Sun Liping on Current Social and Economic Issues

Sun Liping, “An Informal Discussion of Hot Topics in Today’s Economy and Society”[1]
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
Sun Liping (b. 1955) is a prominent professor of sociology at Tsinghua University, as well as an active public intellectual in China, known for his liberal perspectives on social and political issues (see this brief interview for an overview of his basic worldview).  As part of his engagement as a public intellectual, Sun posts frequently to his WeChat feed, generally addressing the issues of the day from a longer-term, sociological perspective in a pithy, understandable way. His voice is often that of a “truth-teller,” as his post on “You Want Them to Have Three Children?  First, Give Them a Reason” suggests. 

I recently ran across Sun’s “informal discussion,” published on his WeChat feed on January 15, 2022.  In fact, as he notes, it is both an outline to a series of talks he is currently giving in a small-group setting, as well as a sort of index to what he has posted to his feed over the past few months.  Although a bit cryptic in places, I thought it was an interesting window into how one prominent liberal intellectual views China and the world at this juncture.

Unsurprisingly, Sun’s concerns seem to be:  the general atmosphere of uncertainty, both at home and abroad; the pandemic, which seems to be ending in a way that may well not help China; Sino-American relations, which seems to have arrived at a lose-lose juncture; and arguments about entrepreneurship and common prosperity in China.  Of course, some of the nuances of Sun’s thinking are hard to intuit from an outline, but to my mind he seems to be arguing that China should “stay the course,” by which he means that the priority should be to stick to bread and butter issues and avoid big gestures and "own goal" errors.  More daring commentators often argue that China should “pass the United States on the curve,” which is exciting if somewhat dangerous.  Sun prefers to “drive carefully in the slow lane.”

Sun also appears to be genuinely worried that “common prosperity” may turn into some sort of “soak the rich” program, cheered on by rising populism in China.  I was struck by his final remark, which came after his discussion of the post-pandemic world (in which China may find herself alone with a zero-tolerance policy, which would be awkward, to say the least) and the rocky state of Sino-American relations:  “The problem China most needs to address is the problem of the plunder of wealth and parasitism,” which I take to be an attack on recent measures that target China’s entrepreneurs.
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I incorporated my notes and comments into Sun’s outline, included in brackets and marked DO, because without such notes and comments his outline is harder to understand, and scrolling up and down to check the notes can be a pain.
 
Translation
 
The following subjects are from the outline of a series of talks I am giving in a small group setting, and I publish them here as a sort of index to my WeChat feed over the past few years, because I have posted on most of these subjects there.
 
I.  The most important feature of the current situation is uncertainty.
 
The direct cause of the uncertainty is that we are in a period when many policies are changing.
 
Why are we in such a period? [DO:  Sun could be referring to either domestic or foreign policy changes, or both.  Xi Jinping will presumably seek a third mandate this fall, and many current policy maneuvers may be seen as related to this.  Sino-American relations manage to be both consistently bad and in constant flux].
 
Policy risk in a period of policy changes.
 
The biggest risk is traceability (追溯性).  [DO:  This appears to have to do with supply chain issues, i.e., being able to trace a part or a process, back to its origin.  I can find no evidence that this became a recent buzzword, and do not know why Sun refers to it].
 
The background to an era of uncertain policy.
 
The end of one era is the beginning of another. [DO:  This is of course a major theme in China’s thought world:  the 20th century is over, and both Soviet Communism and American liberal democracy are either gone or on their last legs].
 
The country’s sense of direction, the elite’s sense of security, the people’s feelings of hope. [DO:  China should be in a position to dominate the 20th century, but important, pivotal choices remain to be made.  “The country’s sense of direction” surely refers to Xi Jinping’s vision of China’s pioneering a new version of socialism.”  “The elite’s sense of security” surely refers to current attacks on the moneyed elite.  This conflict between Xi and the moneyed elite cannot abandon the people, in Sun’s eyes].
 
Yao Yang: correcting the reforms, catching up and surpassing the United States to become the world's leading power, once world leadership is achieved, China can set the rules, retake Taiwan and accomplish the other goals of our great rejuvenation (according to other people). [DO:  Yao Yang has over the past few months published bold statements in important places (see particularly here, but this is not the sole example), pushing back, in my reading, against Xi’s interpretation of the sinicization of Marxism and warning generally about radicalism.  Sun seems to be saying that returning to a more pragmatic vision of reform will revive the economy, allowing China to achieve its goals.  Sun might well be tongue-in-cheek here.  I do not recall him speaking frequently about “our great rejuvenation”].
 
Concrete examples of divergent views: Li Guangman's article, Gu Chujun’s compensation, changes in the official framing (提法) of certain issues. [DO:  Li Guangman was a relatively obscure blogger who in August of 2021 published on his WeChat feed a screed attacking celebrity culture in China, the evil of the United States, which was encouraging color revolutions in China, and recent reforms in China, for their “superficiality.”  Gu Chujun is a former tycoon who was arrested and jailed for corruption in 2005.  Part of his conviction was subsequently overturned and he was released before the end of his sentence, and received compensation for some of the fines he had paid when convicted.  By “changes in the official framing,” my guess is that Sun is talking about “common prosperity,” or perhaps China’s incomplete “reform” agenda, both of which have been much discussed in past few months.  To my mind, Sun is talking about sub-currents of populism in China and the Party-State’s temptation to pander to them].
 
What do the changes mean for enterprises, and especially for technology companies? [DO:  For many intellectuals, China’s tech companies are seen as the major source of growth and innovation in China’s—and the world’s—economy.  Everyone knows that real estate is a ticking time bomb, but tech is a bright spot].
 
II.  The post-pandemic era and economic development
 
Three ways to assess the pandemic
 
Pessimism without desperation.
 
The pandemic’s impact:  brief, shallow, or strong?
 
Driving carefully in the slow lane 慢车道上的紧运行. [DO: I think this is Sun’s clever way at pushing back against people who argue that China should 弯道超车, “pass [the United States] on the curve,” i.e., take advantage of America’s current difficulties to surge ahead, if at some risk]
 
Are we currently entering the post-pandemic era? [For more on Sun’s views of the post-pandemic era, see here].
 
Symbolic indicators of the post-pandemic era.
 
What the post-pandemic era will look like.
 
Being psychologically prepared to embrace the post-pandemic era.
 
Three problems to be faced in the post-pandemic era
 
Two ways of thinking, two models. [DO:  Zero-tolerance vs. living with the virus].
 
How will different worlds get along? [How does China stick to zero-tolerance when the rest of the world removes covid restrictions?].
 
Possible opposing trends in the Chinese and American economies.
 
III.  The grim external environment and the future world situation
 
Things I was hoping not to see prior to the U.S. Presidential election.
 
One way to observe the Biden period in Sino-U.S. relations: the key is to see if two basic Trump policies change or not:
 
Taking China as the number one strategic adversary. [DO:  China had hoped—against hope—that Biden would change this, knowing that he would not].
 
The time frame for evaluating the relationship. [DO:  When does the sh__ hit the fan].
 
Biden's thoughts on protracted war:
 
Inevitable confrontation in the long term.
 
Containment that means something and containment that doesn’t.
 
Not seeking a comprehensive decoupling with China in any area, nor a full-scale hot war or cold war with China, but instead engaging in “comprehensive” confrontation and decoupling in key areas and on key issues.  [DO:  These three items are all a way of saying “Biden—and the Americans in general—will of course talk a big game about getting tough on China, but a lot of that will be just talk.”]
 
Rebuild alliances, weave a big net.
 
Remain vigilant, wear out the adversary, and wait for the other to make a mistake.
 
Three indicators signaling whether the international situation is good or bad:
 
Confrontations over values become increasingly prominent.
 
Stirring up the people to influence the government. [DO:  In other words, allowing populist sentiment to influence foreign policy—or stirring up populist sentiment to that end].
 
Changing the baseline by allowing the masses to escape with impunity 法不责众式冲击底线.  [DO:  I first thought this referred the events of January 6 in the United States, which could surely have impacted the American-led international order, but on reflection wonder if it is not yet another expression of concern about “fleecing the rich” in an attempt to help the poor].
 
IV.  Putting food on the table or reaching for the stars:  The macro-level policy choices China is facing
 
The temptations, pressures, and constraints we are facing
 
The three factors mentioned above have become three major gravitational forces.
 
Three tensions at the institutional and macro-policy level.  [DO:  I don’t know what the three specific tensions are, but they surely have to do with issues of inequality, the nature of future reforms, and tensions surrounding entrepreneurship and welfare policy].
 
Adjusting industrial policy in the light of these tensions.
 
Reaching for the stars at a moment of decoupling and reorientation 四脱四向 (lit., the "four decouplings and four reorientations").  [DO:  Sun spells this out in another post:  moving away from the virtual economy and toward the real economy, moving away from software and toward hardware, moving away from the private economy and toward the state economy, and moving away from the international and toward the domestic].
 
Reining in our ambitions and taking care of China properly.
 
Surmount the obstacles and accomplish the two great transitions.
 
Resolve the thorniest issues of the people’s livelihood.
 
The focus of a truly great country is on the details of the people’s lives
 
Properly manage the relationship between a strong country and a wealthy people.
 
Build a well-off society.  [DO:  Strangely enough, Sun does not use the common phrase xiaokang shehui/小康社会, but rather yinshixing shehui 殷实型社会.  To my mind, they mean the same thing, but there may be nuances that escape me].
 
The lessons of a guano economy.  [DO:  I assume Sun is talking about Peru, whose economy thrived on exports of guano over the course of the latter 19th century, but I confess that I fail to see the connection to China, which is hardly a one-commodity economy].
 
V.  We should be talking about enhancing resilience, not reform.  [DO:  The idea of prospective reforms seems to worry Sun, although Liberals generally call for carrying them through.  Perhaps this is what he was referring to when he mentioned changes in the “framing” of certain issues above].
 
The crux of many of our current problems is that we are too rigid, and lack flexibility
 
From Miao Kexin to Li Tiantian .  [DO:  Sun’s text has Miao Jiaxin 缪佳馨 instead of Miao Kexin 缪可馨.  I found nothing interesting on Miao Jiaxin, but Miao Kexin was a fifth-grader who committed suicide after being criticized by her teacher in ways that suggest “rigidity” in the teacher’s thinking. Li Tiantian 李田田 was a rural teacher who was confined to a psychological hospital by public security officials after agreeing online with someone suggesting more research is necessary on the Nanjing Massacre in Nanjing in 1937, because the number of deaths reported in Chinese sources might be exaggerated].
 
Flexibility means first to be flexible in thinking.
 
Free will and the expansion of the soul.
 
Thinking flexibly about international relations
 
Weng Yongxi.  [DO:  Weng Yongxi 翁永曦 (b. 1947) is an entrepreneur who played an important role in China’s rural reforms in the early 1980s.  He is currently a visiting scholar at Peking University’s Department of International Relations.  Sun is presumably referring to him because at some point in the past few years Weng penned an essay entitled “There is No Way for China to Replace the United States as the Leader of the World”].
 
Will the U.S. decline?
 
We cannot fall into the trap of Cold War thinking.
 
Domestically, we must be flexible enough to make the economy strong and the society resilient
 
Resilience and launching China’s reforms.
 
Maintain flexibility in terms of supervision and regulation.
 
Face difficulties and problems head on.
 
VI.  Properly understand the problem of common prosperity so as to preserve the vitality of the economy
 
The widening gap between rich and poor is a worldwide problem.
 
We need new thinking about the problem of inequality.
 
The gap between rich and poor in an era of abundance is different from the gap between the rich and the poor in an era of scarcity. [DO:  I suspect Sun means that it is less problematic in an era of abundance].
 
Pay attention to the relationship between the changes in the logic of capital and the emergence the new gap between rich and poor.
 
The idea that primary distribution widens the gap between rich and poor and that secondary distribution reduces this gap is not always true.  [DO:  “Primary distribution” means “the market;” “secondary distribution” means redistribution by the government through tax and welfare policies].
 
Understand common prosperity and corporate social responsibility from the perspective of balancing diverse interests
 
Establish a mechanism to balance diverse interests under the conditions of the market economy.   [DO:  Sun insists that the market is the baseline].
 
The Meituan case 美团案. [DO:  Meituan is a huge Chinese corporation, based in algorithm-driven food delivery services, but with fingers in many pies.  As part of China’s wealthy platform economy, it has been the subject of considerable criticism recently, and has also been quick to make contributions to various causes when the Party-State has called on rich players in China’s economy to be more “socially responsible.”  For a journalistic depiction of the food delivery industry in China, see here].
 
Protect private property, avoid striking down landlords and dividing the land, and be careful about destroying wealth while redistributing it.  [DO:  “Avoid striking down landlords” reflects the fears of many Liberals that Xi & co. are headed back to the “red old days”].
 
The problem China most needs to address is the problem of the plunder of wealth and parasitism [DO:  This is phrased with just enough ambiguity as to leave a slight doubt as to whether the capitalists or the Party-State are the “plundering parasites.”  My suspicion is that Sun means the latter].
 
Notes

[1]孙立平, “漫谈当前经济社会热点问题” published on Sun’s WeChat feed, Social Observations/社会观察 on January 15, 2022.