Chen Ming, "Confucian Civil Religion"

Chen Ming, “The Road to Confucian Civil Religion”[1]

Introduction and Translation by David Ownby

Introduction

Chen Ming 陈明 (b. 1962) is professor of philosophy at Capital Normal University 首都师范大学 in Beijing and one of contemporary China’s most prominent Mainland New Confucians.  This 2010 interview (published in 2013) with the Taiwanese scholar Chen Yizhong 陈宜中 (b. 1970) offers an accessible yet detailed overview of Chen’s life and thought, his views on other New Confucians both inside China and from the Chinese diaspora, and the logic of his project to fashion a “Confucian civil religion” to provide cultural and social cohesion and stability for a rapidly changing China.  The interview, like Chen himself, is open, engaging, provocative and witty.  He is a refreshing contrast to the stern and avowedly anti-modern Jiang Qing 蒋庆(b. 1953), another leader of the Mainland New Confucian movement.[2]

One of the surprising things about Chen’s interview is his repeated and emphatic embrace of liberal democracy and constitutionalism, themes that Mainland New Confucians have abandoned in the past few years as they have sought to catch Xi Jinping’s ear and realize a Confucian China via a top-down approach.[3] Prior to Xi’s renewed focus on Marxism,[4] China’s establishment intellectuals were freer to dream the China Dream as they wished, and the Confucianism Chen imagines could be readily integrated with propositions made by Chinese Liberals such as Xu Jilin[5] and Gao Quanxi.[6]  Chen draws heavily on Robert Bellah’s theory of “civil religion” in the United States, and imagines Confucianism evolving to play the role that Protestantism has in America:  as a core set of originally religious values that inform secular morality and public life.  He sees Taiwan as a model, even if “Confucian religion” hardly exists as such on the island.

Chen realizes that Confucian civil religion will likely not develop organically in China, and sets himself the task of refashioning Confucian so that it will be both “thicker”—i.e., more appealing to those already drawn to Confucianism or in search of a “religion of the soul”—and “thinner”—i.e., capable of easy coexistence with other faiths in a plural China.  Indeed, much of Chen’s project aims at healing China’s ethnic tensions through the development of Confucian civil religion, a notion that sounds at best naïve in the present context.

It is not clear what tools Chen has at hand to carry out this task, one reason why he and other Mainland New Confucians turned toward the state in recent years.[7]  Chen’s more recent writings[8] are more strident, and replace his embrace of liberal democracy with condemnations of both liberalism and socialism as Western imports unsuited to Chinese conditions.  On a recent visit to Montreal, he repeated the Party line on the necessity of “reeducating” China’s Uighurs as a defense against terrorism.  My personal impression is that the hoped for “Confucian moment” has largely passed in China, that Xi Jinping will incorporate Confucianism into his upgrade of Marxism on his and the CCP’s terms.  Chen will perhaps change his tune if he realizes that the top-down strategy—which he explicitly rejects in this interview—is not possible.

Translation

The Path to Yuandao

Chen Yizhong [CYZ]:  What types of thought did you encounter when you were in university in the 1980s?

Chen Ming [CM]:  That was the era of the “culture craze,” so for the most part it was comparisons between China and the West, anti-traditionalism, a lot like the May Fourth.  At the time, I was very anti-tradition as well, believing that tradition impeded modernization and was an accomplice of dictatorship.  I was studying Chinese, and was deep into the “misty poets” 朦胧诗人,[9] who were all about individual emotion.  I was against the idea that the point of literature was to convey the Way 文以载道, and believed that the highest value of literature should be esthetic.   I discovered and eventually came to like philosophy through literary theory, for example when I read Sartre’s “existentialism is a form of humanism” in the journal Foreign Art  外国文艺.

I changed to philosophy when I did my M.A., but I still liked literature.  At the time, active figures in the thought world did literature or translation.  I was quite passionate, and knew a fair bit about the outside world.  I had always paid attention to Li Zehou 李泽厚 (b. 1930),[10] and once wrote him a letter before I went to graduate school.   He even wrote me back.  So when Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 (1955-2017)[11] made his criticism of Li Zehou,[12] I paid attention to that, too.  A lot of my classmates followed this exchange, and most of them agreed with Liu’s criticisms of Li.  I found that Liu Xiaobo had talent and wrote convincingly, but that his thought was a bit overwrought.  What Li Zehou said about the truth and role of “tradition” was something of a revelation to me, but my standpoint stayed more or less neutral.  I neither completely agreed with him nor completely rejected him.

CYZ:  This was about the time that the writings of Lin Yusheng 林毓生 (b. 1934) and Yu Yingshi 余英时 (b. 1930)[13] entered the mainland, right?

CM:  Right.  The Guizhou People’s Press published Lin Yusheng’s book.[14]  In 1986 or 1987, the Beijing Theory Information 理论讯息报 serially reprinted Yu Yingshi’s book The Modern Meaning of Chinese Culture as a Value System 从价值系统看中国文化的现代意义. At the time, everybody on the mainland had an emotional resistance to the idea of “tradition,” to the point of arguing that tradition was the base cause of the Cultural Revolution.  But Yu Yingshi and Lin Yusheng were not like this.  In the Hong Kong-Taiwan reading room at school, I read the works of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995)[15] and other New Confucians, and understood the splendor of tradition.  This is what pointed the way back to tradition for me and for many on the mainland who identify as Confucians.

CYZ:  So before 1989, you already agreed with a Confucian viewpoint?

CM:  At the time, I didn’t really understand Confucianism.  Overall, I leaned toward Westernization, modernization and liberal democracy.  Of course, I have the same views of liberal democracy today.

CYZ:  So your main turning point occurred after 1989?

CM:  Yes, after 1989.  But it wasn’t just Tian’anmen in China, there was also the August Coup in the Soviet Union.[16]  What did this mean?  This led me to understand that relations between China and the West were not a simple question of ideology, or of orthodoxy versus heterodoxy, but instead of geopolitics.  After the failure of the August Coup, Russia basically became a thing of the past, including both its ideology and its political system, but the principles of geopolitics had not changed, and the Western powers continued to see Russia as an enemy.  With the occurrence of a certain number of events in Chinese-American relations, I came to feel that the world was in fact an empire, with the United States as the center.  And I felt that the relationship of China to this empire would be decided solely by this structure of center and periphery.  Thus in terms of China’s domestic situation, if the price to pay for implementing reforms for the sake of abstract values was territorial division and social upheaval, then we needed to rethink things.  We needed gradual reforms that would ensure stability, and we needed to find a path that fit our national character and our own wishes.  We could not afford to do a rerun of the “sunflower classic.”[17]

After I started my Ph.D. in 1989, I began reading Confucian works with a certain set of questions in my mind, and came to understand more about the meaning and function of Confucianism in history.  In this process, what moved me the most was the responsibility of the elite to the people, to the tradition of moral orthodoxy 道统, and to the world.   Later on, I devoted my dissertation to these themes.

CYZ:  You founded the revue Yuandao 原道[18] in 1994.  Could we see this journal as the main representative of the “national studies craze 国学热” of the 1990s?  Why did you decide to set up Yuandao?

CM:  The founding of Yuandao was really a mixture of happenstance and necessity.  After June Fourth, a lot of my friends felt that the revolution had failed, and that there was no space and no meaning in getting involved in thought or scholarship, so they went into business to make money.  Some people writing best-sellers managed to make some money that way, maybe because they were born to be intellectuals and couldn’t let go of culture.  I was still in school during this period, and the Religion Department had a lot of books on divination which I shared with these literary friends, and might be said to have helped them out.  They came to feel that I was someone who could run a magazine, which I was more than willing to do.  This was right at the moment when independent journals [民间办同人刊物 i.e., publications managed by the editorial board and not together with a government agency] were all the rage, like China Book Reviews 中国书评, Scholars 学人, The Origins of Inquiry 原学, etc.  I thought up the name Yuandao to suggest a link to the Confucianism of the Qianlong 乾隆 (r. 1735-1796) and Jiaqing 嘉庆 (r. 1796-1820) eras of the Qing dynasty.  My friends didn’t agree, and thought we should call it something like New Hunan Criticism 新湘评论.  I thought this wouldn’t work, so they took back their investment, but I had already arranged things with a bunch of writers, many of whom were important figures from older generations, which meant that I would be in a bad spot with them if I didn’t publish something.  So I contacted Liu Lexian 刘乐贤 (b. 1964)[19] and a few more classmates and friends and managed, by hook or by crook, to get the journal out.  It was pretty well received, and has continued down to the present day.

CYZ:  How do you view the national studies craze of the 1990s?

CM:  My impression is that the national studies craze slowly grew out of the campus of Beijing University, right?  “Peaceful evolution” was out, and Western materials were restricted, so then there was the “search for Mao Zedong” and then the return to tradition.  Young people develop their bodies and their minds, and always look for something that suits their needs!  They fumble around, looking at everything, until finally they sync up with society and have what they call “enlightenment.”

CYZ:  What year was it that you announced your support for “cultural conservatism?”

CM:  It wasn’t really about “support,” instead I felt I needed a name or some kind of identification, and it came to be “cultural conservatism.”  There’s a clear explanation to this effect in the first or second issue of Yuandao.  My classmates and friends are very active, and they have all kinds of viewpoints.  Yuandao published liberal essays, New Left essays, and in a post face to Yuandao I wrote that we hoped that any liberal or any Marxist could engage in a dialogue with us cultural conservatives.  I clearly remember adding an excerpt from something Daniel Bell[20] (b. 1964) wrote to an essay by Chen Xiaoming 陈晓明 (b. 1959),[21] so that we had:  political liberalism, cultural conservatism, and economic socialism.  For Bell, “cultural conservatism” was not a negative term; this is one way that we positioned ourselves.  Looking back on it now, we were a bit muddled, with only a limited understanding of the various ideas and the links between them.

CYZ:  When was it that national studies and Confucianism began to receive more attention?

CM:  Only in the last few years!

Yao Zhongqiu 姚中秋[22] (b. 1966) [YZQ]:  There were some activities in 2004, one of which was the tenth year anniversary of Yuandao, and another was the conference on Confucian religion 儒教会议 held in Guangzhou.

CM:  I also organized that meeting.  In 2004, I set up a Confucian religion research center in the Religion Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and started to think about putting together the meeting.  Later I received the support of the Trust Foundation 信孚集团[23] in Guangzhou, and organized the “First National Academic Conference on Confucian Religion.”

YZQ:  Later on, there was the “debate on reading the classics 读经的争论.”[24]  Confucianism was showing up in a lot of places.  Some liberals entered the Confucian camp, which caught the attention of the thought world.  For example, the film director Liu Haibo 刘海波 (b. 1975), the legal scholar Fan Yafeng 范亚峰 (b. 1969), and myself all supported Confucianism, although Fan Yafeng later became a Christian.  In any event, Confucianism achieved a certain self-consciousness during this period, as well as taking its place on the ideological spectrum.

Criticism of the Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians

CYZ:  From your argument for “revealing the essence through the function 即用见体” through your advocacy of “Confucian civil religion,” your thought journey has been very different from that of people like Jiang Qing 蒋庆 (b. 1953) and Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光 (b. 1963),[25] to the point that some people have even suspected that you are a “fake Confucian.”  Although you were once influenced by Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians, you still disagree with their form of discourse.  While you consistently profess support for liberalism, democracy, and constitutional rule, you also often promote strongly nationalist views.  Could you spell out for us the basic elements of your thought?

YZQ:  I suggest that you divide this in two.  One would be “abandoning the faith 叛教,” i.e., your views and criticisms of other Confucians.  The other would be the basic structure of your own thought.

CM:  As someone born in the 1960s and who came of age intellectually in the 1980s, I have always had an intimate relationship with liberalism.  This is my unchanging “original intention 初衷.” 

As for “abandoning the faith,” let me first talk about Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians.  I have said that the Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians are my spiritual teachers.  Their epoch worshipped reason, and felt that philosophy was the jewel in the crown.  For them, philosophy came to be the best academic framework through which to explain Confucianism.  As a result, their work has tended to focus on the relationship between concepts within Confucian thought, and they have argued that Confucianism is something very close to a Western philosophical system.

By way of contrast—and maybe this is related to the “culture craze” of the 1980s—I have always focused on Confucianism as a cultural symbol, and on Confucianism’s mutual, internal relationship to our history, our society, our life and vitality, and from that perspective have sought to understand Confucianism’s meaning and function.  I find these things more important, and for this reason don’t really accept the discourse of the Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians.  Their basic assumption, that philosophy is equally valid across time and space, may provide us a bit of comfort when we search for our original identity, but is of no help when trying to create a new world.  From my view, the absence of philosophy does not mean that culture has no dignity.  The crucial point is the absence of something to say about the world and about life, the crucial question is the absence of faith.  The idea of “engaging with the world 为天地立心” is, by its nature, much closer to religious feeling than to philosophical knowledge.  It’s a kind of intuitive awakening and not a philosopher’s proof.

Mou Zongsan’s definition of Confucianism as “mind-nature 心性论” was a necessary outcome of the form of philosophical discourse, which consequently presented Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism 理学 as the highest form of Confucianism, and at the same time essentialized it.  In fact, Song-Ming Neoconfucianism is a long way from the spirit of Confucius, and from the tradition of the Yizhuan 易传; it was the form Confucianism happened to take in the particular context of the Song era.  Mou Zongsan saw problems with Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), and hence championed the thought of the school of Hu Wufeng 胡五峰 (Hu Hong 胡宏, 1102-1161) and Cheng Mingdao 程明道 (Cheng Hao 程颢, 1032-1085).[26]  Yet, while Mou himself longed for a world in which the Way would be both existent and active 即存有即活动, he never succeeded in connecting this notion with the religious feeling and worldview expressed in the great changes flowing out of Confucius and the Yizhuan.  The way that the idea of “both existent and active” was expressed is philosophical and smacks of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism.  Not only is it cut off [from the original Confucian content], but it makes itself and all of Confucianism passive.  It requires the invention of the idea of a “collapse 坎陷,”[27] without which communication with the outside world will remain impossible.

If we must talk about philosophy, then Confucians should start from the angle of the philosophy of human life or political philosophy.  A philosophy of human life is one of merging with heaven and virtue and advancing while worshipping heaven, and of completing oneself and completing others, joining in the transformation 与天合德奉天而行成己成物参赞教育.[28]  As for political philosophy, it consists of taking care of the elderly and cherishing the young 安老怀少 and acting in such a way as to please those nearby and attract those from afar 悦近来远.[29]  As for the concrete measures needed to bring benevolent rule to all, there are no established rules.  This kind of theoretical basis is extremely flexible, and there is extensive room for exploration and discussion.

CYZ:  So you don’t agree with the discursive manner by which Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians use “mind-nature” Neo Confucianism to open up a space for Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science?[30]  Do you feel this is too reliant on Western “philosophical” methods?  How do you view Xu Fuguan 徐复观 (1904-1982)?[31]

CM:  My views are pretty close to those of Xu Fuguan, because his historical approach and his liberal advocacy don’t require any particular space to be “opened up.” 

CYZ:  How do you view the problématique of the Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians hoping to link Confucianism and Mr. Democracy?

CM:  Democracy is a mainstream value since the May Fourth period, and like science is completely above suspicion, because people have come to see it as a miracle drug leading to national revival and wealth and power.  And this of course has led to errors and biases in understanding of the theory of democracy.  Science has become scientism, so that even questions about human life have come to require scientific solutions, although in fact science is not something that lends meaning to life.  Democracy is a kind of system, a tool for the pursuit of justice.  Yet differences in the success of democracy have to do with historical and social conditions.  In my view, deepening our understanding of democracy does not necessarily mean building it, but rather better understanding how to realize the original intentions behind the pursuit of democracy.

CYZ:  Yu Yingshi is not a New Confucian, although he was misunderstood as such on the Mainland.  Yu once analyzed the role that Confucianism could play in a constitutional democracy and in a plural society from the perspective of Russian political liberalism.  He interpreted Confucianism as a rational, comprehensive theory, an important player in a plural society, which would be able to develop its influence while respecting the basic norms of constitutional democracy.  My guess is that you find this a distorted view of Confucianism?

CM:  Yu Yingshi is fairly complex.  He was Qian Mu’s 钱穆 (1895-1990)[32] student, and has a strong understanding of modernity as well as good academic training.  In my view, he is someone who understands and identifies with traditional Chinese intellectuals.  In his early writings, his defense of traditional culture is very clear, and his Confucian Ethics and the Commercial Spirit 儒家伦理与商人精神 aims without doubt to defend Chinese culture against Weber’s theory.  From this perspective, I have a great deal of respect for him.  As for his views that you just mentioned concerning the role of Confucianism in a constitutional democracy, I have nothing against them.  When I say that moral orthodoxy is greater than political orthodoxy I’m speaking in historical, cultural terms.  Yu’s views might be taken to mean that in the process of establishing constitutional rule, Confucianism should be taken into consideration as representing useful value statements from the moral tradition. In the context of modern institutions, the position of the constitution is higher than any theory or religion, this of course is something demanded by the modern political principle of the separation of powers. 

But social pluralism should be important within Confucianism as well.  And here, Confucianism can and should use its own strength to secure its own special position, just as Protestantism has become the civil religion of the United States.

YZQ:  My feeling is that in modern China, those who follow Confucians have two possible paths.  One is Song-Ming Neoconfucianism, which is the path chosen by Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968)[33] and Mou Zongsan.  The other is the path of history, which is the path chosen by Wang Guowei 王国维 (1877-1927), Chen Yinque 陈寅恪[34] (1890-1969), Qian Mu, and Yu Yingshi.  If you choose the path of history, it is hard to come up with a complete system, because history itself already destroyed the possibility of completion.  But Chen Ming has chosen to follow neither of these paths.

CM:  The first path is something like taking the classics as both essence and function, and the second is more like taking the classics as essence and history as function.  My feeling is that my “revealing the essence through the function” is close to what Zhang Xuecheng 章学成 (1738-1801)[35] proposed:  “both essence and function,” “classics and history as one.”  Of course the precondition for this is the qianyuan 乾元 theory of changes from the Zhouyi 周易.[36]  After we started publishing Yuandao I wrote Yu a letter and included a copy of one of the issues.  At that time, I had just read his Remembering the Wind Blowing on the Scales in the Water 猶記風吹水上鱗, which talked about the conflicts between Qian Mu and the New Confucians, and even though it was clear that he was telling the truth, from the point of view of a Confucian “united front,” I suggested to him that he shouldn’t exaggerate the conflict between Qian and Mou, or present it as an internal division.  Of course he paid no attention to me.  Still, his influence on me was very important, especially in terms of methodology.  I admire how he combines sociology and history, even if my own approach is closer to cultural anthropology or cultural studies.

From Confucianism to “Confucian Religion”

CYZ:  It is very popular on the mainland these days to talk about “Confucian religion” and not just “Confucianism” or “Confucians.”  You are in close contact with the world of Confucian scholarship, so you must have noted that the term “Confucian religion” appears with much less frequency in Taiwan than on the Mainland.  How do you explain this difference?

CM:  On the Mainland, the term “Confucian religion” has replaced  “Confucianism” basically to emphasize the organic relationship between Confucian culture and social and spiritual life.  The ism of Confucianism is ontological, or maybe simply philosophical, but this clearly does not do justice to the true form and role of Confucianism in history.  If no one uses “Confucian religion” in Taiwan, it is because Confucian culture is still a living thing in Taiwan.  In the public sphere, Confucianism plays the role and exercises the influence of civil religion.  In the private realm, it permeates personal beliefs and daily ethics at a subconscious level.  So whether you call it “Confucian religion” or not, it exists as “Confucian religion.”

If things were the same on the mainland, then we—or at least I—wouldn’t make such a big deal about it.

CYZ:  In the recent Mainland context, it looks like “Confucian religion” already refers to a “religion” and not a “teaching.”  Is this in imitation of Kang Youwei 康有为 (1858-1927)?[37]  I notice that you, too, use the term “Confucian religion,” and see it as a kind of “religion.”

CM:  The reason that Confucius’s texts that we find in the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries 四库全书[38] are called “classics” is not because there is any scholarly difference between Confucius and Han Feizi 韩非子 (279-233 B.C.)[39] or Mozi 墨子 (470-391 B.C.)[40], but instead because of his role and influence in daily ethical life and in actual political practice.  Now, of course, the social basis and structure on which Confucianism relied has declined and ultimately disappeared with changes in society, and it is thoroughly reasonable and natural to seek a new social basis and platform for its reconstruction. 

Outside of “religion,” is there a better form or approach?  I think Kang Youwei came to the same conclusion.  If Kang Youwei’s Confucian religion movement had not overplayed its hand in trying to make Confucianism into the national religion, and had instead sought, in a down to earth way, to give Confucianism the same legal status as Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Islam, combining Confucian capital such as Confucian temples, ancestral temples and academies in one system, then we wouldn’t be in such a tough spot today.  If there is an opportunity today [to revive Confucianism], then we have to seize it, and not be cast aside by history yet again.

CYZ:  The same legal status as Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Islam?  Do you mean registering as a religion?  If so, then let me ask a follow-up question:  Can Confucians carry out a religious movement?  Are they good at it?  In Taiwan, registered Confucian churches are among the groups with the smallest number of members, and they have far less influence than Daoists or Buddhists.  If Confucians register as a popular religion on the Mainland, will they really have more influence?

CM:  Yes, they should register as an ordinary religious organization.  At least that way they could get an operating license and compete as an equal in the religious marketplace. 

Something interesting that I have been thinking about is how to structure a Confucian argument about questions of life and death.  I have a student who is working on the topic, and has discussed it with Lu Yunfeng 卢云峰[41] at Beijing University.  Prior to the establishment of Buddhism and Daoism, Chinese people’s ideas of life and death were profoundly influenced by Confucianism, but after Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179-104 B.C.),[42] Confucianism became increasingly politicized and elitist, which led to the diminution of the persuasiveness of Confucianism on this front—which was also one of the main reasons for the rise of Daoism among the people.

As for how competitive Confucianism might be, this is another question.  The core of Taiwan’s Yiguandao 一贯道[43] is in fact Confucianism.  I’ve looked into, and found it quite encouraging.

CYZ:  Taiwan’s textbooks contain a good deal of Confucian materials, but this is not religious education.  There are too many kinds of religion, and if the government promoted one particular kind, it would make the error of merging church and state, and thus violate a basic norm of constitutional democracy.  So from another perspective, it is precisely because Confucianism is not seen as a religion that its social influence transcends that of a religion.

CM:  When I mentioned the position of Confucian religion in Taiwan before, I was thinking of things like Ma Yingjiu’s 马英九 (b. 1950)[44] participation in Confucian ceremonies, and of the Confucian classics being included teaching materials in required courses in Taiwan’s high schools.  These facts are more important than whether we call it Confucian religion or not.  On the Mainland, Confucianism is nothing at all.  A little while ago there was a conference at Taiwan University, and I argued that when Taiwanese scholars say that the idea of “Confucian religion” is an obstacle to the spread of the influence of Confucian culture, this is an example of “the well-fed not knowing the hunger of the hungry 饱汉不知饿汉饿.”  If Mainland scholars oppose this kind of Confucian religion, then it’s an empty argument completely divorced from reality.

Criticism of the Idea of a National Religion

CYZ:  There are some Mainland Confucians who propose that Confucianism become the “national religion,” or even advocate the establishment of a system where church and state are intimately bound together.  How Confucian is this idea of a national religion, or this fundamentalist theocratic idea?  My impression is that you have not criticized the idea of a national religion.

CM:  It's true that I have not sharply criticized this idea, because your criticisms are already enough!  But I recently said something that was not too politically correct:  first, that as a religion, Confucianism’s religiosity is itself rather weak, in terms of the manner and the degree to which it believes in spirits, and in terms of arguments concerning life and death and the soul.  So even if I promote the idea of Confucian religion, I oppose the notion that it is already a fully formed religion.  If we make the mistake of presenting it that way, we can neither effectively present what Confucianism is, nor can we rebuild Confucianism.

Second, you have to respect history, and cannot, in order to prove your own arguments, make up your own historical narratives, for example proclaiming that “Confucianism was the national religion beginning in the Han dynasty.”  The Han inherited Qin institutions, and its foundation was a mixture of the ways of the hegemon and the ways of the king, outwardly Confucian and inwardly Legalist.  Confucianism emerged out of shamanism; it matured and developed on a social basis.  Of course, there were the brilliant [individual] moments of Yu the Great, the Kings Tang, Wen and Wu, as well as Confucius, but Confucianism at base is a social product.  Almost all early societies and countries wrapped themselves in the cloak of religion—the idea of severing communication between heaven and earth 绝地天通 is one sign of this.  From the moment that politics and religion were separated in China,[45] Confucianism as a system of rites and music was diluted by politics, the high point of which was the Qin burning of the books and burying the Confucians. When Dong Zhongshu convinced Han Wudi to adopt Confucianism as the sole philosophy of rule, this was a sudden, happy occurrence, a world-changing event.[46]  Henceforth, Confucianism became merely a technique of social governance, and was no longer the Way.  In addition, the reason that things evolved in this way was because Confucianism already had a firm social basis, otherwise, why use it in this way?

YZQ:  Why do you think that this is politically incorrect?

CM:  It’s politically incorrect because, according to the principles within the Confucian world, my speaking this way does not help to build the image of Confucianism.  I truly believe that a “top down approach” will not work theoretically or in practice, and hence cannot yield good results.  I propose, first, that the proper approach to Confucian religion is to build a social basis and work up from there.  Only if things are working at lower levels, on a solid base, will the top pay attention.

Second, we have to bear in mind that times have changed.  Today’s Confucians are weak.  Aside from the challenges of liberalism, Christianity, and ideology, Confucianism itself has yet to devise an appropriate response to social change or to the challenge of modernity.  By “modernity,” I do not mean ideological discourses of the left and the right, but rather changes in ways of production, life and thought since the industrial revolution.  Confucianism should and must make adjustments and reforms in response to this.

CYZ:  In what ways do you differ from Jiang Qing?

CM:  My most important differences with Jiang Qing are the following.  First, Jiang looks at the world, and at Chinese problems, from the angle of Confucianism.  I start from the perspective of people—first Chinese people, but then people of the entire world—so as to see what Confucianism can contribute to the well-being of the Chinese people and humanity at large.  Jiang Qing’s starting point is an essentialized culture; my starting point is the development of human life. 

Second, Jiang is concerned with the decline and revival of “Chineseness.”  He believes that modern China is already thoroughly Westernized, which means “barbarized,” politically through Marxism, economically through capitalism. I am concerned with the revival of the Chinese people, which is related to the search for wealth and power in modern times.  In my view, “Chineseness” is a product of history, and one cannot simplistically essentialize it from a cultural perspective.  What I am concerned with is how people can live and develop well, in the broadest possible sense.[47]  My heritage is that of the Self-Strengthening Movement[48] and “Chinese essence, Western function;” Jiang’s heritage is that of Woren 倭仁[49] and his fellow diehards.     

Third, Jiang Qing basically rejects modernity.  He starts from a value judgement concerning the whole of modernity, and rejects it.  My understanding of modernity is a historical judgement, and I make a critical analysis of it as the hand we have been dealt. 

Fourth, given these differences in methodology and basic assumptions, we also have different views as to the future development of Confucianism.  I don’t approve of the top-down approach of “national religion,” and prefer the path of “civil religion.”  Aside from these differences in goals and plans for developing growing out of these goals, on the question of the attitude toward “Confucianism as a religion,” Jiang Qing emphasizes its completeness and perfection, which is why he wants to elevate it to the position of “national religion.”  I stress the importance of reform, and would like to contribute to Confucianism’s discussions of life and death, which would solidify its foundation, enhancing its role and influence as “civil religion.”

CYZ:  Do you accept any of Jiang Qing’s political plans (his “Confucian constitutionalism”)?

CM:  No.  I think his plan is impracticable.  He says that the members of the House of National Essence 国体院 will be people with Confucian bloodlines, but what good are Confucian bloodlines?  His “legitimacy of the heavenly way 天道合法性” can be achieved through the construction of the constitution, so why gild the lily?  How is he going to put together the House of Confucian Tradition 通儒院?  Who picks the members?  I think a “fake Confucian” like me would have no chance of being selected!

CYZ:  Do you reject Kang Xiaoguang’s plans as well?

CM:  Kang and I overlap a lot in terms of our problématique, in that we both approach China as “stakeholders.”  In terms of his understanding of culture, Kang’s approach is instrumentalist, which is very close to my view.  But Kang brings Huntington into the picture.  The reason that he is a Confucian is linked to Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations.  Huntington not only supplied Kang’s field, he also gave him his logic.  My feeling is that Huntington invented his arguments about culture and civilization on purpose, and that Kang kind of fell for it.  There’s more to civilization than “clashes,” and if you really believe in civilization you can identity transcendent interests, as well as political and legal functions.  So Kang transformed Tu Wei-ming’s “Confucian China”[50] into a real thing, and built his own arguments on top of it.  I feel that it is impractical or perhaps too idealistic.

According to his logic of “cultural empires,” Chinese Confucians anywhere in the world make up a community.  In that case, are Chinese Christians in China part of the West?  Are Chinese Moslems part of the Middle East?  Won’t this completely mess China up?  We should be clear that the reasons behind the conflicts on the world stage are interests, always interests. 

YZQ:  The reason Kang Xiaoguang can’t publish his essays is not because of problems with the essays, but is because he writes as a strategist, and seeks to reveal the rulers’ secrets to everyone.  He has argued for a corporatist state and for elite control, but what he means is that the elite should have a monopoly on power.

CM:  I share one basic view with Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang, which is to understand, explain, and construct Confucian culture from the point of view of religion.  This means paying attention to the internal relationships between Confucianism, daily life, and questions of existence, and not taking it merely as a system of knowledge and being satisfied with a clarification of the internal logic of the system, judging its success on the basis of comparison with a Western philosophical current or another personal comparison.  This is the biggest difference between Mainland New Confucians and Hong Kong-Taiwan New Confucians.  The fact that I disapprove of the attempt to establish Confucianism as the national religion is a lesser consideration in this same field.

Confucian Religion “From the Bottom Up”

CYZ:  You don’t agree with the “top down” strategy of establishing Confucianism as the national religion, and instead propose:  1. To use Confucianism’s status as a religion to mobilize Confucian resources in civil society, which would require strengthening Confucianism’s religious content; 2. To define and construct Confucian religion’s special position and influence from the point of view of “civil religion.”  Could I ask you to go into a bit more detail on this “bottom up” strategy and the thinking behind it?

CM:  Our “country” today is a “Republic of five nationalities,” a modern, pluralistic country, not merely the country of the Han ethnic group.  To impose the religion of a particular ethnicity as national religion through politics or state power was something that Kang Youwei could not do at the time, and it is even less possible for the people who would do the same thing now.  The group that corresponds to this country is not the Han as an ethnic group, but instead the citizens of the Chinese Republic.  The equality of each ethnicity or group is the legal and moral basis of the Chinese Republic, and its greatest political wisdom.

From a historical perspective, Confucianism clearly possessed this trans-ethnic political position in Chinese history, as seen in the structure of Tian’anmen, with the Taimiao 太庙 on the left and the Shejitan 社稷坛 on the right,[51] and in imperial edicts beginning with “ordained by heaven 奉天承运,” or the ever-present Ming-Qing plaques with the inscription “heaven, earth, ruler, parent, teacher 天地君亲师” found in places of Confucian sacrifice.  Emperors of the Han ethnicity this things this way, as did emperors from other nationalities.  The Records of Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion 大义觉迷录 was the Yongzheng 雍正 emperor’s (r. 1723-1735) argument on the subject.  To say just a few words about it, Yongzheng promulgated the imperial edict in the South to popularize the use of Mandarin, and while he said that the purpose was to “encourage customs of respecting the Way” and “ruling subjects in their native language 同文之治,” in fact his goal was to strengthen the political community.[52]  As you can see, explaining Confucianism through the concept of “civil religion” is obviously possible and necessary.  As we revive and rebuild Confucianism today, our goal should clearly be to establish it as a “civil religion!”  So we should begin from this goal, and from the characteristics or conditions that Confucianism possesses.

CYZ:  What does “civil religion” mean?

CM:  “Civil religion” actually refers to a function or to a role.  To develop this function, or to achieve this role, it is necessary that the foundation of Confucianism be a religion, otherwise it’s unthinkable.  For this reason, the first thing to do is to reconstruct “Confucianism as a religion.”  To my mind, the important points here are, first, to locate and consolidate our own social basis, second, to improve Confucianism’s views on individual life and death, and on arguments concerning the soul.  So the first task has to do with modern society, and the second has to do with strengthening weak links in our own theory and practice.  This means that we have to make Confucianism a bit “thinner.”

Concretely, one thing to address is changing the notion of “differences between Chinese and barbarians 华夷之辨”, and another is the question of the importance accorded to individuality.  Confucianism posits heaven as the origin of all things, and also contains the idea that all things return to heaven, but this idea remains unknown, perhaps because Confucius said “not knowing life, how can we know about death 未知生焉知死?”  But this does not fulfill people’s needs, and explains why Confucianism declined so quickly with the abolition of the examination system and the end of its link to politics.  But the success of the Yiguandao and other types of Confucianism in Taiwan and Southeast Asia has a lot to do with promises these groups make regarding questions of life and existence.  Having looked into these groups, I think that it is possible to use historical documents, popular beliefs and the example of the Yiguandao to try to retool Confucianism.  Only when we have achieved this basis does it make sense to talk about establishing Confucianism as a “civil religion.”

CYZ:  You say that “Confucian religion” should improve its stances on individual life and questions of life and death and the soul, even while you admit that these are not Confucianism’s strong points!  On the one hand, this appears to be thin, “pared down” Confucianism, but at the same time it looks you need to “thicken” Confucianism’s religiosity.  And as you move between “thick” and “thin,” your idea of “Confucianism as a religion” seems to turn it into a kind of popular religion.  Yet in a plural system of popular religion, both Buddhism and Daoism have more influence than Confucianism.  If “Confucian religion” already has a hard time becoming the main force in the popular religion(s) of the Chinese people, then how is it going to take the path of popular religion to achieve the status of a civil religion?

CM:  “Thick” or “thin” has to do with relations between Confucianism and other religions or its compatibility with other religions.  Improvement will come from within.  What you said is correct:  “Confucianism as a religion” comes very close to “popular religion.”  But the notion of popular religion does not mean that its impact is slight, nor that its theory or organization is sloppy or loose.  To repeat what I’ve already said, Confucian evolved out of shamanism, and was intimately linked to the social life of the group, directly producing a system of ritual and music.  But it ultimately came to live or die as politics.  After Dong Zhongshu, Confucianism’s deep basis was ignored, which ultimately led to the loss of its existential basis as politics changed.  Now if we admit our error and start over to carve out a niche for ourselves, it is entirely possible.

As for achieving the position of a civil religion, this is not completely reliant on something as big as “Confucianism as a religion.”  The influence of Confucianism as a popular religion is very weak in Taiwan.  Of course, “weak” is a relative concept, because a characteristic of Chinese religion is that it is diffused.  But what can compare with the position of Confucianism in the public sphere?  In other words, Confucianism is not merely a popular religion, but is a constellation, a group of popular religions.  I predict that under the religious management system on the mainland, it is entirely possible that the name of the largest Confucian group won’t even have the character for “Confucian” in it.  Neither the Three-in-One Religion 三一教,[53] the Yiguandao 一贯道, nor the Dejiao 德教[54] in Southeast Asia contains the character for “Confucian,” but all belong to the Confucian religion broadly speaking. 

CYZ:  A few minutes ago you also mentioned changing the notion of “differences between Chinese and barbarians 华夷之辨.”

CM:  Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873-1929)[55] also thought about how to bring together the various ethnicities that the Manchus had included in their territory.  Just one cannot equate the “American people” with Anglo-Saxons, African-Americans or Native Americans, the “Chinese people” is not the same as Han, Manchu, Tibet, or other groups.  The Chinese Republic is not the simple sum of 56 nationalities, instead, it is an organic synthesis, based on constitutional principles and the combined identities that each ethnicity brings based on its own cultural background. 

The central concept, or the ideological construct, corresponding to the American people, the American way or life or the American spirit, is not the internal history and tradition of a particular group, but rather the reflection of an existential reality that transcends all groups.  Its contents is constrained by politics and law, but culture remains an organized part of it, and its own existential form can only be something of a cultural nature.  Similarly, “Confucianism as a civil religion” is one element shaping China’s political community, a self-understanding and an expression of its political-legal status and accompanying discourses.  Here, by “accompanying discourses,” I am referring to things like a common understanding or the “common good.”  These are linked internally to the groups’ culture, a new thing that is part of that culture but not wholly subsumed in it—something that corresponds to each individual’s synthetic experience in time and space, something that must be cultivated and constructed.  In this sense, the work that falls to culture is equally important as that involving politics and law.  And as the largest of the 56 groups or nationalities in China, the Han should assume even more responsibility, and should possess not only a self-conscious sense of Chineseness, but should also leave Han chauvinism behind, and contribute as a leader in the construction of the consciousness of the Chinese people.

What I’m talking about is perhaps easier to understand in the context of the emergence of Christianity out of Judaism, the later Protestant Reformation, and the development of Protestantism as a civil religion in the United States.  First, I see the separation of Christianity from Judaism as the separation of belief from a particular group.   And the Protestant Reformation was a response to social change.  And the achievement of the status of civil religion by Protestantism in the United States was the result of changes already discussed.

YZQ:  Chen Yizhong asked you what your definition of “civil religion” is.  What role do you see for it?  I feel like you haven’t yet been altogether clear.

CM:  Civil religion has two functions.  First, it establishes a values foundation for politics, establishing a political legitimacy and a set of boundaries for that legitimacy.  In a certain sense, this was what Dong Zhongshu did.  In other words, he pushed “Confucianism as a religion” toward the position of “civil religion.”  Establishing a values foundation for politics, this is the first function.  

The second function is social, in the life of the nation, and it is to provide an integrated basis for intellectual and cultural identity, moulding and shaping the consciousness of the Chinese people. 

Of course, since I advocate beginning with Confucianism, it is hard to avoid suspicions of Han chauvinism.  Christians might ask:  why take Confucianism as the civil religion?  Why not Christianity?  My answer is that the Han remain the major body of the Chinese people.  Moreover, the plasticity of Confucianism as a religion is greater than that of Christianity.  Christianity is a god-based religion, and its contradictions with Islam are harder to resolve.

CYZ:  Let me try to sum up your major viewpoints.  You criticize the notion of establishing Confucianism as the national religion, saying that this “top-down approach” is unworkable.  You say that Confucianism should devote itself to becoming what you call a “civil religion,” and emphasize its trans-ethnic nature and its foundational role in public space.  On the one hand, you hope that “Confucianism as a religion” can develop in society through strengthening its discussion of individual life, as well as questions concerning life, death, and the soul, and on this basis you further hope that Confucianism can play the role of achieving a trans-ethnic “national  integration,” and hence enjoy the position and influence of a civil religion.  You argue that “Confucianism as a civil religion” must get past the idea that there are “distinctions between Chinese and barbarians,” and fall in step with the changes of modern society.  Is this the big picture?

CM:  Yes.

Confucian Religion as “Civil Religion”

CYZ:  Why the expression “civil religion?”  For Rousseau, the point of “civil religion” was to produce a highly homogenous citizenry.  Not only was the emphasis on unity, there were even military values involved, all of which seems to be in conflict with the plural societies of modernity.

CM:  Why “civil religion?”  First because I am dissatisfied with how academics like Ren Jiyu 任继愈 (1916-2009)[56] and He Guanghu 何光沪 (b. 1950)[57] use Christianity as a standard from which to describe Confucianism.  Confucianism is a religion, but this doesn’t mean that it is the same kind of religion as Christianity.  I want to prove this point and avoid tedious theoretical discussions so as to discuss Confucianism’s functions fairly succinctly, which will enable us to get a handle on Confucianism’s special features clearly and directly.

My understanding and use of the concept of civil religion are closer to what we find in Robert Bellah’s discussions of American society.  The nation is built on a social basis, and society is a community, with its values and ideals and emotions and surrounding discourses.  Theories that build the state on the basis of atomized individuals are in fact little more than logical assumptions, and whatever positive meanings they locate, they remain nothing more than a reference point.

Fei Xiaotong’s 费孝通 (1910-2005)[58] idea of the Chinese people as “a plural entity 多元一体,” with political unity and cultural pluralism, has many positive elements, but there remains the question of the lack of connection between politics and culture.  Within the large tent of political unity or a constitution, the cultural frontiers between the 56 nationalities remain clear, which preserves and strengthens each group’s sense of time and memory.  Yet should we not, from a spatial perspective, reflect on the possibility of creating a new cultural consciousness on the basis of this political community?  This community is our life space, and will become its own history, and a new culture, following the evolution of this life.  Surely it would be natural to see “national consciousness” as one organized part of this new culture?  Bellah argued that “some kind of civil religion exists in any society with a political structure.”  This is also how I understand Chinese national consciousness.

Constitutional respect for social pluralism does not preclude guidance in terms of cultural development, so as to stimulate positive mutual interaction between culture and politics, between cultural entities, and between individuals.  In the past, Sun Yat-sen had a great deal to say about the question of forging a plural culture and a unitary politics.  But the July 5 incident in Xinjiang[59] and the earlier March 14 incident in Tibet[60] would seem to suggest that ethnic integration and the formation of the Chinese people are at their beginning, and one might even say that the challenge is severe.  The problem is both political and cultural, a contemporary example of the enduring tensions in the relationship between agricultural and herding cultures.

“Confucianism as civil religion” and “Confucianism as a religion” are not the same thing.  “Confucianism as a religion” is important in the context of history and of the Han and other groups that recognized Confucianism.  Confucianism as a civil religion is important in the context of a people who will make up a political community.  The first is temporal, the second spatial.  Making the transition or the leap between temporal and spatial will require a very thin version of Confucianism, one that can link up with other religions as well as modern values.  The smoother the links, the greater the possibility of the establishment [of Confucianism], and the better the result.  When I talk about getting past the idea of the “differences between Chinese and barbarians,” this is in relation to civil religion.

CYZ:  On the question of relations between Han and Tibetans or between Han and Uighurs, how will “Confucianism as a civil religion” encourage ethnic harmony and justice?  Some people say that harmonizing relations between Han and Tibetans or Han and Uighurs is not simply a question of the one-sided views of Han intellectuals, but also requires listening to the opinion of “the other.”

CM:  This is both a political and a cultural question.  Marxism and liberalism share a point in common, which is that neither takes seriously questions of nationality or ethnicity.  One sees man in terms of his class existence, the other in terms of his individual existence.  Such reductionism might have a positive point, which is that it leaves the resolution of ethnic questions to politics or law.  Still, the cultural aspect of the question is real, and we cannot reduce the totality of the problem to politics or law.  I completely agree with your idea of “respecting the other.”  My opposition to the idea of a national religion is surely one proof of my “respect for others,” right?

In the context of other religions, the Confucian version is relatively thin.  Historically speaking, Confucianism paid comparatively more attention to society.  Confucianism’s original idea, drawn from shamanism, of the unity of heaven and man, and its belief in heaven, understood worship from the perspective of life, all of which is fairly readily acceptable in a polytheistic setting.  Confucianism’s “what I do not wish others to do to me, I do not wish to do to others 己所不欲，勿施于人”[61] has the status of the Golden Rule.  All of these are advantages in Confucianism’s efforts to achieve and develop the status of civil religion.  As national consciousness increases, an organic ethnic integration can take hold, and increased ethnic integration will surely lead to greater harmony in ethnic relations.

CYZ:  Still, you must admit that when you point out the weakness of Confucianism while arguing that its religious nature must be strengthened, that you are talking about two different aspects:  the first is an “is” and the second is an “ought.”  One of your references for this latter “ought” (“we should strengthen Confucianism’s arguments concerning life, death and the soul”) is the Yiguandao, and another is Protestantism.  Can we reduce your theory of civil religion to “Protestantism in America?”

CM:  Confucianism’s weakness on questions of life and death is a result of historical factors; after Dong Zhongshu, Daoists and Buddhists took up these questions.  But there remains a logical space within Confucianism for discussion of these issues.  It merely requires activation.  This isn’t a question of “is” and “ought.”  New religious movements spring up all the time.  Why can’t new branches grow on the old tree of Confucianism?

Let me point out as well that my reference is not Protestantism, my reference is America.  The United States are a great melting pot, where different ethnic groups came together reasonably well to form the American nation, from which arose the American way of life and the American spirit.  Japan is a mono-ethnic nation, and its basic civil religion should be Shintoism, which was forcibly constructed [in contrast with the relatively organic nature of the American experience].  This illustrates that there are many examples of civil religion. There are obvious differences between the Japanese, French, Chinese and American examples.

CYZ:  I noted that you seem to be concerned about the development of Protestantism in China.  If we add the membership in the Three-Self Church[62] to those of the underground churches[63]  then there are 60,000,000 to 80,000,000 Protestants, if not more.  Would Confucianism as a civil religion accept and include these “non-Confucians”?  Or would it seem them as “Western pollution”?

CM:  They would not be suppressed, but integrated.  We could build consensus.  My viewpoint is that the cultural character of the Chinese nation would remain Confucian at the base, and this is what I am devoting my efforts to.  But I don’t see this leading to religious oppression.  Establishing a national religion might lead other groups to feel uneasy, but the idea of civil religion should not.

The problem of the underground church is related to state policy on religion and to the Three-Self church, but not so much to Confucianism.  In addition, while some of my Protestant friends oppose Confucianism, many others feel like there is room for integration and harmony.  It is natural that there be tension between different gods, but tension does not mean conflict.

The question of “Western pollution” is complicated, all tied up with questions of cultural and political status and identity.  It was Americans who thought up the “clash between civilizations” and “soft power,” which means that they are not mere abstractions.  And if you look at things historically, political, economic and even military factors get dragged onto the religious platform.  In my view, all of this is oversimplified, either too stupid, too empty, or too sinister.

I have always seen Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang 冯玉祥 (1882-1948),[64] Zhang Xueliang 张学良 (1901-2001),[65] and Wang Jianxuan 王建煊 (b. 1938)[66] as proofs that there is no conflict between being a Christian and being Chinese.  Confucians must change their attitude, and accept those with cultural, political and legal standings that are not completely the same as theirs.  This is not in contradiction with Confucianism’s becoming a civil religion, and instead will facilitate the development of this consciousness and the achievement of this goal.  In the cultural construct of the “unity of the three teachings” [under the dynasties], Confucianism was meant to “govern the world.”  This illustrates that the main function of Confucianism lies in the public sphere.

CYZ:  Your theory builds on Bellah’s theories of modernity, as well as structural functionalism.  In any event, what you consider most important seems to be the role of “national integration.”

CM:  It’s true that my work is structural-functionalist, and I do value national integration.  But in my view, the nation and the state are both positive concepts, in other words I am talking about legitimate nations and states, by which I mean those that include modern values regarding rights, citizens, and law such as emphasized by liberal democracies.  Fundamentally, “civil religion” is about consensus and the common good, the largest common denominator in any social or cultural body.  A country, or the world, must be based on something, and this basis must consist of values, which, in turn, are based on beliefs and hence are religious.  My hope is the Confucianism can rely on the contributions it has made in the process of national construction to achieve the status of civil religion.

The civil religion that I imagine will contain viewpoints and values that Buddhist, Muslims and Christians can accept, such as “overflowing virtue 生生之德,” “heavenly conscience 生生之德,” as well as harmony and love 仁爱 [i.e., basic concepts underlying all of Chinese civilization, and that find echoes outside of Confucianism and outside of China].  These are ideals and values as well as statements of consensus and feelings.  Of course, the viewpoints and values of Christians, Muslims and others can also be integrated into this.  The idea of “Confucianism as civil religion” is nothing other than saying:  in our civil religion, Confucianism occupies a comparatively larger intellectual space!  Civil religion is by nature thin; its characteristic is that of an overall synthesis, with relatively little internal content but considerable ability to expand and absorb ideas of other religions.

CYZ:  What you are proposing seems to me pointing toward a kind of national identity with Confucianism as its cultural base.

CM:  I can accept that.  I don’t deny that in putting forth my argument concerning civil religion, I hope that the Confucian tradition can achieve greater influence in the plural entity that is China.  But what I want to stress is that this civil religion based on Confucianism must transcend the ethnicity of particular ethnic groups.  Here, what should guide us are community feelings and commonly shared experience; cultural elements and historical narratives may be useful as supplemental references.  Compared to other resources we could draw on, Confucianism is clearly more open than Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or Daoism, which means that it should also be more competitive.  People from these other faiths may not feel this way, but this is my view, which I am willing to discuss.

YZQ:  Rebuilding Confucianism in the way you are discussing involves two processes.  One is the reconstruction of Confucianism itself, after which comes the second, which is the idea of providing a spiritual support to a modern country still in formation.  These are two different missions, but you seem to hope to accomplish them all at once.

CM:  I think about the reconstruction of Confucianism on two levels, i.e., “Confucianism as religion” and “Confucianism as civil religion,” and stress the importance and guidance of “ultimately attaining the goal and function of civil religion.” This is because if Confucianism cannot develop this capacity, then while it will not be meaningless, its meaning will be limited.

YZQ:  To my mind, there is a serious conflict between these two tasks or goals.  To rebuild Confucianism you must make it “thick.”  But if you also want to provide a modern state with universal values, then Confucianism needs to be “thin,” otherwise it cannot fulfill this latter role.

CM:  True enough.  But to my mind, if Confucianism cannot serve as a civil religion in the construction of a modern state, if it cannot play a role in the moulding of Chinese national consciousness, then no matter how “thick” Confucianism might be as a “religion,” its significance will be slight.  In the Tang, there was a concordance of three religions in which Confucianism governed the world, Buddhism governed the heart, and Daoism governed the body.  “Confucianism governed the world,” means that Confucianism was more concerned with public affairs, and had more influence in that realm.  At present, Confucianism does indeed need to address its shortcomings and pay more attention to mind and body and affairs of the soul, after which it can reclaim its place in society.  But it must absolutely set its sights on this position as “civil religion,” and pay attention to the interface and the space required for this connection.  Otherwise, it’s the project to make Confucianism a national religion that is hoping to kill two birds with one stone, or even two combine the two tasks into one.  Not me!

First, I see a clear divide between “Confucianism as a religion” and “Confucianism as civil religion.”  The idea of Confucianism as a religion is addressed to Han Chinese or to believers in Confucianism, in the hopes that Confucianism can function as a complete religious system in the spiritual life of these believers.  The idea of Confucianism as civil religion is addressed to the people of the Chinese Republic.  This draws on values and arguments extracted from Confucianism as a religion, but deploys these in the public sphere.

Next, I admit that “Confucianism as a religion” has its own particularities, but at the same time it is a kind of “weak” religion, with many flaws, for example it lacks its own organizational system, and pays too little attention to questions of the soul and life and death, etc.

Finally, to my mind, instead of saying that we should revive Confucianism, we should say that we will rebuild Confucianism, and rebuild from the perspective of the place of a civil religion in a social order.  We need to use what is imagined to create what is real, an imagined civil religion to create a real religion.  We need to understand this process as being linked with that of the development and transformation of the nation, and as an important organized part of this process.  Here in Taiwan, I discovered that “Confucianism as a religion” is not all that flourishing, and can’t compare to Buddhism or Daoism.  But the roots of Confucianism are found in everyone’s heart, which secures the place of “Confucianism as civil religion” and serves as the base for its widespread influence.  This leads me to have more faith in my own ideas. 

From Chinese Essence and Western Function to “Revealing the essence through the function”

CYZ:  You propose “revealing the essence through the function,” but what is “function,” because it doesn’t seem self-evident?  You feel that certain current problems are important, like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.  Hence you emphasize the Confucians (or Confucianism) must be “useful” in building China’s national consciousness and its modern state.  But there are many types of contemporary issues, and not everyone judges their importance in the same way.

CM:  Let me first clarify a few things about my idea of “revealing the essence through the function.”  This idea of “revealing the essence through the function” came out of my engagement with the well-known model formula “Chinese essence, Western function.”  “Chinese essence, Western function” was a plan, launched by a group of scholar-officials when Western culture entered China, for dealing with the problem of the relationship between Confucian tradition and Western culture.  This formula evolved out of another—China primary, Western auxiliary 中主西辅—and the reason that the first replaced the second to become the consensus choice was that “form and function,” in addition to the idea of “primary and secondary,” also contained the notion of “basics and inessentials 本末.”  Hence the formula served as a theoretical explanation or proof concerning whether Chinese or Western culture was primary or secondary.  The general argument was that Chinese culture was concerned with ethical principles, and hence was spiritual.  Western culture talked about warships and guns, and hence was material.  Spiritual concerns are basic, material concerns are matters of detail.  This of course is a simplification, but it provides a theoretical explanation, and at the time conformed to mainstream desires.  For these reasons, “Chinese essence, Western function” achieved its historical position and its broad influence.

Like Confucius’s Spring and Autumn Annals, Zhang Zhidong’s 张之洞 (1837-1909)[67] Exhortation to Study 劝学篇[68] was both cultural and political.  In my view, “Chinese essence, Western function” worked first as a kind of behavior, and later as way of thinking.  And the reason that this thought and behavior should be affirmed is that there is a conscious assumption behind it concerning Chinese agency.  My idea of “revealing the essence through the function” is to make this essential point stand out more clearly, and to add my own explanation.

The “essence” in “revealing the essence through the function” refers, in an ontological sense, to the core of all living things 天地生物之心; in human culture, it refers to the kingly heart 王心 that the sage, embodying heaven, creates.  This is one of Dong Zhongshu’s concepts, his idea of the king.  In Dong’s mind, the king had no form, left no trace, and did not speak, so how did heaven speak through him?  The meaning of heaven is seen in all the things of the world, as in the expression “spring, summer, fall, and winter, wind, rain, frost and dew, there are teachings in all of these.”[69]  We can only see them through their functions.  This “function” should first be used or experienced as a verb or as a gerund, only after which come our ideas of the effectiveness, results, situations and results produced.  Experience is always contextual, intentional, with resulting effects.  This “function” as “results” is decided by intentions and goals; by contrast, intentionality itself can only “appear” through this kind of “activity” and “use.”  The sage, the greatest Confucian personality, receives the mandate of heaven 奉天而行, takes all life as virtue 以生生为德, takes benevolence as his heart 以仁为心, he completes himself and completes others, joining in the transformation 成己成物参赞化育, and for this reason, his “function” is first that of “development 发用.”  If you understand this from a pragmatic point of view there’s a certain overlap [with the other idea of “function”], but this is a vulgarization and we can’t accept it.

The reason that “function” is not clear in and of itself, is because intentionality itself is abstract, and only takes on concrete form when realized in particular circumstances.  To put it simply, there is one person’s “function,” one moment’s “function,” and then there are “functions” that are universal and eternal.  Thus the Confucian attempts to engage the mind and achieve peace for all times.  In our age of divided interest and plural societies, the Confucian respects, on the one hand, the dictum “what you do not wish for yourself, do not do to others,” and on the other must seek out the golden mean, the point of equilibrium between competing interests.

CYZ:  Your hope is to link up major contemporary issues with Confucianism, and through developing the Confucian “function” illustrate its value.  Your idea of “realizing the essence through the function” must in fact pay attention to both, and in any case, the proposition may be decided by factors not in your control

CM:  You’re exactly right.  And for this reason, while what I’m doing is both pragmatic and constructivist, the constructivist side is stronger, and this is my basic point of view and method.  If we limit ourselves to pragmatism, then moral and value angles might wind up being sacrificed.  When Confucianism talks about establishing virtue, about building a life for humanity, this is abstract but real at the same time.  As you advance toward a goal, the steps you take are naturally close to one another.  So why should we not talk about results?

It’s not Cultural Nationalism, and it’s not Chinese Universalism 天下主义

CZY :  In recent years, China’s economic rise has provoked a new wave of nationalism, accompanied by all sorts of cultural nationalism and economic nationalism.  Where do you see yourself in all of this?  Are you a cultural nationalist 文化国家主义?

CM :  No.  I’m not this kind of nationalist.  Let me emphasize :  the reason that I want to abandon ideas like “the distinction between Chinese and barbarian” is basically because the cultural chauvinism  文化民族论 and the cultural nationalism implicit in terms like “barbarian” are out of touch and unworkable in today’s society.  A related second reason is that, beginning from principles like these, the result is not good; it neither corresponds to basic Confucian ideas, nor does it improve the people’s welfare.  Cultural nationalism and cultural chauvinism both take culture as the essence of a country or a people.  This kind of essentialism is in fact an ideological discourse, a metaphysics.  In my view, we need to get to a point of equilibrium between the Spring and Autumn Annals idea of “revering the emperor and expelling the barbarians 尊王攘夷”[70] and the idea of “racial-cultural difference 文化夷夏论.”[71]  The notion of “revering the emperor and expelling the barbarians” is rooted in ideas about and the interests of politics and the community attached to those politics.  Those who spout ethnic nationalism should learn some history, which will keep them from winding up in historical nihilism and absurdity.

Not long ago I gave a talk in Guangzhou, in which I addressed the question of Confucianism from the point of view of the Chinese people/nation.  I said that we should oppose cultural nationalism, and people immediately rose in opposition to me.  One person brought up Huntington’s clash of civilizations, and said that the European Union was the result of a common culture.  I first refuted him through facts:  cultural commonality is highest among Arabic countries, and next comes what we might call “cultural China”—meaning China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam.  But how many wars have been fought between these countries?!  The greenest of the the green Hoklo culture advocating Taiwan independence is in fact an authentic descendant of the civilization of the central plains 中原河洛文明!  Do you still hold to this simplistic idea that culture is strong enough to exist as or to create a political entity?  The territorial boundaries that are the hard foundations of modern nations make a certain amount of sense, although they don’t always stand up to scrutiny, but history is always like this.

CYZ:  When you were talking about civil religion, you repeatedly insisted on the importance of a (cultural) identity that transcends ethnic groups.  Now you seem to be arguing the other side, in opposing theories that elevate cultural nationalism.

CM:  But there’s no conflict here!  When liberals talk about politics through the veil of ignorance,[72] when they make people an abstraction, this is wrong.  Cultural determinists can’t see the necessity of this occlusion 遮挡 and directly insert culture into politics, which is also wrong.  I think we should take both of these into account.  So I have reserves about cultural chauvinism and cultural nationalism.  When I’m talking with people who are only concerned with politics and public space, I emphasize the importance of the cultural dimension. 

Culture and politics are intermingled with life in complicated ways, and should be understood structurally, not synchronically or unidimensionally.  One cannot be reduced to the other, one cannot replace the other.  From a Confucian standpoint, we insist that the tradition of moral orthodoxy 道统 is greater than the tradition of political orthodoxy 政统, and that politics must have a moral basis.  But from a contemporary perspective, we also have to respect the principle of the division of church and state, and admit that any culture should function on a platform of a legal framework. 

I once offered the following criticism of Zhu Xueqin 朱学勤 (b. 1952)[73]:  liberals treat the political community as if it were a simple organization of individuals, yet the culture of each individual cannot be completely obscured by the veil of ignorance.  Now I offer a criticism of the idea of the “distinction between Chinese and barbarian” from another angle:  if every group brings its culture into political life, the only possible result is the division and disintegration of this political community.  A long time ago, I wrote an essay entitled “Do More Research, Talk Less about Culture 多研究些问题，少谈些文化,”[74] arguing against dragging culture into everything.  Compared to those who take cultural chauvinism and cultural nationalism to extremes, I think that we should examine the fundamental importance of politics and interests.  Culture is not optional, but it surely is not the most important thing.

We talk about the five people republic, and about wanting Manchus, Han, Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans to form a modern country.  To achieve this, of course we need a good system, but we also need to invest our efforts in the construction of a citizen consciousness.  The construction of a civil religion is doing the same work, creating a trans-ethnic culture.  In the absence of this, we have a unified political system without cultural integration, everyone running around in their own groups, and the foundation of this politics will be extremely fragile.

CYZ:  Recently, many commentators on the mainland have been talking up Chinese universalism, the tribute system, the Chinese empire…You just said that you advocate abandoning the idea of ethnic difference 夷夏之辨 because Han chauvinism inhibits the integration of the Chinese republic.  Yet you seem to accept the current international order, and don’t talk about Chinese universalism, the tribute system and the Chinese empire.

CM:  Viewed from outside, yes, that’s true.  But there is also an internal dimension.  Chinese universalism in fact comes with boundaries, because you can’t have “all under heaven” without first having heaven.  Heaven has to have a meaning, as a spirt or something sacred.   But Jehovah and Allah are not included in our heaven.  Our heaven is a unified, organic whole built out of nature, righteousness, values, and will.  Jehovah and Allah are absolute spirits that existed before the beginning of heaven and earth, and thus do not share the same heaven with us, so how can we talk about “all under heaven?”  This is one thing.

Second, when we talk about “all under heaven,” there is no doubt that this theory assumes that Chinese are at the center.  Every people takes itself as being at the center, which is understandable.  The problem is that when we talk about “Chinese universalism” in the context of the world system, and argue that it is a fairer system, then this first ignores the assumption of our own centrality, as well as turning its back on the power dynamics that accompany this claim.  The people promoting this idea seem not to have realized this.

CYZ:  It seems to me that many people have realized this.  When they talk about Chinese universalism, the tribute system and the Chinese empire, what they are promoting is Sinocentrism and Chinese imperialism.  Is this not the case?

CM:  I know.  But this is worse!  You have to know yourself before criticizing others, right? 打铁先要自身硬，你现在吃几两干饭.  The post-WTO world is indeed an empire, with one single center, which is the United States.  Does tribute go to the US or to China?  Your own laws and powers are not respected and you can’t keep your own foreign reserves.  What are you talking about?  Hearing this makes me think about Jin Yong’s Murong Fu 慕容复.[75]

YZQ:  Actually, the idea behind talking about the tribute system was the same as in the discussion of Chinese universalism.  All of these people thought that Chinese people had already invented a more civilized organization than the existing world order.

CM:  That’s right.  This is what I was arguing against.  Politics is not science, but more like the art of playing chess.  All these brilliant people just look like eggheads in this instance.  Maybe they’re trying to plug into international academic circles?  Actually, I have been paying attention to the tribute system for a long time.  In 1997 I read Huang Zhilian’s 黄枝连 (Huang Chih-Lien, b. 1939)[76] early book about it in Macao.  It was about strategy, and meant what it meant.  But the point is, how is the world organized?  According to power and interests!  What cards do you hold now?  Virtue or wisdom?  This may not be useless, but it’s not worth a lot.  It’s one thing to pretend to be stupid, but there’s no cure for real stupidity.

CYZ:  Some people argue that with China’s rise, it’s time to replace the American empire, and China won’t fail like Germany and Japan did!  You’re not a fan of the dream of the great Chinese empire?

YZQ:  On this point, Chen Ming’s liberal leanings are very clear.  One of his basic assumptions is that China has not yet built a fully modern country.  People talking about the Chinese empire all believe that China is already great, and the question now is to put other people in their place.  Actually, Chen is even more clearly Confucian on this front, because Confucians generally only pay attention to management of internal concerns, and have little interest in external affairs.

CM:  True.  I am a very liberal nationalist.  But I am worried about external affairs, like the South China Sea and Southern Tibet.  This is why I know that while we may be big, we are not strong, and there are incidents all over the place where we can’t hold things together.

Qiu Feng 秋风 (Yao Zhongqiu) says that Confucians usually only worry about internal affairs, and are basically uninterested in the outside world.  Maybe, but this is not true in my case.  To my mind, the four dimensions of universal, national, social, and individual all exist in a true sense, and all are worthy of the same attention.  Qiu Feng used to pay attention only to the universal and the individual, and more recently has started to pay attention to the social, but he seems not to be adequate attention to national consciousness.  Not long ago he said that he was a Confucian of the Chinese universalist school, while I was a nationalist Confucian who preached that we should “revere the emperor and expel the barbarians.”  I find the sentence “Tis in foreign lands that a hero must seek renown; how can I let my life pass away as an old bookworm?”[77] quite heroic, while bookworms like Jia Juanzhi 贾捐之 (? - 43)[78] strike me as pedantic.  If you can’t speak without bringing up culture, then this is a mark of incompetence.  Some people say I’m a “fake Confucian,” but I don’t agree.

Civil Confucian Religion and Constitutional Democracy

CM:  I uphold the slogan of the May Fourth:  Fight for sovereignty abroad and the people’s rights at home 外争国权内争民权.  As a modern country, China should fight for and protect whatever her interests are.  Generally speaking, [China’s] Liberals are more concerned about questions of fairness and justice at home, while the New Left is more concerned about questions of imperialism, and both often get wrapped up in these concerns and fail to notice others.  I am different in that I pay attention to both, as well as dividing interests into large or small, close or distant, and problems into minor or major, pressing or less urgent.

CYZ:  Could you share your criticism of China’s Liberals?

CM:  As I just said, I am against giving culture a deciding position, and for this reason I differ from Jiang Qing’s fundamentalism.  At the same time, a modern country cannot completely rely on institutional arrangements or law to achieve integration.  A modern country also needs civil consciousness or a civil religion as a mechanism to provide a sense of identity or belonging.  So in this way, I also differ from the Liberals.

Liberalism’s “constitutional patriotism 宪政爱国主义”[79] makes a certain amount of sense, but it completely sets aside anything that touches culture, society, or history.  Constitutional countries are made up of the sum of atomized individuals, which has become completely empty and unrealistic.  Any political community has its own history, which necessarily produces corresponding ideas, consciousness, and feelings.  As I already mentioned, Americans possess a cultural form [accompanying their constitution], which is what Robert Bellah called civil religion.

If Liberals choose to understand Confucianism in a positive way, then I feel gratified, because from my point of view Confucian thought and liberalism can readily coexist, particularly classical liberalism and the communitarianism strain that we find in modern liberalism.  At one point, I worried whether the basis of premodern Confucianism and democracy and science, the values of modernity, would necessarily conflict, that there was no way to reconcile them.  Now I think I was worrying over nothing.  England was the earliest democratic country, but it never experienced an Enlightenment as did France and Germany.  Religious reformers like Luther and Calvin were not English.  In England, what was important was the industrial revolution, and the reconciliation of social interests and relationships.  Weber’s theories [concerning the rise of capitalism] seem totally fictitious.  If universal values exist, their root is in human nature, and if their roots are in human nature, then they will not be constrained by cultural traditions.

CYZ:  In your theory of “civil religion,” Confucianism is meant to be the cultural basis of Chinese national identity.  On the question of national identity, liberals are divided.  Some liberals are especially concerned by narrow nationalism, and hence steer clear of stronger expressions of nationalism.  Yet other liberals argue that a cohesive national identity is not only important, but necessary.

In my observation, the reason that some liberals suspect civil religion might well be the result of a rigid, extreme anti-traditionalism.  But some simply might not understand.  What, finally, is the relationship between what you call civil religion (or “civil Confucian religion”) and the civil culture or civil consciousness demanded by modern liberal constitutional rule?

CM:  I feel like the idea of civil culture is too vague.  It can’t convey the depths of national consciousness, and especially cannot help to achieve the integration of a political community and cultural groups. 

People’s understanding of religious concepts comes from Christianity, Buddhism, etc., and while these are strong religions with broad influence, this does not mean that they are the models for all religions, and in fact one might say that in the context of world religion they are minorities or even special cases.  Far more universal are popular religions that emerged out of shamanism, as is true when observed from the writings of Frazer and Eliade and when observed from documents we have found.  Confucius said “I have followed the same path as the shamans but have taken it to a different destination.  I admire their virtue  吾与巫史同途而殊归者也，吾好其德义也.”[80]   When Confucius say “their” he is referring to heaven.  Confucius was not concerned with the attributes or the will of some absolute other, but instead had special feelings for that which installed great virtue in himself.  This is where Confucianism built its discourse of the sacred, as well as its arguments concerning fate and life.  Since life develops out of destiny, we must grasp heaven’s mandate, complete ourselves and complete others, join our virtue to that of heaven and join in the transformation, achieving immortality through the practice of virtue.  The political philosophy of “cultivate oneself, put the family in order, rule the country and bring peace to the world 修齐治平” is in fact embedded in this kind of religious discourse.  “Investigating things and extending knowledge 格物致知 means to understand the overflowing virtue of heaven and earth from a material standpoint, to internalize one’s own life goals and put them into practice.  Establishing this kind of Confucian discursive system can lay a foundation for a Confucian civil religion and for Chinese national consciousness.

Confucius’s description of good politics was “taking care of the elderly and cherishing the young and acting so as to please those nearby and attract those from afar,” and his demand on rulers was that they “dispense care broadly 博施广济” and his subsequent concern for governance was “first enrich the people and then teach them 先富后教.”[81]  This is all abstract, and as for how to carry it out in practice, it seems to me that nothing is set in stone 无可无不可,[82] and “revealing the essence through the function” is flexible as well.  What would Confucius say about constitutional government?  Kang Youwei and Chen Huanzhang 陈焕章 (1881-1933)[83] both supported constitutional government.  The Chinese word for “constitution”--xian 宪—originally referred to the idea that “the sacred kings modeled themselves on heaven so as to establish teachings on earth 圣王法天以立教於下,”[84] which originally meant to control power, and this was not merely a secular idea.

CYZ:  “Confucian constitutionalism” has recently become popular on the mainland.  Yet fundamentalist Confucian constitutionalism openly opposes liberal democracy.  And those Confucian theories that aim to “unify the three traditions” that are always trying replace the ruling authorities with Confucius, they are like this too.  In other words, it seems as if we need to clarify the relationship between “Confucian constitutionalism” and “modern liberal democratic constitutionalism.”

CM:  People can define “Confucian constitutionalism” however they want.  I’m not here to criticize.  To my mind, Zeng Guofan 曾国藩 (1811-1872)[85], Zhang Zhidong, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and later Confucians like Zhang Junmai 张君劢 (1887-1969)[86], Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan and Qian Mu surely all identified as Confucians, and were either supporters of constitutionalism or part of a group seeking to reform Confucianism.  I think that these people make up the mainstream of modern, authentic Confucianism.  And I think I belong to and will hand on this tradition. 

CYZ:  You said earlier that Confucianism needs to modernize, and mentioned the importance of modern concepts of rights, citizens, and law.  This means bringing Confucianism into the basic elements of modernity.  You stress that Confucianism as a civil religion could become an important support for modern democratic constitutionalism.  But how are these two meant to connect?  You seem to talk merely about your intentions or goals (i.e., “Confucian civil religion” as the basis for the national identity of a modern, democratic, constitutional China), but you seem to have neglected the concrete connection between “Confucianism as civil religion” and a modern, democratic, constitutional China.

CM:  These are questions that I am currently working on.  My feeling is that liberals may be too wary of me.  My willingness to soften and diminish the posture of Confucianism is to realize the goal of integrating Confucianism with liberalism, which means providing a better solution to questions relating to rights and institutions.  But my version of liberalism is not only “thin” as political philosophy, its metaphysical basis is not the atomic individual.  I hope to return to Aristotle’s goal as a basis, and to the idea of perfection, combining the ideas of overflowing virtue and prosperity 繁荣 to achieve both.

I hope to engineer an integration of Confucianism and liberalism and to work on this topic.  I think that Taiwan cannot be independent, and that the country cannot divide, so the system has to change so that it can provide people which a sense of identity and belonging.  From this angle, Confucians must carry out some theoretical upgrades to Confucianism.  This includes both a new description of the former overall perspective for Confucianism as well as the absorption of new values and a new plan for a mode of operation.

I believe that people can spread the Way, the Way does not spread itself.  I feel that the classics oblige me to start something new, so even while I run Yuandao, I also want to open Confucian academies.  I believe in Zheng Yan’s 证严 (b. 1937) words:  “Go do it, and do it right.”[87]

CYZ:  The mainland economy has grown very quickly, but in this process, basic social norms and the ethical and spirit order have been severely damaged.  Many of my friends from the mainland worry about this, and I would guess that you are among them.  If “Confucian religion” is to develop a greater bottom up influence, surely it must contribute to the amelioration of this trend toward social collapse?

CM:  There’s no doubt about that.  Confucians are embedded in society.  The root of heaven is in the state and the root of the state is in the family, right?  The amelioration of society and the regeneration of Confucianism are part of the same process.  Modern society is plural, but Confucianism, as an essential element, is irreplaceable.  You mentioned a collapse, one part of which is the decline is society’s own structure, and another is the decline in society’s influence in terms of political power and in terms of capital.  “Big society, small government” used to be a slogan with some currency, but it is not heard any more.  The state is growing at the expense of the people, power and resources are concentrated in the hands of the state and large corporations, “civil society” and “middle class” are now negative concepts.  All of this is extremely worrisome, and is a question of life and death for Confucianism.  But no one profits from social collapse, so these trends must sooner or later be reversed.  This might well be Confucianism’s opportunity.

CYZ:  If, one day, a kind of constitutional democracy with Chinese characteristics takes form which manages to achieve the goals of  “pleasing those nearby and attracting those from afar” and “taking care of the elderly and cherishing the young,” without Confucianism having achieved the status of a civil religion, would you support such a situation?

CM:  Of course I would!  Confucians are worry-warts, but we’re not neurotic or paranoid!  Confucius said “If only the Way prevailed in the world, I would not have to try to change it.”[88]  Had Confucius had the time, we surely would have preferred to go on a spring outing with a few of his friends, untroubled by light wind or rain 三五童子踏青去，微风细雨不须归.”  [89]

CYZ:  My last question has to do with your impression of Taiwan.  You have visited Taiwan many times, and not only have had many exchanges with Taiwan’s Confucian community, but have also paid attention to the development of popular religion in Taiwan.

CM:  My greatest impression of Taiwan is:  within the space of a few blocks, you have century-old houses, brick houses from a few decades ago and new skyscrapers all together.  And between the buildings or in some corner there’s  a visible shrine to some unknown god and incense burning.  At first I found the mixture kind of ugly, but after I thought about it I came to appreciate it.  These are like growth rings in a tree, recording the natural evolution of Taiwan’s society, behind which we find the rationality, humanity and kindness of the system.

The influence of Confucianism and Confucian religion is hard to talk about here, because it is already part of the people here, and has become an organized part of social life.  The most important lesson Taiwan offers for the mainland should be this social aspect.  We should have faith in society, and in the positive nature of traditional culture and social reconstruction.

Translator’s notes
 
[1] 陈明, “公民儒教的进路,” in Chen Yizhong 陈宜中, 中国关键七问： 忧思者的访谈 [Seven Key Questions for China:  Interviews with Those Who Worry] (Taibei:  Jinglian, 2013), pp. 177-212.

[2] An example of Jiang’s views on women, for example, can be found here :  https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-qing-only-confucians.html . 

[3] Read Ge Zhaoguang’s devastating criticism of these efforts here :  https://www.readingthechinadream.com/ge-zhaoguang-if-horses-had-wings.html .

[4] See Timothy Cheek and David Ownby, “Making China Marxist Again,” available online at https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/making-china-marxist-again-xi-jinping-thought .  Jiang Shigong, Beijing law professor and New Left thinker, offers what may well be the definitive version of Xi’s Marxism here:  https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-philosophy-and-history.html.

[5] See for example https://www.readingthechinadream.com/xu-jilin-what-body-for-confucianism.html .

[6] See for example https://www.readingthechinadream.com/gao-quanxi-political-maturity.html .

[7] For a deeper examination of this phase of the history of China’s Mainland New Confucians, see Stephen Angle, ed., “The Adolescence of Mainland New Confucianism,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, vol. 49 (2018).

[8] See for example https://www.readingthechinadream.com/chen-ming-transcend-left-and-right.html .

[9] The “misty poets,” the best known of whom are probably Bei Dao 北岛 (b. 1949) and Gu Cheng  顾城 (1956-1993), were a reaction in the 1980s to the excessive politicization and didacticism of poetry in the Maoist era.

[10] Li Zehou is a major Chinese scholar of aesthetics and philosophy, and an important figure in the Enlightenment movement of the 1980s.

[11] Liu Xiaobo was a literary critic and well-known dissident who died in prison.

[12] See Liu Xiaobo, “A Dialog with Li Zehou—The Sensate, The Individual, My Choice,” Chinese Studies in Philosophy, 25:4 (1994), 25-73, DOI: 10.2753/CSP1097-1467250425.

[13] Lin and Yu are Chinese-born scholars who spent most of their professional careers in the United States.  Their work on “Chinese tradition” has been important in the context of post-Mao intellectual life in China.

[14] 中国意识的危机 : "五四" 时期激烈的反传统主义 (Guiyang:  Guizhou renmen chubanshe, 1986).

[15] Mou Zongsan was a major figure in twentieth-century Confucianism.

[16] This was the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev on August 19, 1991, which destabilized the political situation and led to the fall of the Russian Communist Party and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet empire.

[17] This is a reference to the martial arts novel The Smiling, Proud Wanderer 笑傲江湖 by Jin Yong 金庸 (1924-2018).  The “sunflower classic” refers to a martial arts secret created by a eunuch under the dynasties, the details of which were hidden in a Shaolin Temple in Putian, Fujian.  The plot is driven forward by different understandings of the original secret practice.  Chen Ming is comparing liberal democracy to the sunflower classic, and arguing that debates and divisions over its proper interpretation could well lead China into chaos. 

[18] The “origin of the Way,” the title of a famous essay by the Tang Confucian Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) in which he criticizes both Buddhism and Daoism and argues for the restoration of Confucianism as China’s main ideology.

[19] Li Lexian is a historian at the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.

[20] Daniel A. Bell is Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University and professor at Tsinghua University (Schwarzman College and Department of Philosophy).  He is best known for his support of China’s “meritocracy,” which he links to China’s Confucian tradition.

[21] Chen is professor of Chinese Literature at Beijing University.

[22] Yao Zhongqiu, who writes under the pen name Qiu Feng 秋风, is professor of philosophy at Shandong University and a prominent Mainland New Confucian.

[23] A private education group in South China.  See their website at http://www.xfschool.com/ .

[24] See Wang Conglong, “Debatable ‘Chineseness’: Diversification of Confucian Classical Education in Contemporary China,” China Perspectives 2018/4:  53-64, available online at http://www.cefc.com.hk/issue/china-perspectives-2018-4/ .

[25] Jiang and Kang are major figures among Mainland New Confucians.

[26] Hu and Cheng were important figures in the Song period reworking of Confucianism.

[27] In Phenomena and Noumena Mou Zongsan writes that, “if it is true that human beings cannot have intellectual intuition, then the whole of Chinese philosophy must collapse completely.”  See Nicolas Bunnin, "God's Knowledge And Ours: Kant And Mou Zongsan On Intellectual Intuition." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35.4 (2008): 613-24.

[28] These are key concepts from the Yizhuan, see 颜炳罡 and 刘光本, “先秦儒家的义理开合与逻辑建构,” available online at http://www.chinakongzi.org/rw/xszj/yanbinggang/200706/t20070605_27832.htm .

[29] From The Analects, see http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 69.

[30] During the New Culture Movement, Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (1879-1942) called for “Mr. Confucius” to be replaced by “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy.”

[31] Xu Fuguan was an important New Confucian thinker.

[32] Qian Mu is considered one of modern China’s most important historians.

[33] Xiong Shili was a major New Confucian thinker.

[34] Wang Guowei and Chen Yingque are towering intellectual figures from the Republican period.

[35] Zhang Xuecheng is a well-known Qing historian and philosopher.

[36] This refers to the first line of the Yijing, in James Legge’s translation: “Khien [qian] (represents) what is great and originating, penetrating, advantageous, correct, and firm.”  See https://www.biroco.com/yijing/Legge1899.pdf , p. 57.

[37] Kang Youwei, a major Confucian thinker and reformist figure of the late Qing-early Republican era, argued for the creation of a Confucian religion.

[38] The massive encyclopedia compiled during the eighteenth century.

[39] Han Feizi is the best known of China’s legalist thinkers.

[40] Mozi was a Warring States period thinker who opposed the ideas of both Confucians and Daoists.

[41] Lu is a sociologist at Beijing University who has worked on the Yiguandao.

[42] Dong was a Han dynasty Confucian who played a major role in the adoption of Confucianism as state ideology.

[43] Long condemned as a “sectarian” religion, Yiguandao (The Unity Way) was legalized in the 1980s in Taiwan, and is widespread in Taiwan, Hong Kong and throughout the Chinese diaspora.

[44] Ma Yingjiu was president of Taiwan between 2008 and 2016.

[45] Chen uses the phrase 政由宁氏 祭则寡人, which refers to an incident during the Spring and Autumn period when Duke Xian of Wei 卫国国君献公, who had been forced out of his kingdom, was pleading with the ruler who had replaced him, Ning Huizi 宁惠子, to allow him to return.  The phrase means “you can handle the government, just let me handle some of the rituals.” See https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/140386211.html .     

[46] Chen uses excerpts from two poems to make this argument:  The first is “柳暗花明又一村,”  taken from the poem 游山西村 by the Song poet Lu You 陆游, which has come to mean a surprising and happy turn of events.  The second, “蕭瑟秋風換人間,” comes from Mao Zedong's 1954 poem, 浪淘沙.北戴河, which uses a line from the poem Guancanghai 观沧海 by Cao Cao 曹操 , the meaning of which is “even if the autumn wind still rustles the leaves, the world is completely changed.”

[47] Chen uses terms from the Zhouyi :  生生不息，天地位，萬物化.  A literal translation in English would detract from his meaning. 

[48] The Self-Strengthening Movement 洋务运动 began in the 1860s and continued through the 1890s, and represented efforts by part of China’s political elite to respond to the Western challenge through institutional reform.

[49] Woren (Wo-ren) (d. 1871) was a Manchu official who opposed the Self-Strengthening Movement.  A brief biography is available online here:  http://www.dartmouth.edu/~qing/WEB/WO-JEN.html .

[50] See “Confucianism and Modernity—Insights from an Interview with Tu Wei-ming, Bingyi Yu and Zhaolu Lu.” China Review International, 7.2 (Fall 2000): 377-387.
 
[51] 左宗右社, “ancestral temples on the left, state temples on the right.”

[52] Chen is referring to the Zeng Jing 曾静 (1679-1735) case of 1720, in which Zeng attempted to incite a rebellion against the Qing because of their Manchu ethnicity.  The Yongzheng emperor summoned Zeng to the capital and engaged him in a debate about Zeng’s claims, which was later made into a book entitled Records of Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion 大义觉迷录.  See Jonathan D. Spence, Treason by the Book (New York:  Penguin 2001).  Chen presumably sees Yongzheng as practicing an openness akin to “multi-culturalism.”

[53] A local religion, based on Confucian principles, founded by Lin Zhao’en 林兆恩 (1517-1598) in Fujian in the sixteenth century.

[54] A Confucian-based religion established in Chaozhou, Guangdong during the Sino-Japanese War, and which subsequently spread among Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. 

[55] Liang was a disciple of Kang Youwei, and played a major role in the 1898 reforms.  After a period of exile, he became an important journalist and public intellectual in the late Qing-early Republican period.

[56] Ren Jiyu was a well-known scholar of philosophy and religion.

[57] He Guanghu is professor of philosophy at Renmin University who has studied Christianity in China.

[58] Fei Xiaotong is China’s best-known sociologist.

[59] A reference to riots in Urumchi in 2009.  See https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html .

[60] A reference to violence in Tibet in 2008.  See https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/world/asia/15tibet.html .

[61] From The Analects.  See http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 20.

[62] The Three-Self Church 三自教会 refers to China’s officially recognized Protestant church.

[63] The underground or “House” churches 家庭教会 are churches that are not recognized by China’s religious authorities.

[64] Feng was a well-known “Christian warlord” from China’ Republican period.

[65] Zhang was a well-known militarist in China’s Republican period, and became a devout Christian later in life.

[66] Wang is a well-known Taiwanese politician who is also a Christian.

[67] Zhang was a leading figure in China’s Self-Strengthening Movement.

[68] Published in 1898, Zhang’s Exhortation to Study is the origin of the formulation "Chinese learning for fundamental principles and Western learning for practical application 中学为体，西学为用" that Chen is addressing in this passage.

[69] From the Hanshi waizhuan, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Han_shi_waizhuan .

[70] This phrase was also the rallying cry (sonno joi) of those wishing to overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century.  The nationalist overtones are obvious.

[71] The Yixialun 夷夏论 was a document written by Gu Huan 顾欢 (b. 420) attacking Buddhism as a foreign faith. 

[72] A concept from the liberal philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002), arguing that moral decisions should be made from behind a “veil of ignorance,” i.e., a willful blindness toward ethnic, religious, culture, etc. factors that might otherwise prejudice the decision.

[73] Zhu is a prominent Chinese liberal.

[74] This is a play on Hu Shi’s famous 1919 essay “More Study of Problems, Less Talk of ‘Isms’.  多研究些问题，少谈些“主义”,”available online at http://www.aisixiang.com/data/3884.html .

[75] A character in Jin Yong’s martial arts novel Demi-Gods and Semi-Devils 天龙八部 who drove himself crazy trying to restore the former Yan dynasty.  See https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%85%95%E5%AE%B9%E5%A4%8D/2798 .

[76] Huang is a Malaysian-born scholar who has taught in Hong Kong and Singapore.  The book Chen is referring to is probably either 天朝礼治体系研究中卷，东南亚的礼仪世界：中国封建王朝与朝鲜半岛关系形态论 (1994) or 天朝礼治体系研究：朝鲜的儒化情境构造朝鲜王朝与满清王朝的关系形态论 (1995), both of which deal with China’s historical tribute system.

[77] A quote attributed to Fu Jie 傅介子 (? - 65), who assassinated the King of Loulan in the first century BC, exacting revenge for the prior murder of Chinese envoys to the region.  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu_Jiezi .

[78] Jia was the grandson of Jia Yi 贾谊 (c. 200-169 BC).  The reference here is to Jia Juanzhi’s discouraging the emperor from taking military action.  See http://hanchao.jiaolishi.com/renwu/zt4413.html .

[79] Reference to the work of the Princeton political scientist Jan-Werner Müller (Constitutional Patriotism), which builds on earlier work by Jürgen Habermas.  Müller’s work has had a certain impact among China’s Liberals.  See http://cnpolitics.org/2016/09/nationalism/ .

[80] From The Analects, see http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 68.

[81] From The Analects.  The entire quote is:  “The Master traveled to the state of Wei.  Ran You drove his chariot. The Master said, ‘How populous it is!’ Ran You said, ‘As Wei is already populous, what would you add?’ ‘Enrich them.’ ‘Once the people were enriched, what would you add?’ ‘Teach them.”  See http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 68.

[82] This too is from The Analects.  Eno’s translation is “I have no rule for what is permissible and what is not.”  See http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 103.

[83] Chen was Kang’s disciple and a pivotal figure in the failed effort to establish a Confucian religion under the Republic.

[84] From Kong Yingda’s 孔颖达 (574-648) explanation of the character xian in his Shangshu Zhengyi 尚书正义. 

[85] Zeng was a stern Confucian moralist who played a major role in the defeat of the Taiping rebellion in the 1860s.

[86] Also known as Carson Chang, Zhang was an important politician and public intellectual in the Republican period.

[87] Zheng Yan (Cheng Yen) is a Taiwanese Buddhist nun and the founder of the Ciji (Tzu Chi) Foundation 慈济基金会.

[88] See http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 101.

​[89] This is a jingle 顺口溜 composed by Chen Ming.  The first half is based on a passage from The Analects :  “’In late spring,’ said Zeng Dian, ‘after the spring garments have been sewn, I would go out with five rows of six capped young men and six rows of seven boys. We would bathe in the River Yi, and stand in the wind on the stage of the Great Rain Dance. Then chanting, we would return.’ The Master sighed deeply. ‘I am with Dian,’ he said.” See http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf , p. 57.  The second half is based on “Fisherman’s Song 渔歌子,” by the Tang poet Zhang Zhihe 张志和.  The basic idea of the jingle is to roam carefree in nature.