Xu Jilin, et. al., "Black Lives Matter"

Xu Jilin, Liu Qing, Bai Tongdong, and Wu Guanjun Reflect on “Black Lives Matter”[1]

Introduction and Translation by David Ownby

Introduction

The text translated below is a transcription of remarks delivered in the context of an “online dialogue” organized by East China Normal University in Shanghai and diffused on June 22, 2020.  The subject addressed is the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States in the wake of the death of George Floyd. The instance responsible for organizing the dialogue was the East China Normal University-University of British Columbia Joint Center for the Study of Modern China and the World, and the Professor hosting the dialogue was Xu Jilin (b. 1957) Professor of History at ECNU and a prominent public intellectual in China (several translations of his work are available on this site). 

Other participants included:  Liu Qing (b. 1963), Professor of Political Science at ECNU and a leading liberal voice in China; Bao Tongdong (b. 1970), Professor of Philosophy at Fudan University, often identified as a New Confucian; and Wu Guanjun (b. 1977), also Professor of Political Science at ECNU, a prolific young scholar perhaps representing a new generation of public intellectuals (see for example his The Great Dragon Fantasy:  A Lacanian Analysis of Contemporary Chinese Thought (World Scientific, 2014) in English).  As Xu Jilin notes, all three participants have studied and/or taught for extended periods abroad—Liu and Bai in the United States, Wu in Australia—which lends them a certain credibility even if their academic work focuses more on China—or on the world of contemporary thought—and less on events in the contemporary United States.

The exchange is an update of a piece Xu Jilin wrote some time ago after the events that transpired in Charlottesville in August of 2017 (translated here), and is framed by a very similar set of questions:  “How correct is political correctness?” “Identity politics and anti-racism movements,” and “The coming election in America and Black Lives Matter.”  When I read Xu Jilin’s original text, I was struck by its essential conservatism (from an American perspective):  Xu questioned the political wisdom of identity politics, as it weakens the common consensus that binds any body politic together, and groused about political correctness and “white liberals” in a way that made me think of David Brooks, the New York Times columnist (of course, no one says “white liberals” in the United States—it is a Chinese appropriation of anti-political correctness discourse in which Western liberals become the object of derision).  The message I took from Xu’s piece was that the American left should be careful, because its tactics were endangering the foundations of American democracy.

The online dialogue translated here represents an update and expansion of Xu’s original text.  Liu and Wu are somewhat to the left of Xu (again in American terms), so we get a broader discussion of the progressive movement in the United States, but despite their sympathy for Black Lives Matter, all participants remain concerned about the tactics employed by BLM and other parts of the left—again, both identity politics and political correctness are singled out for their “divisiveness.”  The ready acceptance of an anti-political correctness stance by the part of all members of the discussion prompted Lin Yao, a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University to voice his objections in the companion piece also published this week on the site , a brilliant analysis of what political correctness and anti-political correctness really are:  rhetorical moves to pull the rug out from under your opponent and change the subject.

For me, working through the online dialogue inspired two basic reflections.  First, I was once again struck by how knowledgeable these Chinese intellectuals are about the United States.  Again, none of them focuses on the US in their research, none of them is attached to a research center that works on the US.  Their level of interest and mastery of detail are testimony to how important the US remains to Chinese intellectual life (especially but not exclusively liberal intellectuals). 

My second reflection is more complex.  There is something more than a little off-putting about Han Chinese intellectuals warning Black Lives Matter activists about identity politics because they are putting the Anglo-Saxon heritage of the United States in peril.  The same Han Chinese intellectuals who, to my knowledge, say little about cultural politics and the politics of culture in China, at least in ways that engage Han Chinese racism or government “minority policy.”  Of course, it is not the intellectuals’ fault that they can engage in sophisticated discussions about American society pretty much at will, but that remarks about Xinjiang or Tibet will be immediately censored.  But could they not make a subtle nod to signal that they realize the irony of the situation? Perhaps Liu Qing’s and Bai Tongdong’s suggestions that a little political correctness might do China good are in fact just such nods.

Which of course probes the question:  why are Chinese intellectuals talking about Black Lives Matter?  My guess is that it is because the movement received considerable coverage in China, sparking a good deal of online discussion, most of which either condemned US racism or the violence of the protest movement (not without a certain schadenfreude).  I suspect that Xu and co. are responding to the anti-Americanism of many of these discussions and defending a democratic model which has been at the heart of their reflections for some time.  In so doing, they cannot but help to reveal how they understand that model:  as a consensus model built on Anglo-Saxon culture where the majority rules and the minorities tinker with the model at everyone’s peril.  E pluribus unum, yes, but not at the price of unum.
 
Translation

How Correct is Political Correctness?

Xu Jilin :  The three professors we have invited to speak today have all studied abroad, either in the US or in Australia, and have lengthy experiences of studying and teaching there, but in their positions on the political landscape, there are subtle differences between them that are difficult for outsiders to perceive.  Our discussion tonight will be divided into three themes, and we will first address the question of whether American “political correctness” is in fact correct.

Bai Tongdong:  Good evening everyone.  One of professor Xu’s goals in choosing the professors for this discussion was to hope to contrast different viewpoints.  I “accepted the command” of representing America’s right wing, the conservative viewpoint.  And in fact it is true that I am greatly opposed to “white liberals.”  As for political correctness, when I was studying and teaching in America I did indeed find it excessive.

But before we start to discuss this question, I would like make clear that, in relation to “political correctness” I simply cannot accept the discourse of “political error” that we find in the Chinese world.  Although I personally oppose viewpoints associated with the radical left, I nonetheless believe that in the US, both the radical left and the moderate right possess a common baseline, which is a fundamental recognition of the need to respect minorities and disadvantaged groups, as well as social equality and justice.  In China we find some opinions that go against that baseline.  My feeling is that in our discussion we must understand the existence of this baseline, and that expressions of racism or of gender discrimination violate that baseline and should be prohibited.  Should we not be able to respect this baseline, then we are in no position to criticize political correctness or white liberals.

Liu Qing:  Professor Bai just made a very important point, which I would like to emphasize.  Although I have no social science survey data to prove it, my impression, obtained through everyday life experience, is that in China we are not sensitive enough to the need to “respect others.”  Discrimination against women, against disadvantaged groups, against minorities or even against simple “outsiders”—both in terms of overt and hidden discrimination—remains fairly widespread.  To my mind, this sensitivity is basic to civilization, and should become a common baseline respected by all.  In the past few years, appeals to and discussions of such ideas have become quite animated, but in practice we remain at some distance of achieving the norm of equality and respect, and I feel that we should all continue working in this direction.

Back to the question of political correctness in the West.  The origin of this expression goes back some forty years, and at the outset was a sarcastic term, used in leftist circles, to make fun of fellow travelers who were too dogmatic in their defense of “leftist orthodoxy.”  The right wing took over the term in the late 20th century, and used it to criticize the left's attempts at normative coercion in the public sphere.  Later on the term took on a variety of meanings, but it has always been somewhat pejorative and sarcastic.

Behind the debate about political correctness in the West (and especially in the US) are aspects of the “culture wars.”  Many of the ideas and terms labelled politically correct are thoroughly progressive causes, demanding that people treat particular groups and lifestyles that suffer discrimination with greater sensitivity and respect, and that they give greater consideration to changing the historical legacy of stereotypes and discrimination that still exist in the present day, all of which has led to new cultural attitudes.  I believe that such demands are in principle consistent with modern notions of freedom, equality, and respect, and signal the progress achieved in Western society since the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

On the other hand, however, the controversy over political correctness has intensified in recent years in relation to the appropriateness and proportionality of the way in which the ideal of equal respect is put into practice, and the balance between it and other legitimate and reasonable claims, as we see in discussions of the principle of freedom of expression, and attitudes towards history. On such questions, divisions have arisen even among liberals who support progressive causes.  For example, in the past few years, in some Southern cities in America, we have seen debates concerning the monuments to Robert E. Lee and other Confederate generals.  Those who support removing these monuments have their reasons, arguing that Lee’s statue represents the opposing side in the Civil War, and symbolizes the power of slaveholders, and as long as the statues remain on display they will continue to remind African-Americans of the humiliation of slavery.

But there are many liberals and leftists who want to preserve these statues and historical monuments, such as Andrew Young, Martin Luther King’s comrade in arms and human rights leader.  They have different reasons, some harboring concerns that these debates will divide the people and thus hurt the progressive movement.  Others argue that historical facts should be respected, which means preserving these historical monuments, while at the same time adding new, critical explanations.  Simply getting rid of them will wipe away historical memories, leaving the false impression that the tragedies in question never occurred. 

Yet it is hard to arrive at a consensus on these questions, because somebody can ask whether even Hitler’s statues can be preserved as long as we add a new explanation. Others wonder if removing Robert E. Lee’s statue means that statues of Washington, Jefferson, and other founding fathers would have be removed as well, since they were slaveholders just as Lee was.  All of this involves the logic trap of the “slippery slope.”  Still, knowing that there is a slippery slope problem does not help to identify the right place to stop.  This is not an easy problem to solve.  Princeton University decided to change the name of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and National Affairs, removing the name of the former president because of his racist views.  Is this going too far?  Some people are proposing that Yale University change its name, because the founder, Elihu Yale (1649-1721) was a slave-trader. On the face of it this seems crazy, but who can guarantee it won’t happen?

Similar things have happened in the Me Too movement that started a couple of years ago, when the work of artists accused of sexual assault or harassment has been censured.  For example, the actor Kevin Spacey was accused of sexual assault, and his part in a movie he just finished filming was reshot with a different actor, and his previous work has been "put on ice."  Another example is the director Woody Allen, whose alleged sexual assault also led to boycotts of his work.

All of this raises a question:  using today’s progressive standards, most public figures and artists of the past, as well as their actions and their artwork, will surely be open to suspicions of being “politically incorrect,” leading to accusations of male chauvinism, racism, white supremacy, Eurocentrism, chauvinism, and religious or class oppression.  Does that mean we have to clean up all of the history of humankind, getting rid of this “filth and impurity” until it is “clean” enough for us to accept it?  Then will be able to tell humanity’s “story”? 

In my view, social movements against discrimination and prejudice embody moral ideals of justice.  Yet extreme moralism can also produce its opposite, and turn into a new kind of fanaticism, arbitrariness, and hypocrisy that eventually leads to political defeat.  This is a profound lesson that history—and particularly 20th century history—has left to the people, a lesson that bears remembering even today.

Xu Jilin:  The original point of political correctness was to protect the collective rights of minority groups and the cultural particularities of marginal groups, appropriately limiting the freedom of speech of majority groups and mainstream culture, so that different ethnicities, different religions, and different cultures would accept one another and coexist.  Yet there have been disputes about political correctness from the very beginning, and it is a principle upheld particularly by white liberals and Americans of non-European heritage.  In the past few years, political correctness has not only taken on current reality, but has started to go back through American history of the basis of the same principles, completely reversing the traditional historical narrative. 

In the early history of the United States, a number of founding fathers like Washington and Jefferson were important slaveholders, and thus part of the tradition of slavery.  Some white liberals want to carry out "transformative justice" by presenting the characters of such figures as they really were, reevaluating early American history, and even proposing the removal of statues of historical figures who defended the interests of slave owners.  Political correctness was originally a mediation of the battle of the various gods of a secular, pluralistic society, designed to prevent cultural conflicts that erupt over discriminatory language.  But now because of the coercive tactics the movement employs, they have moved from maintaining social order to purging history, and for this reason have provoked even deeper racial and ethnic conflicts. 

Is political correctness itself correct?  This has to do with an even deeper question:  What is America?  Throughout history, Europe has been a Christian world, and the modern civilization that grew out of Christianity became the basis of nation-building in Europe and America.  America was once proud of being a “cultural melting pot,” and no matter the nationality of the immigrants, no matter what their cultural background was, once they arrived in the US they would accept the more advanced, more civilized American and European values.  Yet in the wake of the 1960s, cultural pluralism swept over Europe and the US, becoming mainstream, and the theory of the “melting pot” was rejected as being “politically incorrect.”  America was no longer Anglo-Saxon America, but rather a common abode for people of different ethnicities, religions and cultures. 

But the decline in American and European values led cultural conservatives to despair.  In his Who are We?  The Challenge to American Identity, the political scientist Samuel T. Huntington (1927-2008) bemoaned the fact that there were no longer any Americans to be found in this great land!—by which he meant Americans with the Anglo-Saxon spirit.  In his view, multiculturalism was eating away at America’s soul, obscuring America’s national identity.  America would soon no longer be America, and following wave after way of invasion by “foreign religions,” American would inevitably go the way of Rome, disappearing after having lost its distinctive spirit. 

In Huntington’s view, the clash of civilizations did not only happen internationally; its roots were found within American society as well.  In the clash between Christianity and other axial civilizations, the invasion of the “barbarians” would change not only the American population structure, but also America’s very soul.  Huntington has died, but his warning call still resonates.  Trump is in fact merely a populist, vulgar version of Huntington.
 
Wu Guanjun:  After listening to Professors Bai and Liu talk about common “baselines,” the word “situation” comes to mind.  The word was used by the French philosophers Guy Debord (1931-1994) and Alain Badiou (b. 1937), and my friend Lan Jiang translates it into Chinese as qingshi 情势.[2] We can use analysis and reason to discuss the idea, as we are doing at the moment.  However, on the other side of the Pacific they are in a completely different situation, because George Floyd was killed by the police.  This is not a "debate" that proceeds through reason, but a revolt provoked by events in Badiou's sense of the word.  In this situation, the public sphere is failing – at this moment in the US there is no space for calm, reasoned discussion of the issues, and a "common baseline" simply cannot emerge.  The connotation of the word “matter” in “Black Lives Matter” is very clear.  It speaks of urgency, the attitude of a showdown, the idea that I will not accept any option other than addressing these issues on my terms.  In the United States today, given Floyd’s dying words, "I can't breathe," the phase of dispassionate "reasoning with facts" has passed, and the two sides are already ready to fight.

Moreover, in the present situation, both opposing sides feel that they are the victim [literally that they are “in an ice cellar” 身处冰窖], and “can’t breathe.”  One side cannot breathe because of the coercion of political correctness, when even using a cream to “whiten” your skin is evidence of racism, and the other side asks “where is the pressure to be politically correct?” in a reality where is it abundantly clear that Black lives count for nothing, that Blacks “cannot breathe.”  Both of these logics are all-encompassing, and both make sense in their own terms, so that direct dialogue is impossible.  The first exists at the level of discourse, but the second has deep roots in the current situation.  It is true that at the level of discourse, political correctness can be oppressive, creating a situation where many people dare not speak. 

Yet at the level of practice, even Trump has admitted the existence of “systemic racism” in the United States, and Blacks feel unsafe.  In an existential sense, both feelings have truth value.  “Angst" is a word used by existentialists to describe situations where, in daily life, you cannot even brush your teeth or put on makeup, where you could well be killed going to the convenience store to buy groceries.

What has impressed me most has been the Daily Show host Trevor Noah, who has consistently held a liberal left-wing position, but this time his remarks sparked a lot of controversy.  As a Black host, he questioned why people would find the looting and violence that came out after Floyd’s death unacceptable. In his view, society is a contract, but the police, who are meant to uphold the law, instead took the first step in breaking the contract, so why should the Black lives that are not respected abide by it?  Reacting to this event, Noah changed his stance from liberal left to radical left.  Hosts like him no longer want to serve the role of social healer. 

In today’s America, being a "centrist" who is both outraged at the murder of ordinary Black citizens and also finds political correctness frightening is actually quite awkward.  At this moment of division, when both sides are already fighting mad, neither side has an empathetic understanding of the other.  It’s easy to say that solidarity is important to a country, but BLM activists might well answer:  What do we base this solidarity on?  Liberal discourse is nothing but fake universalism.  This is why the movement’s slogan is “Black lives matter” and not “all lives matter.”

Liu Qing:  I believe that Blacks continue to suffer widespread systemic discrimination.  In a recent lecture, Lin Yao, a Ph.D. student in Political Science at Yale University, shed considerable light on the issue of discrimination against Blacks in the American judicial system.  The specific trigger for the current movement is police brutality resulting in the deaths of unarmed suspects.  The movement is clearly concerned with racism, because the object of the protest is not all police violence, but instead is specifically directed at police officers who use excessive force or shoot people because of prejudice against Blacks.  Is the premise behind the protest and the demands valid?  Is it supported by clear, undeniable evidence?  It’s hard to say. 

A couple of years ago I started to follow a Black public intellectual named Coleman Hughes.  He is very young, and only this year graduated from Yale with a B.A. in Philosophy, but he is already a columnist and a podcast host who has attracted a lot of attention.  He has always supported the Democratic Party, and in the past participated in in BLM activities, but later on changed his stance, and while he still votes Democratic, his standpoint is somewhat unclear.  He recently published an article entitled “Stories and Data:  Reflections on Race, Riots, and Police,” where he points out that while indiscriminate killing by law enforcement exists, and must be condemned and punished, such indiscriminate killing is not solely directed at Black people, and in fact, for every Black person killed through police violence, at least one white person—if not more—has suffered the same fate. 

A tragedy very much like that of Floyd’s death happened in 2106.  A white male named Tony Timpa was forced to the ground under the knee of a Dallas police officer for 13 minutes, all the while crying heedlessly for help, until he finally choked to death.  People took videos of the whole thing and put it on the Internet.  Criminal charges were filed against the officers, but were later dropped.  His was an equally tragic fate, but because the victim was white, it did not result in a great wave of protest, and remained merely a local event.

In his article, Hughes points out that Blacks are the victims in 35% of cases when police brutality against unarmed suspects results in death.  Can this prove that indiscriminate killings by police are evidence of systemic prejudice?  Some people say that this clear proof, because the Black percentage of the population is only 14%, while they make up 35% of the victim of indiscriminate deaths, which would appear to be clear evidence.  But Hughes argues that this is not scientific proof.  Using the same logic, the percentage of men who are the victims of indiscriminate killings is 93%, while men only make up half of the overall population. So can we use this number to prove that there is a systematic gender bias in indiscriminate police killings?  No. 

Therefore, making such judgements requires serious social science research and analysis, including complex "control variables " to discern whether or not the race of the victim is influencing the outcome.  His article cited four research reports, none of which had found that race was a clear factor in the cases in question.  Among these reports, that of the Harvard scholar Roland Fryer was the object of suspicions, but Fryer published his answers to the questions, refuting their claims.  In any event, the question of whether indiscriminate killing by excessive police enforcement is racially biased as yet has no definitive conclusion based on scientific research. 

As a result, Hughes made a challenging point:  A "story" that has not yet been sufficiently substantiated, but which has been confidently accepted as "fact" by many, widely circulates through social media, and has become the premise of the BLM movement's protests.  He argues that the United States could have launched a protest movement against indiscriminate police killings in general, but because of this unreliable assumption, the movement has come to be overly racialized and thus exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions. 
 
Wu Guanjun:  I want to pick up on what Prof. Liu said and talk about stereotypes in racial questions.  An expert in American cognitive psychology did a study that had people compare how threatening Blacks and whites are.  One of the results was that even Black people see other Black people as more threatening.  Thus when the police deal with Black people, such stereotypes may will lead them to engage in life-threatening behavior very quickly, while the same thing may not occur when they are dealing with white people.

Liu Qing:  There is one point that I would like to clarify.  I think that systemic racism remains widespread in the United States, but the specific dimensions and expression of this racism are complex.  For example, in an interview, Hughes pointed out that Americans of African- and Latino-American descent are more likely to be questioned and searched than whites.  There is clearer research support for this, and it clearly indicates the existence of racism.  It’s just that there is no similar proof in the matter of indiscriminate killings.  Yet the slogans of BLM are based on the assumption that the police do not care about Black lives, an assumption that may not be as reliable as those participating in the movement think it is.  There is also considerable data to suggest that the situation of Blacks is improving in some areas. 

In his article, Hughes cites research data indicating that the incarceration rate for black 18-29 year olds in the United States has dropped by half since 2001.  The point he wants to stress is that it is still possible to make progress through institutional, democratic means, and that such progress continues to occur.

Bai Tongdong:  I would like to talk about the debate about Robert E. Lee.  I have great respect for General Lee, who was a gentleman, a noble man, and a model.  Yet we should also understand the perception that many people have of the statue, and the symbol the statue represents.  Many of these Southern statues were erected after the defeat of the Confederacy, and symbolize Southern support for the slave system rather than the historical figure of General Lee.  In addition, regarding what Prof. Wu said about the divisions in American society, I want to point out that most Americans support the protests involved in this movement (although there has been considerable violence and looting), feeling that the Trump government has handled the situation badly and that the question of racism is serious.  Even if I am not optimistic that these problems will be resolved, it may well be that America is experiencing a general, genuine “turn to the left” on the question of racism.

Identity Politics and Anti-Racism Movements

Xu Jilin:  Following the direction of the remarks by the three speakers, I would like to move the discussion toward the next topic.  In the face of the same objective "fact" that a white police officer "choked" a black man to death, the "truth" understood by people of different generations will not be the same. 

In the 19th century, "universal intellectuals" like Émile Zola (1840-1902) would have said that this was an affront to human life and dignity.  In the 20th century, Marxists would have seen it as the oppression of the proletarian underclass by the running dogs of the bourgeoisie.  In the 21st century, “white liberals” see the problem as one of whites bullying Blacks.  These three centuries have witnessed a change in discourse from "civic politics" to "class politics" and finally to "identity politics." 

In the 19th century, because of the influence of the Enlightenment, everyone was searching for universal “citizen rights.”  The reason that the mistreatment of Blacks was unjust was because their legitimate rights as “universal people” had been denied.  In the 20th century, Marxism came to have an impact on the entire world, and the same kind of unjust behavior came to be seen as class oppression by the bourgeoisie of the proletariat and the people in general.  At the end of the 20th century, with the end of the Cold War and the fading of ideology, class politics and citizen politics as general constructs also gradually faded away, social protest movements lost the perspective of a shared political utopia, and universalist left-wing movement began to divide, turning into an identity politics that stresses various cultural identities:  feminism, gay liberation, racial equality, etc. 

The American sociologist Michael Hechter has pointed out that the political core of the democratic system is grounded in the search for voters in the middle, that the interests of minorities are always far from those of the middle groups, and that when political power ignores their political positions and interests, these minorities try to seek their political rights and interests under the slogan of cultural pluralism.  In essence, identity politics are rights politics in which disadvantaged groups seek to enjoy the same rights as those of mainstream groups.  Thus we see people of color, women, and the intellectually disabled pursuing their rights.  At present, in both in the United States and Europe, identity politics has become an overpowering political movement.  If we analyze political correctness, we will discover that behind its emergence lies the shift from the politics of citizenry to the culture of identity politics.  Thus I would like to ask the three speakers how they view identity politics and its relationship to the current movement.

Liu Qing:  In my view, there are two different ideas here—universalism and particularism.  Protests against racism can appeal to universalist principles in terms of rights, but they can also appeal to the particular identities and experiences of particular ethnic groups and fight on the basis of the principles of particularism.  This latter case is that of identity politics. 

In America, there is a black conservatism, with its own politics, intellectual circles, and traditions, a representative figure of which is the Stanford economist Thomas Sowell (b. 1930).  He has often criticized the contemporary left, arguing that they are betraying the tradition of Martin Luther King.  In Sowell’s view, the movement King led was based on the position of universal rights, and its aim was to arrive at a society where no one would be judged on the color of his skin.  Two years ago, Sowell published a tweet in which he said that “If you believe that everyone should respect the same principles and be judged according to the same standards, then the label that would have been attached to you sixty years ago was ‘radical,’ thirty years ago it was ‘liberal,’ and now it’s ‘racist,’” suggesting that if Martin Luther King were alive today he might be branded a racist.  We can argue about whether Sowell is right or not, but he has put his finger on genuine changes in ideas over time. 

In the 1960s, Dr. King appealed to a universalism that everyone at least claimed to accept, a position which put “discursive pressure” on the dominant whites.  However, if the demands of the movement are formulated in terms of a particular group identity, such claims to particularity, especially if exaggerated, may be hard for others to understand and produce unfortunate consequences.   While such claims might increase intimacy and unity within the group, it also might lose part of the strength that comes from outside alliances. 
 
However, I don’t consider that universalism and particularism are necessarily in conflict; particularism should be a means to achieving the principle of universality.  For example, what would happen if people in favor of equal respect adopted a "color-blind" strategy?  In terms of form, it looks fair, but it would be a very strange strategy, because when I say “I can’t see the color of your skin,” what I’m really saying is that I am pretending not to see the color of your skin.  If we want to pursue Dr. King’s dream of the ideal society where skin color no longer matters, we would have to admit that we had seen the other’s skin color, had thought about our complex reaction to that skin color, and only then could we perhaps overcome the prejudice and discrimination contained in that reaction.  Only after going through this kind of process could we approach the goal of equality for all.  Thus identity politics has meaning, but that meaning is as a means or a tool in service of progressivism, and not in and of itself.
 
But radical identity politics may go even further, arguing that the historical memory and bitter experience of particular identities produces legitimate claims that cannot be accommodated by universal human rights principles and that are incomprehensible to outsiders.  In the current moment, identity politics is not only a tool, but is a goal in and of itself.  These sorts of claims may have a basis in theory, but can be dangerous in political practice, because they can absolutize conflict and make conflict perpetual. 

My viewpoint is that of an “old leftist,” as the English historian Eric Hobsbawm pointed out in a talk in 1996:  “The political program of the left is universalist.   It is for everyone ... The social and political movements of the left-wing masses are indeed a kind of alliance or group alliance, but what unites them is not the particular goals of the group, but a grand and universal cause, through which each group believes its particular goals will be achieved:  democracy, republicanism, socialism, communism, or whatever the goal might be.” 

At present, radical identity politics in American is not only a strategy and a tool, but seems to have become the goal itself.  This leads us to speculate on two future questions:  one is the current state of oppositional politics, and the other is how to deal with pluralism within a group.  A person’s identity is not singular, but rather plural, which is problematic in both theoretical and practical terms.  In terms of the effectiveness of political practice, if an identity politics overstresses its particularity, other people have a hard time understanding, which means that rational dialogue is useless.  As a result, only force or violence work, and in that case it is of course the dominant, advantaged group that has more “power,” which means that when push comes to shove they can suppress the weaker group.  When a protest movement can only shout slogans and rejects dialogue and reasoning, the protestors ironically wind up in a losing position.  I think this is why Martin Luther King valued the power of reason and called for a non-violent movement.

Now there are researchers who look back on the history of the civil rights movement and argue that it was the combination of violent protest, like that advocated by Malcolm X, together with King’s non-violent movement, that finally resulted in the historical progress of the 1960s.  There is historical evidence for this, but in any event, if progressivism turns its back on the principles of Martin Luther King or the spirit of Nelson Mandela, it will not only be suspect on moral grounds, but will be threatened on practical grounds as well. 

Wu Guanjun:  As political discourse, identity politics is not leftist, and in philosophical terms it is not post-structuralist.  First, it deals with identity in an essentialist manner, so that when you construct your identity, no matter whether you are Black, or a woman, or a member of the working class, your identity can only be an essentialized version of that fact.  If the first thing you have to do is defend essentialism to prove how important your identity is, then this is a very defensive right-wing posture.

At first glance, Black Lives Matter is identity politics, while All Lives Matter is civic politics.  But what I want to emphasize is that the refusal of the BLM movement to recognize the “All Lives Matter” slogan is not because of identity politics, but instead builds on the post-structuralist thought like that of the Argentinian political theorist Ernesto Laclau (1935-2014).  Laclau pointed out that, in the struggle for leadership, exceptionalism speaks not for the particular, but instead for the universal.  It is within this framework that the leaders of today's Black Lives Matter movement must emphasize the importance of Black lives, because talking about the importance of all lives becomes a "cliché" that everyone agrees on, and then the discussion dies out.

Malcolm X once said that when we drank our coffee black, it was too strong, so we added a little cream to dilute the coffee flavor, and the scary thing was this added cream.[3]  At present, this added cream is the same thing as “All Lives Matter.”  No one will disagree with it, but in fact it puts an end to the discussion, so no one will push things forward and nothing will change.  This is why BLM must preserve its pure "blackness" and refuse to be diluted by the cream--which means refusing to allow a black man’s being strangled to death to be transformed into the meaningless idea that "All Lives Matter"!

When the Slavonian philosopher Slavoj Žižek (b. 1949) joined a meeting of the Occupy Wall Street movement, he said:  “What we have to be wary of is not only our enemies, but also our fake friends.”  Today’s BLM movement is in a similar position, as “fake friends” have thrown themselves heart and soul into the movement, taking a very active stance, but in fact they are the cream in Malcolm X’s coffee—because the way they joined the movement was precisely by sticking an All Lives Matter Band-Aid over the wound opened up by Floyd’s death.  For this reason, the civic politics of All Lives Matter is the precise opposite of Black Lives Matter, and the two are not allies.  BLM looks like identity politics, but instead it is based in the negation of identity, in the X of Malcolm X, which means “without identity”—other contents can be written into this negation, this blankness, hence the expressions of universalism in the speeches of the movement.

Of course, when radical politics are compared to civic politics, its weak point is that it has not been cut by cream, which means that its flavor is too strong.  Who knows how many Americans there are today in the oppressed “silent majority” who are put off by BLM or even oppose having it pushed down their throats.  This is a situation that the angry-eyed BLM protesters can't see and couldn't care less about.  As Liu Qing just said, the intensification of the conflict has left no platform on which to compromise or to move forward together.  For the progressive left, this movement, including abolishing the police, represents institutional change, and is extremely beneficial.  But my concern is whether society is ready for such a change; such a hasty change might even bring about what Hobbes called a pre-political state, a "state of complete disorder."  A Badiou-style event is a space for possible hope and change, but there will certainly be a price to pay, such as the violent scenes in “The Joker,” and even if Badiou and Žižek will insist that it's worth it, specific political movements will nonetheless have to consider the price to be paid by the society as a whole. 

Liu Qing:  That’s right.  The exceptional focus right now on Black identity and the difficulties Blacks encounter are from one perspective completely legitimate and understandable.  It’s like when the pandemic hit, everyone first tried to save those hit hard by the virus, and if someone had said that all lives are worth saving, well, it’s true enough but it is hardly to the point.   But from another perspective, I worry that the radicalism of BLM will harm a broader cross-racial unity.  I once was discussing this with a friend, and asked him what would happen if the slogan were changed to “Black Lives Matter, Like All Lives Matter,” or “All Lives Matter and Blacks are No Exception,” and he said that there was nothing wrong in principle, but that it missed the point. 

The American political scientist and feminist theorist Iris M. Young (1949-2006), who early on championed the “politics of difference,” argued that an identity based on notions of a generalized universal citizenship is unable of a to discern and highlight the most critical issues, which is an important insight.  But what I want to stress is that an identity politics movement must remain open to principles of universality.  Prof. Wu just mentioned Laclau.  His partner, the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe (b. 1943) opposes making pleas for particularity a political goal.  She argues that all left-wing forces, include the Black movement, the women’s rights movement, etc., should join together to seek to achieve the universal goal of freedom and equality for all.  I believe that if it abandons universalist principles, the BLM movement will lack one of its most basic arguments for legitimacy.
 
Xu Jilin:  The rise of identity politics, to a certain degree, has brought about division among various racial and cultural groups in the US, and the entire political community has become fragmented and even confrontational.  A political community possesses not only a plural politics constructed on the basis of the cultural identities of different ethnicities, but must also, if it is to continue to exist, possess a common political culture. 

America’s earliest cultural politics was constructed together with its political culture, and the two were part of the same whole.  The unique Anglo-Saxon Protestant cultural tradition molded the founding spirit of the United States, creating a political culture organized around the constitution.  Protestant culture in America had two natures, one produced by a particular ethnic cultural politics, and the other grounded in a universalist culture that spoke to all mankind.  As immigrants from different races and ethnic groups multiplied, the United States gradually changed from a wholly Anglo-Saxon people into a multi-racial, multi-ethnic nation, which resulted in the separation of cultural politics and political culture. 

The question now is:  does the political culture based on the constitution still have priority over a cultural politics based on status and identity, or do the various cultural politics have priority over the national political culture?  How does a political entity with a plural culture, multiple religions, and competing identities maintain a unified political culture?

The American political theorist Mark Lilla (b. 1956) fears that the weakening of the American foundation, the confrontation of various identity politics, will eventually rend asunder the cultural homogeneity of the American political community, and he wants to balance cultural pluralism with civic republicanism.  The politics of culture is rooted in the plurality of cultural identities but has recourse to political rights, while political culture derives from political traditions and is ultimately translated into cultural homogeneity.  Culture and politics do not have a clear-cut boundary between them. They do, however, constitute a relationship of “pluralism within unity.” 

Pluralism refers to the different cultural identities of citizens, while unity is the political culture shared by citizens of different ethnic, religious and cultural identities.  At present, the homogeneity of American political culture has stayed the course, and is recognized by the cultural politics of confrontation, but what if the confrontation continues?  Will America eventually fall apart?  We are already seeing now competitive confrontations based on the idea of “one set of values, different expressions.”  Clearly, identity politics needs to constrain itself, the limit being to not destroy the homogeneity of the political culture.

Bai Tongdong:  I feel like identity politics are dangerous in the broader perspective.  Because identity politics always emphasize the identity of small groups, while at the same time opposing measures to increase national identity, like for example a national common language (which is English in the US), arguing that this weakens the identity of smaller groups or is even an expression of authoritarianism.  Yet any country, including liberal democratic countries, that spends all its time stressing the identities of smaller groups within the country and opposing the national identity, will inevitably wind up divided.

To return to the question of Black Lives Matter, behind the problems faced by African-Americans at present are two important socio-economic changes.  First, in the past, Afro-American employment rates were not necessarily lower than those of whites, but many African-Americans were employed in labor-intensive agricultural work in the South, for which they received low wages.  But in the 1950s, with the decline of labor-intensive agriculture, there was a large-scale movement of Blacks to big cities in the South and the North.  Second, Blacks initially were able to work in manufacturing in the cities, but the automation that accompanied the next wave of American economic development meant that Blacks found themselves once again unemployed.  This has created high unemployment among Blacks in cities with large Black populations, and high unemployment leads to high crime rates.  As Black unemployment rises, so does the Black crime rate;  it is only natural that the cases of mistreatment of Blacks by law enforcement will go up as well.  The root of these problems is of course racism and slavery in American history.  But at present, the problems are more of an economic order.  In this sense, when we portray the problem in terms of Black racial identity, it obscures the essence of the problem and can lead to the wrong approach to the problem.

In my view, current racial politics are sending the wrong message about economic policy, but that wrong message already exists, and is very difficult to change.  But in this situation, if they continue to seek answers based on race, not only will it not solve the problem but will make the problem worse.

For example, the real beneficiaries of the various race-based affirmative action movements are the Black middle and upper middle classes, and even the more affluent classes, who receive better treatment, all of which can make whites feel the such programs unfair, which in turn can even exacerbate discrimination against Blacks.  All of this while the Blacks who really need help (the poor) receive no help.  So my feeling is that trying to treat an economic problem, which is wrapped in racial symbolism, as a purely racial problem will in the end be counterproductive.

At the same time, I also feel like America’s problems are very hard to solve.  In Western Europe, and especially the welfare states of Northern Europe, one of the reasons it works is because their poor people are also white people, so when extending aid to these people, the other people in those countries could feel like they were helping their own people. But in America, helping people means helping people of other races.  There is a lack of solidarity there.  And framing the problem in terms of race only makes the problem harder to solve.

The Coming Election in America and Black Lives Matter

Xu Jilin:  Professor Bai’s discussion of how identity politics relates to the dilemma posed for Black people in the context of the ongoing economic transformation makes for a good segue way to our third topic.  In terms of background, in the last presidential election, Trump’s slogan was to “Make America Great Again,” to make American manufacturing great again.  The reason Trump finally won was because of the support of the working-class in four swing states.  With the eruption of the current anti-racist movement, the Democrats have started to play the card of identity politics, but Trump has adopted an extremely tough position on BLM.  Thus I would like to ask our three guests what the impact of this movement will be on the presidential election in November. 

Liu Qing:  I had been thinking that Trump’s chances for reelection were more or less over, and even now I think that probability is slim.  But the movement could be a factor in the election, depending of course on how the movement develops.  In terms of an historical comparison, in the late 1960s the US also saw the emergence of violent protest movements, and what was the result?  Nixon’s victory in 1968, whose campaign slogan was “law and order.”  With anti-war protests in full swing in major cities, it was surprising to see a conservative president elected.  Those who voted for Nixon were the so-called “forgotten people,” those not seen in the protests.  This should be a lesson for those on the left, even in the context of today’s America.

We need to understand that identity politics is a dangerous game, because if you can play it, so can your opponent.  The most famous example of identity politics in American history is the KKK.  In the course of the 2016 election, Trump actually made use of the power of “white identity politics.”  Moreover, the current movement has also seen moments of violence and destruction, which can turn off people who originally sympathized with the protesters.  Some people think that there is always a price to pay for revolution.  But using violence against someone who is threatening to hurt you is one thing, and using violence to loot a store is another.  Those damaged in the looting have not been limited to big companies, but also include small mom-and-pop stores, clothing stores, some minority-owned, and these people might adopt another kind of identity politics to express their dislike of the protesters.

As for the presidential election, the most important thing is to win over the voters in the middle.  Because iron-clad Trump followers, who will support him no matter what, make up some 35% of the voters, and there is another 35% who resolutely oppose Trump.  So the 30% in the middle are those who will decide the election.  The question is the direction in which the current movement will make those middle voters lean.  Answering this question would require real research.  Of course, the movement is complex, and we have seen cases of police and protesters marching together, but we have also seen instances where the police have killed protesters or where protesters have attacked the police.  In the final analysis, then, the movement might be a factor, and it might help Trump’s reelection chances just as it might not help.  Chances that he will lose remain greater, but the movement does indeed bring uncertainty.

Xu Jilin:  Professor Liu’s analysis hits the nail on the head.  I suspect that we will see a split in the GOP, with some leading Party members coming out to announce their public split with Trump.  Some of them will focus on his poor performance in handling the coronavirus, but others will express dissatisfaction with his words and actions in the context of BLM.  My suspicion is thus that Trump will have a hard time putting the movement to his profit.

Liu Qing:  I would just like to add to that that there has all along been a Never Trump faction within the GOP, and that those associated with this faction last year launched the Lincoln Project to oppose Trump’s reelection.  In fact, Trump has no real party identification, and never relied on the support of GOP Party elders or pro-establishment groups.  His power lies in his electoral base, and in the 2016 election, he used the power of these voters to kidnap the party.  So the appearance of anti-Trump Republicans is not new.

Wu Guanjun:  I agree with Professor Liu, in the sense that BLM could be a factor in the election.  We can see how the Democrats are working hard to use BLM to win Black votes.  But at the same time, they also worry that the movement might get out of hand, which could push some voters in the middle toward the Republicans.  This is the quandary Democrats risk to fall into—they want to use the movement, but worry that if the movement strays from the role they have assigned it, they will wind up losing voters in the middle.  And Trump, who is always ready to change tactics, doesn’t care about support from the middle, and instead pushes his own logic to new extremes.  Bernie Sanders is similar, and neither he nor Trump pursues voters in the middle, relying completely on voters who identify with them, which is a make-or-break strategy.

So on this point I share Professor Liu’s opinion that in terms of the election, BLM will not necessarily hurt Trump.  And the typical Democratic political strategy of appealing to both left and right might well not work in the current moment.  Looking indecisive might well cost them voters in the middle.  The Democrats are sort of boxed in by Trump’s extremism. 

And there’s one other thing.  My feeling is that for a lot of voters who are in bad shape, Trump is a sort of father figure.  In Trump’s rhetoric, he speaks for the oppressed and for those who have been mistreated.  He might not be perfect, but he has self confidence and a sense of commitment.  Right now, at a moment when conflicts are intensifying, Trump speaks to the psychological needs of those ignored by the mainstream media.  This may wind up being a factor. 

Bai Tongdong:  Even when Trump won, he lost the popular vote, and won by a razor thin margin in some key states.  In his four years in office, he has devoted all of his efforts to strengthening his base.  This is not what you are meant to do in a presidential election, but it instead how a talk-show host increases his fan base (we should not forget that before being elected, Trump’s most successful experience was playing a successful businessman on television).  The downside of this strategy is clear, which is that Trump does not have the support of a broad base of voters.  Some of his policies should have cost him voters, but most of those who have been harmed by his policies will still vote for him, stupidly.  But if he has any hope of winning, he can’t lose a single one of those voters. So those voters put off by his policies (of which there should have been more) are extremely important. 

In addition, in 2016 Hilary was not well-liked, and the division between Hilary and Bernie Sanders was very deep, so that many Sanders supporters voted for Trump, and many democratic and independent voters simply did not vote.  Biden does not inspire the same dislike, and he has a good relationship with Sanders, who gave his sincere support to Biden after dropping out of the race.  Biden’s problem is that his voters are not excited about him, but Trump is his biggest help on that front.  The anti-Trump enthusiasm is there for anyone except Sanders, whom the moderates can’t accept.  Thus, looking at things rationally, Trump’s chances of reelection are not great.

The uncontrolled outbreak of the coronavirus has had a major impact on the US economy, leading Trump to lose the major source of support for his reelection.  The current human rights movement is another blow to Trump.  So, at least for now, Trump’s loss looks to be clear.  As for the arguments just presented by colleagues, I’m not convinced.  We do see Trump, in the face of this protest, trying to copy Nixon, who also ran for president at the height of the civil rights movement, to gain the support of the so-called silent majority through a law and order campaign. 

But a lot of people have pointed out that Nixon could use this strategy because he was challenging the incumbent, whose mistakes he could dwell on.  Trump is the incumbent, so he cannot use law and order to oppose others.  In addition, we have also seen that the violent aspects of the BLM movement calmed down quickly instead of escalating.  Biden has also clung to a moderate viewpoint, avoiding being boxed in by extremist forces.  And Trump’s efforts to set himself up as the representative of law and order have failed.  The American military clearly stood up to oppose Trump’s efforts to use the military to shut down the demonstrations.  When he took a picture in front of the church with a Bible in his hand, hoping to gain support from the religious community, his violent dispersal of peaceful protesters was met with a strong backlash, with many religious people condemning his actions.

Of course, I’m afraid to make a prediction because in 2016, many people said that Trump couldn’t win.  So I understand all this, but in the current political context, my feeling is that Trump will not be reelected.

Still, the reason that Trump won the first time was that he hit on real problems in America, which is that in the process of globalization, automation, and high-tech development, many blue collar American workers have not been able to keep up.  Trump came to power by using a racialized discourse to mobilize those who have been harmed by these changes, although the plans he has put forth to redress the situation have been extremely wrong-headed.  At the same time, it does not seem to me that Biden knows what to do either.  These basic problems are those of the West at large, or maybe of the entire world.
 
Notes
 
 [1] 许纪霖x刘擎x白彤东x吴冠军：反思“黑命攸关”运动, published online at the Pengpai Intellectual Marketplace 澎湃思想市场 on July 3, 2020, at the following address:  https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Ozo6ZTK1VvB5Rrc9h8w81w .
 
 [2] Translator’s note:  It would appear that certain Chinese intellectuals have adopted the American notion that using a French word adds a certain je ne sais quoi, for which I cannot help but feel a mild ressentiment.  I have not read Debord, but the French word “situation” is no more loaded than its eerily similar English counterpart (“situation”).  Wu, and the French philosophers, are of course talking about a particular moment or set of circumstances that inflames people and leads them to set reason aside.
 
[3] Translator’s note:  Malcom X’s original quote was:  “It's just like when you've got some coffee that's too black, which means it's too strong. What do you do? You integrate it with cream, you make it weak. But if you pour too much cream in it, you won't even know you ever had coffee. It used to be hot, it becomes cool. It used to be strong, it becomes weak. It used to wake you up, now it puts you to sleep.”