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Sun Liping on Putin's Conservatism

Sun Liping, “A Subplot in the Overall World Context”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
Sun Liping (b. 1953) is a well known sociologist who retired from Tsinghua University in 2020, and who frequently publishes blog posts on his WeChat feed on a variety of contemporary subjects (including the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, China’s declining fertility rate).  Sun writes as a common-sense liberal who dares to ask hard questions, and he has a considerable following. 
 
The text translated here is in the same vein, and is meant to counterbalance some of Sun's negative posts on Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine (and thus to question, if indirectly, China’s decision to back Russia).  His point is that Putin’s philosophy can be described as “moderate conservatism,” which includes a defense of order, a reassertion of the importance of the sovereign nation-state, a distrust of revolution (i.e., “color revolutions”), and a strong defense of “values.”  He further discusses American politicians and media figures who support Russia and Putin, such as Trump, Mike Pompeo (I’m not sure to what extent Pompeo actually supports Putin), and Tucker Carlson, as well as similar figures in Europe, such as Marine Le Pen.  His point is that we should not dismiss such discourse as political “noise,” but take it seriously as a discernable ideological or intellectual trend throughout the world which may impact our common future.
 
I don’t know what prompted Sun to write this piece, nor exactly how it was received by his readers.  Whatever Putin’s supposed “moderate conservatism,” his conduct of the war surely makes any objective observer question his “values.”  I also think that Sun underestimates the cynicism of figures like Tucker Carlson, for whom support for Putin, or for Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, is part of the conceit that Joe Biden is leading a “socialist revolution” in the United States, which in turn is a part of “wedge-issue” politics in the U.S., designed to fan the flames of extremism.
 
That said, Sun Liping has in the past expressed sympathy with and admiration for Trump because of Trump’s condemnation of political correctness (see here).  In his text, he also uses the term “white liberals 白左,” which I translate as “woke”—a term used to disparage “snowflakes” who refuse to face up to hard facts.  Sun’s use of the term is “neutral” and in quotation marks, but it signals his identity as “center-right” in the Chinese context, which generally means faith in markets and distrust of activist governments—in China or in the United States.  My Chinese colleagues tell me that dislike of “political correctness” in China means distrust of the slogans and discourse of the Party-State, in other words that it is more pointedly political and less broadly cultural/intellectual than in the West.  Perhaps, on the eve of the opening of the 20th Congress of the CCP, Sun wants to signal that “moderate conservatism” would not be such a bad thing, all things considered, a reminder that "liberalism" can mean many things in China.
 
Translation 
 
[This post is not meant to take a position or announce my own orientation, but simply to explore a question: Why have so many right-wingers in the West become Russia or Putin sympathizers or even supporters in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war? What is the connection between them? What is the significance of grasping this connection for our understanding of the complexities of the world?
 
A great many right-wingers have become Russian supporters or sympathizers

At a rally on October 10, Trump  openly criticized Biden’s use of the word “Armageddon” when talking about Russia [i.e., Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons], saying that the United States should urge Russia and Ukraine to negotiate, while instead Biden said "exactly the wrong thing," and that if Biden did not change, the Russia-Ukraine conflict might turn into "World War Three."

On the spectrum of thought in today's world, Trump undoubtedly is on the right, or with the conservatives. Trump's remarks clearly illustrate his difference with the Biden administration's position.
 
In fact, Trump has always held this position. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump repeatedly said that if he were still president, the war would not have occurred. When the war seemed to be in risk of escalation, Trump repeatedly stressed that Putin's nuclear threat is by no means a bluff, and that if the U.S. and its allies continue to back Putin into a corner, it is hard to guarantee that there will be no risk of global war.

On the same day, Oct. 10, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave an interview where he publicly attacked Biden's "Armageddon" remarks, saying they "might be even more dangerous than the end of the world" for Americans, and calling Biden's comments very "reckless.” Some found Pompeo's comments unexpected.

In fact, there is nothing unexpected about this. There is no shortage of people in the right-wing camp in the United States who express understanding, sympathy, and even support for Putin or Russia. I read one article that noted that Tucker Carlson, a spokesman for Fox News, has been harping on pro-Kremlin talking points for months. Other right-wingers regularly spread anti-Ukrainian fake news and denounce sending heavy weapons to Ukraine.
 
This is true in the United States, and it is no different in Europe. Le Pen, the far-right leader who has become so popular in French politics, has not only repeatedly expressed her admiration and affection for Putin, but also stated during the recent election that, once elected, she would adopt a balanced diplomacy and keep an equal distance from the U.S. and Russia, to the point that Western allies feared that a Le Pen victory might shake the Western anti-Russian coalition. Despite wide skepticism about her stance, she remains sympathetic to Putin's stated reasons for the war and has rejected some of the Western alliance's tougher actions against Russia. This tendency is also manifested to varying degrees in right-wing forces in other European countries, which I will not discuss for reasons of lack of space.
 
Many commentators tend to interpret the above phenomenon from a political point of view, meaning that since the Biden administration in the United States is a strong supporter of Ukraine, as is the Macron government in France, despite certain hesitations, those who oppose Biden or Macron in the political arena will of course take different attitudes and positions. I do not fully agree with this. One cannot deny the political factor, but it is not the sole factor.
 
Modern conservatism in contemporary Russian politics
 
At the plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club held on October 21, 2021, Vladimir Putin delivered a lengthy speech. According to some commentators, this speech clearly articulated Russia's national philosophy of "moderate conservatism." In fact, this speech is very important in helping us to understand where to situate Russian politics in the context of thought trends throughout the world.
 
In this speech, Putin expressed his concern about the following world issues: the future security of humanity, the great internal divisions humanity is facing; and the fact that humanity’s very existence is becoming problematic. In this situation, he said, we have to fight for real values, and preserve these values in any way that we can.  And these values make up conservatism, what I have called here the moderate conservatism which is Russia’s national philosophy. 

Putin went through the main points of this philosophy.  First is the importance of order. Second is the reaffirmation of the role of the nation-state, the idea that the nation-state is not obsolete and that only a sovereign state can effectively respond to the challenges of the times and the demands of its citizens. Third is that revolution is not the way to solve problems. Fourth is that, in the modern, fragile world, firm support for the spheres of morality, ethics, and values is becoming ever more important.  When it comes down to it, these ideas constitute moderate conservatism.  Putin says that we need to adhere to the correct conservative ideas. Today the world is in the midst of great changes, and the importance of rational conservatism as a political foundation is increasing with the risks and dangers and the fragility of the reality surrounding us.

What is most striking about Putin’s speech is its critique of radical progressivism or what one might call the Western “woke left 西方白左.”  If we obscured the name of the person who gave the speech and the venue where they spoke, and attributed the remarks to a Western conservative politician or scholar, people might not be surprised.  But it was Putin talking. In fact, he has long been a strong critic of the left-leaning radicalism that seems to be becoming mainstream in Europe and the United States.

Some interpret Putin’s conservative rhetoric as a strategic move to garner support from the West.  I disagree with this view as well.  Considerations of politics and interest cannot be denied, and are surely important, but there are other factors as well.
 
A few thoughts after this brief overview
 
1.  In the heat of the battle, we need to focus on the big issues, the real issues, because lives are at stake.  I have written many posts on this topic [i.e., criticizing Russia’s war on Ukraine], so I believe that my readers and friends will not misunderstand what I am saying here. But the way we look at things should not be one-dimensional. It is like when we look at a painting—our attention is naturally drawn to the foreground highlighted by the artist, but we should not ignore the background.
 
2.  The reasons that different opinion groups have arisen around the question the war are complex, and include geopolitics, national interests, and personal understandings, all of which are certainly important. But ideas should be understood as part of this complexity.  Ideas may seem like a subtext in the context of hard interests and politics, but they play a subtle role nonetheless.
 
3. The intellectual spectrum in Russia itself is also quite variegated.  The three most basic orientations are pro-Western liberalism, which has been on the wane in recent years, Soviet-style ideology, which still has a certain traction among the older generation, and Tsarist nationalism, which has become increasingly dominant in recent years. It is important to note that Russian conservatism is upheld by the Orthodox Church, which is the faith of more than 100 million of Russia's 150 million people.  On this spectrum, Putin is in no way a communist or even a left-wing politician, but a Russian nationalist, a moderate conservative politician.
 
4. Moderate conservatism, which is the philosophy of the Russian state, has a subtle connection with the conservative post-right wing in the West. In this sense we can understand why right-wing, and especially far-right, leaders in the West often seem to have set up a mutual admiration society with Putin.   Many people have noticed that the West, and particularly Europe, are trending to the right at present, and are wondering what kind of impact will this trend have on the future direction of the world.
 
Notes

[1]孙立平, “世界格局中的一条暗线,” published on Sun’s WeChat feed “Social Observations/社会观察 on October 14, 2022. 
 

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