“The ‘Past and Present Lives’ of Historical Nihilism”

Wang Yuhang, “The ‘Past and Present Lives’ of Historical Nihilism”[1]

Introduction and Translation by David Ownby

Introduction

The text translated here is propaganda, and is not at all the kind of thing I usually bother with.  I include it on the site because the theme of “historical nihilism” is one that we may hear a fair bit about over the next few months, as the CCP gears up to celebrate its 100-year anniversary on July 23, 2021, part of which will surely seek to reinforce the centrality of Party history to the history of modern and contemporary China.  “Historical nihilism” is a scary version of “historical revisionism,” which in some quarters is already scary enough, a phrase employed to condemn historians, scholars, anyone who dares to challenge orthodoxy, received wisdom, national myths.  Of course, for professional historians, “revisionism” is at the core of what we do—we critique and thus “revise” the record handed down to us.  Otherwise we wind up simply repeating the state-mandated textbook, which of course is what those who condemn “historical nihilism” or “historical revisionism” would prefer.  Most of the texts translated on this site are indeed examples of “historical revisionism” (few strike me as “nihilist” however), which is why they are interesting.

I don’t know who the author of this text is (strangely enough, there are more than 900 Linked-In profiles for people named Wang Yuhang), and the text is unexceptional.  It harks back to Maoist or Stalinist times, when “evil weeds” were sprouting everywhere, the fruits of malicious gardeners seeking to change the very nature of the garden.  Historical nihilism is, according to the author, a foreign invention (wouldn’t you know it), brought into China by extreme Westernizers like Hu Shi in the 1920s and 1930s.  The revolution silenced the nihilists for a time, but as China has opened up during the reform and opening period, historical nihilism has returned and its influence is now “pervasive” (无孔不入, lit. “in every corner”—classic scare talk—we might say that Wang Yuhang is “in every corner” of Linked-In).  What this cabal of nihilists wants is nothing less than to put an end the great experiment of socialist revolution and to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  We must be vigilant!  I am being sarcastic, but there is a web site in China where people can write in and report examples of “historical nihilism,” which is no laughing matter.

Since I do not read much propaganda, I don’t know if this kind of talk has always been just under the surface, or if it largely disappeared in the reform and opening period only to be revived by Xi Jinping.  It seems obvious that what I call “intellectual and ideological pluralism”—which characterizes the Chinese thought world between roughly 2000 and 2015, and to some extent even today—could be called “historical nihilism” by someone like Xi, who thinks pluralism is a bad thing, and the term is indeed used here and there in texts translated on the site.  It is also true that most of the texts on the site do not have much to say about the Party and the revolution, or at least do not talk about the Party and the revolution in the way that Xi Jinping would like them to do.  I doubt that “vigilance against historical nihilism” will turn into much of a movement—people are too busy with other things and the writings of most intellectuals are too obscure—but it could be a handy excuse for the regime to crack down on certain figures already on their radar. 

Lest we get on our high horse, this sort of thing is not unique to China.  The New York Times’s “1619 Project,” which argues that racism is the fundamental fact of American history (you should listen to the podcast—much of it is absolutely brilliant, whether you ultimately agree or not) generated a fierce backlash, not only in Donald Trump’s defense of Confederate monuments, but among respectable intellectuals like Andrew Sullivan.  Emanuel Macron similarly vowed that “France won’t take down statues or erase history.”  Nicolas Sarkozy refused to apologize for France’s colonial past.  I don’t think anyone in the U.S. or France set up a web site to encourage “snitching” on historical nihilists, but the tension between a populist conservatism and a “progressive” urge to speak truth to power exists in many places.

Translation

Gong Zizhen 龔自珍 (1792-1841), a famous intellectual from the late Qing period, once said, "To destroy a people’s country, first eliminate its history…”  History tells us that a country, a people, risks extinction once its true history is subverted and destroyed. Therefore, from time immemorial, all nations and peoples have attached great importance to their true history, and do their best to preserve their own unique history.

In modern China, however, there have been persistent if indistinct attempts to undermine and "transform" history, to stir up public sentiment and create ideological confusion. This is historical nihilism, an erroneous trend that originated abroad and is now pervasive in China.

Some experts believe that historical nihilism in China originated in the 1920s, as part of the idea of "complete Westernization."  Chen Xujing 陈序经 (1903-1967), a historian at the time, held so-called "Western culture" in high esteem, believing that it was better than China's in every way, even in terms of clothing, food, housing, and transportation. People like Hu Shi 胡适 (1891-1962) also shared this view and advocated "Westernization" as the solution for Chinese culture. However, these ideas did not correspond to the direction of China's historical development at the time, so the market for them was limited, especially after Marxism came to be widespread in China, the people's revolution was victorious, national self-esteem and self-confidence were fully stimulated, and historical nihilism fell silent. What is worth thinking about is that the long period of suppression did not bring about historical nihilism’s demise, but instead stimulated its "hidden growth."

With reform and opening, China opened its economy, and then its thought and culture, and all kinds of Western ideas began to pour into our ancient Eastern country. At the same time, economic problems began to impact the political field, ideas of bourgeois liberalization took root in this soil, and historical nihilism also took advantage of this to start to spread once again. In the 1980s, in the name of "rethinking history," some people launched an intellectual movement to correct mistakes and biases. For example, they attributed the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution to the socialist road, arguing that China should let capitalism develop to its fullest and not engage prematurely in socialism.  To give another example, they went from correcting Mao Zedong's mistakes in his later years to negating Mao Zedong thought and the Chinese revolutionary path.  Yet again, they went from attacking the backwardness of China's economic and social development to negating the entire process of Chinese civilization.  Since then, historical nihilism has not disappeared, but it has constantly changed its appearance, disguised itself and wandered about the ideological realm with great tenacity.

The growth of historical nihilism in the new era is inextricably tied to the "farewell to revolution 告别革命" argument.  Its goal, in fact, is to negate the revolution, negate the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the Chinese people and the great socialist struggle of the Chinese people under the leadership of the party. It wants to negate the leadership of the Communist Party of China, reverse the development course of modernization and reform and opening, and incorporate China into the Western capitalist system.  During this period, historical nihilism explored topics such as "playful narratives 戏说," "decoding secrets 解密," "sensational exposés 爆料," and "rethinking 反思," and used heroic figures and major historical events as fodder for discussion, making up nonsense in an effort to gain attention.

Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP in November of 2012, our Party has attached great importance to ideological work, and has clearly resisted and opposed various erroneous thought trends. Historical nihilism has begun to pull back, shifting from blatant propaganda to covert infiltration, making frequent appearances in academic research and literary performances in an extremely confusing manner, and making the Internet a new platform and camouflage for its infiltration.  If you don’t pay attention, you may fall into their trap and become passive.

General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized at the recent Party History Study and Education Mobilization Conference [on February 20, 2021] that we must take a clear-cut stand against historical nihilism, strengthen ideological guidance and theoretical analysis, and better rectify and strengthen our roots. This is the tenth time that General Secretary Xi Jinping has talked about historical nihilism since the 18th National Congress. It not only reveals the stubbornness and complexity of this erroneous thought, but also demonstrates the confidence and determination of the Party Central Committee to resist and oppose it.

Our struggle with historical nihilism may still continue for a long time, but as long as we remove the scales from our eyes and heighten our vigilance, we will be able to limit its space for survival and dissemination, and create a strong atmosphere for Party history learning and education, and the Party's one hundredth birthday.
 
Notes

[1] 王宇航, “历史虚无主义的’前世今生,’” published online on March 26, 2021.