Qin Hui on Ukraine--2

Qin Hui, “Ukraine Series No. 2:  Aggression and Appeasement—Crimea and the Sudetenland Compared”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
Qin Hui (b. 1953), who taught at Tsinghua University until his recent retirement, is a historian and one of China’s most prominent public intellectuals.  Translations of many of his writings, treating topics as diverse as Thomas Piketty’s Twentieth- First Century Capitalism, “China as seen from South Africa” and “Globalization after the Pandemic:  Thoughts on the Coronavirus” are available on this site.  Qin emailed me last week, asking me to translate a series of texts he is writing on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which are being published in FT Chinese.  I am delighted to do so, because Qin’s voice is certainly unique in China, and perhaps in the world.  The text translated here is the second in the series; the Chinese version was published on February 28, 2022, and is pay walled.  I should note that Qin's wife, Jin Yan, a noted scholar of Russian history, has also published on the current crisis (I will try to translate some of her material for next time), and that the two of them have put together online lectures on the war and related themes (available here.  In Chinese, of course, and more than seven hours long, so not for the faint of heart).
 
The war in Ukraine has provoked a great deal of commentary among Chinese establishment intellectuals, some of it explanatory, some of it sympathetic to the pronouncements of the Chinese government, some of it mildly critical.  In this context, Qin Hui’s text is extreme and unrepresentative, because the goal of his essay is to completely demolish any and all justifications of Russia’s invasion, whether they are offered by Putin or by Putin admirers in China.  To this end, he wields the same tools he always does:  a comprehensive understanding of comparative historical examples, a keenly analytic mind, and a finely honed sense of sarcasm.  His ultimate point is to wake the world up to the greatest threat to peace since Hitler, the Sudetenland, and Poland.  In fact, the entire point of the text translated here is to draw direct parallels between Crimea and the Sudetenland, and to suggest Putin’s behavior has been even more outrageous than Hitler’s, as has the appeasement of Biden and the West.
 
Favorite Quotes
 
“The unrest in Sudetenland in 1938 led to a crackdown by the Czech government on the radical Sudetenland ‘Germanists,’ resulting in casualties. (Compare:  The 2014 unrest in Kiev extended to Crimea, but to a much lesser extent than in Kiev, with no casualties and no repression by the Ukrainian government). Hitler used this as a pretext to threaten Czechoslovakia to cede Sudetenland or face armed aggression. The British and French appeasement policy of ‘avoiding war at all costs’ did not provide the promised security guarantees to the Czechs, and the ‘Little Entente’ did not work. (Compare:  Even though the turmoil in Crimea was the least significant in all of Ukraine, Putin used it as a pretext to stage a coup d'état to annex Crimea, backed by armed force. The European and American appeasement of ‘avoiding rupture at all costs’ did not provide security guarantees for Ukraine, and NATO did little).”
 
“If we compare Sudetenland solely with Crimea, it is true that the Sudeten Germans were opposed to Czech independence, and the Czech army clashed with the Sudeten Germans several times between 1918 and 1919. In particular, on March 4, 1919, the Sudeten Germans declared a general strike demanding the ‘right of self-determination’ to join Austria, and the Czech army suppressed it, causing hundreds of casualties and 54 deaths. By contrast, the independence of Ukraine in 1991 was welcomed by the Russian-speaking regions. Ukrainians of course supported the referendum on independence, but the same is true for the absolute majority of the Russian-speakers, although support in the Russian-speaking regions was slightly lower.  In Lugansk and Donetsk, the most pro-Russian regions today, 83.86% and 83.90% supported Ukrainian independence at the time, while only 13% and 12% opposed it. In Crimea, where ethnic Russians were overwhelmingly dominant, even the officers and sailors of the Black Sea Fleet voted mostly in favor. So much so that in Sevastopol, where the Black Sea Fleet command is located and where 90.6% of the population speaks Russian, 57.1% of voters supported independence and only 39% opposed it. In other words, the Ukrainian and even Crimean Russians identify less with Ukraine than the Ukrainians, but much more strongly than the Sudeten Germans identified with Czechoslovakia. The ‘pro-European’ and ‘pro-Russian’ conflicts developed only after 2004 and are far less profound and serious than the Czech-German ethnic conflicts in the Czech Republic and even in Sudetenland. If this gave Putin reason to divide Ukraine, Hitler had ten times more reason to divide Czechoslovakia.”
 
“I really don't understand what people like Biden are thinking!  Even if you really don't want to send troops (I actually agree with this point given that Russia is a nuclear power), wouldn’t a little vagueness serve the interests of deterrence? It's not like they don't know how to do this; ambiguity has always been the American calling card in the Taiwan Straits!  Taiwan is not recognized as a country, and yet they refuse to say that they will not react should something happen, yet when they are fully aware that an internationally recognized sovereign country like Ukraine it about to be slaughtered, and is repeatedly asking for help, they handcuff themselves, saying to the bandits with their knives drawn that ‘I will do absolutely nothing to stop you.’  All they do is yell and scream and impose a fine here and there.  Doesn’t this amount to encouraging the robbers to do as they please?” 
 
Translation
 
Striking Historical Similarities 
 
If we compare Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 with the German annexation of Sudetenland in 1938, and especially if we compare the evolution of the situation in Crimea up to now with the evolution of the situation from Sudetenland through 1939, they look incredibly alike! And the subtle differences suggest that things in Crimea are even more outrageous than they were in the Sudetenland.
 
Is this not the case?  Please check out the following comparisons. 
 
The Sudetenland region was a predominantly Germanic region in Czechoslovakia.  (Compare:  Crimea is a predominantly Russian region in Ukraine).
 
Although Czechoslovakia had been part of the Moravian state in the early Middle Ages, this state disappeared long ago and thereafter, Czechoslovakia was ruled by the German Holy Roman Emperor, the Emperor of Austria. (Compare: Kievan Rus' or Kyivan Rus', a loose federation in Eastern and Northern Europe from the late 9th to the mid-13th century, died out long ago, and subsequently Ukraine was ruled by the Russian Tsar for many years.)

With the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, Czechoslovakia became independent, and according to the Paris Peace Conference agreement, its northwestern border inherited the pre-war German-Austrian frontier with Trans-Laitania, meaning that a German-speaking region was included in Czech territory.  (Compare: With dissolution of the Soviet Empire after the Cold War, Ukraine became independent, and according to the agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, former republics kept their borders, meaning that Russian-speaking regions were included in Ukrainian territory). 
 
The Sudeten Germans, however, were traditionally pro-German and did not identify much with the Czech state.  They were in deep conflict with the central government of Czechoslovakia over the status of the German language, etc., and extremists demanded a "return" to Germany.  (Compare:  The Crimean Russians are traditionally pro-Russian and do not identify much with the Ukrainian state, and they are in deep conflict with the central government of Ukraine over the status of the Russian language, etc.). Hitler later exploited such separatist tendencies by encouraging Sudeten Germans to leave the country and merge with Germany, and threatening the Czech Republic with force. (Compare:  Putin later used such separatist tendencies to encourage Crimean Russians to leave and merge with Russia, and threatened Ukraine by force.) 
 
For its own geopolitical security, Czechoslovakia joined the French-backed "Little Entente" in 1920-21, which Germany perceived as being directed against it, creating what Hitler called "security concerns". (For similar reasons of geopolitical security, Ukraine wanted to join the European Union and NATO, which Russia considered to be directed against it, creating what Putin called "security concerns"). The prolonged economic crisis in Germany after World War I generated popular resentment and a need to avenge the war-time loss. German rulers were able to instigate a quest to "recover historical territories." (Similarly, due to the prolonged economic crisis in Russia after the Cold War, grievances among the population and the need to avenge the defeat of the Cold War allowed Russian rulers to instigate a quest for the "recovery of historical territories"). 
 
The unrest in Sudetenland in 1938 led to a crackdown by the Czech government on the radical Sudetenland "Germanists," resulting in casualties. (Compare:  The 2014 unrest in Kiev extended to Crimea, but to a much lesser extent than in Kiev, with no casualties and no repression by the Ukrainian government). Hitler used this as a pretext to threaten Czechoslovakia to cede Sudetenland or face armed aggression. The British and French appeasement policy of "avoiding war at all costs" did not provide the promised security guarantees to the Czechs, and the "Little Entente" did not work. (Compare:  Even though the turmoil in Crimea was the least significant in all of Ukraine, Putin used it as a pretext to stage a coup d'état to annex Crimea, backed by armed force. The European and American appeasement of "avoiding rupture at all costs" did not provide security guarantees for Ukraine, and NATO did little). 
 
Czechoslovakia was forced to give in and lost Sudetenland. As a result, Hitler soon annexed the entire Czech Republic, still citing "security concerns" and the recovery of "historical territory," and finally launched a full-scale war against Poland a year later. (Compare:  Ukraine refused to give in but was unable to do anything about it and lost Crimea. As a result, Putin, still citing "security concerns" and the recovery of "historical territories", soon planned the dismemberment of the eastern provinces of Ukraine and finally launched an all-out war against Ukraine eight years later).
  
Pushed to the wall by Hitler, Britain and France were forced to declare war on Germany, but remained weak and wavering, fighting a "strange war" that ended in 1940 with little action having been taken. (Forced to the wall by Putin, the U.S. and Europe sternly rebuked Russia, but clearly said that they would not send troops to help Ukraine, and would limit themselves to imposing economic sanctions on Russia, the results of which…we will have to wait and see). 
 
To tell the truth, such comparisons surprised even me.  Can history really repeat itself like this after all?
 
The Crimean Case is More Extreme than the Sudetenland Case
  
Of course, no two snowflakes are exactly alike. There are still some subtle differences between Sudetenland and Crimea. 
 
(1) Putin has said that Ukraine is "not merely a neighbor," but also Russia’s "historical territory" and has been "from time immemorial," which means that Russia the right to discipline管教Ukraine. When did this "since time immemorial" begin? According to Russian textbooks, since 1654, when Russia and Ukraine merged, right? Even if we know that know that the Treaty of Berejaslav was a "wartime alliance" and not a "merger," let’s accept what Putin says anyway. So can Czechoslovakia be considered a German "historical territory?" We know that Czechoslovakia has been under the German-ruled Holy Roman Empire since 1002 and under the Austrian Habsburgs since 1526 (Germany and Austria not only share a language and an ethnicity, but were also one country at the time of the Sudetenland affair), which is much earlier than the "Russo-Ukrainian merger," right? Czechoslovakia did not become independent until 1918 and was only 20 years old by the time of the Sudetenland incident in 1938. But not only did Ukraine become a part of Russia 600 years later, it also has a longer history of independence than Czechoslovakia.  Ukraine became independent in 1991, and had enjoyed 23 years of independence when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. If Putin's hegemonic logic about "disciplining a little brother" is valid, wouldn't Hitler have had even more reason to discipline the Czechs? 
 
(2) If we compare Sudetenland solely with Crimea, it is true that the Sudeten Germans were opposed to Czech independence, and the Czech army clashed with the Sudeten Germans several times between 1918 and 1919. In particular, on March 4, 1919, the Sudeten Germans declared a general strike demanding the "right of self-determination" to join Austria, and the Czech army suppressed it, causing hundreds of casualties and 54 deaths. By contrast, the independence of Ukraine in 1991 was welcomed by the Russian-speaking regions. Ukrainians of course supported the referendum on independence, but the same is true for the absolute majority of the Russian-speakers, although support in the Russian-speaking regions was slightly lower.  In Lugansk and Donetsk, the most pro-Russian regions today, 83.86% and 83.90% supported Ukrainian independence at the time, while only 13% and 12% opposed it. In Crimea, where ethnic Russians were overwhelmingly dominant, even the officers and sailors of the Black Sea Fleet voted mostly in favor. So much so that in Sevastopol, where the Black Sea Fleet command is located and where 90.6% of the population speaks Russian, 57.1% of voters supported independence and only 39% opposed it. In other words, the Ukrainian and even Crimean Russians identify less with Ukraine than the Ukrainians, but much more strongly than the Sudeten Germans identified with Czechoslovakia. The "pro-European" and "pro-Russian" conflicts developed only after 2004 and are far less profound and serious than the Czech-German ethnic conflicts in the Czech Republic and even in Sudetenland. If this gave Putin reason to divide Ukraine, Hitler had ten times more reason to divide Czechoslovakia. 
 
(3) The Sudetenland did indeed experience unrest in 1938, when the extreme pro-German Sudeten German Party (SDP) won nearly 90% of the ethnic German vote in local elections in the spring of that year, and mass protests by ethnic Germans against Czechoslovakia repeatedly turned into violent riots, which the Czech army suppressed in yet another bloodbath, after which the SDP was banned. In contrast, the Russian demonstrations in Crimea in 2014 were much smaller and less violent, and as Putin himself said there was no repression or bloodshed, and the pro-Russian Party of Regions not only was not banned, but was in power at the time (and was later overthrown by Putin's "masked men" coup, not by "pro-Europeans" or the Ukraine central government). So if Hitler's "liberation" of Sudetenland had the excuse of a supposedly repressed ethnic German population, Putin's annexation of Crimea did not—according to what he said, it was merely a “preemptive” repression. 
 
(4) In the geopolitics of Europe at the time, which was dominated by the Franco-German rivalry, Czechoslovakia in 1938 had long been a member of the French-backed "Little Entente," which was considered intolerable from the perspective of Hitler's "security concerns." But Ukraine’s intentions in 2014 were merely to join NATO (Putin himself had had the same intention), and no time table had been fixed, yet Putin's "security concerns" exploded, and by 2022, Putin launched a full-scale war against Ukraine over the mere fact that they refused to "promise never to join NATO."  If this bandit logic holds true, Hitler would have had a reason to annex Czechoslovakia one hundred times over! 
 
(5) Appeasement in 1938: Chamberlain and Daladier, representing Britain and France, bypassed Czechoslovakia and reached a direct compromise with Hitler in Munich, thus allowing Germany to annex the Sudetenland.  Appeasement in 2014: Europe and the US did not directly betray Crimea, but nonetheless stood by when Russia invaded, although they talked a great deal, and even imposed an arms embargo on "both sides." It's like if there was an armed robber in the street killing people, and the police not only don't stop him, they don't even allow the victims to buy guns to defend themselves! But at least the West condemned the annexation of Crimea, unlike Chamberlain who made a virtue of betrayal and boasted that he had won "peace for our time!" So in 2014, Western appeasement is not as evil as that of Chamberlain and Daladier in 1938. 
 
(6) However, by the beginning of 2022, eight years had passed since the annexation of Crimea, and Putin, who is definitely a “give him an inch and he’ll take a mile” type of figure, had not only been fighting a proxy war with Ukraine for eight years, but it l0oked as if he is about to do what Hitler did in 1939 and launch a full-scale bloody war.  At this point, not only did Europe and the United States not hasten to usher Ukraine into NATO and give them security guarantees, but even when they knew that Putin was going to strike (unlike Hitler’s unexpected “blitzkrieg”), they made it clear that they would never send troops to aid Ukraine, and Biden even once said that if Russia limited itself to a "small aggression" rather than a major annexation, this would be acceptable! 
 
I really don't understand what people like Biden are thinking!  Even if you really don't want to send troops (I actually agree with this point given that Russia is a nuclear power), wouldn’t a little vagueness serve the interests of deterrence? It's not like they don't know how to do this; ambiguity has always been the American calling card in the Taiwan Straits!  Taiwan is not recognized as a country, and yet they refuse to say that they will not react should something happen, yet when they are fully aware that an internationally recognized sovereign country like Ukraine it about to be slaughtered, and is repeatedly asking for help, they handcuff themselves, saying to the bandits with their knives drawn that “I will do absolutely nothing to stop you.”  All they do is yell and scream and impose a fine here and there.  Doesn’t this amount to encouraging the robbers to do as they please? 
 
In 1939, when Hitler finally went to war, Britain and France were the first to enter the war on the side of Poland. Although it was a "strange war" and quite listless, it was still a much stronger action than what Europe and the United States did in 2022. Of course, Biden says that because Ukraine is not a NATO member, he has only moral obligations, not treaty obligations. But the United States surely had no treaty obligations in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan…In 1939, France had indeed signed a treaty with Poland, but Britain had not, which means that Britain went to war on the basis of moral obligations. To put it bluntly, the U.S. and Europe are afraid of Russia.  What's more, Germany in 1939 was indeed very strong, and Britain and France were actually somewhat vulnerable. But Russia in 2022 cannot be compared to the United States, whether in terms of overall national power or military might, leaving NATO aside.  Thus there is no doubt that the appeasement of Europe and the United States in 2022 is worse than that of Britain and France in 1939. 
 
Ukraine’s Doing Better than Expected is No Reason to Justify the Aggressors and Appeasers 
 
Of course, a few days after the war began, it became clear that Ukraine was neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland, and if Russia does not suffer a complete disaster, the most they can probably achieve will be a humiliating "victory," like the Soviet-Finnish "Winter War" of 1939-1940, which they “won” but in fact lost. But this is the result of a surprising performance by Ukraine, and not because the United States and Europe did not engage in appeasement. There are several popular views on this with which I disagree. 
 
Some people say that now the Ukrainian army has American and European weapons, so it is a "proxy war," and that what is stopping Russia is the U.S. and Europe, not the Ukrainians themselves. What kind of talk is this? It is obvious from the videos that Ukraine’s heavy weapons, such as aircraft, tanks, artillery and armored vehicles, and even basic light weapons, such as rifles and machine guns, are all their own Soviet-style weapons (don’t try to tell me they were captured from the Russians), and what the West has supplied are basically individual defensive weapons such as "javelins" and "stingers." These things are useful, but the acceleration of Western military aid is something that has only come about in recent days when Ukraine has shown an amazing will to resist, earning them time and admiration. What Western weapons have you seen in the almost eight years of fighting since 2014? 
 
More important than that, are we going to call the Ukrainians "proxies" for using some foreign-supplied weapons against the invasion in their own homeland, even in their own capital? One hundred percent of the weapons used by the Chinese volunteers who fought in the Korean War were supplied by the Soviet Union, and they were fighting outside Chinese territory.  Do you want to insult them by calling them “proxies?”  Do you want to give credit to the Soviets for their war efforts? And when Vietnam and Cambodia were fighting against France and the United States, they surely did not fight with weapons they manufactured themselves? During the War of Resistance, do you think all Chinese guns were “made in Hanyang?”[2] Have you heard of the "Lend-Lease" program when the Soviets fought Germany?  Are all of these "proxy wars?" 
 
Some people are also saying the U.S. and Europe were “wily” in showing their weakness to Russia, that they were “playing dead”[3] to lure Russia to take the bait. If this were the case, they would not be guilty of appeasement, but would be as clever as Zhuge Liang.[4]  But isn't this giving too much credit to the American empire? Is the entire military situation the result of Biden’s calculations? Then how do we explain the behavior of Europe and the United States a little while back, when they pulled out all the stops to try to force Zelensky to beg Putin for peace? As a last resort, Biden even begged China to intervene and persuade Putin to stop, which earned China’s smug refusal.  Are you going to insult China by claiming that they are part of the American scheme?  And why did the U.S. repeatedly sound the alarm twenty days before the war, pointing out that Putin was about to make a big move, even revealing his plan of attack, and jumping up and down in an attempt to stop Putin at the last minute? Surely the U.S. was not worried about keeping its own brilliant plan from succeeding?  Maybe they were worried that their strategy of “playing dead” would not work if they revealed Putin’s secret plans?
 
On the first day of the Russian attack, the U.S. and Europe repeatedly told Zelensky that Russia would "behead" him and offered to send him into exile, but Zelensky refused. Was the determination Zelensky and the Ukrainians displayed also part of the American and European plans? Of course, Volodin, the chairman of the Duma, said that Zelensky had already fled, and that the videos were recorded in advance and released at certain intervals. To my mind, this is unbelievable even as a rumor, because the war situation has changed rapidly over the past few days, and this would mean even before the war started, Zelensky had already thought through what videos to make and when to release them.  That makes him into a Zhuge Liang, or into some kind of god.  A better rumor would be to say that the people in the videos are all Zelensky look-alike doubles, or even super intelligent holographs, which would be a bit more convincing. 
 
Other people say that economic sanctions are powerful enough to be decisive, and that it is enough for the West to bet on this as a weapon that will bring Russia down without the West’s having to fight, so it is not appeasement. It is true that after the Crimea incident in 2014, Russia has already suffered heavy losses due to economic sanctions, and the economy has been shrinking. But the common people bear the brunt of economic losses, and whether or not—or how—this suffering can put pressure on the rulers has to do with the political system.  
 
Of course it is true that the reason why appeasement is widely practiced in fact has to do with the fact that democratic countries are more concerned about the economic loss of people's livelihood. It is clear that Germany has become a typical example of appeasement towards Russia because of economic considerations like the "Nord Stream 2" pipeline, becoming the most submissive to Putin and the weakest European power in this crisis. When people suffer due to sanctions, this puts pressure on democratic governments to seek a compromise.  This is a "high human rights vulnerability," so sanctions are undoubtedly useful in democratic countries. 
 
But when it comes to autocratic emperors who do not care about the lives of the people, sanctions do not work very well. Look at North Korea, which sanctions have reduced to starvation levels.  They are still launching nuclear missiles one after the other, so you can see how useful sanctions are. 
 
Of course, it is true that Russia's "retreat from democracy" has not yet reached North Korea's level. The anti-war marches and joint statements appearing all over Russia since the beginning of the war illustrate that Putin's war of aggression is indeed unpopular, but on the other hand, it also illustrates that, at least for now (the future is hard to say), Putin's authoritarian dictatorship has not yet reached the level of the Nazis. Under the Nazi system, there could be no anti-war movement until the fall of Berlin. To paraphrase a famous saying: under Putin's rule today, the question is how much freedom exists; under totalitarian regimes like those of Hitler and Stalin, the question is whether freedom exists at all. 
 
So sanctions work with Putin, but in a limited way.  In terms of preventing people from opposing the war even if they are hungry, Putin may not be the equal of Hitler or Kim Jong-un, but he surely has an edge on Europe and the United States. For this reason, if things get better in Ukraine, it will be the result of the resolute will of the Ukrainian people and their elected leaders to resist the enemy, and not the result of European and American sanctions, nor the result of European and American scheming, and certainly not the result of European and American appeasement. 
 
Invasion is a crime, and appeasement is a mistake. In all fairness, the Ukrainians and the West also bear some responsibility for the state of affairs between Russia and Ukraine, although certainly not in the sense that some people have senselessly insisted. I’ll talk about Ukraine later (in fact, I talked about it quite a bit above), but the West's responsibility is certainly not that of having "plotted" or "backed Russia into a corner." On the contrary, they are scared to death of Russia, and so have appeased, indulged, and tolerated Russia all along, just like Chamberlain and Daladier and their ilk back the day, and as a result, and have allowed “Emperor Putin” to back them into a corner. Ukraine has been driven to the brink of extinction, facing a fate similar to that of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Fortunately, the Ukrainians have shown themselves to be braver than the Czechs in the darkest moments of their national crisis, and no matter how many mistakes they made in the past, they now have earned the world’s respect.

Notes

[1]秦晖, “侵略和绥靖：克里米亚与苏台德的比较
——乌克兰系列之二,” published in FT Chinese (pay walled) on February 28, 2022. 

[2]Translator’s note: Qin’s reference is to the "Hanyang 88 汉阳八八式步枪" also known as the “made in Hanyang 汉阳造,”which is a Chinese-made bolt-action rifle, based on the German Gewehr 88.It was adopted by the Qing Dynasty towards the end of the 19th century and was a standard Chinese rifle, in use until the end of the Chinese Civil War. 

[3]Translator’s note:  Qin uses the expression 拖刀计/tuodaoji, literally “drag the sword strategy, “the origin of which appears to be traditional Chinese novels that describe soldiers “dragging their swords” as if they were injured or exhausted, which would lead the enemy to let his guard down, at which point the sword would come back to life.

[4]Translator’s note:  Zhuge Liang (184-234) was a Chinese statesman and military strategist during the Three Kingdoms period that followed the end of the Han dynasty, and is greatly respected for his cleverness.