Wu Xinbo on Blinken's Trip to China

The Observer Interview with Prof. Wu Xinbo, “Three Meetings in Two days:  How was Blinken’s trip to China?”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
The text translated here is one of a flurry of similar commentaries (for more of the same see the excellent Sinification substack)on U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China in June.  The Observer is often characterized as a “nationalistic” website, and its editorials and commentary can indeed sound such themes, but in this instance, they chose to interview Wu Xinbo (b. 1966, his C.V., in Chinese, is available here), a Professor of American Studies and Sino-American relations at Fudan University in Shanghai whose views appear to me to be more middle-of-the-road.  Wu visited the United States in June, which also gave him insights into American views of China not available to all Chinese.
 
I see little or no ideological spin on Wu’s analysis of the state of Sino-American relations; to my mind he is simply stating the facts as they are, from a Chinese point of view.  Relations are bad, but not hopeless, and they can be managed if both sides are careful and if unfortunate events do not get in the way, as they all too often do.  Prof. Wu, like many Chinese, hopes that high-level interactions between China and the U.S. can resume the more “normal” frequency and intensity of the pre-Trump era, not because he believes that Sino-American relations can return to a “normal” state, but because without these high-level interactions, there is little control over the relationship from either side, and things tend to go from bad to worse to dangerous.  Thus Wu is hopeful that Blinken’s visit will be followed by a reciprocal visit to Washington by Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang, and ultimately by another meeting between Biden and Xi at the APEC meeting in San Francisco in November.  Xi’s last visit to the United States was in 2015.

Prof. Wu is of course not a neutral observer.  He accuses the U.S. of executing a “two-handed” policy, underscores fundamental “deviations” on the Taiwan issue, and notes that the U.S. is constantly trying to “rope in” their allies to engage in “small cliques” to thwart China.  He describes American policy toward China as “containment.”  Americans reading such documents for the first time might bristle, but such language is par for the course, and what is more important in texts like Wu’s is the expression of hope that the relationship can improve.  He even notes toward the end of the interview that China has certain responsibilities moving forward, noting that “I think we need to get our economy in order domestically and play the role of a responsible power externally so that we can influence the U.S. elite and the public in a direction that will ease tensions.  This is up to us, and we cannot expect Americans to say good things about China, nor can we expect American politicians to change their attitude toward China.” 

Readers might notice that Secretary of State Blinken is referred to merely as "Blinken" throughout the interview, which, given Chinese obsession with protocol, might seem like a deliberate slight.  I might add in this context that Blinken’s full title is given in the introduction to the interview, which I did not translate, which perhaps make the omission in the interview seem a bit less harsh.   
 
Translation
 
Observer: After talks with Qin Gang and Wang Yi, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Blinken in the afternoon of the 19th. Previously, neither China nor the U.S. had confirmed this schedule.  What signal do you think this sends?
 
Wu Xinbo: First it shows that China attaches importance to Sino-U.S. relations and hopes to work with the U.S. to promote the stability and development of Sino-U.S. relations. During my recent visit to the U.S., some Americans asked whether China has basically given up on the U.S. and no longer expects anything from the U.S. I said that China is not as optimistic about U.S.-China relations as it once was, but it has not given up on U.S.-China relations either.
 
Second, that President Xi met with Blinken also showed that China is willing to actively consider the U.S. invitation that President Xi attend the coming APEC summit. This matter is not yet confirmed, but the meeting was a positive signal.
 
Observer: President Xi stated that China respects the interests of the United States and is not out to challenge or replace it. Similarly, the United States should respect China and not seek to damage its legitimate rights and interests. During the meeting, Blinken re-emphasized President Biden's commitment to the "four no's and one no intention" policy. The U.S. all along has been saying one thing and doing another, but is there a possibility of change in the future?
 
Wu Xinbo: The U.S. will continue to say one thing and do another, meaning that U.S. China policy will continue to be "two-handed," and there will be no fundamental change.
 
Consequently, while high-level interactions between China and the United States may increase moving forward, while the atmosphere may improve somewhat, and while some specific issues perhaps can even be resolved, we should not expect a major breakthrough in Sino-US relations. This is because American perceptions of China and its policy thinking toward China have not changed, and it still sees China as its main strategic competitor and still deals with China through what it calls "strategic competition," which is actually containment and suppression.
 
Observer: The Taiwan issue is the core issue in Sino-US relations. Wang Yi, a Politburo member and director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office, stressed during his meeting with Blinken that for China, there is no room for compromise or concession on this issue. What is the current U.S. perception of the Taiwan issue and how does it deviate from the Chinese perception?
 
Wu Xinbo: There is a fundamental deviation between the U.S. and China on the perception of the Taiwan issue.
 
The U.S. believes that because of the so-called "Taiwan Relations Act," they have "obligations" to Taiwan's security, and therefore "have the right" to develop relations with Taiwan, especially in terms of military cooperation. Second, the U.S. believes that Taiwan is a so-called "democratic regime" and that they should support Taiwan's "democracy," so there are also values-based considerations in U.S. relations with Taiwan.
 
China's views on the Taiwan issue are poles apart. We believe that the Taiwan issue is an internal Chinese issue, involving China's core interests such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, and has to do with national reunification.

Observer:  On the 18th, the U.S.-China Foreign Ministers' meeting lasted for five and a half hours. From the official press release released by both sides after the meeting, how do you think the talks went overall? What was the most important outcome or consensus reached by the two sides?
 
Wu Xinbo: From a diplomatic perspective, the talks have been very long. The key thing is that the description of the talks by both sides is basically consistent: China described them as "frank, in-depth and constructive," and the U.S. used the same language.
 
This illustrates that the two sides put forward their ideas and concerns, discussed some issues in depth, and reached some results in the talks. To be more specific, I believe that the main results are the following:
 
First, both sides agreed to jointly implement the important consensus reached at the Bali meeting between the two heads of state, aiming to effectively manage differences, and to promote dialogue, exchange, and cooperation. This means that in the next phase, high-level interactions between China and the United States will be more frequent, and the visits of the U.S. Treasury Secretary and Commerce Secretary to China could happen in the near future.
 
Second, the U.S. invited Foreign Minister Qin Gang to visit the United States. If this return visit can be materialized in the next few months, it will mean that China and the U.S. are expecting to take high-level interactions to a higher level.
 
Third, results have been achieved in a number of specific areas, particularly in cultural and educational exchanges, including increased passenger flights and visas between the U.S. and China, and the two sides will move forward in these directions.
 
Fourth, the U.S. and China will restart or restore some mechanisms enabling work-level dialogue.
 
Observer: As you suggested, moving forward, high-level interactions between China and the U.S. should be more frequent. Prior to that, what will the state of high-level interaction between China and the U.S. be?
 
Wu Xinbo: High-level interaction between China and the U.S. was interrupted during the Trump era. When the Biden administration came to power, there were some high-level interactions between China and the United States, but they were relatively few and basically not regular. In the more than two years of the Biden administration, only the Chinese commerce minister has visited the United States – a five-hour visit to Washington, which is quite brief.   In other words, in the years between the Trump break in high-level contacts and this Blinken visit, high-level contacts between China and the United States have not truly resumed, nor have they been normalized. I hope there will be regular high-level contacts between China and the United States going forward.
 
Observer: What is the function of maintaining regular high-level contacts between China and the United States?
 
Wu Xinbo: Such contacts serve two purposes:
 
First, high-level contacts indicate that the relationship between the two countries is in a normal state of operation. It means that, in addition to trade, there is interaction at the governmental level.  If such interactions stop, the relationship is no longer normal.
 
Second, high-level engagement can push forward the resolution of specific issues and cooperation in specific areas. For example, if the ministers of commerce and transportation of the two sides hold talks, we can always expect some concrete results.
 
Observer: I noticed that during the meeting, when Blinken invited Qin Gang to visit the United States, Qin answered that he would be glad to visit the U.S. at a mutually convenient moment. What do you make of this answer and when will it be "mutually convenient?”
 
Wu Xinbo: This illustrates that China has accepted the invitation in principle but has not decided on a precise date. The timing of China's visit to the U.S. is linked to China's assessment of the next phase in U.S.-China relations and to some basic considerations as to how to handle this phase.   Currently, the U.S. has the APEC summit in November in mind, and if Minister Qin Gang visits the U.S. within the next two to three months, then China and the U.S. may have higher-level interactions at the APEC summit in San Francisco in November, such as a meeting between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state.
 
Observer: Blinken's visit to China comes on the heels of a series of visits to China by executives from U.S. companies, including Elon Musk and Bill Gates, who met with senior Chinese officials. What does the recent spate of visits to China by many prominent U.S. businesspeople mean?
 
Wu Xinbo: There are two reasons why U.S. executives have been flocking to China:
 
One is that they have not been to China for three years because of the pandemic, so now they want to visit China as soon as possible to get a sense of the situation on the ground, because many reports in the U.S. media on China are negative and even misleading.
 
The second is because they themselves have great expectations for further development and expansion of their economic and trade activities in China. By visiting China, they assess the situation and get first-hand information for their coming business decisions.
 
Observer: During your recent visit to the U.S., did you get a sense of what the U.S. business community is thinking? How do they view the current U.S.-China relationship and U.S. policy toward China?
 
Wu Xinbo: When I was in Washington, I met with Craig Allen, president of the National Committee for U.S.-China Trade, who has also visited China recently. I think that American businesspeople are very dissatisfied with the current state of U.S.-China relations and are extremely dissatisfied with the delay in improving bilateral relations, especially the failure to normalize economic and trade relations, which has dragged on for more than two years under the Biden administration.
 
They expect a certain improvement in the bilateral relationship between China and the U.S., especially in the development of bilateral trade relations. At the moment, they have received some positive signals from both governments, and they also hope to promote the process of improving Sino-U.S. relations and normalizing economic and trade relations from the perspective of the business sector.
 
Observer: It took four months for Blinken's trip to China to finally come to fruition. Prior to the trip, the U.S. State Department held a press conference to promote the visit in a high-profile manner, appearing to attach great importance to it, while at the same time saying that it did not expect many results. How do you evaluate the American approach here?
 
Wu Xinbo: The signal the U.S. was sending was quite realistic. The fact that Blinken’s visit finally materialized despite the many twists and turns was no easy matter and represents an important juncture in the high-level interactions between China and the United States.
 
At the same time, early in the process of working with China to prepare for the meeting, the U.S. also realized that it was not realistic to expect that this meeting would achieve many results. In terms of China policy, the U.S. also did not make substantive positive adjustments, and it was not possible for the U.S. to honor all of the requests that the China made to the U.S.
 
In terms of the reality of U.S.-China relations, the previous interactions between the two sides had not created the conditions necessary for this visit to produce results, so Blinken's visit to China is just an opening to the next phase of U.S.-China interactions.
 
Observer: On the eve of Blinken's visit to China, U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jake Sullivan visited Japan, where he participated in a trilateral meeting of American-Japanese-South Korean national security advisers, as well as the first trilateral meeting of American-Japanese-Filipino national security advisers. Both of these meetings focused on China, dealing with the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. Was this a coincidence, or a deliberate diplomatic maneuver by the Biden administration to organize a small clique at China's doorstep?
 
Wu Xinbo: U.S. policy toward China has always been "two-handed:" on the one hand there is the containment and suppression of China, which includes roping in allies and creating cliques, none of which has stopped; on the other hand, the U.S. has indicated that it wants to strengthen contact and communication with China and explore potential areas of cooperation.
 
So we should not be surprised by such American actions, it’s just that in the last couple of years the U.S. has focused too much of its energy on roping in allies, engaging in small cliques, and suppressing China, and has neglected communication and dialogue with China. Now, on the one hand, the U.S. has sent Blinken to China to strengthen communication, and on the other hand, Sullivan went to allied countries and continued efforts to rope them in to counter China.
 
By choosing this moment for Sullivan to go to Japan and engage in the trilateral dialogues, the U.S. was actually appeasing its allies, because these allies may also be worried that once the U.S.-China relationship heats up, the U.S. may well leave them behind.
 
Observer: There have been recent changes in the U.S. administration's China team, with the departure of the State Department's top official for China affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rick Waters at the end of June, and the announcement of Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman's retirement. Laura Rosenberger, senior director for China and Taiwan at the White House National Security Council, also stepped down earlier this year and became chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. What signals are these changes sending?
 
Wu Xinbo: Overall, I don’t think these changes represent any change in the Biden administration's policy toward China. Some of the changes are for personal reasons, not policy reasons, and some may have some policy-level considerations.
 
Based on what I learned during my visit to the United States, the fact that Rosenberger became head of the AIT may mean that, moving forward, the US wants to increase her authority in her dealings with Taiwan.
 
The previous AIT chairman, James F. Moriarty, had served on the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration and had been out of office for many years. When he became head of the AIT, he lacked authority in dealing with Taiwan because of the weakness of his official background. This is not the case with Rosenberger, who has just moved from her White House post, and Taiwan will pay more attention to take the signals she sends out.
 
Sherman retired for personal health reasons, and Waters left for family reasons.
 
Observer: According to the observations you made on your recent visit to the U.S., how does American society currently view China?
 
Wu Xinbo: I think the overall American view of China is very negative. There are three reasons for this:
 
First, since the Trump era, U.S. political figures have constantly attacked and demonized China, which sends very negative signals to society.
 
Second, certain U.S. Congressman have built their brand on their anti-China stance, and are constantly promoting various anti-China agendas, and behavior like has also worsened the atmosphere regarding American views of China.
 
Third, some U.S. mainstream media reports on China are full of bias and distortion, which means that the U.S. public receives very negative information about China. Objectively speaking, during the three years of the pandemic, Americans could not come to China see the true situation for themselves. The pandemic itself also led to a negative perception of China by the American public.
 
Observer: According to what you saw in the U.S., what aspects are Americans most concerned about?
 
Wu Xinbo: I think the U.S. is very concerned about China's own development and the direction of its internal and external policies. For example, how China's economy has recovered after the pandemic, and whether China's open-door policy will continue.
.
The U.S. is also concerned about China's foreign policy. The U.S. now clearly feels that Chinese diplomacy is becoming more and more active and has seen some positive changes in Chinese diplomacy, such as the recent promotion of the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the fact that China is now promoting a process leading to the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
 
So I think we need to get our economy in order domestically and play the role of a responsible power externally so that we can influence the U.S. elite and the public in a direction that will ease tensions.  This is up to us, and we cannot expect Americans to say good things about China, nor can we expect American politicians to change their attitude toward China.
 
Observer: With the U.S. elections coming up in 2024, does this mean that the "window of opportunity" for improving U.S.-China relations is closing? What is your outlook for China-U.S. relations moving forward?
 
Wu Xinbo: Over the next two years, we should view Sino-U.S. relations in two stages.
 
The first stage is that leading up to the APEC summit in November. We will need to see whether high-level interaction between the U.S. and China increases in this phase, how far the two sides can develop cooperation in some specific areas, and whether the meeting between the two heads of state in November can indeed be realized.
 
The second phase is from November of this year through November 2024. During this year, American electoral politics will basically dominate Sino-U.S. relations, and the overall impact will be negative. During American elections, candidates make anti-Chinese attacks in order to score political points, so in this phase, the key is on how much negative impact the election will have on U.S.-China relations.
 
Notes

[1]观察者, “2天3场会见，布林肯来华谈的怎么样？” published online on The Observer platform on June 19, 2023.