Yao Yang and Qin Zizhong on Confucianism and Inequality

Yao Yang and Qin Zizhong, “Who Will Finally Be Able to Resolve the ‘Inequality’ Problem?”[1]

Translation and Introduction by David Ownby

Introduction

Yao Yang (b. 1964) is a professor at the China Center for Economic Research and Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University.  He is a respected scholar and prolific writer who has published on a variety of topics, in both Chinese and English (his cv is available here).  He won the 2009 Sun Yefang Economics Award, China’s highest award in economics, the 2008 and 2010 Pu Shan Award in International Economics, and the 2008 Zhang Peigang Award in Development Economics.  He is generally identified with China’s New Left, and has worked with scholars such as Wang Shaoguang 王绍光 (b. 1954) and Hu An’gang 胡鞍钢 (b. 1953). 

Qin Zizhong is a younger scholar, having earned his Ph.D. at Renmin University in 2017.  He is currently an Associate Professor at the Institute of Marxism at Hainan University.  He specializes in issues of equality, and as his C.V. (in Chinese) indicates, he and Yao have penned joint articles on Confucianism before.
 
The text translated here caught my eye because, in the run-up to the centenary celebration of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 2021, a well-known New Left scholar and a young professor at an Institute of Marxism combined their efforts to publish a text on how Confucianism can solve the problem of inequality.
 
Their argument is fairly complex, and at places even quite technical, but one major point seems to be that the original Confucian thinkers—Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi—all struck major blows for something like egalitarianism in the context of the societies in which they lived.  They endorsed the collapse of the rigidly hierarchical society that had preceded their own, and constructed new narratives which either sang the praises of the people, or redefined hierarchy and the movement within that hierarchy, or both. 

At the same time, the authors want to push back against modern liberalism and its insistence on absolute egalitarianism (my impression is that their target may be Black Lives Matter and identity politics), insisting on the importance to any society of “symmetrical equality” and some sort of hierarchy and/or meritocracy.  In other words, what we want is equality of opportunity, and redress for those born into unfortunate circumstances, but politics demands considerations of merit if good governance is to be achieved.
 
Yao has flirted with Confucianism before (see here, for example), as have other New Left thinkers, and the text translated could be read as a defense of Communist/Confucian meritocracy à la Daniel Bell, and thus could have made its contribution to the July 1 celebration.  Yet neither Xi Jinping nor the CCP is mentioned.
 
Links to other texts on the site
 
For texts related to the theme of Confucianism, click here.
 
For texts related to the theme of liberalism, click here.
 
Translation
 
How Do Confucians View “Equality?” 
 
By today's standards, Confucius' political views are deeply unequal, reflecting strong hierarchical notions grounded in calls to "obedience." However, Confucius' ideas are no more inclined to uphold a fixed hierarchy than the ideas of his contemporaries (e.g., the ancient Greeks). As the historian Xu Fuguan 徐复观 (1903/04-1982) once argued, in the context of Western Zhou society, Confucius's thought was distinguished by its egalitarianism: "In the history of Chinese culture, it was Confucius who truly discovered the idea of humanity.  In other words, he destroyed all unreasonable boundaries between human beings and recognized the idea that as long as we are human, we are the same, and equal.”

Confucius’s discovery of the universal idea of humanity can be explained through the following three points. First, Confucius destroyed class restrictions in society and politics, and transformed the traditional class distinction between the superior and the small person into a moral distinction between the two, which meant that both were the result of individual efforts, after which the superior person changed from being a class oppressor, and became the symbol of all those who strive for improvement. 

Second, Confucius destroyed the political myth that to overthrow an unreasonable ruler is equivalent to rebellion, and pulled the ruler down from his position of privilege so that he would be judged according to the same conscience and reason as the common people. 

Third, Confucius destroyed not only the localism of the Warring States era, but also the racial views of his time, giving equal treatment to those known as ‘barbarians.’"

Mencius was even more enlightened than Confucius, and his saying that "every man can become a Yao or a Shun [ancient sage kings]" meant that everyone had an equal opportunity to become a saintly and virtuous person. This is the starting point for equality. Although not all people wind up becoming saintly and virtuous, this is less due to an inequality in their basic status and social position and more to an inequality in in terms of effort and practice:  some people give their all, while others do not, and the resulting inequality is the product of accumulated effort.

What distinguishes the person who strives to become a sage—and succeeds—from an ordinary person is their sense of moral character, in that the sage is the model personality of one who “is benevolent and loves others,” and "who puts himself in the place of others.”  In this respect, this inequality is not oppressive, but instead, as Amartya Sen (b. 1933) says, is the very foundation for the enforcement of unilateral obligations.

Sen writes: "A perspective that looks at the unilateral obligations arising from the inequality of power is not only broadly used in human rights activism today, but can also be seen in the early struggles for freedom and human rights associated with freedom." For Mencius, the worthy person willingly chooses to take on more responsibilities and duties, and the resulting inequality is not a substantive inequality.

Xunzi, who followed Mencius, returned to Confucius's theory of differences in human nature, but we can also deduce ideas of equality from his thought. His saying that "anyone on the streets can become a Yu [another ancient sage king]"[2] suggests that everyone can become a man like Yu through constant "accumulation of deliberate effort 积伪" or by cultivating goodness in himself. This is similar to Mencius' idea that "every man can become a Yao or a Shun."

On the basis of classical Confucian thought, today’s Confucians can develop the modern concept of relational equality.[3] In fact, issues in contemporary Western political philosophy are experiencing a shift from basic equality 元素平等 to relational equality. As a result, the richness of relational ideas accumulated in the Confucian tradition finds itself in the spotlight.

Formally speaking, identity 同一性 [i.e., the idea that we are all the same] and symmetry 对称性 [i.e., the idea that we should receive similar treatment despite our differences] are two aspects of equality, and in the scholarly tradition can be traced back at least to Aristotle's notions of quantitative equality and proportional equality. During the Enlightenment, identity achieved great success as a critical weapon against hierarchy, but at the same time symmetry suffered, i.e., proportional equality declined along with hierarchy.
 
In reality, however, what was destroyed was the entrenched hierarchy, not the idea of hierarchy. Setting aside the stickiness of history, hierarchies are necessary even at the abstract level. First, societies with a certain population size must have a certain level of hierarchy in their political structure, otherwise they cannot be governed effectively; second, as long as we recognize the diversity of human nature and the differences in abilities, then the system must allow for a certain level of hierarchy. The key here is not the presence or absence of a hierarchical system, but the degree of upward and downward mobility permitted within this system.

Traditional Chinese culture is rich in ideas of quantitative and proportional equality. The Enlightenment, which rejected proportional equality and promoted quantitative equality, spread to China in recent times, and modern Confucianism has been able to draw on the equality ideas of the Confucian doctrinal tradition on the basis of a more comprehensive interplay of Chinese and Western theories. 

The Confucian theory of relational equality can be naturally derived and developed from Confucianism's abundant relational ideas and symmetry-oriented ideas of proportional equality (such as the correspondence between virtue and blessing, good being rewarded with good, and evil being rewarded with evil, etc.).  Concretely, Confucian relational equality is an equality based on aptitudes, meaning that those with similar aptitudes are politically equal.

Certain levels of the Confucian political structure are not open to all, but only to those who possess the aptitudes required to enter that level, including competence and virtue (hereafter referred to as a "competency set" for simplicity’s sake), to those who meet the hierarchy’s requirements. This is clearly different from the abstract equality promoted by liberalism. For the sake of illustration, let us imagine a simple social structure that contains a three-tier political structure, from low to high, with each tier corresponding to an opportunity set we will call “opportunity one,” “opportunity two,” and “opportunity three.”

We can imagine that the first tier includes the basic constituent units of society, such as schools, businesses, social groups, etc., and the corresponding rights enjoyed by those units; the second tier includes basic activities of political participation, such as elections and representation; and the third tier includes the offices required to run the state and the corresponding rights attached to those offices.

According to the logic of liberalism, all opportunities are open to all. In contrast, Confucianism treats the three tiers of opportunities differently. Concretely, “opportunity one” is open to all. Because everyone has the potential to become a sage, opening this opportunity opens the door to sagehood for all. At this lowest level, modern Confucians, like liberals, recognize the formal freedom and equal rights of all people. Since everyone has equal value, each person therefore has the freedoms that correspond to this value, including freedom of choice, freedom of speech, and so on.

As for political participation, people can choose to enter this level or not. If they choose to enter, they must possess the appropriate attributes. This requirement is not excessive, just as a person must pass certain exams in order to attend college. But those who choose not to enter are not considered to be inferior; the political hierarchy is only one part of life, and there is a huge space outside of politics for people to pursue excellence. Thus, "opportunity two" and "opportunity three" are open to those with the appropriate qualifications, and the latter is more demanding than the former.

In reality, people have different sets of competencies, and higher positions correspond to higher responsibilities (and influence), and therefore require corresponding sets of abilities. In this respect, the Confucian concept of equality is defined by symmetry, in the form of the age-old proportional equality common to both Eastern and Western cultures.

Compared to the liberal view of equality, the Confucian view of equality can better deal with the issue of individual responsibility.  The liberal view of equality is prescribed by identity/sameness, and the issue of individual responsibility is the central problem that the post-Rawls liberal left has had to grapple with.[4]

Ronald Dworkin's (1931-2013) solution was to distinguish between resources and preferences. For Dworkin, resources (including impersonal resources such as social environment, family background, etc., and personal resources such as an individual's gender, height, personality, etc.) exist objectively and individuals are not responsible for them, so egalitarian assistance should be provided to those who lack resources; by way of contrast, preferences are subjective and are the responsibility of individuals, so inequality resulting from preferences should be allowed.

Through this distinction between resources and preferences, Dworkin does focus on the issue of personal responsibility within a liberal egalitarian framework, but in terms of resources, the development of an individual's character and abilities is not purely objective; and in terms of personal ambitions, we cannot exclude objective factors, which means that the shaping of personal preferences and goals cannot be entirely subjective.  Therefore, Dworkin does not completely resolve the issue of personal responsibility.

By way of contrast, Confucian relational equality is defined by symmetry, and therefore it deals with the issue of personal responsibility in a very rational way. Relational equality focuses directly on the correspondence between elements and gives a normative expression to this correspondence.

The Confucian tradition is not only full of ideas focusing on relationality and symmetry, but is also deeply concerned with ethics, as we see in Confucius's statement that the benevolent "cherish people," or Mencius's notion of the "moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others," as well as Xunzi's counsel that "the five types of handicapped people should be received by their superiors and nurtured… Take in those who are orphaned or widowed.” From these ideological resources, we can develop the relevant principles of a Confucian relational equality. To deepen the discussion, let us consider a relational equality that includes the four elements of endowment, opportunity, effort, and utility.

Relational equality contains two elements of symmetry. The first aspect of symmetry is that the correspondence between each person’s endowment, opportunity, effort, and utility follows the same set of rules (a set of rules expressed in the form of constitutional law, etc.), which in turn relates to the question of whether the individual as a person is treated fairly.  A lack of symmetry in this respect would mean that members of society are in an unequal or unjust social relationship, so it can be expressed as the overall principle of relational equality.  Accordingly, if opportunities one, two, and three as discussed in the previous section are not open to all according to the law based on equality of attributes, then the principle of wholeness is not met.

The second aspect of symmetry is an interpersonal comparison of the individual's endowments, opportunities, efforts, and utilities at the elemental level, which is related to the equivalence of the elements that make up a person, and the absence of symmetry at the elemental level would imply a certain inequality, but this inequality is different from the overall inequality, and it can be corrected by the principle of compensation, i.e., if a person's endowments, opportunities, efforts, utilities, etc. are lower than some corresponding given value, the person is compensated accordingly.

This second aspect of symmetry requires more explanation. First, Confucian relational equality not only recognizes interpersonal differences in individual endowment, opportunity, effort, and utility, but also allows for the expression of such differences in the social structure. This seems to clash with the value of equality, but in fact it does not.

Unlike left-wing liberals such as Rawls, who advocate the elimination of differences in individual endowment, Confucianism recognizes and distinguishes between the differential nature of individual endowments. In our view, the differences in individual endowments are objective and unchangeable, and the differences in individual endowments neither necessarily lead to unreasonable inequality nor deny the possibility of individual sainthood and virtue, unless one believes that there is only one path to sainthood and virtue.

However, it is undeniable that (1) those who receive excellent endowments are more capable of becoming sages with the same level of effort; (2) for those who receive average endowments, they need to put in more effort to achieve the same level of achievement; (3) as for those whose endowments and family backgrounds are deficient, unless these misfortunes are corrected on the basis of human dignity and other values, it will be difficult for them to realize the value of their lives.  Together, these three situations demonstrate asymmetry (i.e., de facto inequality) at the level of endowment; and, if left uncorrected, they undermine values such as human dignity, and thus the principle of compensation applies.

The question is how to determine the threshold of the compensation principle. In these three cases, although there is some difference between (1) and (2), this difference does not constitute an obstacle to the realization of life values, so the threshold should not be drawn between (1) and (2); what really constitutes an obstacle to the realization of life values is (3), so the threshold should be drawn between (2) and (3), and thus the compensation principle only needs to apply to (3), for example, improving the conditions of people with disabilities, the education and living conditions of children from poor families, etc., in order to enhance the level of realization of their life values. This division is in line with the spirit of Sen's doctrine of capabilities; it does not demand a complete equality of capabilities, but an equality that leads to capability building.  

For Confucianism, individual values are part of social values. However, in Mencius' discourse, the people are at the forefront, and the equivalence of individual values in the sense of benevolence is emphasized, so that assassinating an immoral ruler is like killing an ordinary person. Despite this, we must admit that Mencius was not aware of the distinction between the group and the self. The same is true of Xunzi's idea to "make clear social divisions and so employ the masses." But we shouldn’t be too hard on the ancients; after all, in their time, no one could put the individual above society, which is true in both China and the West.

From the perspective of Confucianism, which attaches importance to the cultivation of the individual, the value of the individual includes a component of individual effort, and society should support the individual, as we see in expressions such as "there is a teaching; there are no divisions," "regulating the people's production," and "collecting the widows and orphans, and compensating the poor.” Furthermore, Confucianism does not require individuals to make sacrifices for society, but only that each individual should have his or her own place in the social order. Thus, Confucianism can accept a thin version of individual value theory.

Confucianism explores the issue of individual self-determination in two relational dimensions, one of which is the relationship between the individual and the social organization. In this dimension, Confucianism favors the denial of individual self-determination in the following sense: each individual is constrained by the rites. The rites define the proper relationship between old and young, high and low, all of which leaves little room for individual self-determination. The second dimension is the relationship between individuals. In this dimension, Confucianism respects individual self-determination.

This is best exemplified by the saying " not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself;" the same is true of the doctrine of the Middle Way. The Middle Way means to act according to common sense and not to go to extremes, so that one can tolerate the different opinions of others. However, unlike classical liberals who emphasize only negative freedom, Confucianism affirms the act of guiding individual choices based on high moral principles, as expressed in the phrase, “wishing to be enhanced himself, he seeks also to enhance others.”

The balance between the principle of not imposing on the other and the principle of enhancing the other is something that modern Confucianism must achieve. Having absorbed the modern theory of rights, we explain the Confucian attitude toward individual self-determination as follows: morally, the principle of "not imposing" and the principle of "enhancing others" are of equal importance, but institutionally, the principle of "not imposing" takes precedence, and the establishment of the principle of "enhancing others" presupposes the establishment of the principle of "not imposing."

Confucianism equality can be divided into two levels. First, at the level of individual comparison, Confucianism affirms that everyone has an equal right to pursue sainthood; second, at the political level, equality is based on attributes, i.e., only those who meet certain qualifications can compete equally among themselves for political positions, which takes the form of symmetry between individual ability sets and corresponding political positions.

Here, we draw on modern equality theory and develop the Confucian view of equality from the perspective of social relations to obtain a kind of relational equality, and thus outline the meaning of its principle of equality in a preliminary way. Confucianism's relational equality is defined by symmetry, of which there are two kinds. The first kind of symmetry concerns whether the individual as a whole is treated fairly, which regulates the overall principle of relational equality; the second aspect of symmetry concerns whether the elements that make up a person are equal, which regulates the compensation principle of relational equality.
 
In sum, Confucianism has two different approaches to liberalism: at the individual level, there is considerable overlap between Confucianism and the principles of liberalism; at the political level, Confucianism emphasizes that individual values and choices must be subordinated to order, and that equality among individuals can only be based on attributes. This notion of relational equality unifies two seemingly contradictory traits of the Chinese: in private life, the Chinese uphold individualism; in political life, the Chinese uphold collectivism.

Our work further develops Confucian liberalism, articulating it as a liberalism based on order and attributes, and demonstrates that the part of Confucian liberalism that cannot be reduced to Western liberalism constitutes the very foundation of the survival of Chinese culture. Moreover, the concept of harmony, which is nurtured in Confucianism's middle way, has a clear advantage in dealing with the conflicting interpersonal relationships and the imbalance between human beings and nature caused by Western liberalism. Accordingly, Confucian liberalism can contribute to the peaceful co-prosperity of humankind.
 
Notes

[1] 姚洋, 秦子忠,  “谁反而最有可能解决“不平等”问题?” published on the online platform of Beijing Cultural Review/文化纵横 on June 13, 2021.

[2]Translator’s note:  The longer passage from which this quote is taken is: “Anyone on the streets can become a Yu. How do I mean this? I say:  that by which Yu was Yu was because he was ren, yi, lawful, and correct. Thus, ren, yi, lawfulness, and correctness have patterns that can be known and can be practiced. However, people on the streets all have the material for knowing ren, yi, lawfulness, and correctness, and they all have the equipment for practicing ren, yi, lawfulness, and correctness. Thus, it is clear that they can become a Yu.”  Eric L. Hutton,  trans., Xunzi:  The Complete Text. 
​
[3]Translator’s note:  “Relational equality ideals are often coupled with the ideal of equal democratic citizenship. On this view, in an egalitarian society, all permanent adult members of society are equal citizens, equal in political rights and duties, including the right to an equal vote in democratic elections that determine who shall be top public officials and lawmakers responsible for enacting laws and public policies enforced on all. An ideal of social equality complements political equality norms. The idea is that citizens might be unequal in wealth, resources, welfare, and other dimensions of their condition, yet be equal in status in a way that enables all to relate as equals. On this approach, an egalitarian society contrasts sharply with a society of caste or class hierarchy, in which the public culture singles out some as inferior and some as superior, and contrasts also with a society with a dictatorial or authoritarian political system, accompanied by socially required kowtowing of ordinary members of society toward political elites.”  See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[4]Translator’s note:  “The theory of justice pioneered by John Rawls explores a simple idea – that the concern of distributive justice is to compensate individuals for misfortune. Some people are blessed with good luck; some are cursed with bad luck, and it is the responsibility of society – all of us regarded collectively – to alter the distribution of goods and evils that arises from the jumble of lotteries that constitutes human life as we know it. Some are lucky to be born wealthy, or into a favorable socializing environment, or with a tendency to be charming, intelligent, persevering, and the like. These people are likely to be successful in the economic marketplace and to achieve success in other important ways over the course of their lives. However, some people are, as we say, born to lose. Distributive justice stipulates that the lucky should transfer some or all of their gains due to luck to the unlucky.”  Richard Arneson, “Rawls, Responsibility, and Distributive Justice.”  The question Yao and Qin raise is:  what is the responsibility of the individual if society owes them distributive justice?