Ma Rong, "Ethnic Regional Autonomy"

Ma Rong, “The Historical Evolution China’s System of Autonomous Ethnic Regions”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction

Ma Rong (b. 1950, Brown University Ph.D. 1987) is a well-known and prolific sociologist at Peking University and a specialist in ethnic relations in China.  Himself a member of the Hui minority, Ma specializes in Tibet,[2] but has published dozens of books and articles on a variety of topics dealing with ethnic issues in many parts of China—and indeed the world.[3] I chose to translate Ma’s text because of widespread current Western interest in minority ethnic groups in China, sparked by ongoing conflicts and government policies in Xinjiang and Tibet.  My thanks to Tabitha Speelman of Changpian for pointing me toward Ma’s text.

Those curious to know more about what is happening in Xinjiang and why will be disappointed with Ma’s text, which of course addresses ethnic issues from within the framework of China’s (and to a lesser extent the former Soviet Union’s) system of ethnic management.  That said, the text is not without interest, and it is always valuable to know how Chinese establishment intellectuals discuss hot-button Chinese questions, even if their discussions often strike us as obtuse.

Ma’s article appears in a February 2019 issue of Ethnic Studies 民族研究 devoted to the topic of “Seventy Years of China’s Ethnic Regional Autonomy System,” and Ma’s argument, in a nutshell, is that ethnic regional autonomy, if appropriate in the early period of PRC history, is increasingly obsolete given China’s economic and social development since the Deng Xiaoping era.  This is an argument that Ma has been making for some time, and which has generated considerable resistance from certain scholars as well as ethnic minority “interest groups” who benefit from aspects of the current system, the roots of which go back to the extreme (if largely fictitious) formal autonomy granted to “ethnic republics” under the former Soviet Union.[4] Ma argues that China’s system often harms the very ethnic minorities it claims to protect—basically by keeping them in ethnic “ghettos” (my term, not Ma’s)—that limit their life chances.  Everyone will be better served, Ma argues, by a policy that emphasizes integration rather than “autonomy.”

Ma outlines the basic debates that have raged in China over ethnic issues in recent years, but generally without naming names or going into much detail.  His main focus in this text is on comparing the 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law—the charter text of the present system—with other similar historical documents, including China’s various constitutions.  His point is to suggest that the circumstances of the drafting of the 1984 law—particularly the fact that ethnic minorities had suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution—resulted in a text that bent over backward to “restore order” and reassure ethnic groups that their rights and interests would be preserved.  While acknowledging such sentiments, Ma’s clearly believes that China’s ethnic minorities would be equally well protected by claiming their rights as Chinese citizens.  Ma Rong's view of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law thus recalls Lu Xun’s view of Kong Yiji:  “When he wasn’t around, we barely missed him.”[5]

Ma Rong’s argument also recalls that of Hu Lianhe and Hu An’gang, “How the Nationalities Question is Handled Outside of China” in its general (if largely implicit) endorsement of multiculturalism and “melting pot” countries like the United States and Brazil.  It is of course abundantly clear that China’s current ethnic policy often provides precious little protection to the supposedly “autonomous” groups—the word is clearly Orwellian in today’s Xinjiang or Tibet—but whether a policy favoring “integration” would be better is anyone’s guess.  The voices of ethnic minorities are strikingly absent from Ma’s text, and he tells us nothing about their wishes.

Ma’s China Dream is one in which ethnic identities are replaced by a national identity, and Ma, playing on the considerable ambiguity of many of the key terms of his argument in Chinese, comes very close to suggesting that what China needs is a “Chinese ethnicity 中华民族.”  Minzu 民族 can of course be translated as “nation,” “people,” “nationality,” or “ethnicity,” and in most contexts (including many in Ma’s text) the very common expression Zhonghua minzu 中华民族 means “the Chinese people/nation.”  In other instances, however, Ma is clearly trying to be provocative by suggesting that a “Chinese ethnicity” might be possible, although he does not dwell on the complexities of what that might mean, how it would be different from a Han ethnicity or the Chinese people (which surely means the ensemble of Chinese citizens residing in the People’s Republic).  I chose to translate the term as “Chinese ethnicity” unless it was obvious that it did not mean that (in the mouth of Xi Jinping, for instance) to give the reader a sense of what I took to be Ma’s intentions.   
 
Translation
 
In the 1990s, a few minority areas in China saw the emergence of a number of disturbing trends (such as the May 1990 Baren Township incident[6]).  In the twenty-first century, following the overall development of the social economy of the country as a whole, and the progress of the “Western development 西部大开发” strategy, regional differences in terms of levels of economic development, language, culture, and religion gradually became more acute, and around 2008 there occurred a series of violent ethnic terrorist incidents, including the March 14 Incident in Lhasa and the July 5 (2009) Incident in Urumqi, that shocked the entire nation, leading to serious reflection on the matter by the people and by the scholarly community. 

As a result, since 2000 a discussion has been underway within the Chinese academic world concerning whether or not the theories, institutions and policies related to Chinese ethnic groups employed since the establishment of New China should be revisited, accompanied by a great debate concerning how to improve our basic approach to ethnic relations in contemporary China.  Since “ethnic regional autonomy 民族区域自治” has been the banner and the core discourse of the Party’s ethnic work, how to understand this system must be the center of the discussion and the focal point of debate as we revisit the theories, institutions and policies employed by New China in the management of ethnic questions.

I.  Two Perspectives on Understanding and Improving Ethnic Relations in China

Regarding proposals concerning the future improvement of ethnic relations in China, scholars participating in the discussion have brought forth two completely different proposals.

A.  The argument that the key to improving ethnic relations in China is to genuinely implement the “Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law 民族区域自治法.”

Scholars supporting this first perspective argue that in terms of theory, not only should we continue to uphold the “ethnic 民族” discursive system and basic institutional policies in place since the establishment of New China, but in addition, we should strengthen the dynamism of preferential ethnic policies in order to protect the special political rights and particular group benefits received by minority ethnicities through the implementation of an even stronger system of minority regional self-rule.  Some argue that only by comprehensively carrying out the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, and especially the “regulations concerning self-rule 自治条例” in the five largest autonomous regions, can we truly carry out autonomous rights, after which we can improve ethnic relations in the few areas where these have been deteriorating, bringing social stability to Tibet and Xinjiang.  Hence we should step up the comprehensive formulation of the regulations concerning ethnic autonomous regions in each autonomous area 区 and prefecture 州, making it possible for the governments of all autonomous areas to have the concrete legal authority necessary to the exercise of relatively autonomous power, and should also demand that the system of ethnic regional autonomy be upgraded and expanded.
 
Some scholars sharply criticize the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law for never having been comprehensively and completely implemented, arguing that putting in place the regulations for the autonomous rule of the five largest ethnic regions is the greatest problem faced in upholding and improving the system of ethnic regional autonomy and in improving ethnic relations, and at the same time call for a strengthening of the authoritative position of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission 国家民委 in directing ethnic work, arguing that the State Ethnic Affairs Commission system should become a representative organ able to truly represent the interests of minority groups and protect their autonomous rights at the central and local levels, in order to help such groups interact effectively with other ministries and agencies at all levels.
 
B.  The argument that we should eliminate ethnic conflict by strengthening identification with “ethnicity” of the Chinese “people” 中华民族的“民族”
 
The second proposal scholars brought forth argues that given the development of Chinese society in the twenty-first century, there is no longer any way to define the “internal affairs” of each minority group and establish the legal sphere of “autonomous management,” and hence that under new social and historical conditions, we should, while fully respecting the historical memory and traditional culture of all minority peoples, gradually strengthen the political identity of all citizens with the “Chinese ethnicity 中华民族,” and, on the basis of legal principles related to modern citizens, actively improve the conditions of life and prospects of development for our ethnic minority citizens.   They further argue that all of the rights and interests with which minority peoples are concerned (language and cultural rights, freedom of religious belief, rights to employment and development, environmental protection, rights to legal equality, etc.) can be fully protected within the framework of legitimate citizen rights and the constitution of the People’ Republic of China.
 
China’s “National Human Rights Action Plan 国家人权行动计划” (2012-2015) established quantitative goals in the seven areas of “rights to work,” “rights to a basic standard of living,” “rights to social guarantees,” “rights to health,” “rights to receive education,” “cultural rights,” and “environmental rights,” and the government is currently actively promoting equality in matters of public service and social welfare among all areas and groups.  For this reason, in future the primary energy of ethnic work in our country should be devoted to strengthening the identification of all groups with the “Chinese ethnicity,” and should promote the specific content of the constitution and citizen rights while formulating measures to bring these into being:  they should clearly define the “legal” and “illegal” aspects of concrete events (such as religious activities), and carry out management according to national law (and not according to the “local policy” of each level of government).
 
At the same time, in the management of quarrels or conflicts, we should move away from identifying those involved in the conflict as a “member of X ethnicity” and toward an identification as an “individual citizen;” conflicts involving the rights and responsibilities of citizens should not be resolved by instances of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission “carrying out ethnic policy,” but should be resolved and managed by the government, the police, the courts or other such instances according to the country’s civil and criminal law. 

The “law” of our country’s ethnic work should be the law of the constitution of the country’s legal framework, and we should not set aside the spirit of the constitution and emphasize ethnic regional autonomy and the law of the particular collective rights of each ethnic group.  The government’s educational, personnel, and employment agencies should strive to increase the level of participation of the workers of minority ethnic groups in all occupations involved in our country’s industrialization and modernization, allowing them gradually to achieve the same competitive capacity as Han workers, and achieve a common prosperity on the basis of self-respect and self-confidence.
 
The above debate reveals that the true core of the issue revolves around the question of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law.  Today, in the face of a tense international situation and the ethnic separatist activities emerging in certain regions, the central authorities strongly call for the creation and consolidation of a consciousness of common Chinese ethnicity 中华民族共同体意识, while the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law says nothing about the “Chinese ethnicity.”  Because contemporary discussions of ethnic theory and policy cannot avoid returning to the 1984 proclamation of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, it is extremely necessary to review the historical background that gave rise to this law, and to launch a discussion about its basic nature.
 
II.  The Historical Process that Produced China’s “Ethnic Regional Autonomy System”

Let’s first look back at the historical process that produced China’s ethnic regional autonomy system.
 
A.  “Federal Rule” and the “Ethnic Autonomous Rights”
 
From its inception, the Chinese Communist Party was deeply influenced by Lenin’s and Stalin’s theoretical views on ethnicity and by the experience of the Soviet Union.  An important part of Lenin’s theory was “ethnic autonomous rights.”  A 1922 document from the Second Party Congress [of the CCP] mentioned a plan for national reconstruction which called for “unifying China proper (including Manchuria) as a true democratic republic; carrying out self-rule in Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang 回疆, which will form a league of democratic, self-ruled territories.  The Chinese Federal Republic will be founded on the basis of a free federal system, providing for the union of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang.”  The 1931 “Outline Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic 中华苏维埃共和国宪法大纲” pointed out: 

“The Chinese Soviet regime recognizes the rights to self-determination of minority ethnic groups within China’s territories, and has always affirmed that each small or weak ethnic group has the right to leave China and establish its own independent country.”  The 1945 Party Constitution put forth the goal of “building a new democratic federal republic, based on the alliance of all independent, free, democratic, unified, rich, and powerful revolutionary classes, together with all freely united ethnic groups.”  With the victorious end of the war of resistance against Japan, China’s internal and external situations changed greatly.  In January of 1946, the “Draft Outline for Peaceful National Reconstruction 和平建国纲领草案,” presented by the representatives of the CCP at the Political Consultative Conference 政治协商会议 proposed:  “In ethnic minority areas, we must recognize the equal position and the rights to self-determination of all ethnic groups,” but said nothing about a “federal system.”  From this point forward, the “federal system” disappeared from CCP discourse, nor did the Party continue to emphasize “rights to ethnic self-determination.”
 
The September 1949 “Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领” was a document outlining the political system to be created once the PRC was established.  Clause 51 of Chapter Six on “Ethnic Policy” stated that “in all areas where minority groups live in concentrated fashion, we should implement ethnic regional autonomy, and according to the number of people and the size of the region, separately set up the offices of self-rule.  In regions in which ethnic minorities live scattered among the rest of the population, as well as within autonomous areas, all ethnic groups should have a certain numeric representation within the organs of local government.”  In the domestic and international context of 1949, the “Common Program 共同纲领” clearly identified “ethnic regional autonomy” as New China’s basic political system for dealing with ethnic issues, illustrating the historical evolution of the Central Committee’s political program regarding ethnic issues.  At the same time, the concept of a “Chinese ethnicity” does not appear in the “Common Program,” which is consistent with the discourse system found in the 1954 Constitution.

B.  The 1952 “Implementation Outline for the Ethnic Regional Autonomy [Policy] of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国民族区域自治实施纲要”

In August of 1952, the State Council promulgated the “Implementation Outline for the Ethnic Regional Autonomy [Policy] of the People’s Republic of China,” a document that was to be the embryo for the 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, and whose overall structure is similar to the 1984 law.  In comparison with the Implementation Outline, the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law added a preface and in terms of structure maintained the first chapter, titled “Overview 总则,” and had eleven clauses where the original document had three.  Chapter Two of the Implementation Outline (“Autonomous Regions”—six clauses) was combined in the “Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law” with Chapter Three (“Autonomous Organs”—four clauses), becoming Chapter Two (“The Establishment of Ethnic Autonomous Regions and the Organization of Autonomous Organs—seven clauses). 

The fourth chapter of the Implementation Outline (“Autonomous Rights”) became Chapter Three of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law (“The Autonomous Rights of the Autonomous Organs”), and the original eleven clauses were increased to twenty-eight.  Chapter Two of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law (“The People’s Courts and the People’s Procuratorate of the Ethnic Autonomous Regions”—two clauses) was newly added.  Chapter Five of the Implementation Outline (“Ethnic Relations within Autonomous Regions”—five clauses) is Chapter Five of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law (‘Ethnic Relations within Ethnic Autonomous Regions”—six clauses).  Chapter Six of the Implementation Outline (“Guiding Principles of the Higher People’s Government”—six clauses) becomes, in the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, Chapter Six (“The Responsibilities of Higher Level State Organs”), and the number of clauses increased to nineteen.  Chapter Seven (“Appendix”—five clauses) in the Implementation Outline becomes Chapter Seven (“Appendix”) in the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, but with only two clauses. 

In terms of a basic comparison, the 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law and the 1952 Implementation Outline for Ethnic Regional Autonomy have similar structures, the “autonomous rights” section has expanded from 11 to 28 clauses, and the newly added material basically relates to hiring 招工, encouraging the development of the non-state economy, forest and grassland property rights, natural resources, basic construction, enterprise management, foreign trade, expenditure standards, taxes, banking, management of the mobile population, environmental protection, etc.    The section devoted to “The Responsibilities of Higher Level State Organs” increased from six to 19 clauses, basically listing specific fields concerning the assistance, guidance and resources to be deployed in various aspects of work in autonomous regions.  The salient points concerning the 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law are Clauses 21 through 45 which consist of detailed regulations concerning the sovereign or autonomous rights of ethnic autonomous regions.

A comparison of these two documents reveals a few points particularly worthy of note:

First, neither text mentions the very important topic of “the Chinese ethnicity,” a feature shared by both.

Second, in Chapter Four of the Implementation Outline, entitled “Autonomous Rights,” we find Clause 14: “The concrete form of the autonomous administration of each ethnic region will reflect the wishes of the majority of the people living in the administered region as well as those of the leading figures with whom they are in contact;” as well as Clause 18: “Internal reforms of each ethnic region will reflect the wishes of the majority of the people living in the administered region as well as those of the leading figures with whom they are in contact.”  These clauses are not in the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, and they reflect the particularities of China’s national situation in the early 1950s.  At the time, Tibet had only just been peacefully liberated, and the Lhasa government was still in existence, and when the central government discussed how to set up an autonomous region in a place like Tibet, they left a certain space for negotiation on questions such as “the concrete form of the autonomous administration,” and “at what moment to initiate internal reforms,” and did not impose a single, nation-wide form or schedule, reflecting a pragmatic spirit of “seeking truth from facts.”

Third, Clause 20 was added to the section on the “Autonomous Rights of the Autonomous Organs” in the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law:  “Should the resolutions, decisions, orders and instructions of the higher authorities be inappropriate in the context of ethnic autonomous regions, the autonomous organs can inform higher state authorities of this and ask their permission to modify or halt the implementation of the policy.  Higher state authorities should provide an answer within 60 days of receipt of the notification.”  This is a clause that was never in the Implementation Outline, and it objectively grants autonomous local governments “the autonomous rights to modify or refuse the implementation of orders or resolutions of the central government,” which in a legal sense increases the autonomous administrative rights of autonomous regions.  This clause is the most important difference in the two documents, and in its basic intellectual approach is consistent with trends in the early 1980s having to do with opposing the “left” as a part of efforts to “restore order 拔乱反正.” 

Differences between China’s center and some of China’s frontier regions are quite important in terms of the trajectory of historical development and social conditions, and certain institutions and policies that are appropriately applied to the Han population can in some instances not be appropriate for frontier regions, and granting those ethnic groups who live in those regions certain rights to modify these policies reflects a scientific spirit of “seeking truth from facts,” yet how this should be appropriately written into the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law is a huge question that demands careful reflection.  If these “autonomous rights to modify or refuse the implementation of orders or resolutions of the central government” lack institutional constraints or take on enlarged proportions, then under certain internal or external conditions, they could create the risk of political divisions.

C.  “Ethnic Regional Autonomy” in China’s Constitutions          

China has proclaimed four constitutions, in 1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982.  In the 1954 version, there were six clauses relating to regulations of the autonomous organs in ethnic autonomous regions.  In the 1975 version, revised during process of the Cultural Revolution, these six clauses were reduced to one.  In the 1978 version, revised after the Cultural Revolution, the number of clauses had risen to three. 

By 1982, the Chinese mainland was actively promoting a “return to order” and the implementation of policies consistent with this.  The constitution issued that year significantly increased the number of clauses treating the autonomous organs of ethnic autonomous regions from three to 11, not only restoring the demands from the 1954 constitution that “any place where ethnic minorities reside should practice regional autonomy”, but also adding language concerning “establishing autonomous organs and implementing autonomous rights,” listing and strengthening the concrete contents of various aspects of “autonomous rights.”  In the Chinese society of the early 1980s, the emphasis was on “carrying out the policies 落实政策” that from top to bottom aimed to “restore order” in the face of the “extreme left” thinking of the Cultural Revolution and its expansion of class struggle; this was the general political atmosphere in domestic matters at the time, as well as an important historical background helping us to understand part of the 1982 constitution’s thinking about ethnic regional autonomy and the 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law that emerged shortly thereafter.

D.  Once Promulgated, the 1984 “Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law” Became the Banner and Core Discourse of Ethnic Work
 
The Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law of the People’s Republic of China was formally announced in 1984.  Subsequently, the People’s Congress system, the system of Chinese Communist Party-led multi-party cooperation and political consultation, and the ethnic regional autonomy system came to be viewed by the central government as China’s three basic political systems.
When Comrade Deng Xiaoping met with János Kádár (1912-1989), General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in October of 1987, he said:  “To solve our ethnic problems, China does not use the federal system of the People’s Republic, but rather the system of ethnic regional autonomy.”  Jiang Zemin, in a speech delivered in September of 1999 at the Second Central Committee Meeting on Ethnic Work, said:  “Ethnic regional autonomy is one of China’s basic political institutions.  It integrates closely our country’s concentrated, unified leadership with the regional autonomy enjoyed by minority ethnic areas, and has a great political vitality.  We must consistently uphold this policy and continue to improve it.” 

In May of 2005, Comrade Hu Jintao, at the Third Central Committee Meeting on Ethnic Work, said:  “Ethnic regional autonomy is not to be called into question as the basic experience in our country’s efforts to resolve ethnic problems, it should not waver as one of our country’s basic political institutions, nor should it be weakened as part of the superiority of our country’s socialism.”  As this illustrates, the system of ethnic regional authority was repeatedly affirmed in the speeches of the highest members of our country’s central leadership, and for many years has served as the core element in the discursive system of the Chinese Communist Party’s ethnic work,  thus becoming a “political tradition” that neither government officials, scholars or the people dare to lightly call into question. 

We should point out yet again that the 1984 Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy stated that “the People’s Republic of China is a multi-ethnic country commonly created by people throughout the country,” and upheld the notion that “ethnic autonomous regions all remain parts of an indivisible People’s Republic of China,” and emphasized that “each minority ethnic region should carry out regional autonomy, set up autonomous organs, and enjoy autonomous rights.  Carrying out regional ethnic autonomy embodies our country’s spirit of fully respecting and protecting the rights of all ethnic minorities to manage their internal affairs.”  Yet this Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, meant to guide the development of ethnic relations in China, did not make a single mention of “the Chinese ethnicity.”  Looking at this today, one cannot but think that this was an important omission.
 
III. The Position of the Central Committee’s Fourth Meeting on Ethnic Work on “Ethnic Regional Autonomy”
 
China’s academic debates on ethnic theory (including the definition of the concept of “ethnicity,” whether there exists a “Chinese ethnicity,” and whether, going forward, we should strengthen the system of ethnic regional autonomy or instead build common Chinese identity) have been underway for almost twenty years.  At the 2014 Central Committee’s Fourth Meeting on Ethnic Work, the important mission was identified as “correctly grasping the ethnic question, the special features laws of ethnic work in the light of our new situation, unifying our thinking and understanding, making clear our objectives and mission, affirming our confidence and determination, and raising our capacity and ability in ethnic work.”  For this reason, a careful reading of the documents from this meeting will be helpful in understanding the important trends in our country’s ethnic work.

A.  Upholding and Improving the System of Ethnic Regional Autonomy Will Require Achieving the “Two Integrations”

As noted above, ethnic regional autonomy was formally recognized, early after the establishment of New China, as the basic system for solving China’s ethnic problems.  It was affirmed by many high-level leaders, and became a core part of the discursive system guiding the ethnic work of the Chinese Communist Party.  At the same time, as is the case with many of China’s policies regarding the rights and interests of ethnic minorities (such as the one-child policy, bonuses in the college-entrance examinations, preferential work assignments, special welfare benefits, the appointment of cadres in autonomous regions, the policy of “two restraints and one leniency 两少一宽[7]”), its legal basis and administrative justification are related to the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law and to every citizen’s status as such.  A small change can have huge consequences, which would affect not only the individual interests and social benefits of hundreds of millions of ethnic minority peoples throughout the country, but also the dreams of university of millions of ethnic minority students, and the jobs and future promotions of millions of minority cadres, among other issues. 

Since these various “ethnic policies” aimed at ethnic minorities as a whole have been in practice for several decades, this in fact means that ethnic minorities now make up a certain “vested interest group” with a certain basis in law and history.  For this reason, when scholarly discussions call this system into question, it necessarily provokes a strong reaction on the party of minority ethnic cadres, scholars, and the masses; ethnic minority cadres and scholars are important sources of support for the central government within the ranks of Party and government cadres and scholars in all autonomous areas.  It was likely this consideration that led the 2014 Central Committee’s Fourth Meeting on Ethnic Work to once again affirm this system:  “Ethnic regional autonomy is at the origin of our Party’s ethnic policies, all of which emerge from this, and exist because of this.  Should this origin change, the foundation would become unstable and would produce a domino effect in questions of ethnic theory, policy, relations, etc.”

Yet even as they reaffirmed this system, the Meeting on Ethnic Work made two completely new observations concerning how we should, in light of today’s new situation, understand the system of ethnic regional autonomy constructed over the years:  “Upholding and improving the system of ethnic regional autonomy will require achieving the ‘two integrations.’”  One is upholding the integration of unity and autonomy. 

Unity is one of country’s highest interests, a common interest of all ethnic groups, the prerequisite and basis for implementing ethnic regional autonomy.  In the absence of national unity, there can be no ethnic regional autonomy.  At the same time, we must, on the basis of assuring the application of our country’s laws and policies, and guaranteeing, on a legal basis, the autonomous rights of autonomous regions, provide special assistance to autonomous regions and appropriately resolve the special problems of autonomous regions. 

The second is the integration of upholding ethnic factors and regional factors.  Ethnic regional autonomy includes both.  Ethnic regional autonomy is not an autonomy enjoyed by certain particular ethnicities, even less an area reserved for a particular ethnic group.  We must be clear on this point, or risk going in the wrong direction.”  China must continue to uphold the system of ethnic regional autonomy, but as to how we should understand this system and in what direction we should lead it in practice, we need to “catch up with the times.” 

B.  How to Understand China’s Ethnic Autonomous Regions from the Perspective of “Ethnicity”

When considering the administrative boundaries and the name to confer on our ethnic autonomous regions, New China’s thinking was similar to that in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and we used as reference points traditional ethnic regions and the names of the ethnic groups living there. As to how we should today understand this means of designation, the meeting on ethnic work clearly pointed out:  “Our autonomous regions wear the ‘hat’ of ethnicity, and wearing this ‘hat’ means that these groups must bear the even greater responsibility of protecting national and ethnic unity.” 

This perspective is very different from the common understanding of most people, which is that autonomous ethnicities have enhanced rights and interests in terms of their autonomous administrative structures and economic activities.  This new language 提法 concerning what responsibilities the autonomous ethnicities should bear has stimulated a great deal of reflection.  As to why, at the present day, it remains necessary to maintain the system of ethnic regional autonomy, the meeting on ethnic work pointed out:  “In matters of reform we absolutely cannot make errors that would be destabilizing, or make 180-degree turns in important systems or policies, otherwise we risk falling on our face.”  In the context of this argument, it is necessary to add an appreciation reflecting a deeper logical exploration and a longer historical view.

At the same time, the Fourth Meeting on Ethnic Work pointed out:  “In properly carrying out the regulations of the constitution and of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, the key is to help autonomous regions to develop their economy and improve the people’s livelihood,” and not, as some people have proposed, and to speed up the implementation of the regional autonomy laws of the five autonomous regions or in all of Xinjiang’s autonomous regions.  Objectively speaking, this was an indirect answer to those people who were calling for the implementation of the regional autonomy laws of the five autonomous regions.

C.  Our Views on Several Controversial Issues

For some time, various people have called for the “promotion” or “expansion” of ethnic regional autonomy.  By “promotion” they mean elevating the rank of the system of ethnic autonomous regions in the national administration, establishing central and local administrative structures corresponding to the system of ethnic regional autonomy, which would mean setting up an ethnic affairs office on a par with structures such as the National People’s Conference or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.  At the level of the central government, China currently has the National People’s Conference and its offices (the Great Hall of the People) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and its offices (the Hall of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), and the yearly meetings of these two structures (collectively called the “two meetings”) are the most important events in China’s political life. 

Thus those calling for the promotion of ethnic work are demanding that a political structure (The National Committee of Minority Ethnic Autonomous Regions) that would the equivalent of these two be established at the central governmental level, which would imply the construction, in Beijing, of offices that would be the equivalent of the Great Hall of the People and the Hall of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

To a certain extent, this way of thinking is reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s “Soviet of Nationalities,” one of the “two Soviets” in the Supreme Soviet (the other   being the “Soviet of the Union”).  During the time of the Soviet Union, the Soviet of Nationalities represented the particular interests of all ethnic autonomous regions.  The Soviet constitution stipulated that the Soviet of Nationalities be made up of 750 representatives, elected by secret ballot for terms of five years in elections that were in principle universal, equal and direct, held in the federated republics (32 representatives from each), the autonomous republics (11 representatives from each), the autonomous oblasts (5 representatives from each) and national districts (1 representative from each). 

The Soviet of Nationalities had two regular meetings each year, when they would discuss and exchange views on ethnic questions and related projects.  There was one chairman, four vice-chairmen and 30 standing committee members.  “According to the 1924 constitution of the Soviet Union, it was one of the chambers of the Soviet Central Executive Committee 苏联中央执行委员.”  Any important policy measure in the Soviet Union had to be voted on by the two Soviets (the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities). 

As everyone knows, in China, the process of the election to the National People’s Congress and the National People’s Political Consultative Conference already completely takes into account the question of the representation of ethnic minorities, thus in the present system, do we also need to separately establish a national administration to “represent the minority ethnicity autonomous regions?”  What would be the nature of the relationship of this body be to the National People’s Congress and the National People’s Political Consultative Conference?  This deserves reflection.

By “expansion” is meant going beyond the administrative regulations concerning ethnic autonomous regions in the present constitution and in the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law and establishing ethnic autonomous cities or ethnic autonomous districts attached to cities, transforming what have heretofore been ethnically autonomous regions, prefectures and counties (or banners) into autonomous  regions, prefectures (municipalities) and counties (banners, municipalities, and regions).  The Policy and Law Office of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission 国家民委政法司 has for years pressed for changes to the constitution that would add language concerning “ethnic cities,” so that when the economic or demographic development of an autonomous country (or banner) justified its “promotion” to the status of municipality, it could still keep the rights and interests of its original status as “ethnically autonomous.” 

Since China began the policy of reform and opening, the economic development of cities and townships and the pace of urbanization have accelerated, and when the development of the non-agricultural economy and the population size of certain autonomous counties (or banners) reached the threshold of becoming municipalities, the percentage of the minority ethnic population as a part of the overall population often clearly declined.  In the overall trend of China’s social development, the percentage of the entire country’s population residing in cities and townships grew quickly, from 36.9% in 2000 to 58.2% at the end of 2017.  Today as China promotes “Western development” and the process of rapid urbanization, the developmental trajectory of these newly established cities should be even more open, and they should ever more actively join in the great developmental flow of exchange and integration, and should not continue to cling to a “regional autonomy” connected to an ethnicity.

D.  Promoting “Strengthening Exchange and Interaction 交往交流交融 within the Chinese Ethnicity”

The Fourth Central Committee Meeting on Ethnic Work noted:  “The formation of a single national market in China, and the increase in social exchange among the people, will greatly stimulate integration, this is a historical trend, a necessary outcome of the development of our socialist economy, a necessary outcome of maintaining our socialist identity, a necessary outcome of the advance of Chinese civilization…We must respect such laws, and correctly grasp the historical direction of the social interchange of the people.   We cannot ignore the people’s common nature and refuse to lead, nor can we transcend historical stages and use administrative means to force progress while ignoring ethnic differences.”  This illustrates that ideas of strengthening ethnic regional autonomy through “promoting” or “expanding” [the current system] goes in the opposite direction from calls by central authorities to strengthen the great historical trend of social exchange within the all ethnicities.

Moreover, at at the time of the 2010 census, China still had 64,000 “undesignated people 未识别人口,” among which some groups (such as the Chuanqing 穿青 of Guizhou, the native Portuguese 土生葡 of Macao) would like to recognized as new “ethnicities,” and with this status enter into China’s great national family and political structure.  There are also a few regions applying to establish new autonomous counties or municipalities as “ethnic regions.”  The Fourth Central Committee Meeting on Ethnic Work formally argued that our country’s task of “ethnic designation” is basically over.
 
E.  On the New Cry for the “Right to Ethnic Self-Determination”
 
After the end of the 1940s, China’s central authorities no longer promoted either the federal system, or the “right to ethnic self-determination.”  In the “Central Committee Directive to the Front-Line Committee of the Second Field Army on the Question of the “Right to Self Determination” of Minority Ethnic Groups 中共中央关于少数民族“自决权”问题给二野前委的指示,” dated October 5, 1949, it was clearly pointed out that:  “The determination of the Party’s ethnic policy should be based on the regulations on ethnic policies in the Common Program of the CPPCC 人民政协共同纲领.  On the further question of the “right of self-determination’ of ethnic minorities, we should no longer emphasize it at the present day.  In the past, during the Civil War, our Party did emphasize this slogan to win the ethnic minorities to our side and oppose the reactionary rule of the GMD (which adopted a particularly Han chauvinist posture toward ethnic minorities), and this was entirely correct at the time.

But the current situation has undergone a fundamental change, the reactionary rule of the GMD has basically been defeated.  The New China, led by our Party, has been established, and thus to complete the great enterprise of unifying our county, to oppose the plots of the imperialists and their running dogs that aim to divide China’s ethnic unity, on the domestic front we should no longer emphasize this slogan to avoid its being used by imperialists and by reactionary elements within ethnic minorities within China, which would put us in a passive posture.” Thus, since the end of the 1940s, the Party Central Committee has clearly stated that in China’s ethnic work we must abandon the slogan and framework of ‘the right to ethnic self-determination.’  Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai repeatedly warned us that not [using the slogan or the policy] was not only because it did fit our national situation, but also to prevent outside forces from using ethnic problems to stir up division.”

On November 17, 2017, the China Ethnic Journal 中国民族报 published an article that emphasized:  “The ‘right of ethnic self-determination’ is an important theory within the system of ethnic regional autonomy…Marxism-Leninism does not oppose the right of ethnic self-determination, but instead considers it to be an important theory and guide in managing ethnic issues…Although in terms of the name [employed in policy matters], it appears that the Chinese Communist Party, which upheld the right to ethnic self-determination from the time of the founding of the Party until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, did not choose to make this policy part of its system in managing the issue of different ethnicities engaging in national construction, yet from the point of view of the core meaning of its thought, the idea promoted by the ‘right to ethnic self-determination’ of respecting the political sovereignty and interests of minority ethnic groups finding themselves in a position of weakness, earned the affirmation of the CCP.” 

While this article acknowledged that the Party no longer promoted the “right to self-determination” after the late 1940s, it also emphasized that the “core” of the “right to ethnic self-determination” was affirmed by the CCP, and also insisted that in theoretical terms, the idea of the “right to ethnic determination” remains linked to our country’s current system of ethnic regional autonomy.  The China Ethnic Journal published another article on August 12, 2016 in which it publicly doubted that the “Chinese ethnicity” as a political body had genuinely taken form, emphasizing ethnic regional autonomy as a theoretical basis for the claim.

IV.  Comparison of the Articles of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law and the Constitution

A.  The Basic Contents of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law

Why does the 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law carry an important trace of the posture of “overkill 矫枉过正” that marked the field of ethnic work in the 1980s?  Let us undertake a basic comparison of the content of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law with the discussions of the 2014 Fourth Conference on Ethnic Growth, with an eye toward analyzing similarities and differences.

1.  Throughout the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, the work “ethnic” is used to refer to 56 [minority] ethnic groups, and the term “Chinese ethnicity” does not appear at all, which means the understanding and explanation of this basic concept in this important law is partial.  Yet we should also point out that “Chinese ethnicity” only appeared in the 2018 revisions to the constitution, and the term was absent from all previous constitutions.

2.  The second paragraph of the preface states:  “The Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law exists under the rule of a unified country, and allows areas inhabited by minority ethnicities to carry out regional autonomy, setting up autonomous organs, implementing autonomous rights…thus embodying the spirit in which the country fully respects and protects the rights and interests of every minority group to manage its internal affairs.”  Although there are mentions of the “unified leadership of the country,” and of “consolidating national unity,” and in Clause 5 of the resumé there is the passage “autonomous organs must preserve national unity,” the core focus remains on “establishing autonomous organs, implementing autonomous rights, respecting and protecting the rights and interests of every minority group to manage its internal affairs.” 

Given Chinese society’s current level of social development, members of all ethnic groups, to different degrees, live in integrated 混同 areas, work in integrated work units, receive medical treatment in integrated hospitals, so what kinds of things are really worth calling “internal ethnic affairs?”  What is the concrete boundary between “internal” and “external?”  Since autonomous organs are the governmental structures of autonomous regions, then if the governments of autonomous areas (regions, prefectures, countries) implement autonomous rights, then can this be seen as evidence that we have already carried out “minority ethnicity management of its own internal affairs?”  If not, then what should the structures of government power do to achieve that goal?

3.  The third paragraph of the preface states that:  “We must oppose chauvinism, especially Han chauvinism, and at the same time oppose ethnic-based regionalism 地方民族主义.”  This expression is found in various constitutions over time.  While continuing to oppose Han chauvinism, the text of 2014 Fourth Central Committee Ethnic Work Conference changed “ethnic-based regionalism” to “narrow ethnic claims 狭义民族主义,” which is worth noting.  After 70 years of socioeconomic development and population movement, a certain level of ethnic integration has already appeared in many places, and for this reason, ideas of “ethic nationalism” emerge among small groups, the “ethnic consciousness” of (X ethnic group), rather than the “ethnic consciousness” of an administrative region (X region).   

4.  Clause 17 of the section on the organization of the organs of autonomy states:  “The chairman of an autonomous region, as well as the heads of autonomous prefectures and counties, shall be occupied by citizens of the ethnic group of the autonomous region being administered.”  With the exception of the period of the Cultural Revolution, which was unique, this clause has beem consistently implemented.  Because the system of leadership in China is one in which the CCP organizes the leadership of the administrative organs, meaning that the power and influence of the Party secretary in all autonomous regions is greater than that of the heads of administrative regions, prefectures, and counties, and as result, even if in the selection and appointment of cadres, the heads of autonomous regions, prefectures, and counties are all from minority ethnic groups, the Party secretaries are often Han. 

The Fourth Central Committee Ethnic Work Conference pointed out:  “Politically excellent superior minority cadres that are willing to take on responsibilities should be placed in important leadership posts, allowing them to be decision-makers and leading actors, or even be transferred to China proper 内地 where they could take up positions in central Party or state organs.”  Should a superior ethnic minority cadre serve as Party secretary in an autonomous region, and, at the same time, the regulations of the Autonomy Law stipulate that the head position in local administration must also be occupied by a minority cadre, then in this case there will be no Han figure at the top of either the Party or state structures, which is perhaps not the ideal arrangement.  Consequently, at present the relevant regulations of the Autonomy Law discussed above are not in fact favorable to the appointment of minority cadres to the position of Party secretary in autonomous regions.

As for Clauses 19 through 45 on autonomous rights, another article has summarized their contents:  the constitution and the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law also have clear regulations.  Ethnic regions enjoy the following privileges in terms of autonomy:  in terms of political autonomy, they have rights to legislative autonomy, rights to modify or to refuse to implement administrative provisions, language rights, personnel management rights, rights concerning public security, etc.; in terms of economic autonomy, they have autonomous rights to economic construction and management, autonomous rights to management of natural resources, autonomous rights to enterprise management, autonomous rights to manage foreign trade, autonomous rights to manage local finances, autonomous rights to the management of financial construction, etc.; in terms of autonomous rights to social management, they have autonomous rights in the management of minority education, autonomous rights in the management of minority culture, autonomous rights in the management of minority science and technology, autonomous rights to the management of matters of health and hygiene, autonomous rights to the management of minority physical education, population, and the environment, etc.”  Below I have chosen the contents of some of these for a more concrete analysis.

5.  Clause Nineteen states:  “The People’s Representative Assemblies of the ethnic autonomous regions have the power to prescribe autonomous or specific regulations in light of the particular political, economic and cultural characteristics of the local ethnicity…which will go into force once they have been approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.”  At present, the five large autonomous regions have not yet determined each of their “autonomous regulations,” an important link in our national administration of provinces and autonomous regions. 

Should the five large autonomous regions choose to include their “autonomous rights and interests” within these “autonomous regulations,” then in future efforts to carry out our work such a decision might engender conflicts with the rights and constraints of various central committees and offices or with comprehensive national planning, or there might emerge contradictions with neighboring provinces or municipalities or other autonomous regions,” and lead to “zero sum games” over “ethnic” rights and interests in the course of interaction.  This kind of division of power and struggle over interests would necessarily tend to increased “ethnic” consciousness among minority groups and within the central authorities (mostly made up of Han cadres), which could well create deeper conflicts and contradictions among various “ethnic” groups and between autonomous regions and central government structures.
 
6.  Clause 20 states:  “Should the resolutions, decisions, orders and instructions of the higher authorities be inappropriate in the context of ethnic autonomous regions, the autonomous organs can inform higher state authorities of this and ask their permission to modify or halt the implementation of the policy.”  In the 1950s, the conditions of certain minority ethnic areas in terms social, economic, cultural, and economic development were very different from those of the coastal areas and the central provinces, as were the differences between ethnic groups living in the far West, and simplistically carrying out the unified national orders and plans could readily have resulted in serious errors in our work because of divergences from local conditions. 

Seventy years after the establishment of New China, although differences between regions throughout the country are gradually diminishing, nonetheless to guarantee that we do not commit errors, and to maintain the spirit of “seeking truth from facts,” it remains necessary that the governments of all ethnic areas (or “autonomous regions”) maintain communication and coordination with high level organs and the central government.  In theory, in situations where, because of differences between orders from the top and local conditions, rigid implementation runs the risk of producing objectively bad outcomes, lower-level governments should have the right to demand that implementation of the policy by changed or halted.

At the same time, in provinces (like Jiangsu or Zhejiang), municipalities, counties, and townships which are not ethnic autonomous regions, the situation can also arise in which high-level decisions and commands do not correspond to the situations of local work units on the ground, in which case these local units should also communicate and coordinate with the upper levels in a spirit of “seeking truth from facts” and “adapting to local conditions.”  Yet such communication and coordination need not necessarily rise to the level of “legal rights” (autonomous rights).  For this reason, if we understand this clause to mean “in matters of public concern to central authorities and to ethnic autonomous regions, we must respect the principles of cooperation and consultation,” placing the administrative organs of autonomous regions more or less in a position equal to that of central authorities in their “cooperation and consultation” on matters of public concern, this might be a serious error of understanding. 

From the perspective of seventy years of social progress, differences in China’s different regions, including the eastern provinces and cities and the autonomous regions in the West in terms of social and economic systems and in terms of the labor market, are increasingly diminishing, and the “cooperation and consultation” between the center and local government on matters of public concern will become increasingly universal, and even if the law guarantees certain “autonomous rights,” the practical meaning of these rights will be progressively diluted.

7.  Clause 21 states:  “When the autonomous organs of an autonomous region carry out their administration, they may employ the local language or languages in accord with the regulations concerning the local autonomy of the group in question.  At the same time if they employ multiple languages in the course carrying out administrative tasks, they can use the language of the group administering the affairs of the region as the main language.”  In the 1950s, the use of minority languages was common in Tibet, Xinjiang, and the herding regions of Inner Mongolia, among others, and in conditions when the majority of people did not have a good grasp of Chinese, such a clause was completely necessary.  But after seventy years of mandatory education, the universal spread of radio and television, urbanization and population migration, outside of distant Tibetan regions and villages in southern Xinjiang, Chinese has become the language tool employed by the vast majority of minority youths in terms of education and employment. 

If today we do not strengthen the study of our common language, and carry out bilingual education in the Tibetan regions and in villages in southern Xinjiang, and instead cling to the policy of using “the language of the group administering the affairs of the region as the main language,” this no longer accords with the overall developmental trends of Chinese society or the development of the younger generation of minority ethnic groups.  The future development trend in language use in all regions of China must take our common language as the main language, and local minority languages and dialects as secondary.

The Fourth Ethnic Work Conference pointed out:  “If you cannot speak the language, communication is difficult, and in the absence of communication, understanding is problematic, meaning that identity is slow to take form.  In some ethnic areas carrying out bilingual education we must both demand that ethnic minorities learn the common national language, and encourage the Han who are living in those areas to study the language of the minority groups.  When minority groups master the national common language, this is advantageous in terms of getting a job, receiving modern scientific culture and knowledge, and integrating into society.  We should actively promote the common schooling of Han and minority ethnic groups, mixing them in the same classes, creating an atmosphere and conditions of studying and advancing together.”

8.  Clause 22 states:    “Employ all possible measures to train large numbers of local cadres and the human resources to work in science, technology and administration and technical personnel from among the local ethnic group…When local organs hire staff, people from among the ethnic group administering the region and from other minority groups should receive appropriate consideration.”  We have observed that over the years, Party and state organs in various autonomous regions have worked hard in this sense, yet to understand this clause as meaning an “autonomous right in personnel matters” is not completely accurate. 

The leading cadres at the provincial level (or that of the autonomous region) are selected and appointed by the Central Organization Department 中组部, leading cadres at the regional prefectural, county and municipal levels are selected and appointed by provincial organization departments, and reported to the Central Organization Department for approval.  When selecting the main leading cadres for the administrative organs of autonomous regions, prefectures and counties, aside from taking their ethnicity into account, there is no difference.  So what does it really mean if today we insist that ethnic autonomous regions have an “autonomous right in personnel matters?”

The Fourth Ethnic Work Conference pointed out:  “All cadres, be they ethnic minority or Han, are Party or state cadres, and all must give priority to the affairs of the Party and the state and seek in their work to create happiness for all ethnicities…We must uphold the principles of combining moral character and talent 德才兼备, training and promoting such people in great numbers.  Politically excellent superior minority cadres that are willing to take on responsibilities should be placed in important leadership posts, allowing them to be decision-makers and leading actors, or even be transferred to China proper where they could take up positions in central Party or state organs.”  Superior ethnic minority cadres receive the complete confidence of central authorities and are employed in important posts in regions outside of ethnic autonomous regions.  In light of this important policy, should we cling to the idea of an “autonomous right in personnel matters,” this reflects a narrow vision.

9.  Clause 24 states:  “With the approval of the State Council, [ethnic autonomous regions] can organize a public security corps to secure the social peace of their region.”  Clause 23 of the 1952 Implementation Outline states:  “The autonomous organs of all ethnic autonomous regions should, in accordance with the unified military system of the country, organized the public security corps and the people’s militia of their own region.”  In the early 1950s, the army of the Tibetan government had not yet been reorganized, and in the Southwest and in Qinghai certain local tribal leaders still had traditional armed security forces.  This clause in the Implementation Outline preserved a certain space for the existence of these traditional armed forces which had not yet been reorganized or liberated, avoiding labeling them as “illegal” and worsening the contradictions.  The 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law preserved this clause, as did the revised version of 2001.  Yet if we view this as a “right to an autonomous security force,” this perhaps demands discussion.

10.  Clauses 25 to 30, relating to “arranging and managing local economic construction projects in terms of local initiative,” “determining ownership and usage rights to local grasslands and forests,” “managing local initiative enterprises and projects that belong to the locality.”  The management rights to “local economic construction projects” are within the sphere of rights belonging to provincial, regional, and county governments.  Should a central-level ministry decide to a certain central-level enterprise should carry out projects of basic economic construction or natural resource development in an ethnic autonomous region, this is also a construction project that belongs to the comprehensive national plan, and not part of “local economic construction projects.” 

In such circumstances, the Development and Reform Commission of the State Council and state organs will normally reflect appropriately on the financial receipts and social benefits that will accrue to the local governments.  But if we elevate the right of the autonomous region to financial management to the legal level of “autonomous rights in the management of economic construction, autonomous rights in management of natural resources, autonomous rights in enterprise management,” establishing a more or less rigid division of rights in a legal sense, this may not help ethnic regions to obtain finance or assistance from the center, nor to integrate the development of ethnic regions into overall national developmental plans.

Consulting the annual economic statistics of the autonomous regions, we can see the proportion of central government subsidies in the financial receipts of the five largest regions in 2011:  Tibet (91.7%), Ningxia (68.8%), Guangxi (62.8%), Xinjiang (60%), Inner Mongolia (24.3%).  In general terms, the financial income of China’s ethnic autonomous regions is to a very great degree dependent on financial transfer payments and various kinds of “assistance” from the central government.  In such a model, where money basically flows in only one direction, emphasizing autonomous rights in economic construction perhaps has only a political meaning.   

11.  Clause 31 states:  “According to state regulations, [ethnic autonomous regions] can develop foreign economic and trade activities, and with the approval of the State Council, can open ports to foreign trade.  Those ethnic minority regions that border on a foreign country can, with the approval of the State Council, develop border trade.  The foreign economic and trade activities of ethnic autonomous regions benefit from the preferential policies of the state.”  With the exception of the last part concerning “preferential policies,” what is described here is in no way different from the rights enjoyed by other work units throughout the country.  No matter what the region, anyone wishing to develop foreign trade or border trade must seek the approval of the State Council.  To call this “autonomous rights to manage foreign economics and trade” is imprecise, and merely underscores the political and legal meaning.

12.  Clause 32 states:  “[Ethnic autonomous regions] have autonomous rights to manage local finance.  The use of anything which, according to the state financial system, belongs to the financial income of an autonomous ethnic region, should be independently arranged by the autonomous organs of the ethnic autonomous region.  Within the unified national financial system, ethnic autonomous regions enjoy the financial support of the upper levels of the financial administration via the standardized financial transfer payment system implemented by the state.  The financial accounting of the ethnic autonomous regions, according to national regulations, establishes mobile capital, with greater proportional reserve sums than in other regions.  In the process of carrying out financial budgeting, the autonomous organs of ethnic autonomous regions make their own arrangements for the use of excess income and surplus funds for expenditures.”  As already mentioned above, given the situation in which all autonomous regions rely financially on transfers from the central authorities and assistance from the Eastern provinces and cities, the actual meaning of “autonomous rights to the management of local finance” is very limited, again confined solely to the political and legal sense of the term.

13.  Clause 36 states:  “According to national education policy, and according to legal regulations, [ethnic autonomous regions] have the right to determine the educational policies of their region, the establishment of schools, the school system, school management, school curriculum, the language of the school and recruitment to the school, at all levels.”  We have seen how, for many years, the Uyghur Autonomous Region in Xinjiang has set up a model of separate schools for different ethnic groups based on the maternal language of the students, and in the context of the university entrance exams lowered the admission threshold for minority studies; the legal basis for such policies was this clause. 

“Schools (or classes) that recruit mostly minority students, as well as other educational structures, should, to the extent possible, use textbooks written in the minority language, and the classroom language should also be that of the minority.  Depending on circumstances there should also be Chinese language classes, beginning from the early grades or later, promoting the commonly used putonghua as our standard language.”     In the early 1980s, when Tibet and Xinjiang set up separate Chinese and ethnic schools and classes, and in the ethnic schools taught all courses with the exception of Chinese language in the minority language, such initiatives were based on this spirit, which some people called “autonomous rights to ethnic educational management.” 

Since the 1980s, the system in use for many years by faculties and departments in Xinjiang’s universities in which students take classes in their own languages, meaning that Uyghur and Kazakh students learn their major disciplines in their own languages, the quality of minority language textbooks in math and chemistry cannot compare to those in the Chinese language, and the same is true for the educational outcomes, to which we might add that the cutoff math grade for admission of such minority students to key university science and technology faculties and departments was 35 in 2018 (it was 90 for Han students).  This kind of native-language educational system actually harms the academic results of minority students in their major fields, keeps them from entering top-drawer universities in central China, and creates language barriers for them when they try to find a job and develop their careers after graduation.

14.  Clauses 38 to 42, related to management rights with regard to ethnic cultural enterprises, plans for science and technology development, medical and public health initiatives, physical education initiatives, foreign cultural and educational exchanges, etc.  What are called “autonomous rights” in these areas in fact have no basic differences from the management rights of corresponding administrative organs (the Cultural Office, the Educational Office, the Public Health Office) in other provinces and cities. 

15.  Clauses 43 and 44 state:  “Based on legal regulations, determine the way to manage the migrant population;” “Implement the family planning policy and the healthy birth policy 优生优育, elevating the quality 素质 of each ethnic population.”  These have been called “autonomous rights to population management.”  In current social life, we have seen for a long time that in southern Xinjiang and in many minority communities in Tibet, family planning is in fact not implemented, and they have maintained high birth rates.  For example, in 1972, the overall birth rate among the Uyghurs of Moyu 墨玉 county in Southern Xinjiang (based on age-specific calculations of the number of children one women has over the course of her life) was 6.64, while the figure for all Uighurs in Xinjiang in 1981 was 5.56. 

In the clauses discussed above from Chapter Three, “The Autonomous Rights of Autonomous Organs,” with the exception of the question of the use of language (Clause 22), and native language use and ethnic schools (Clauses 36 and 37), the other areas in which rights are mentioned are in fact largely similar to the rights of governments in other regional administrative units (provincial, regional, county-level). Yet these administrative rights appear in the “Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law” as high-level legal protections of “ethnic autonomous rights.”  This squarely reflects the unprecedented upsurge of “ethnic” consciousness among China’s 56 minority groups in the early 1980s, and even if many of the clauses of this law mentioned preconditions such as “based on legal regulations and the state’s unified plan,” or “according to state regulations,” or “with the approval of the State Council” or “under the guidance of the state plan,” they all emphasized these rights from the perspective of “ethnic autonomous rights,” and in addition the law did not explain:  who (or what structures) should determine if central decisions and directives were or were not suited to the current conditions of the ethnic autonomous regions?  If there were disagreements on these topics, who would render a judgement?

According to the constitution of the Soviet Union, the autonomous republics had the right to leave the Soviet Union and form independent countries.  In the years when state power was stable and the system highly centralized, when the central government enjoyed great authority and controlled the chief resources of the country, no one really tried hard to realize this “right to independence,” and no one even took this clause seriously.  There were many in the Soviet government who were smug about this in the context of external propaganda, arguing that this clause illustrated the sincere commitment on the part of the Communist Party and the central government to the “rights to self determination” of minority peoples as well as their “democratic spirit.” 

But once the country’s political system began to waver, when, for example, Gorbachev’s “perestroika” led to the decline in influence of traditional ideology and to the weakening of the powers of the central government, then possibly there were some republics (the three Baltic countries, Georgia, etc.) who sought to establish independent countries on the basis of the constitution’s “right to leve.”  This is how the Soviet Union, formerly a “superpower,” fell apart.  People might ask:   Could the clause concerning “changing or halting the implementation of policy” in China’s Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law at some future point take on this key function, becoming the legal justification through which ethnic autonomous areas could openly challenge the authority of the central government? 

B.  Clauses in China’s “Constitution” concerning “Ethnicity” (the 56 “Ethnicities”)

Clause 4, Clause 99, and Clauses 112 through 122 deal with regulations concerning ethnic regional autonomy.  If we compare Clauses 112 through 122 of the Constitution with the contents of the Ethnic Autonomy Law discussed above, we note that provisions in the Constitution concerning the People’s Congresses of the autonomous regions, the appointments of the leading authorities of the autonomous regional governments, their autonomous financial rights, their management of economic construction and educational projects, of regional public security forces, and of the use of regional languages, already contains the basis of what is found in the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law concerning “autonomous rights.”  The above clauses already appeared in the 1982 constitution, and thus were promulgated more or less at the same time as the 1984 Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, and both of these important documents were a product of the overall political atmosphere in China at the beginning of the 1980s.  When the Constitution was revised in 2018, these clauses were not altered.

The Constitution is the basic law that defines the fundamental system of a country.  When we compare the texts, we find that the contents of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law are basically consistent with the corresponding clauses in the Constitution.  In other words, if the clauses contained in the Constitution are implemented in the work of our government, then the contents of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law are optional.

C.  Calls to Raise the Status and Function of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law in Recent Years
At the end of 2017, China Ethnic Journal published an article that claimed:  “An important reason that the system of ethnic regional autonomy is not fully implemented is because of the lack of autonomous rights and constitutional protection of their position.  According to principles stated in the constitution, the measures concerning ethnic autonomous regions should serve to develop the ‘small constitutions’ of the ethnic autonomous regions, but the situation has dragged on without entering the phase of establishing the law. 

In light of this, the central authorities should take on the leading responsibility in the process of putting into practice the measures concerning ethnic autonomous regions.  At the same time, according to the principle stated in Clause 3 of the constitution, they should adopt a concrete division of authority so as to normalize and improve the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, elevating it to a stable legal position, thus guaranteeing that rights to autonomy will not be ignored or receive the same harmful treatment as most laws, administrative regulations and local policies...The path toward the legalization of the relations between central authorities and ethnic autonomous regions lies in elevating the Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law, this core standard in the system of ethnic regional autonomy, to a constitutional position defining a basic law governing relations between central authorities and the ethnic autonomous regions...thus clarifying the nature of this relationship. 

Further clarification on the basis of legal standards of the rights are enjoyed by ethnic autonomous regions will place mutual constraints consistent with the basic law on relations between central authorities and ethnic autonomous regions...and will establish a mechanism to decide disputes between central authorities and ethnic autonomous regions on questions of rights and interests.  Establishing a constitutional review mechanism is an important constitutional guarantee and a mechanism for effectively resolving quarrels and disputes between central authorities and ethnic autonomous regions.”

When they mention here “the basic law on relations between central authorities and ethnic autonomous regions,” and “mutual constraints consistent with the basic law on relations between central authorities and ethnic autonomous regions,” people naturally will think of the “basic laws 基本法” associated with the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao.  Hong Kong and Macao are former colonies, ceded by China to England and Portugal, and for long periods operated political, economic and legal systems unlike those of the mainland, and after China became strong later in the twentieth century, the Chinese government formally secured the return of these regions through diplomatic negociations with the governments of England and Portugal.  Out of concern for the important institutional differences between these regions and the motherland, and in order that the political, economic and judicial systems of these two regions could be effectively integrated, the central government chose to employ the formula of “one country-two systems,” and promulgated a “basic law” to facilitate the workings of the relationship between the Hong Kong and Macao “special administrative regions,” China’s central government, and the provinces and municipalities of China proper.

In contrast, China’s various minority ethnic autonomous regions have since 1949 been under the direct administrative control of China’s central government, and their basic political, economic and legal systems are not fundamentally different from those of other provinces and municipalities.  For this reason, comparing the mechanism used to resolve disputes over authority and interests between the central government and ethnic autonomous regions to the “basic law” model, or going so far as to clearly demand the “establishment of a constitutional review mechanism” confuses two models whose natures are completely different.

V.  The Future Direction of China’s Ethnic Work

At the meeting of the National People’s Congress on March 20, 2018, the re-elected National Chairman Xi Jinping gave a talk.  In Chairman Xi’s recent addresses, we can see how the Party center expresses its fundamental viewpoint on the ethnic question, as well as the how it defines the direction of the future development of our country’s ethnic work. 

Today’s world is made up of “nation-states” (sovereign states recognized by ther United Nations) possessing independent administrative, legal, diplomatic, economic, and financial systems.  In the political body that is today’s China, and for all of the Chinese people that make up the Chinese People’s Republic of China, the “Chinese ethnicity” constitutes our most basic, core political and cultural identity, and the Chinese passport and the Chinese identity card are the legally defined “borders” separating the Chinese from citizens of other countries.  What expressions like the “Chinese people,” “Chinese civilization,” the “sons and daughters of China,” and the “national spirit” exphasize is the commonly shared history, the collective identity and the common destiny of all Chinese people, and such expressions have recently become the chief thread in speeches by our highest leaders concening the discourse on “ethnicity.”

Chairman Xi’s October 18, 2017 “Work Report” delivered to the 19th National People’s Conference, representing the 18th Central Committee is the programmatic text of this cohort of central leaders.  On 73 occasions, the text refers to the Chinese people as a whole and as a “nation.”  The “Chinese people” are also referred to 14 times, while there are ten instances in the report in which China’s ethnic differences are referred to as “people of all nationalities,” and only six instances that mentioned the 56 “ethnic groups” (“ethnic religious work,” “frontier ethnic regions,” “ethnic separatist activities,” the “system of ethnic regional autonomy,” “ethnicity, religion,” and “ethnic unity”), while at the same “ethnic regional autonomy” was mentioned only once. 

The “Work Report’s” concrete formulation on the ethnic question, in the section devoted to the “patriotic united front,” is:  “Deepen progressive education on ethnic unity, consolidate the consciousness of the common body of the Chinese people, stregthen interaction among all ethnic groups, encouraging all ethnic groups to be as closely bound as pomegranate seeds, so that they will unite together to struggle, develop and prosper...together achieving the great revival of the Chinese people.”  Obviously, what Chairman Xi stressed were “interaction among all ethnic groups,” and “consolidating the consciousness of a common Chinese ethnicity.”  In his speech at the closing ceremony of the 13th National People’s Congress in March of 2018, Chairman Xi did not mention “ethnic regional autonomy,” but instead emphasized:  “In the river of thousands of years of history, the Chinese people have always been united as one, pulling together in times of difficulty 同舟共济, building a united, multi-ethnic country, developing the plurality within unity of the 56 ethnic groups, the interlinked and harmonious relationships among the ethnic groups, forming the great family of the Chinese people that looks out for and helps one another.”

The revised 2018 Constitution mentions the “Chinese ethnicity” twice (once each in Clause 32 and Clause 33), meaning that the “Chinese ethnicity” have formally “entered the Constitution.”  The vocabulary and expressions employed in the above-mentioned speeches clearly illustrate that there has already been an important change in the core emphasis concerning the two notions of the “Chinese ethnicity” and the “56 ethnic groups.”  Past expressions tended to stress “ethnic regional autonomy,” “ethnic equality,” and “common prosperity,” while in recent years the emphasis has tended to shift toward “the community of the Chinese ethnicity” and “interaction among the people.”
In 1989, Professor Fei Xiaotong pointed out that “Over the past century of resistance to the Western powers, the Chinese people have become a conscious national entity.” 

His idea of “plurality within unity” has received the repeated affirmation of central authorities.  Comrade Hu Jintao, in his July 2016 speech at the National United Front Work Conference, clearly pointed out:  “Equality, unity, mutual assistance and harmonious socialist ethnic relationships have created the basic situation of the plurality within unity of the Chinese people, and the fundamental interests of the great family of the Chinese people.”  At the Central Committee’s Fourth Ethnic Work Meeting, Chairman Xi explained the idea of the “plurality within unity of the Chinese people” as follows:  “When we talk about the nature of the plurality within unity of the Chinese people, the unity contains the plurality, and the plurality constitutes the unity.  The unity is not separate from the plurality, nor the plurality from the unity.  The unity is the main thread and the direction, the plurality the moving parts and the motivation.  The two exist in dialectical unity.”

Since 2000, debates have continued within the academic community concerning trends in the development of ethnic relations in China and the objective results of ethnic regional autonomy and preferential treatment of minorities.  At the Central Committee’s Fourth Ethnic Work Meeting in 2014, central authorities expressed themselves fairly comprehensively on these issues.  On the one hand, they noted that the system of ethnic regional autonomy has, since 1949 and the founding of New China, become the basic system and core discourse for the management of ethnic questions, and to avoid a one hundred and eighty degree change that could lead to a “setback 翻车,” they reiterated their positive attitude toward this system, gong so far as to express the strong opinion that “the idea of doing away with the system of ethnic regional autonomy should be put to rest,” providing a “tranquilizer” to those who worried that the Party was considering important changes to the discourse and basic system of ethnic management.  On the other hand, while affirming the system of “ethnic regional autonomy,” in terms of priorities they particularly emphasized that it is necessary that “unity” be above “autonomy:”  “In the absence of national unity, there can be no regional autonomy.” 

When discussing the ethnic groups that implement regional autonomy, they emphasized that these groups must protect unity, and that the preservation of ethnic unity is “the greater responsibility.”
Looking back at the road New China has traveled over the past 70 years in its management of ethnic issues, there have been great successes as well as important failures.  When sorting through the discursive system used by government texts and academic discussions of ethnic questions, we find different approaches and sharp debates in the academic world.  The emergence of different opinions on this highly complex question is natural; what is scary is the “single voice 一言堂” of the Cultural Revolution, and only by letting “one hundred flowers bloom” can our thought move forward.  If at the time Deng Xiaoping had not championed “thought liberation,” China could not have found the path to reform and opening, and we could not have achieved the great results we have achieved today in our national modernization. 

​As today we reflect on China’s ethnic question, the most important point remains that of “thought liberation” and opposing the “two whatevers 两个凡是,” upholding “seeking truth from facts” and “practice is the sole criterion of truth.”  As we analyze the positives and negatives of ethnic policies since the founding of New China, our objective is that, having weighed successful experiences against failed lessons, our future path will be better and smoother.  Our goal is to truly integrate all ethnic groups in our country into one whole, that will respond in common to the constantly changing events on the international front, and realizing the “China dream of our 1.39 billion people for prosperity and strength.

The wheels of history are always moving forward, and the country’s laws and regulations also need to change in accord with basic social progress and contradictory situations, carrying out necessary revisions and adjustments in the spirit of seeking truth from facts and keeping abreast of the times.  Every historical period has its own principle contradiction, and each contradiction has its principle aspect, and in order to follow the direction of historical progress and appropriately deal with current contradictions, the leadership must survey the trends and take appropriate measures to adjust our work strategy in the spirit of seeking truth from facts.  In the process of the evolution of the Chinese people’s “plurality within unity,” when the strength of emphasis and promotion of “unity” to excessive, so that it might damage the social interests and cultural traditions of the “plurality,” we should pay attention to the “plurality” and protect the traditional culture and interests of minority ethnic groups; and when promotion of the development of the “plurality” threatens social and national “unity,” we then must emphasize the “community of the Chinese ethnicity.”            


Translator’s Notes

​[1] 马戎, "中国民族区域自治制度的历史演变轨迹," in a special issue in 民族研究 (Ethnic Studies) entited “民族区域自治制度70 年 Seventy Years of the Ethnic Regional Autonomy System,” 2019.3:  92-109.

[2] See for instance, in English, Ma Rong, Population and Society in Contemporary Tibet (Hong Kong:  Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

[3] Ma’s impressive CV is available here. 

[4] For an excellent overview of Ma’s arguments and his detractor’s criticisms, see Mark Elliott, “The Case of the Missing Indigene:  Debate over a ‘Second-Generation’ Ethnic Policy,” The China Journal 73 (2015):  186-213. 

[5] Julia Lovell, trans., The Real Story of Ah-Q and Other Tales of China (London:  Penguin 2009), Kindle edition.

[6] An armed conflict between Uyghurs and the Chinese government in Akto County, Xinjiang, in April of 1990. 

[7] This is part of China’s traditional policy toward ethnic minority groups.  For details, see here.