Zhao Yanjing, "China's Narrative"

Zhao Yanjing, “The Claims are Flooding in, and it is Urgent to Rebuild the Core Narrative of ‘China’s Fight against the Virus’”[1]

Introduction and Translation by David Ownby

Introduction

Zhao Yanjing is Professor of Urban Planning at Xiamen University, has published extensively on the topic, and has worked in municipal governments as an urban planner.  He has given talks in English at Harvard in 2012, at MIT in 2016, and his CV is available (in Chinese) here.  Several of his essays are available on the Aisixiang website, suggesting that he is a well-known public intellectual, but he was not on my radar until I discovered the text translated here.

Zhao’s topic is the overall narrative of the coronavirus pandemic, or, more precisely, how the Western narrative of the pandemic is stigmatizing China.   Although he posted a somewhat similar piece on March 31, 2020, urging Chinese to contribute to American efforts to fight the coronavirus through unofficial channels only, as a way of convincing Americans not to believe the China-demonizing rhetoric coming out of the White House, the topic appears to be a new one for Zhao, whose published work naturally focuses on issues of urban planning.

Zhao’s argument, in a nutshell, is that the West is blaming China for domestic political reasons, fearing that if New Yorkers, say, or Spaniards, or Italians, or the French, compared the response of their government to that of China, they might note that China looks pretty good.  He is indignant that Wuhan’s sacrifice is dismissed, and blamed on the evils of totalitarianism.  He feels that this is one more instance of the West’s distorting a Chinese success in the interests of maintaining Western hegemony throughout the world.  He calls on China to get to work and compose its own narrative before it’s too late. 

Zhao appears to be motivated solely by righteous indignation, and he writes with the moral authority of an independent intellectual.    There is no mention of Xi Jinping or the Chinese Communist Party in Zhao’s text, nothing about the China model or the glories of socialism with Chinese characteristics.  Zhao does not appear be anti-Western in any broad sense; he simply feels that the coordinated campaign to vilify China by Western politicians and media is misleading, dishonest, and treacherous.  He is willing to admit that mistakes were made, particularly by local officials in Wuhan (no mention is made of mistakes at the level of central authority), but insists that the mistakes were corrected and the situation saved, if at great cost.  He calls on the rest of China to stop discriminating against people from Hubei, and says that if they don’t, then they should not complain when the rest of the world discriminates against them.

In fact, Zhao’s text is subtly critical of the Chinese government, even if his main targets are the China-demonizers in the West.  I say this because China does, of course, have a narrative (see this example, in French, issued by the PRC Embassy in Paris), but Zhao’s fear is that this narrative is descending to the same level of scapegoating as in the West, and that the meaning of Wuhan’s sacrifice will be lost or diminished in the cat-fight.  Zhao calls on China’s “we media,” by which he means, I guess, citizen journalists, to fashion their own narrative and diffuse it internationally through non-official channels. 

Zhao’s anger is not hard to understand, and his optimism regarding citizen journalists in China and the receptiveness of Western citizens to their narrative is refreshing, if perhaps a bit naïve.  To my mind, neither the Chinese central government nor most Western governments have covered themselves in glory on this front, and I confess that I find most of the narrative Zhao proposes persuasive.      

Translation

As the coronavirus has spread around the world, the West’s reading of China’s response to the virus has quickly changed, from ridiculing China’s system at the outset to accusing the Chinese government of an evil cover-up. From initial statements like “The United States, Italy and other countries cut off all air routes to China, creating the impression that Chinese people had become the untouchables of the world” (in Great Britain’s Financial Times) to Trump’s openly calling the coronavirus “the China virus,” the main Western narrative of the coronavirus crisis evolved quickly.  As the West slid into its own deep crisis, the narrative of the crisis moved from an attack on the Chinese system to a defense of the Western system.  By inciting the whole world to blame China, they avoid taking domestic political responsibility.

Especially when the pandemic began to deliver unimaginable blows to Western economies and societies, recasting this “natural disaster” as a “man-made disaster” became the go-to Western narrative, so as to eliminate as much as possible the shock to the Western system that would occur were people to compare the effectiveness of China’s response with that of the West.  Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly did not mince words in his remarks to the crew members of the USS Theodore Roosevelt who were threatened by the coronavirus:  “One of the things about his (i.e., Commander Brett Crozier’s) email that bothered me the most was saying that we are not at war. Well we're not technically at war. But let me tell you something, the only reason we are dealing with this right now is because a big totalitarian regime called China was not forthcoming about what was happening with this virus. And they put the world at risk to protect themselves and to protect their reputations.”

To remove the immense threat of the crisis to core Western institutions, the Western narrative from the outset was that the spread of the coronavirus throughout the world was a “man-made disaster created by an evil system.”  Following the main thread of this narrative, Wuhan has been understood as “Chernobyl,” and China as “the Soviet Union in the Chernobyl incident.”  Once this narrative is accepted by the people of the various countries suffering from the virus, China’s material aid to the rest of the world will be seen as a kind of “repentance” meant to make up for its earlier cover-up, and even after the pandemic is over, China may well be treated in the same way as losing countries after a world war, being isolated and required to provide explanations or even pay damages.  One consequence of this will be huge and lasting harm to China’s international interests, and China’s great success and prestige in defeating the worldwide virus will be completely obliterated.   The storm is coming, and building China’s narrative is urgent.

Faced with the pressure of international public opinion and lacking a core narrative like that of the West, China at present can rely only on the passive tactical responses of its diplomatic corps.  After the outbreak of the epidemic, public opinion inside China moved in the direction of blaming the government, which led local governments early on to try to control many kinds of information (which is what Western countries are doing now).  The sacrifices of the doctors of Wuhan doctors and the suffering of the Wuhan people, widely conveyed via the media (and largely true) are understood in the logic of the Western narrative as “suppression of the people’s right to know.”  Such information, some true and some false (along with conspiracy theories), has, intentionally or not, become important footnotes to the Western narrative (the same is true of a certain diary being published with record speed).

Any fact can be material for a narrative.  In different narratives, the same materials can be understood completely differently.  Constructing a broadly accepted narrative is much better than relying on control to plug leaks, rebut rumors, and spin out endless facts.  Only a narrative can compete with a narrative, and we cannot wait to build China’s coronavirus narrative.  In my view, China’s narrative should include at least the following crucial points.

Narrative one:  the outbreak of the coronavirus was humanity’s encounter with an unknown virus.

The coronavirus crisis is a war, a war waged by all of humanity against a common enemy.  Understanding the “virus” and not “other countries” as the object of the battle should be the dividing line between China’s and the West’s narratives.  The central argument in the Western narrative, and also its shoddiest, is seeing the coronavirus crisis as a “national responsibility,” and once we begin trading blows with Western countries over “who should take responsibility” then we will have fallen into their trap, believing that the virus is not a “natural disaster” but a “man-made disaster.”

If we accept the narrative that “humanity is facing a common enemy—the virus,” then Wuhan is no longer, as in the Western narrative, the origin of the virus, but was instead the first “sailor” to find a leak in the cabin during a storm, and not only should not be the object of blame, but instead becomes a “hero” on the ship of humanity’s destiny!  In the new narrative, Wuhan faced an encounter with an unknown enemy, which is the only reasonable explanation for the local government’s initial cover-ups and mistakes, the only reason that they could frankly admit their mistakes and correct their errors, and the only way to eliminate false statements in the Western narrative about the “Chinese government ’s intentional concealment of facts.”  In the correct narrative, Wuhan is the only city in the world to have passed a “closed book exam,” and the mistakes they made in the beginning would have been hard for any city faced with a “pop quiz” to avoid.  In this kind of narrative, there is no need at all to cover up early policy errors by the government or the immense suffering of the people of Wuhan.  The tragedy of Dr. Li and Fang Fang’s diary could both be a part of the “Wuhan epic” from the perspective of this narrative.

Narrative Two:  Wuhan is today’s Eyam, the British village that fought the plague.

In our narrative, Wuhan is not “Chernobyl,” but instead the English village of Eyam, that sacrificed itself in the fight against the plague.  “Eyam village” and “Chernobyl” have particular symbolic meanings in Western discourse.  Comparing Wuhan to Eyam village serves to demolish the Western narrative according to which the closure of Wuhan meant that “the people were deprived of their freedom.”  The reason why closing Wuhan worked was because of a conscious, voluntary sacrifice on the part of the people.  Wuhan was a much larger version of Eyam village, and the choice to lock down the city was an exalted sacrifice, paid voluntarily by free people, it displayed the glory of humanity!

The material aid dispatched to Wuhan and the countless people who went against the tide to offer their help, the state’s emergency assistance without thought of the economic cost, were not examples of the violence of a totalitarian system, but instead the collective will of the people from throughout the country who refused to give up on the fighting people of Wuhan. The relationship of “we live and die together” between people throughout China and the people of Wuhan, should be a shining example of “we live and die together” of the countries facing the pandemic throughout the world.

Narrative Three.  Wuhan’s sacrifice is humanity’s sacrifice.

China’s narrative should emphasize that, at a time when everyone else in the world thought the virus was a simple flu, Wuhan was the first to discover the virus and “start shooting.”  Wuhan’s encounter with the unknown virus was humanity’s encounter with the unknown virus.  Wuhan indeed suffered heavy losses and made repeated mistakes, but it didn’t surrender like Paris in WWII, or collapse like Allied forces at Dunkirk.  After a short period of shock and panic, Wuhan picked up the most rudimentary weapons and built a line of defense, and subsequently staged a stunning resistance.  Through its own sacrifice, Wuhan took a “poisonous bullet” for the world!  In the proper narrative, Wuhan’s sacrifice is not the unhappy consequence of a totalitarian system, but instead represents humanity’s noble courage and indomitable spirit in the face of danger and difficulty.  Wuhan is like Stalingrad in WWII, providing hope to mankind in its darkest moment.  It is a great benchmark for the anti-epidemic battle being fought elsewhere in the world.  It was Wuhan’s sacrifice that allowed China and East Asia to move quickly past the pandemic, and to become a base area supporting the fight against the pandemic in the rest of the world.

​Narrative Four:  The defense of Wuhan bought time for other places.

In the Chinese narrative, we must especially stress that Wuhan’s fierce resistance revealed the chief characteristic of the coronavirus—it was because Wuhan took the lead in warning the world about the unprecedented cleverness of the “enemy” that for the rest of the world the fight was an “open book exam.”  The superior performance of East Asian countries in fighting the virus was not the result of democracy versus totalitarianism as in the Western narrative, but was achieved on the basis of Wuhan’s enormous sacrifice, and the same is true for China’s other provinces (including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan).  The different successes of countries around the world fighting the disaster have been decided by which ones fully made use of the valuable experience and time won by Wuhan.  Wuhan should not only not be blamed and held accountable, as in the Western narrative, but should be thanked and praised.  The remarks by the WHO expert Bruce Alyward, to the effect that “I feel that the entire world owes a debt the people of Wuhan, and I want them to know that the world appreciates their contribution,” should be heard by the entire world.

Once the narrative is settled, all that remains is the choice of communication tools.
 
First, sincerely pay tribute to Wuhan.  The silent mourning for the victims of the coronavirus at this year’s Qingming festival was a very good gesture, showing the world that the sacrifice made by Wuhan will not be forgotten.  I propose that when the “two meetings”[2] are held in the near future, there be a formal expression of thanks for the great Wuhan lockdown, and that we make up for various lapses in our treatment of the “encounter” that occurred during the crisis.  We must give real rewards (medals, bonuses) to those who sacrificed, to doctors on the front lines, to base-level medical personnel, to workers, to volunteers, and we must reward or compensate all of those who stayed in Wuhan during the closing of the city, refund national taxes paid by Wuhan during the lockdown, and provide preferential treatment for migrant workers from Hubei…Our behavior toward Wuhan is in fact a demonstration to the world of what their behavior should be toward China—and if we cannot treat Wuhan people well, then we should not expect the world to treat China well; if we discriminate against people from Hubei than we cannot expect the world not to discriminate against China.  We must consciously project the relations between China’s various provinces and Wuhan onto the relations between China and other countries of the world, providing the world with a genuine demonstration of what the China narrative means.

Second, develop the function of “we media.”[3]  Confronted with the malicious interpretation of the Wuhan story by the Western media (and some domestic we media), China lacks voices like those of RT and Aljazeera, a shameful commentary on the world of Chinese journalism.  But China has powerful we media, which can take the lead in developing the mainstream narrative within its channels.  Once there is a commonly accepted narrative, it will automatically cut through a great number of facts and figures, and the story will spread via popular channels (overseas students, Overseas Chinese, Chinese international firms, Tik Tok, Twitter) into the outside world (especially the English-speaking world).  These proofs and facts will allow readers to develop their own narratives different from the mainstream Western narrative, which they will convey and circulate in their own words.  At the same time, all state actions must be consistent with this narrative. Every penny spent on foreign aid must be integrated into the narrative, and the ugly narrative of the Wuhan virus must be transformed into a politically incorrect “antisemitism,” and anyone who demeans the dignity of the people of Wuhan should receive no assistance from China.  Once the Chinese crisis narrative enters Western cyberspace, it will, like a virus-killing antibody, spread, mutate, and reshape the facts and eventually overwhelm the crisis narrative established by the West.

Third, build trust in the message we broadcast.  Truth is the prerequisite for this trust.  In the case of the coronavirus, China was the chief actor, China was on the front lines, which meant China had the most truth to convey, but because we lacked our own narrative, our message was not believed by Western mass media.  To counteract the story concocted by Western media, China had no choice but to try and control the internet.  But the result of heavy-handed control is that information that was true all along was no longer believed.  Once we have established a Chinese narrative, this passive form of internet control will no longer be important, and truth will take its place in our discursive struggle—the narrative of whoever manages to uncover the true facts first will be more readily accepted by the media.  The norm in media studies is to shape the image through narrative, and not to shape the image through power.  Reality is always a tool with a strong narrative capacity; once you have a strong narrative, there is no need to be afraid of the truth.

At present, the world’s attention is focused on the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the society and the economy.  But from a historical perspective, in a few months or a few years, the crisis will pass.  Even crises such as the Great Depression and the two World Wars are essentially "temporary," and the post-pandemic economy will surely see a V-shaped rebound.  It is the narrative of the crisis that will have a more enduring impact on the post-pandemic world.  It’s like an exam at school, which, at the time, does not change the student taking the test, but the results lead to a new ranking and a modification of the relations between the students, an impact that will continue through the next exam.  If we see today’s worldwide coronavirus pandemic as a war, then the power structure 利益格局 of the post-war world will not be determined by who sacrificed the most, but rather by who stands where in the narrative.

Struggles to seize the narrative are not fictional battles.  Experienced Western nations understood quicker than we did the extreme importance of dominating the narrative. As Gideon Rachman wrote in an article on the Financial Times website on March 16th:

“If China’s narrative is accepted, then the geopolitical impact of the coronavirus epidemic will exist for a long time, and will perhaps not abate even after the successful development of a vaccine.  During this period, not only will the view that “China’s rise continues, as does the relentless fall of the West,” be accepted by ever more people, but also, there will be people, even in the West, who boldly and actively support China’s totalitarianism and oppose Western democracy.”[4]   

A good narrative can change a bad thing into a good thing, while a bad narrative can ruin a winning hand.  What makes or breaks a country is ultimately decided by the war narrative of the victorious.  We must not naively think that history belongs to the party that holds the truth.  In the face of narrative, the truth is not important. History is always written by the victorious. In this sense, the struggle to seize the narrative is the main battlefield of the great power game sparked by this crisis.
 
Notes

[1] 赵燕菁, “索赔潮来, 重建“中国抗疫”核心叙事刻不容缓,” originally published on April 10, 2020, on Aixiang (http://m.aisixiang.com/data/120808.html ), republished on the Beijing Cultural Review 文化纵横 site on April 21, 2020 (http://mmmono.com/g/meow/1734627/ ).

[2] The “two meetings” are the National People’s Conference and the National Political Consultative Conference.

[3] On “we media,” see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/We_the_Media .

[4] See https://app.ft.com/content/20ab52d8-676a-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3 .