Jiang Ruiping on East Asia after the Coronavirus

Jiang Ruiping, “The Coronavirus Pandemic is Accelerating the Reshaping of East Asia”[1]

Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
Jiang Ruiping (b. 1958) is a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University, where many of China’s diplomats are trained.  He is a specialist in Japan and in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
Jiang is not someone I follow, and I chose this piece because it talks about the coronavirus and its effects on geopolitics.  When the pandemic began, the huge differences in how China and the United States chose to deal with the virus sparked a surge of writing in China (and elsewhere) about the deeper significance of these differences and where they might lead over time.  I translated some of these texts in the interests of following the discussion, and have kept an eye open for further developments, but in general have not found that the initial surge has been followed by similarly thoughtful reflections (of course, I could easily have missed things…).
 
Jiang’s text is only partly about the pandemic, and his broader concerns have to do with China’s rise, the Sino-American rivalry, and the geopolitical status of East Asia.  His perspective is what one would expect from someone who teaches China’s future diplomats, and is grounded in the structures and practices of diplomatic life—bilateral and multilateral international compacts, policy frameworks, economic statistics.  His argument is a less flashy update of Yuan Peng’s much more ambitious essay on “The Coronavirus and a Once-in-a-Century Change,” published in June, 2020, in which Yuan connects the coronavirus with the notion that China’s rise will inevitably make the 21st century “China’s century.”  Jiang argues that the successful coordination displayed by many East Asian countries during the pandemic has pushed this change forward, and that China has gained ground on the economic front throughout East Asia, in many cases replacing the United States as most important economic partner.
 
Jiang is more hopeful that Shi Yinhong, whose recent essay on the Biden administration’s China policy I translated recently, but he is not triumphant, and notes that must of East Asia remains in a “binary predicament,” reliant on American’s for security concerns and on China for economic reasons.    
Translation
 
At present, the coronavirus pandemic is still spreading unchecked throughout the world, and in many countries and regions, the situation is largely out of control.  This has created an unprecedented threat to human life, as well as economic recessions and social upheavals, and is strongly impacting and accelerating changes throughout the world, so that every important aspect of the historical transformation we are living bears the deep marks left by the pandemic. The rapid shift of the world's center to East Asia and the equally rapid reshaping of the East Asian landscape constitute important trends in this once-in-a-century change.
 
The Trend of the “Rising East and the Declining West" is even Stronger
 
The modern world has always been Western-centered.  After World War II, however, following the rapid rise of East Asia as a whole, a development the World Bank dubbed the "East Asian Miracle," the status of this region rose rapidly in the global context.  Consequently, the status of the West gradually declined, and the “rising East and declining West" became part of the world’s once-in-a-century change.  As we entered the 21st century, growth in emerging markets in East Asia, represented by China, has become even stronger, accelerating the transformation of East Asia into one of the three major centers of the world.

By 2019, the three largest East Asian economies, those of China, Japan, and South Korea, will alone account for 24.0% of the global economy, roughly equivalent to America’s 24.4%, and significantly higher than the 17.8% represented the European Union (21% if the United Kingdom is included). In 2011, the Obama administration announced its “pivot to Asia,” in 2017, Trump pushed his “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” and in 2021, the Biden administration further strengthened the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the East Asian alliance system, which actually enhances the strategic position of East Asia in the global geopolitical landscape.
 
The pandemic has further accelerated the shift of the world's center to East Asia, strengthening the momentum of the rising East and declining West.  This is because East Asia in general has performed better than other regions of the world in terms of containment of the virus and economic recovery. The traditional East Asian social culture of "understanding the big picture, taking care of the overall situation, and emphasizing order," as well as the more authoritative East Asian governments and stronger resource mobilization capabilities, have made the prevention and control of the epidemic in East Asia more effective than in other regions. At present, the proportion of people infected with the virus in East Asia (ASEAN + China, Japan and Korea) is only about 10% of the world average.

The effective prevention and control of the epidemic have created favorable conditions for mitigating the impact on the economy and promoting economic recovery. In the global economic recession and the subsequent “retaliatory”[2] rebound, East Asia experienced a "lighter recession and stronger rebound" compared to other world regions. For example, according to the latest data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the global recession in 2020, the emerging market and developing economies in East Asia will decline by 2.3 percentage points less than the world average, and in the global economic rebound in 2021, they will grow by 2.6 percentage points more. This clearly indicates that the epidemic has further accelerated the rise of East Asia's position in the global economic landscape.
 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Helps to Recreate the "East Asian Miracle"
 
In the postwar period, East Asia witnessed a series of moments of sustained high economic growth. Japan was the first to achieve high economic growth in the 1950s, followed by the successful "take-off" of the "Four Asian Dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) in the 1960s, and then the "Four Asian Tigers" (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines) in the 1970s. The next was the rapid rise of China's economy due to reform and opening in the 1980s, and finally, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar extended the series of rapid economic growth to the whole of East Asia.

As early as 1993, the World Bank issued a special report asserting the emergence of the "East Asian Miracle" of sustained high economic growth. This assertion was once strongly questioned by the Western academic community, represented by the famous American scholar Paul Krugman,[3] and it is true the earlier "East Asian Miracle" suffered from certain inherent flaws, one of which was the lack of the necessary support that a regional cooperation framework could provide. Indeed, during a long period of "tri-polar" regional cooperation, the European pole led, the North American pole followed, and the East Asian pole consistently lagged behind.
 
The coronavirus pandemic changed this landscape to a large extent. In Europe and North America, the pandemic was preceded by the impacts of Brexit and the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), respectively, which meant that the regional cooperation framework was even less effective during the epidemic. In East Asia, both in terms of epidemic containment and economic recovery, as well as in regional cooperative structures such as the China-Japan-South Korea framework, the "10+1" (ASEAN + China), and the "10+3" (ASEAN + China, Japan, and South Korea), cooperation proved to be effective. The inherent "crisis-driven" characteristics of East Asian cooperation also responded well to the crisis posed by the pandemic.

The most significant and far-reaching measure of progress has been the successful signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) on November 15, 2020, which brings into being the world's largest free trade area, accounting for about 30% of the world's population, economy, and trade. Following the signing of the initial accord, member countries are actively promoting the approval of the agreement at the national level, making sure it confirms to local laws.   Overall progress is smooth, and official implementation in 2022 appears not to be in doubt. Against the backdrop of the twists and turns in Europe and North America, and the serious blockage of regional exchanges caused by the epidemic, East Asian cooperation has been able to buck the trend, especially the successful signing of RCEP, which in itself means, to a certain extent, that East Asia created both the "miracle" of economic growth and the "miracle" of regional cooperation.  

Along with the full implementation of RCEP, the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment in the region, as well as the comprehensive promotion of other levels of cooperation, is bound to further strengthen the momentum of the East Asian economy to lead the global recovery toward rapid sustained growth, and help recreate the "East Asian miracle" at any number of levels.
 
Decoupling from China or Working with China 
 
Following rapid changes in the balance of power between the major players and the rapid rise in China's power, the U.S. increasingly views China as its biggest strategic competitor, and has been intensifying efforts to contain and suppress China. One of its main tools is to push itself and its allies to forcibly "decouple" from or leave China.  East Asia is a key region in this U.S. strategy, and the concrete measures they are employing include:  first, heightening the antagonism in political and security terms between America’s East Asian allies and China by advancing the "Pivot to Asia" and "Indo-Pacific" strategies, weakening current "mutual economic benefits" by accentuating "mutual political suspicions," and using security confrontations to obstruct economic cooperation; the second is directly inducing or even compelling its East Asian allies to weaken their economic dependence on China, especially by preventing companies in these countries from entering into high-tech fields (such as 5G) with Chinese companies,  and pushing them to withdraw from China.

In this regard, Japan has consistently played the role of a "pawn" for the U.S. in East Asia. The Japanese government has introduced policies, including financial subsidies, to encourage Japanese companies in China to withdraw from that country or shift to third countries, especially to Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Thailand. In the pattern of foreign investment of Japanese enterprises in recent years, there has been a rapid decline in the proportion of investment in China and a sharp rise in the proportion of investment in ASEAN countries.

In terms of foreign trade, Japan also appears to be turning away from China to some degree. For example, Japan's exports to China surpassed those to the U.S. in 2009, and China became Japan's top export destination for the first time.  The share of exports to China was once as high as 19.98% in 2011, 4.67 percentage points higher than exports to the U.S. (15.31%).  Subsequently came a period of decline and Japan was overtaken by the U.S. in 2014, and things have been in flux ever since, with the share of Japan’s exports to China and to the U.S. in 2019 being 19.09% and 19.82%, respectively.
 
The coronavirus pandemic has largely reversed the above trend of fleeing China, and East Asian economies are rapidly becoming more dependent on China and integrated with China.  For example, at the foreign trade level, China has replaced the United States as the top exporting country for the majority of East Asian economies. The main manifestations of this trend are: first, China's share and position in the East Asian and global economy have climbed further as a result of the country's effectiveness in both coronavirus prevention and control and economic recovery; second, China has further strengthened its assistance and support to other East Asian countries during the epidemic, and coordination and cooperation have been further strengthened; third, the recent advancement of regional cooperation in East Asia, especially the successful signing and eventual full implementation of RCEP, will create new opportunities for China to develop economic and trade relations with other East Asian economies; fourth, the joint efforts of the “One Belt—One Road” initiative have become a strong pull in the development of China's economic and trade relations with other East Asian economies; fifth, as China accelerates the construction of a "dual cycle" development pattern with a sustained focus on China’s domestic economy, it will further accelerate the balanced development of economic and trade relations between China and East Asian economies.
 
The Strength of the “Small Horse Pulling a Big Cart” 
 
ASEAN is the earliest regional cooperation organization established in East Asia (1967). In subsequent regional cooperation in East Asia, ASEAN has always occupied a leading position and played a leading role, and it was ASEAN that initiated the "10+3" cooperation in East Asia after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, inviting China, Japan and South Korea to participate. Since then, regional cooperation under various frameworks in East Asia has also been "ASEAN-led."  All countries participating in East Asia cooperation have recognized the "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," and four “bilateral” "10+1" agreements (ASEAN + China, ASEAN + Japan, ASEAN + Korea, and ASEAN + India) and one "10+2" free trade pact (ASEAN + Australia + New Zealand) have been constructed around ASEAN.  

At the same time, although ASEAN is made up of ten countries, they are all economically weak, which means their overall strength is quite limited.  In 2019, the 10 ASEAN countries accounted for only 13.3% of the total economic output of East Asia's "10+3", and only 12.5% of the total economic output of the 15 RCEP countries.  For this reason, the ASEAN-led and ASEAN-centered framework leading East Asia cooperation has been called a "small horse pulling a big cart." Yet it is precisely this "small horse" that, together with other East Asian members, especially China, is pulling the big cart of East Asia forward on the road to regional cooperation, challenging the traditional tri-polar configuration mentioned above, and may well achieve a final victory.
 
The coronavirus pandemic has further strengthened ASEAN's role in East Asia's regional cooperation. First, East Asian cooperation is always "crisis-driven," and the crisis of the pandemic has strengthened the momentum of East Asian cooperation, as well as the impetus for ASEAN to play a leading role in strengthening East Asian cooperation. The fact that, under the leadership of ASEAN, the region succeeded in pushing forward the RCEP despite the pandemic is a typical example. Second, the pandemic has further enhanced the position of ASEAN in the foreign trade and economic landscape of major East Asian economies, laying a more solid economic foundation for it to play its leading role. In particular, during the pandemic, ASEAN overtook the EU as China's top trading partner for the first time, and Japan also shifted its foreign investment to ASEAN.

As already mentioned, the U.S. has further strengthened its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" with the main strategic intention of containing China.  Such efforts mean that the U.S. must attempt to woo the ASEAN countries, further elevating the organization’s strategic position and actually laying a more solid political foundation for it to play a leading role. Finally, the pandemic has further accelerated the pace of global supply chain reconstruction, and the tendency of regionalization has become more obvious, making ASEAN more important in the landscape of the regional supply chains in East Asia in the post-pandemic era.
 
Japan Seizes the Strategic Initiative in Regional Cooperation
 
In recent years, Japanese leaders have repeatedly declared that "Japan must raise the banner of free trade" and strive to be the "flag bearer" of global free trade. Its main efforts on this front are promoting regional cooperation with Japan's participation and leadership and seizing strategic opportunities to advance regional cooperation. First, after the U.S. gave up its leading role in the TPP and announced its withdrawal in 2017, Japan took over the leadership and promoted the formal signing of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) by 11 countries; later, it signed the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU; in addition, during the RCEP negotiations, Japan acted as the second party.  Japan, as the second largest economy among the member countries, also played an important role in the RCEP negotiation process. This clearly means that, prior to the pandemic, Japan had already taken the lead in the strategic pattern of regional cooperation by striking on three fronts in Europe, Asia-Pacific, and East Asia.
 
During the pandemic, Japan has made significant new progress on these fronts. First, the successful signing of RCEP has enabled Japan to take a big step forward in the strategic framework of regional cooperation, for the first time establishing free trade agreements with China, the largest economy in East Asia, and South Korea, the third largest economy. Second, the Japan-UK EPA was officially signed on October 23, 2020.  Third, a new Japan-US trade agreement was signed in October of 2019, following the withdrawal from the TPP.  And last but not least, the U.S. was the leader and chief proponent of the TPP when the Democratic Obama administration was in power, and only withdrew due to the opposition of Trump and the Republicans.  Now that a Democratic administration is back in power, the possibility of CPTPP cannot be ruled out. China formally applied to join the CPTPP on September 16 of this year, and the South Korean government is also interested. This means that Japan, the leader of the CPTPP, may possess an even greater strategic initiative.
 
The "Indo-Pacific Strategy" Deepens the "Binary Predicament" in East Asia
 
 
The United States has long dominated and controlled East Asia, and it has done so at two levels: political security and economic trade. At the political security level, there is a robust U.S. military presence in East Asia, including the two major military alliances between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and countless military bases. At the economic and trade level, East Asian economies are highly dependent on exports, which in turn are highly dependent on the U.S. market, a direct manifestation of which is that most East Asian economies have long had the U.S. as their top export destination.

​But more recently, and following the rapid rise of the Chinese economy and the growth of its market, East Asian economies remain highly dependent on exports, but their exports rely increasingly on China rather than the U.S., so that China has come to replace the United States, becoming the more important export destination for the majority of East Asian countries. At the same time, the United States has further strengthened its political and security control over East Asia through its "Pivot to Asia" or its "Indo-Pacific Strategy.” This has given rise to what is called the "binary dilemma" in East Asia, where countries are dependent on the U.S. for political security and dependent on China for economic and trade matters. 
 
Following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, and in the face of the further rise of China's economic status and the further increase of East Asia's economic and trade dependence on China, the Biden administration has further increased measures political and security control in East Asia, with its main initiatives, including actively repairing the military alliances with Japan and South Korea, actively drawing in ASEAN countries at the political and security level, and increasing the intensity of the implementation of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy."  The two U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Quadruple Alliance Summits held over the course of 2021 are ample evidence of the U.S. determination and strength to promote the Indo-Pacific Strategy and increase its political and security control in East Asia. The direct result of this is the further deepening of the above-mentioned "binary dilemma" in East Asia.
 
Notes

[1]江瑞平, “新冠疫情加速东亚格局重塑,” first published on the website of the 中国国际问题研究基金会 (China Foundation for International Research) on October 20, 2021, and subsequently republished on the Aisixiang website on October 25, 2021.

[2]Translator’s note:  “报复式”回升.  A “retaliatory tariff” makes sense to me, but not a “retaliatory” rebound from a recession.  Perhaps this is economists’ humor?

[3]Translator’s note:  The reference is to Krugman’s 1994 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Myth of the Asian Miracle.”