Thought” in March, 2017. I should point out that the focus and analysis in this text are on overall tendencies displayed by a certain number of Mainland New Confucians who are eager to enter into current politics. I have not paid attention to differences among Mainland New Confucians, nor does my text relate to other scholars who identify with or are sympathetic to Confucianism.

[3] Translator’s note: The speaker in question was Tang Wenming 唐文明 (b. 1970), a well known Mainland New Confucian Scholar who teaches at Tsinghua University. For the conference and Tang's remarks, see here. “Legislator 立法者”is a term borrowed from Rousseau, who, in The Social Contract, uses it to refer to someone who intervenes at a critical moment to give concrete institutional shape to the popular will. Contemporary Chinese intellectuals use this term frequently, and to my mind, what they mean is “conceptual founder,” someone who lays the intellectual groundwork for something to come perhaps much later.

[4] Translator’s note: Zhang Taiyan or (Zhang Binglin 章炳麟) was an important figure in the intellectual and political world of late Qing-early Republican China.

[5] Translator’s note: One of the most important intellectual figures of the late Qing-early Republican period, Kang embraced Confucianism as well as Western civilization, eventually imagining a new age when the two would be integrated and finally transcended. He played an important role in the Hundred Days Reform of 1898, was forced into exile after the failure of that movement, and was active in diaspora circles for many years. He returned to China with the fall of the dynasty and, disappointed with the nature of China’s Republicanism, championed without success the establishment of Confucianism as China’s national religion and constitutional monarchy as China’s proper political form.

[6] See “康有为与制度化儒学” [Kang Youwei and institutionalized Confucianism], 开放时代 [Open Era] 2014.5: 12-41, esp. p. 16. [Translator’s note: excerpts of this text are available in English translation here: https://www.readingthechinadream.com/kang-youwei-and-institutional-confucianism.html ]. See also,“东林会讲：康有为与大陆新儒学”[Talk at the Donglin conference: Kang Youwei and Mainland New Confucianism], 天府新论 [New discussions of the land of plenty] 2015.5, pp. 55-76.

[7] See “首届两岸新儒家会讲” [The first meeting of Confucians from the Mainland and Taiwan], 天府新论, 2016:2: 1-82.

[8] Translator’s note: Lit.,“places of strategic importance 重镇.”

[9] These are: Jiang Qing 蒋庆 (b. 1953), who has been called the“spiritual leader of the Mainland New Confucians,” Chen Ming 陈明 (b. 1962), the “spokesman for the Mainland New Confucians,” Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光 (b. 1963), the “famous social activist,” Yu Donghai 余東海,“moral essayist of the caliber of Han Yu and Su Shi,” and Qiu Feng 秋風 (a.k.a. Yao Zhongqiu 姚中秋) (b. 1966), “today’s all-around Confucian.”

[10] Jiang Qing, Chen Ming, Kang Xiaoguang, Yu Donghai, and Qiu Feng, 中国必须再儒化: “大陆新儒家”新主张. (Singapore: 世界科技出版社，2016).

[11] As noted in the blurb on China’s main New Confucian website: https://www.rujiazg.com/article/id/8430/ .

[12] Translator’s note: Ge is referring to the Chinese-American historian Yu Ying-shih’s depiction of modern Confucianism as a “wandering soul” without a body.

[13] Translator’s note: A citation from the Hanshu 汉书, see http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguogudaishi/detail_2010_07/02/1707026_0.shtml .

[14] Translator’s note: A reference to the Confucian Analects 论语, and to Chi’s response when Confucius asks disciples what they would do if they were invited to serve in a court. See http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 57.

[15] Translator’s note: “To abandon the hundred schools and revere only Confucian methods 罢黜百家，独尊儒术” is a common way to refer to Han Wudi’s 汉武帝 (r. 141-87 BCE) decision to elevate the Confucians to the position of chief counselors to the emperor.

[16] Jiang Qing was the first among the New Confucians to make this change, but when he proposed it in the 1990s, it had not yet become mainstream.

[17] Translator’s note: These are the three chambers Jiang proposes to replace China’s existing political institutions. For a brief discussion in English, see https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/opinion/a-confucian-constitution-in-china.html .

[18] Translator’s note: The “politics of kings and officials” refers to the exercise of politics in the pre-Qin period, i.e., involving ritual and music as well as other more visibly “political” practices. See http://confucius.culture.tw/subject/pdf/tablets.pdf

[19] Zeng Yi 曾亦 and Guo Xiaodong 郭晓东, 何谓普世？谁之价值？ ——当代儒家论普世价值 [What is universal? Whose values? Contemporary Confucians on universal values]. (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue chubanshe, 2013), p. 21.

[20] See “首届两岸新儒家会讲,” p. 9.

[21] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 8. Another scholar said that the problem of diaspora New Confucians was that they“only thought about Confucian ideals in the context of the inner sage, and that they identified with Western values such as freedom and democracy 仅仅放在内圣的层面来考虑，而且认同西方那套自由、民主的价值.” See Ibid., p. 51.

[22] Ibid., p. 51.

[23] A relatively comprehensive overview can be found in Hu Zhihong 胡治洪, “近三十年中国大陆现代新儒家研究的回顾与展望”[Review and outlook of the past thirty years of modern New Confucian research on the Chinese mainland], in Guo Qiyong 郭齐勇, ed., 儒家文化研究 [Research on Confucian culture] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2012), vol. 5, pp. 289-345. Of course, this 56-page long review only covers the period up to 2012, and does not deal with the relatively extreme changes of the past three of four years.

[24] Here is a basic review. As everyone knows, the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, and in the early 1980s, with the government’s tacit consent, mainland academics began a reevaluation of Confucianism, both to correct the complete negation of traditional culture of the Cultural Revolution, as well as to change the past “criticism of Confucius.” Because of academia’s rejection of the anti-traditionalism of the Cultural Revolution, and also because of the need to establish the legitimacy of China’s search for her unique path to modernity, the overall tendency in the intellectual and academic world was to move from the “negation” of the Cultural Revolution to “affirmation.” This received the support of the government, and one important indication of that was the establishment of the Confucius Foundation 孔子基金会 (in 1984) with Gu Mu 谷牧 (who was Vice-Premier at the time) as the titular leader, as well as the establishment journal of Research on Confucius 孔子研究 in 1986. Chinese New Confucianism began to come to public attention in 1986. In that year, Harvard professor and Fulbright Visiting Scholar Tu Wei-ming 杜维明 gave a course on “Confucian philosophy” in the Beijing University Philosophy Department, and met widely with Chinese scholars of all ages in Shanghai, Beijing, and Wuhan. This played an important role in promoting the revival of Confucianism. Also in 1986, three essays on Confucianism were published in important mainland reviews. These included: 1. Li Zehou 李泽厚, “关于儒学与现代新儒学” [On Confucianism and modern New Confucianism] in Wenhuibao 文汇报, January 28, 1986; later published in Li Zehou, 走我自己的路 [Walking my own path] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1986); 2. Fang Keli 方克立, “要重视对现代新儒家的研究” [We must take research on modern New Confucians seriously ] 天津社会科学 [Tianjin social science] 1986: 5; 3. Bao Zunxin 包遵信, “儒家思想和现代化” [Confucian thought and modernization] 北京社会科学 [Beijing social science] 1986: 5, and in 知识分子[The Intellectual] 1987: winter. One should also note that research on New Confucianism formally entered official academic planning in the same year. At the National Philosophical Social Science “7-5” Planning Meeting held in the fall and winter in Beijing, “research on currents of thought in modern New Confucianism” was listed as a key research topic. Against this background, in 1987 the Confucius Foundation and the Singapore East Asian Philosophy Research Center jointly held the important “International Academic Conference on Confucianism.” See Li Zonggui 李宗桂, “’现代新儒家思潮研究’的由来和宣州会议的争鸣”[The origins of ‘research on currents of thought in modern New Confucianism and the debates at the Xuanzhou meeting] in Fang Keli 方克立and Li Jinquan 李锦全, eds., 现代新儒学研究论集 [Collected essays on modern New Confucianism] vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo shuhei kexue chubanshe, 1989), pp. 332-340.

[25] In his “第三代新儒家掠影” [A brief description of the third generation of New Confucians], Fang Keli 方克立 says that there were two reasons for the rise of the New Confucians in the 1980s. One was that “the world was in transition from modernity to post-modernity, and the flaws and limitations of Western civilization seemed to provide an opportunity for the reevaluation or rebirth of the Chinese Confucian tradition 世界正处在一个由现代化向现代以后转型的时期，西方文明的偏失和局限似乎为中国儒家传统的重估和再生提供了机会.” The second was that “China was facing ever more urgent questions of modernization, and the many mistakes China had made in her more than a century of modernization effort prompted people to reevaluate current modernization models and paths. In addition, the development of the ‘Four Little Asian Dragons’ over the past twenty years also served an example, giving the theory of “Confucian capitalism” ever more traction in the marketplace 中国面临着更加迫切的现代化问题，100多年来中国现代化的屡次挫败，促使人们重新思考实现现代化的模式、道路问题的讨论上来，而且’亚洲四小龙’近20年的发展也提供了一种参照,使’儒家资本主义’的理论在今天有了更加广泛的市场.” See 文史哲 [Literature, history, and philosophy] 1989: 3, also published in Wenshizhe editorial board, ed., 儒学：历史，思想与信仰 [Confucianism: History, thought, and belief] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshugan, 2011), p. 414.

[26] In his preface to 再论政治儒学 [Further discussions of political Confucianism] (Shanghai: Huadong shida chubanshe, 2011), Jiang Qing says that it was in 1983 when he read Tang Junyi’s book that he discovered that there was a Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucianism, after which he read Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968), Liang Shuming, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan 徐复观 (1902-1982), and began to identify as a New Confucian.

[27] Zhang Xuezhi 张学智,“包打天下与莫若两行”[Winning it all and Dividing up the Work], originally published in 文史哲 2003: 2, and later included in Wenshizhe editorial board, ed., 儒学：历史、思想与信仰, p. 44.

[28] It is not that no one saw the latent problems. Some people noticed the “anti-modern” and “anti-democratic” elements hidden in the New Confucians’ arguments, and thus were a bit wary. I could mention a personal experience in this regard. It was probably in 1988 when the now deceased scholar Bao Zunxin 包遵信 (1937-2007) made a special trip to the Chinese Culture Institute and gave me an essay prepared on an old type-writer, which was entitled“Further discussion of Confucian thought and modernization 再论儒家思想和现代化.” In it, the author expressed his deep concerns about the way in which New Confucian discourse might serve to offset the criticism of tradition and the pursuit of modernity that had just emerged in the 1980s, and about their conservative tendencies regarding political reform and institutional construction. I felt at the time that China had just pulled itself out of the “criticize Confucius” mode of the Cultural Revolution, and that propagating a little Confucian thought would not be too bad and would serve as a corrective. At the same time, I also felt that the text was a slight overreaction. I read the piece through and then put it aside without further thought, and today have no idea where it is.

[29] Translator’s note: This is a reference to Yu Keping’s 俞可平 (b. 1959) book, Democracy is a Good Thing.

[30] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? pp. 8, 20-21.

[31] Jiang Qing, in his 1989 Ehu 鹅湖 article entitled “中国大陆复兴儒学的现实意义及其面临的问题” [The contemporary significance of the mainland restoration of Confucianism and the problems it faces]”acknowledged that Mainland New Confucians had been “nourished” by diaspora New Confucians like Tu Wei-ming and Liu Shuxian 刘述先 (1934-2016). He also insisted that some “young [mainland] scholars, influenced by New Confucians from Hong Kong and Taiwan and the diaspora, can self-consciously identify with the spirit and values of Chinese Confucian culture, and can also assume the burden of the spiritual life of Confucian culture 青年学者在港台及海外新儒家的影响下，能够自觉地认同中国儒家文化的精神价值，并且能够自觉地承担儒家文化的精神生命.” See Ehu 15.2, p. 33. But in 1991 Jiang clearly criticized diaspora New Confucians for having fallen into an “extreme individualistic tendency 极端个人化倾向,” an “extreme metaphysical tendency 极端形上化倾向,” an “extreme interiorizing tendency 极端内在化倾向” and an “extreme tendency of transcendence 极端超越化倾向,” and announced a parting of the ways. See his “从心性儒学走向政治儒学——论当代新儒学的另一发展路向” [From a Confucianism of the heart to a political Confucianism—On another developmental path for modern New Confucianism] 深圳大学学报 [Journal of Shenzhen University] 1991.1: pp. 81-83.

[32] Jiang Qing, 公羊学引论 [Introduction to Gongyang studies]. (Shenyang: Liaodong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995).

[33] Jiang Qing, 政治儒学 [Political Confucianism] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2003), p. 126.

[34] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 114. Gan Chunsong 干春松 (b. 1965) said it fairly rationally and politely in his proposals for an “institutional Confucianism 制度儒学.” In the foreword to his 制度儒学 [Institutional Confucianism] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2006), he said “to a certain degree,‘institutional Confucianism’can be seen as being a different face of Confucianism from the ‘learning of the heart. 在某种程度上, ‘制度儒学’可以看做是与’心性儒学‘相对的儒家的另一面.” In a footnote, he also explained that this was “inevitable 不得不然的做法,” since “cultural attacks in the modern era have led Confucianism to retreat to a position of ‘internal transcendence,’ while modern New Confucians have also worked hard to separate Confucianism from traditional politics, so that the ‘learning of the heart’ and institutions have become two separate streams 近代以来的文化冲击，导致儒学退却到‘内在超越’的境地，而现代新儒家又致力于将儒学与传统政治相分离，导致儒学之心性与制度被分成两橛, p. 9.

[35] Zhang Xu 张旭,“我为什么提出‘新康有为主义,’” [Why I advocate ‘new Kang Youwei-ism’], in 东林会讲, p. 60.

[36] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 132.

[37] Translator’s note: Both quotes are from the 礼记, 王制 [The Classic of Rites, Kingly Institutions], see https://ctext.org/liji/wang-zhi .

[38] Translator’s note: Wang Jingwei was the leader of the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China, a puppet state erected by the Japanese occupiers between 1940 and 1945. Wang is widely reviled in China as a collaborator.

[39] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? pp. 147-148.

[40] Ibid., pp. 24-25, 152.

[41] Translator’s note: Quote from Mencius, Gongsunchou, 2b. 13, slightly modified from Robert Eno’s translation, http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf , p. 53.

[42] Yu Ying-shih, “钱穆与新儒家” [Qian Mu and the New Confucians], in 钱穆与中国文化 [Qian Mu and Chinese culture] (Shanghai: Yuandong chubanshe, 1994, 1996), p. 88.

[43] Translator’s note: The “uncrowned king” is a reference to the Confucius of the Gongyang tradition, a crusading reformer who might well have become king had events unfolded differently.

[44] Translator’s note: Lu Jia was the scholar who convinced Liu Bang 刘邦 (r. 202-195 BCE), founder of the Han Dynasty, that ruling from horseback was not enough.

[45] Translators note: Shusun Tong’s biography can be found in chapter 99 of the 史记 [The annals of history]. For an English-language translation, see Burton Watson, Ssu-ma Ch’ien: Grand Historian of China (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1958).

[46] Chen Ming, “超越牟宗三，回到康有為” [Transcending Mou Zongsan, returning to Kang Youwei], in 首屆兩岸新儒家會講, p. 20. [Translator’s note: A translation of Chen’s text is available at https://www.readingthechinadream.com/chen-ming-transcend-left-and-right.html].

[47] Ibid., p. 14.

[48] See Jiang Qing, “中国大陆复兴儒学的现实意义及其面临的问题,” pp. 170-171, August-September 1989. 方克立 has a fierce criticism of this text, see “评大陆新儒家’复兴儒学‘的纲领” [A critique of the Mainland New Confucians’program to ‘revive Confucianism’], in 晋阳学刊 [Jinyang academic review], 1997: 4.

[49] Translator’s note: From the 周礼 [Rites of Zhou], see https://ctext.org/rites-of-zhou .

[50] Peng Yongjian 彭永捷, “论儒教的体制化和儒教的改新” [On the institutionalization of Confucianism and Confucianisms renewal], in Gan Chunsong 干春松, ed., 儒教、儒家與中國制度資源 [Confucianism, Confucians, and Chinese political resources]. (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 2007), p. 100.

[51] Some New Confucian scholars, when talking about the practical influence of traditional Chinese politics, mention: 1. the great unity 大一统; 2. the theory of the three bonds 三纲论; and 3. the establishment of centralized government 封建郡县之辩端出来. In fact, of these three, neither the great unity nor the creation of centralized rule is a Confucian invention, but rather belong to the Legalists. See Tang Wenming 唐文明, “政治儒学复兴的正当性问题” [The question of legitimacy in the revival of political Confucianism], in Fan Ruiping, ed., 儒家宪政与中国未来 [Confucian constitutional rule and the future of China] (Shanghai: Huadong shida chubanshe, 2012), pp. 94-95. Liu Zehua 刘泽华 once criticized “New Confucians and those scholars who lean toward the New Confucians, most of whom avoid the question of the relationship between Confucian methods and the emperor in their discussion of the Confucian mission 新儒家以及倾心于新儒家的学者，多半绕开儒术与帝王的关系来论述儒家的主旨,” in 中国政治思想通史（综论卷） [Comprehensive history of Chinese political thought, overview volume] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2014) p. 134. The New Confucians he mentions here are probably diaspora New Confucians, but today’s Mainland New Confucians no longer try to circumvent this question, and instead straightforwardly advocate “political Confucianism,” and link Confucianism and imperial power directly.

[52] Translator’s note: Succession through murder, not virtue.

[53] Translator’s note: In which the emperor killed his own son.

[54] On this point, see Max Weber, “Forms of domination,” and Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. Ge cites the Chinese translations of these works.

[55] This is what Lin Yusheng 林毓生 referred to as “universal kingship 普遍王权,” see Lin Yusheng, 思想与人物 [Thought and people]. (Taibei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1983), p. 149.

[56] See Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, 七至十九世紀中國的知識、思想與信仰——中國思想史第二卷 [Knowledge, thought and belief in China from the seventh to the 19th centuries—The history of Chinese thought, volume 2]. (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2001), pp. 267-268.

[57] Rousseau, On the Social Contract. Ge cites the Chinese translation. The translation from Rousseau is found here: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf , p. 2.

[58] In his talk on“儒学在当今中国有什么用?”[What is the use of Confucianism in Contemporary China?] (a Phoenix Hall lecture presented on July 15, 2006), Jiang Qing argued that Confucianism has eight functions. Number five is to rebuild the legitimacy of China’s political order, and number six is to construct political institutions with Chinese characteristics. He argues that “legitimacy solves the problems of the relationship between authority and obedience and is the basis for the realization of political stability and political capacity. Once legitimacy is resolved, one can, in Rousseau’s words, ‘change strength into right and obedience into duty 合法性解决的是权威与服从的关系问题，是实现政治稳定与执政能力的根本，解决了合法性问题，用卢梭的话说，就可以’把统治变成权利，把服从变成义务.’” How to build legitimacy? His proposal is very simple, and consists of“building political institutions with Chinese cultural characteristics through a revival of Confucianism 通过复兴儒学建立具有中国文化特色的政治制度.” These Chinese political institutions are in turn “built on the ‘great unity institutions of ritual, music, penal law and government’ within Confucian culture 建立在儒家文化上的‘大一统礼乐刑政制度’.” See Ren Zhong 任重, eds., 儒学复兴：继绝与再生 [The Confucian Revival: Restoration and Rebirth]. (Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 2012), pp. 11-13.

[59] Scholars like Wang Shaoguang 王紹光, who have had close talks with the Mainland New Confucians, are skeptical. Wang sums up this kind of institutional planning as “elitism with a Confucian core 以儒士为核心的精英主义.” He says that there are two assumptions in this kind of elitism. One is that neither in China nor in the West are existing institutions elitist enough. The other is that only Confucian elitists can master the way of politics, the way of governance, and represent both the way of heaven and the way of earth. According to Wang, neither of these assumptions has been validated. See Fan Ruiping, ed., 儒家宪政与中国未来, p. 27.

[60] A scholar who participated in their discussions once asked: “Since power makes people corrupt, then what magic formula does Jiang Qing have that will keep these great Confucians, who enter into the chambers with the power to establish the basic laws, from becoming corrupt? 权力使人腐败，那么蒋庆先生有什么法宝，可以确保进入议院掌握立法权的这些大儒不会腐败” This truly is a problem, and another one is, before they enter the chambers, what proof do we have that these great Confucians possess exceptional honesty and integrity? See 康有为与制度化儒学, p. 23. [Translator’s note: Excerpts of this text are available in English translation here: https://www.readingthechinadream.com/kang-youwei-and-institutional-confucianism.html ].

[61] Jiang Qing, et.al., 中国必须再儒, p. 142.

[62] Someone recently pointed out that the theory of “political Confucianism 政治儒学” should be understood as “political theology 政治神学,” in other words a close alliance between politics and Confucianism…The so-called “Confucian order” or “Chinese style of politics 儒家式秩序,”is in fact a kind of “Confucian dictatorship 儒教士集團專政.” Yet at the same time they say that “Despite having a Confucian monopoly on political legitimacy, and despite allowing a Confucian monopoly on political power, it is obvious that we absolutely cannot return to traditional society 用儒家文化垄断政治合法性资源,让儒教士垄断政治权力，绝不可能再像古代社会那样是不证自明的了.” See Yang Zifei 杨子飞, “政治儒学抑或政治的儒学” [Political Confucianism or a political Confucianism], in 武汉大学学报 [Wuhan University Academic Journal] 2016: 4, p. 53.

[63] 伊洛渊源录 [Speeches and acts of the towering figures of Neo-Confucianism since the Northern Song], ch. 1, “遺事” [Legacy]. (Taibei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), pp. 3-4.

[64] Wang Maohong 王懋竑, 朱熹年谱 [Annalistic biography of Zhu Xi]. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998), ch. 1, p. 2.

[65] Kang Xiaoguang argues that ”This was the axis of China’s traditional politics, and the essence of traditional China’s political philosophy 这是中国古代政治的轴心，也是中国古代政治哲学的精华.” See Jiang Qing, et. al., 中国必须再儒, p. 152.

[66] Jiang Qing, “儒学在当今中国有什么用?” p. 11.

[67] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 72.

[68] See “康有为与制度化儒学,”p. 25.

[69] Ibid., p. 32. The next speaker made a statement regarding Kang’s theory of national religion that is hard to understand: “First, the teaching of Confucius is not Confucian religion 第一，孔教不是儒教;” “Second, the teaching of Confucius is not necessarily a religion 第二，孔教不一定是宗教;”and “Third, the teachings of Confucius are China’s natural, national religion 第三，孔教天然是国教.” Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[70] Chen Ming says that his proposal to “Transcend Mou Zongsan, return to Kang Youwei” was the result of a reflection on China’s current problems. “Why choose Kang Youwei rather than Zhang Taiyan or Zhang Zhidong? Because Zhang Taiyan represents merely a 'small China' plan, while Kang Youwei represents a 'great China plan.' All Zhang Zhidong did was to support the empire, while Kang Youwei rethought things based on the eclipse of the Qing order.” “康有为与制度化儒学,” p. 66.

[71] On this question, there seem to be divergences of opinion between Mainland New Confucians, particularly between Chen Ming and Jiang Qing. Chen Ming explains that he does not agree with Jiang Qing’s decision to speak only of “a China of rites and music 礼乐中国,” because if the conversation is limited to the Confucian classics and rites, then this “runs the risk of equating the Han people with China, which could suggest that the Han have a monopoly on China 把属于汉族的东西看成是中国的了，这样就成了汉族垄断中国的概念.”Elsewhere he criticizes Jiang Qing, noting that “When you equate Confucianism with China, this means equating China with the Han people, and is a culturally narrow vision of ‘the original China.’ If this is not a kind of cultural arrogance, then it is the result of the influence of Western theories of ‘ethnic states.’ 在儒教与中国间画等号，实际就是在中国和汉族间画等号，并且是狭义的文化上的‘诸夏’。这如果不是一种文化上的傲慢，那就是受到了西方所谓‘民族国家论’的暗示.’” Clearly, Chen has understood that if Mainland New Confucians overemphasize the notion of the“differences between Chinese and barbarians,” and claim a monopoly on the power to interpret what “China” means, they will reduce the sense of “national ethnicity”and come into conflict with China’s current reality as a multi-ethnic state. See, respectively, Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 135; and Chen Ming, “公民宗教与中华民族意识建构” [Civil religion and the construction of Chinese consciousness], in Ren Zhong, ed., 儒学复兴：继绝与再生, p. 30. Elsewhere, Chen Ming quite frankly points out that he “does not approve theories that strive to whitewash the relationship between Confucianism and nationalism. First, they do not correspond to reality, and moreover their goal is to idealize Confucianism, which in the end will turn Confucianism into something absurd 不赞成那种极力撇清儒学和民族主义关系的说法。首先它不合符事实，其次它试图把儒家理想化，实际却导致儒家的荒谬化.” See Jiang Qing, et.al., 中国必须再儒化, p. 95. This is a real question worthy of debate, and Chen’s viewpoint should be affirmed. But there were also New Confucian scholars who criticized Chen Ming, saying that if we worry overmuch about the Han-centrism hidden in Confucian thought, and oppose the “China of rites and music” of the Gongyang vision, then we will “lose Confucianism’s most valuable part, and wind up seeking only the practical goals of nationalism, which is a deformation of Confucianism 丢掉儒家最有价值的部分，而只满足于追求民族国家这样一个现实目标，我觉得有点儿削足适履.” See Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 136.

[72] Chen Ming notes that:“The contribution and experience of the Qing empire in border management is something that we have not appreciated sufficiently in the past 清帝国治理边疆的功劳和经验，我们以前肯定得不够.””回到康有為,” p. 73.

[73] Translator’s note: The five fu 服 were different degrees of submission to China, submission decreasing with distance.

[74] Qi Yihu 齐义虎 develops Kang Youwei’s plan to defend the Qing monarchy and Qing borders as presented in Kang’s “官制议” [On Official Institutions] (1903) and “廢省論” [On Getting Rid of Provincial Designations] (1902), and goes so far as to adapt what was known as the “Five Degrees of Fealty” system of the pre-Qin era (dian 甸 designating those under direct control of the king, followed by hou 侯, sui 绥, yao 要, and huang 荒, each of which designated vassals who were progressively further from the king). He imagines a “New Five Degrees of Fealty” that will divide up the world as follows: capital-provincial-local relations (i.e., the central government and the regions and cities directly responsible to it) will be the dian fealty; “border regions” (Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan) will be the hou fealty; “neighboring countries” (those sharing the values of the Confucian cultural sphere, as well as South Asian countries that are not part of the Confucian cultural sphere: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bengal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, etc.) will be the sui fealty; friendly countries (third-world countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) will be the yao fealty; and “enemy countries” (superpowers or regional powers) will be the huang fealty. Some of his suggestions are extremely controversial, such as likening Tibet and Xinjiang to “uncooked barbarians 生番,”while the other minorities are put into the category of “cooked barbarians 熟番,” or his promotion of “a policy of direct rule over minority peoples 改土歸流” [Translator’s note: this was the idea, first proposed in the Ming period, of ending the policy of local self-rule accorded to Tibetans, Mongols, and other peripheral peoples with some loyalty to the Chinese empire, and replacing it with direct Han rule]. As another example, he wants to “use the opportunity of constructing an integrated regional East Asian community 借助组建东亚共同体这个区域整合的机会,” which would place Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia and Southeast Asia “in the category of ‘neighboring countries.’” He goes so far as to propose the “absorption” of Australia and New Zealand. In still another example, he argues that China’s refusal to engage in hegemony is not the same as a refusal to assume a kingly role, and that if America is an example of the hegemonic way of fake benevolence and fake democracy, China is an example of the kingly way of genuine benevolence and genuine democracy. This means that the “Chinese path is the path that all of tianxia will follow in its return to a kingly world order, a path opened by China to lead the people of the world out of capitalist alienation and power and toward justice and peace 中国道路就是天下归往的王天下之路，就是中国引领世界各国为全人类开辟的一条走出资本主义人性异化和强权体系的中正和平之路.” See his“畿服之制与天下格局”[Systems of fealty and the world situation] 天府新论, 2016: 4, pp. 60-62.

[75]“东林会讲,”pp. 59-60.

[76] Tang Wenming argues that there are three major elements in Kang Youwei’s thoughts about modern China: the republic, the monarchy, and Confucianism as China’s national religion. See “康有为与制度化儒学,” p. 16. In another talk, he repeated the same ideas, but added that while the idea of a monarchy in modern China is impossible, “there still needs something to replace it.” See “回到康有为,” p. 56. On this question, see also Zeng Yi, 共和与君主——康有为晚期政治思想研究 [Republic and monarchy—Kang Youwei’s political thought in his later years] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2009). The first chapter of this book discusses “the strange state of China after the Republic 共和后中国之怪现状,” and later on asserts that a constitutional monarchy “need not be employed only in the period of xiaokang, and in fact is the best of political systems 不必止施予小康世而已实为最优之政体,” thus expressing his positive attitude toward Kang’s defense of the Qing empire and the monarchical system.

[77] See“康有为与制度化儒学,”pp. 19-20. Even if Machiavelli believed that a monarchy was beneficial to development and maintenance of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-institutional empire, he equally recognized that the monarchial empire also relies on military conquests, colonization or unplanned military occupations, as well as on practical strategies whose measures consist of unscrupulous tactics and tradeoffs rather than morality, truth, or the support of heaven, earth, and man, as the Mainland New Confucians think. See The Prince. Ge cites the Chinese translation.

[78] See “首屆兩岸新儒家會講,” p. 66.

[79] “回到康有为,”p. 34.

[80] Jiang Qing, 公羊学引论, pp. 10-16.

[81] Jiang Qing, et. al., 中国必须再儒化, p. 162.

[82] Might we see the plans of Kang Xiaoguang, Wang Dasan 王达三 (b. 1974) and Jiang Qing as fairly complete designs? Kang Xiaoguang presented an early model in his “文化民族主义论纲” [Plan for a cultural nationalism], in which he made four concrete proposals: 1. “Confucian education should be formally added to the educational system 儒学教育进入正式学校教育体系;” 2. “The state should support Confucianism, and make it the national religion 国家支持儒教，将儒教定为国教;” 3. Confucianism should enter daily life, “becoming the religion of the entire people 成为全民性宗教;” and 4. “Confucianism should be propagated outside of China 向海外传播儒教” by non-governmental organizations. Published in 战略与管理 [Strategy and management] 2003: 2. In his ”中国文化本位论之重提与新诠” [Restatement and reinterpretation of the theory of China’s own culture], Wang Dasan made ten proposals: 1. Consensus (To strengthen and protect the interests of the state and the people, we should maintain a warm and respectful attititude toward Chinese culture); 2. Text-reading (Schools at all levels should incorporate text-reading into their curriculum); 3. Popular customs (Promote certain traditional holidays as national holidays and reestablish the ritual system); 4. Confucius’s birthday (Large-scale memorial activities to be held at all levels throughout the country); 5. Sacrifices (to the emperor and to Confucius); 6. Public lectures (Restore the Confucian academies); 7. Temples (Restore the Confucian temples and academies, which will be self-managed); 8. Confucian religion (Establish the Confucian religion, which will be unified and serve as the national religion); 9. Officials (Officials must study the scriptures, and such courses will be added to the curriculum in administrative and Party schools at all levels; officials will pass a Confucian examination before being selected for public service); 10. Confucianization (A reinterpretation of the legitimacy of the ruling party. In Wang’s words “The ruling party must free itself from one of its historical sources of legitimacy—its anti-tradition, anti-Confucianism stance—and construct its actual legitimacy on the basis of the great revival of the Chinese people and Chinese culture 执政党要从自己的历史合法性之一，即反传统、反儒家之中解放出来，把自己的现实合法性建立在中华民族和中国文化的伟大复兴之上.” In Gan Chunsong 干春松, ed., 儒教、儒家与中国制度资源, pp. 245-247. In his preface to his 再论政治儒学, Jiang Qing says that in answer to the “Fukuyama question,” he would “detail his thoughts about ‘Confucian constitutional rule’ on the basis of the ‘kingly Way of politics’ 王道政治的理念，提出了’儒教宪政’的构想.” This Confucian constitutionalism entailed four points: 1: “The kingly Way of politics—the philosophical basis of Confucian constitutionalism 王道政治: 儒教宪政的义理基础”; 2. “The parliamentary form of Confucian constitutionalism—the tricameral system 儒教宪政的议会形式──议会三院制”; 3. “The oversight functions of Confucian constitutionalism—the Taixue jianguo system 儒教宪政的监督形式: 太学监国制;” 4. “The national form of Confucian constitutionalism—constitutional monarchy 儒教宪政的国体形式──虚君共和制.” See pp. 3-4.

[83] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 113.

[84] Ibid., p. 108.

[85] Ibid., pp. 175-179. The discussions here of men and women, husband and wife, and the family leave one speechless. For example, “women bear complete responsibility for the confusion in relationships between the sexes 男女关系的混乱，绝对是女子的责任” (p. 68); or “Women are surely shouting for joy as the West advocates sexual liberation 西方人鼓吹性解放，肯定是女人在哪里欢呼雀跃” (p. 68).

[86] See Francis L. K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors’ Shadow—Kinship, Personality and Social Mobility in China. Ge cites chapter 11 of the Chinese translation; Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil. Ge cites the Chinese translation.

[87] From Mencius, see http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf   p. 60.

[88] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 79.

[89] Jiang Qing, “读经、儒教与中国文化的复兴──2004年蒋庆先生访谈录” [Reading the classics, Confucianism, and the revival of Chinese culture—an interview with Mr. Jiang Qing in 2004], in Ren Zhong, ed., 儒家回归：建言与声辩 [The return of Confucians: Advocacy and voice]. (Beijing: Zhongguo zhengzhi daxue chubanshe, 2012), pp. 16-17.

[90] In his “论冯友兰的社会政治思想” [On Feng Youlan’s socio-political thought], Zeng Yi argues that “this discussion is fantastic. On the topic of the essence of traditional and family, Feng Youlan carried out an extremely scholarly analysis 此段议论极是精彩。对于传统婚姻与家庭的本质，冯友兰作了非常学理的阐释.” The reason that these scholars, who call themselves “Confucians” find these notions fantastic is because they are a way of relativizing all civilizations. “If this is the case, then many traditional arrangements and concepts, be they ethical or political, which in the past were seen as backwards, are now newly understood on the basic of the plurality of civilizations. This means that Western values and arrangements are nothing more than the product of a particular people 诚能如此，曾经许多被视为落后的传统秩序和观念，不论是伦理的，还是政治的，都讲从多元文明的角度得到重新理解，从而西方文明中的那些价值、秩序，也只是某种特定民族的产物而已.” In 中原文化研究 [Research on the culture of the central plains], 2016: 2, p. 31.

[91] For Chen Dandan’s 陈丹丹 criticism, see 东林会讲, p. 75.

[92] Kang Xiaoguang, “我为什么主张’儒化,’” [Why I advocate ‘Confucianization’], in Jiang Qing, et. al., eds., 中国必须再儒化, p. 165.

[93] Jiang Qing, “王道政治是当今中国政治的发展方向” [The politics of the kingly way is the developmental direction for today’s Chinese politics], in Jiang, et. al., 中国必须再儒化, p. 29. He also advocates the establishment of a national-level “Confucian university 儒教大学,” as well as Confucian institutes at all local levels, Confucian publishing houses, newspapers and magazines, websites and television stations, “scripture halls 讲经堂”or“Confucian temples 孔圣堂”throughout the country, as well as the revival of all sorts of Confucian rituals and activities.

[94] Jiang Qing, “王道政治是当今中国政治的发展方向,” p. 29.

[95] In his “中国政教传统及其重建的现代意义”[China’s theocratic tradition and the modern significance of its reconstruction], Yao Zhongqiu says that “educating all officials in the Confucian classics…would be a good remedy for many cultural and political dilemmas contemporary China faces 对官员群体进行儒家经典教育…乃是解决当代中国面临的诸多文化与政治难题的良方.”See 文化纵横 [Beijing Cultural Review] 2013: 2, p. 67.

[96] Jiang Qing, “王道政治是当今中国政治的发展方向,” pp. 42-43.

[97] Yao Zhongqiu, “秩序底定与史学再造——围绕钱穆的讨论” [Stabilizing the order and remaking historiography—On the debate about Qian Mu]. 文化纵横 2015.10, p. 124.

[98] Yao Zhongqiu, 中国政教传统及其重建的现代意义, p. 67.

[99] See Jiang Qing, “关于重建中国儒教的构想” [Thoughts on the reconstruction of Chinese Confucianism], in Chen Ming, ed., 儒教新论 [New views of Confucianism]. (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2010); later included in Ren Zhong, ed., 儒教重建：主张与回应 [Rebuilding Confucianism: Proposals and Reactions]. (Beijing: Zhongguo zhengzhi daxue chubanshe, 2012), pp. 3-4.

[100] Kang Xiaoguang, “我为什么主张’儒化,’” p. 165. In fact, even if Kang Youwei planned to “adopt Confucianism as the state religion,” people close to him such as Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873-1929) and Huang Zunxian 黄遵宪 (1848-1905) gradually moved away from the idea. Although Liang Qichao early on supported Confucianism (as in his “复友人论保教书” [Replying to a friend on the topic of the memorial advocating protection of Confucianism]), by 1902 when writing texts like “保教非所以尊孔论” [Protecting Confucianism is not a reason to adopt Confucianism as state religion] he criticized those advocating the “protection of religion,” “First because we do not know the true face of Confucius, second because we do not know the definition of religion, third because we do not know how religion will develop in the future, and fourth because we do not know the relationship between the various countries and their religions 一曰不知孔子之真相，二曰不知宗教之界说，三曰不知今后宗教势力之迁移，四曰不知列国政治与宗教之关系.” He also pointed out that the most important thing at the moment was to “delimit the fields of politics and religion so that they do not enter into conflict 划定政治与宗教之许可权，使不相侵越也,”and he particularly criticized the fact that “the idea of protecting Confucianism [i.e., adopting Confucianism as the national religion] will constrain the thought of the people 保教之说束缚国民思想,”arguing that“in an age like ours where new currents of thought are appearing daily, the idea of protecting the religion through Confucianism is impossible 居近日诸学日新思潮横溢之时代，而犹以保教为尊孔子，斯亦不可已乎.”See Liang, 饮冰室合集 [Writings from the ice drinker’s studio]. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju yingyinben), section 4, pp. 50-56.

[101] Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing tradition,” in Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition. Ge cites the Chinese translation.

[102] In fact, some Mainland New Confucians also saw the problem. For example, Gan Chunsong, in his 制度儒学, p. 64 also admits that when the Confucians “take the notion of ‘filial piety’ nourished by familialism, and the related concept of ‘loyalty’ within the family-state system, and see them as the core of a self-evident, heavenly morality, and when imperial power and the hierarchical system are subsumed under the rubric of ‘ritual,’, then everything becomes a kind of necessary, unique possibility, the only possible order.” This problem means that “displacing all Confucian political designs to today’s China is not only impossible, but will also lead to an increase in the distance between Confucianism and modern society, and thus thoroughly position Confucianism as something from the ‘past.’ 从家庭主义孕育出来的’孝’观念及由此而来的家国一体的’忠’观念，看成天经地义的核心道德，皇权与等级秩序在’礼’的笼罩之下，完全成为一种必然的、唯一可能的秩序形式」这是有问题的，因此「将儒家的所有政治设计都搬到现在中国，不但是不可能的，而且会导致儒家与现代社会之间的距离的加大，从而彻底把儒家定位于’过去’.”

[103] Translator’s note: This quote is attributed to Zhang Zhidong 张之洞 (1837-1909), who was an important official, involved in many of the reform efforts of the late nineteenth century. The quote is often used in contemporary texts to suggest the enormity of the changes China experienced in the modern era.

[104] Jiang Qing, “儒生文丛．总序” [Overall introduction to Confucian texts], in Ren Zhong, ed., 儒学复兴：继绝与再生, p. 1.

[105] Some of the representative Mainland New Confucians lack a basic knowledge of history, or what they write is ahistorical. For example, Jiang Qing, in his “儒学在当今中国有什么用?”says that “during the ‘Three Dynasties’ period—Xia, Shang, and Zhou—China developed a unique Confucian civilization…which is why I say that Confucianism is the core value of China’s civilization and the foundation of her beliefs 在中国的夏商周’三代’，中国就形成了独特的儒教文明…所以说，儒学也就是中华文明的核心价值与义理基础.” See Ren Zhong, ed., 儒学复兴：继绝与再生, p. 4. This wasn’t an off-hand remark, and in his “关于重建中国儒教的构想,” he again wrote: “The ‘Three Dynasties’ of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou already had Confucianism, because Confucianism is the structure of a civilization, and when Fu Yi sketched the hexagrams he also created Chinese civilization 夏商周’三代’即有儒教，因儒教是一文明体，伏羲画卦即开创了中国文明.” First published in Chen Ming, 儒教新論, and later included in Ren Zhong, ed., 儒教重建：主张与回应, pp. 3-4. In addition, he also said that Wang Tong 王通 (584-618) of the Sui dynasty praised political Confucianism, established the Hefen school 河汾学派, and subsequently paved the way for“the great age of the Tang, as represented by the rule of Tang Taizong 以贞观之治为代表的大唐盛世.” There is no historical basis for this. See 政治儒学, p. 98. Another example is Yu Donghai 余东海, who lacks historical knowledge, even that of Confucianism or the Confucian classics. He will say things like the “accomplishments of the emperor Wenjing 文景之治”, were the contribution of Confucians [translator’s note: Han Wenjing was not a Confucian]; or that the 春秋 [Classic of Spring and Autumn] was a scripture of an “outer king 外王,” which, with the exception of the Han period “withered in obscurity until the bubble burst at the end of the Qing, bringing forth the reform group 郁而不彰，清晚期冒了个泡，推出一批改良派.” He said that the reigns of Cheng 成 (1055-1021 BCE) and Kang 康 (1020-996 BCE) in the Western Zhou were examples of“Confucian rule 儒家之治.” He even said that there were “village elections 乡举里选” already in the Western Zhou period, as if a base-level democracy already existed. See Jiang Qing, et.al., eds., 中国必须再儒化, pp. 189-199. Then there’s Tang Wenming, who said that the practical influence of Confucian thought on politics was: 1. The idea of the great unity 大一统; 2. The theory of the three bonds 三纲论; 3. The imposition of centralized rule 封建郡县之辩. This is completely ahistorical since numbers 1 and 3 were basically the work of the Legalists, a group the Mainland New Confucians distinguish themselves from clearly, and the greatest practical results were achieved by the Qin dynasty, known for burning the books and burying the Confucians. See Tang Wenming, “政治儒学复兴的正当性问题,” pp. 94-95. Even stranger is that Yao Zhongqiu (Qiu Feng), who originally studied history, actually said that the basic framework of the Zhou feudal order was that “free individuals could, through written documents, establish relations of ruler and servant 基本架构是自由人透过书面契约所建立的君臣关系,” that“both sides were free, and could put an end to the contract 双方都是自由的，可以解除君臣契约.” See Jiang Qing, et.al., eds., 中国必须再儒化, p. 280. He also said that at the time of Dong Zhongshu and Han Wudi, the “shared rule 共治体制” of emperor and scholar was already in place and that Dong Zhongshu put in motion the“constitutional revolution 宪政主义革命”of the Han Wudi era. See Jiang Qing, et.al., 中国必须再儒化, pp. 281-282. He also said that when General Zeng Guofan 曾国藩 (1811-1872) defeated the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, a “variant of Western civilization 西方文明的变体,” this marked the disintegration of the Manchu “tribal rule 部族统治,”and this constituted another “constitutional revolution,” which again goes against common knowledge and is without basis. See “儒家作为现代中国之构建者” [Confucianism as the builder of modern China], 文化纵横 2014: 2, p. 69. Guo Yi 郭沂 (b. 1962), who has studied the history of philosophy and ancient documents says, in his “国家意识形态与民族主体价值相辅相成——全球化时代马克思主义与儒学关系的再思考” [National ideology and the values of popular subjectivity mutually complete one another—Further reflexions on the relationship between Marxism and Confucian studies in the age of globalization], that “As early as China’s emergence into the era of civilization, which would mean that period of the three rulers and the five emperors, Chinese religion [i.e., Confucianism] had already taken form, to subsequently become the national religion under the Three Dynasties period of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou 早在中国跨入文明时代之初，也就是三皇五帝时期，华教就已经形成了，并成为后来夏商周三代的国家宗教.” See 哲学动态 [Trends in philosophy] 2007.3. And there is one New Confucian scholar can’t get the dates for the Foreign Affairs Movement of the late Qing right, as we can see from his casual remark that “Fifty years after the Foreign Affairs Movement, China lost to Japan (referring to the 1894 Sino-Japanese War) 洋务运动五十年后，中国却被日本打败（指1894年甲午战争),” see Bao Tongdong 白彤东 (b. 1970), “中国是如何成为专制国家的” [How China became an autocratic country], in 文史哲 2016: 5, p. 34.

[106] Ren Zhong calls these Xi Jinping’s “three great gestures 三大动作.” See Jiang Qing, et.al., eds., 中国必须再儒化, pp. 117-118. See also Qiu Feng (Yao Zhongqiu), “复兴儒家，复归道统” [Revive Confucianism, restore orthodoxy], in Ibid., p. 269; and Wang Xuedian 王学典 (b. 1956), “中国向何处去：人文社会科学的近期走向” [Where is China going? Recent trends in humanities and social sciences], 清华大学学报 [Tsinghua University Academic Journal] 2016: 2, pp. 5-6; and Chen Ming, in“首届两岸新儒家会讲,” p. 17.

[107] Translator’s note: The expression “original intention” is often used in texts hoping to reconcile Marxism and Confucianism, the idea being to revisit what Marx or Confucius “really meant.” See for example Jiang Shigong, “Philosophy and History: Interpreting the ‘Xi Jinping Era’ through Xi’s Report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP,” translation available online at https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-philosophy-and-history.html .

[108] Qiu Feng (Yao Zhongqiu), “复兴儒家，复归道统,” p. 257. He seems to pay exceptional attention to the report of the meeting of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee, because he mentioned it twice in this text (pps. 257, 269) and brought it up repeatedly elsewhere. For example, in his “解决当代中国问题的关键是回归道统” [The key to solving the problems of contemporary China is to return to orthodoxy] (published under the name of Qiu Feng) he also cites the report of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee, saying that the CCP, “from the moment of its founding, was both the loyal inheritor and promoter of China’s excellent traditional culture, and the guiding force and developer of China’s advanced culture 从成立之日起，就既是中华优秀文化的忠实传承者和弘扬者，又是中国先进文化的积极宣导者和发展者,” and exclaims that “this is a political phrasing that has great real meaning as well as pointing out our future direction. It is the same as announcing that the CCP hopes to resolve the conflict between culture and politics, and the antagonism between the political tradition and orthodoxy 这是一个具有重大现实意义、并且指向未来的政治修辞。这句话等于宣告，中共希望化解文化与政治的冲突、政统与道统的对立.” In “21世纪经济报导” [Economic reports of the 21st century], April 30, 2012, included in Ren Zhong, ed., 儒学复兴：继绝与再生, p. 21.

[109] Qiu Feng (Yao Zhongqiu), “复兴儒家，复归道统,” p. 270.

[110] See 汉书 (History of the Han) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju), ch. 56, “董仲舒传” [Biography of Dong Zhongshu], p. 2523.

[111] Cheng Hao, “下山偶成” [It happened by chance while coming down the mountain], in 河南程氏文集 [The collected writings of the Chengs of Henan], (Beijing: Zhongguo shuju, 1981), vol. 2, p. 476.

[112] Translator’s note: This the title of book in which Guy Alitto interviews Liang Shuming: 吾曹不出如苍生何 : 梁漱溟晚年口述. (Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 2010).

[113] Translator’s note: This is the title of yet another book of interviews with Liang Shuming: 这个世界会好吗 : 梁漱溟晚年口述. (Shanghai: Dongfang chubanshe, 2006).

[114] Translator’s note: These are references to book titles, or sub-titles, bemoaning the fate of Confucianism in modern times. The first one is to Tang Junyi’s volume, 说中华民族之花果飘零 [The Decline of the Chinese people], and the second is to Yu Ying-shih’s use of the metaphor of the “wandering soul” to describe modern Confucianism.

[115] Gan Chunsong, ed., 儒教、儒家与中国制度资源, p. 2.

[116] In the words of Jiang Qing, see 中国必须再儒化, p. 51.

[117] Zeng and Guo, 何谓普世？谁之价值? p. 50.

[118] Translator’s note: English translation available online at http://www.learnancientchinesepoetry.org/2016/11/19/li-bai-southern-hills-leave-my-children-to-go-to-the-capital/ .

[119] Translator’s note: Liu Yong spent his life trying to pass the exams and only succeeded late in life in passing a lower-level examination. Most of his poetry is “boudoir” poetry, treating themes of courtesans, etc.

[120] Jiang Qing, et.al., 中国必须再儒化, pp. 78, 219-220.

[121] Ibid., pp. 323-335.

[122] Translator’s note: Zhou Yu was a general in the state of Wu during the Three Kingdoms Period with a sharp ear for the zither.

[123] “读经、儒教与中国文化的复兴——2004年蒋庆先生访谈录,” in Ren Zhong, ed., 儒家回归：建言与声辩, p. 4.

[124] Jiang Qing, “王道政治是当今中国政治的发展方向,” p. 52.

[125] See Wang Dasan, “传统文化的一阳来复——阳明精舍儒学会讲的思想史意义” [The return of traditional culture—the significance in the history of thought of the Confucian conference at the Yangming Academy], who called it the “summit of cultural conservatism 文化保守主义者峰会.” See 读书时报 [Reading journal], July 14, 2004.

[126] As Ren Jiantao 任剑涛 (b. 1962), who supports their debates but is not a New Confucian, has pointed out, “many Mainland New Confucian scholars share a common ideological assumption, the reason for which is that the mainland national ideology is also facing a serious challenge, and at a certain level of meaning this is encouraging the Mainland New Confucians to compete with other groups over the position of the national ideology 大陆新儒学诸家有一个意识形态的共同预设，原因在于大陆自己的国家意识形态面临严峻挑战，在某种意义上，鼓励了大陆新儒学诸家与各家各派起来竞争国家意识形态位置.” See “首届两岸新儒家会讲,” p. 5. In addition, after completing this essay, I saw Xiao Qiang’s 肖强 (Xiao Sanza 萧三匝) “当代大陆新儒家批判” [Criticism of contemporary Mainland New Confucians] (in 文史哲 2017: 1), in which he argues that the reasons for the rise of the Mainland New Confucians are: First, social chaos has led people to accept the importance of Confucianism to a moral revival; second, the leaders of the ruling party have on their own initiative expressed a welcoming attitude to Confucianism; and third, commercial forces have made the revival of national studies a profitable business. See p. 21.

[127] In the words of Chen Ming, “首届两岸新儒家会讲,” p 4. Similar language is found on p. 66.

[128] This kind of argument has been quite popular in recent years in the Chinese intellectual and academic world. See the editor’s remarks in “封面选题：反思中国外交哲学” [Choosing the cover: Reflections on the philosophy of China’s foreign relations], as well as Sheng Hong 盛洪, “儒家的外交原则及其当代意义” [Confucianism’s diplomatic principles and their contemporary significance], 文化纵横 2012: 8, pp. 17, 45.

[129] Yao Zhongqiu (Qiu Feng), “世界历史的中国时刻” [China’s moment in world history], 文化纵横 2013: 6, p. 78.

[130] I have discussed this point at some length in my “对’天下’的想像” [Imagining tianxia], and will not discuss it further here. See 思想 [Thought] (Taibei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 2015), no. 29. An English translation of this text is available here.

[131] “回到康有为,” p. 41.

[132] Yao Zhongqiu, in Jiang Qing, et.al., 中国必须再儒化, p. 275.

[133] Ibid., p. 281.

[134] Yao Zhongqiu, “东林会讲,” p. 71.

[135] Some people say that the link between the Mainland New Confucians and the New Left is “the priority accorded to values and ideals 价值理性的优先.” Others say that they “have a common enemy—capitalism 有一个共同的敌人——资本主义.” See the transcript of the conference on “儒学与社会主义” [Confucianism and socialism], 开放时代2016: 1, p. 74. As Daniel Bell has said, “As China has become a world superpower, it is now China’s turn to begin to acknowledge her own cultural tradition 随着中国成为全球大国随着中国成为全球大国现在轮到中国开始确认自己的文化传统了.” He flatters Chinese scholars by saying that his favorite is “Left Confucianism 左派儒学,” of which representatives would be Jiang Qing and Gan Yang 甘阳 (b. 1952). He says that they are “an experiment aiming to combine the socialist tradition and the Confucian tradition, so that the Confucian tradition would enrich and transform socialism 是把社会主义传统与儒家传统结合在一起的尝试，让儒家传统来丰富和改造社会主义.” See 儒家宪政与中国未来, pp. 235-237. As for the relationship between the Mainland New Confucians and the Mainland New Left, I will have to leave that to another essay.

[136] This is Yuan Gusheng’s 辕固生 (n.d.) warning to Gongsun Hong 公孙弘 (200-121 BCE). See 史记 [Annals of the historian], ch. 121, “儒林列传” [Biography of the Confucians], p. 3124.

[137] On Dong Zhongshu, see 史记 [Annals of the historian], “儒林列传,” ch. 121, and 汉书 [History of the Han], ch. 56, “董仲舒传” [Biography of Dong Zhongshu], pp 2495-2526. Dong Zhongshu’s “three treatises on heaven and man 天人三策” "may not have circulated widely during the time of Han Wudi, nor were they really put into practice,” which has led some people to say that the “circulation of the three treatises on heaven and man began in the reigns of Zhao [r. 87-74 BC] and Xuan [r. 74-49 BC] 天人三策流传民间可能始于昭、宣时期.” Dong’s biography in the 史记 does not address the question. See Chen Suzhen 陈苏镇, 春秋与汉道：两汉政治与政治文化研究 [The Spring and Autumn and the way of the Han: Research on Han politics and political culture] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), p. 224.

[138] On Gongsun Hong, see 史记, ch. 112, “平津侯主父列传” [Biography of the father of the lord of Pingjin], pp 2949-2952.

[139] See 史记, “平津侯主父列传.”

[140] Peng Yunjie 彭永捷, “论儒教的体制化和儒教的改新,” [On the Institutionalization and Reform of Confucianism], in Gan Chunsong, ed., 儒教、儒家与中国制度资源, p. 107.

[141] Translator’s note: This is the title of one of Ge’s recent works, available in English translation as What is China? Territory, Ethnicity, Culture and History. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 2018. Michael Gibbs Hill, translator.

[142] From 史记, “秦始皇本纪” [Biography of Qinshihuang].

[143] Cui Zhiyong 翟志勇, see the transcripts of the debate on “世界历史的中国时刻,” pp. 27-28.

Ge Zhaoguang, "If Horses Had Wings"

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