Sun Liping, Russia, Ukraine, and the Big Picture

Sun Liping, “The Small Chess Board and the Big Picture:  Russia in the Big Picture May Be Ukraine on the Small Chess Board”[1]
 
Introduction and Translation by David Ownby
 
Introduction
 
Sun Liping (b. 1955) is a prominent professor of sociology at Tsinghua University (now retired), as well as an active public intellectual in China, known for his liberal perspectives on social and political issues (see this brief interview for an overview of his basic worldview).  As part of his engagement as a public intellectual, Sun posts frequently to his WeChat feed, generally addressing the issues of the day from a longer-term, sociological perspective in a pithy, understandable way. His voice is often that of a “truth-teller,” as his post on “You Want Them to Have Three Children?  First, Give Them a Reason” suggests.  Translations of several of Sun’s blog posts are available on my site.  Someone looking to write a book or a paper on “liberal opinion in China under Xi Jinping” could do worse than to study Sun Liping’s posts.
 
Sun has posted frequently on the war between Russia and Ukraine since the Russian invasion (just yesterday—March 14—he posted links to 12 of his pieces on the topic, in case someone missed them).  The piece translated here was taken down by authorities, but subsequently reposted elsewhere on the web (where it is still available).  Although not nearly as provocative as the pieces Qin Hui published in FT Chinese (translated here and here), it is obvious why Chinese authorities took Sun’s pieces down, because he basically condemns the invasion and warns China to think very carefully before imagining that the conflict is going to make China’s future path easier.
 
Unlike many Chinese observers, Sun does not celebrate Putin’s invasion or the West’s consternation.  He suggests that Putin may well have bit off more than he can chew, and wonders if he is not waging war because he finds himself in a tight spot politically at home.  He acknowledges that NATO’s eastward expansion might well make Putin anxious, but then argues straightforwardly that invasion of a sovereign country is not a proper response to such fears.
 
More pointedly, Sun notes that, for all of Putin’s fire and fury, Russia remains a minor player on the decline, with an economy roughly the size of that of the province of Guangdong; when Sun wrote this piece, it was not known that the Russian invasion would appear to stall, a fact that Sun presumably added to his argument in later posts.  The specter Sun raises is that of a worldwide anti-Russian alliance, which will obviously take on other functions, because Russia will not be a major challenge.  Of course, who that “major challenge” will be is completely obvious.  Sun’s not so subtle message is thus that China should not indulge in magical thinking and should absolutely not join forces with Russia.
 
Favorite Quotes
 
A few days ago, I brought up the concept of a ‘double post’ era, meaning post-epidemic and post-globalization. This will be an era of great reorganization of the international order, and is the basic backdrop against which many things are happening today.  If we look at this big picture, Russia may well be the Ukraine in today’s small chess game. Even if Russia wins this small game, it ultimately will not be able to escape the fate set for it by the big picture.  Even biggest chess game is still small.
 
In fact, there is increasingly no place for Russia in the big picture of the double-post era. The basic pattern of the double-post era will be confrontations between major powers, and Russia is no longer a major power. In the current Russia-Ukraine conflict, what is revealed is not so much Russia's concern for security as Russia’s unhappiness at losing its sense of being a great power. But history will show that there is nothing to be done, and Russia is no longer a protagonist on the world stage, but at best a pawn in the grand scheme of things.
 
Some say that this war in Ukraine will allow Russia to regain its position as the number one rival of the United States. This claim has no basis. As I have said all along, the United States will not take as its number one adversary a country whose economic power is merely equal to that of the province of Guangdong. This might also explain why the U.S. and the West are not engaging in direct military intervention at this time. Suffice it to say that if the world ever finds a way to deal with nuclear weapons, or to ground them completely, Russia will become completely irrelevant to the world.”
 
“But we must understand that this time Russia is undoubtedly on the low side of the moral high ground. Because even if you face a genuine threat, this is not a reason to invade a sovereign state by force, because why should another sovereign state become your strategic buffer zone? This disregard for international law and justice could well provide the moral basis for the formation of a global anti-Russian alliance. Thus we have seen the UN Secretary General make a clear statement, most countries have condemned Russia, popular demonstrations against Russia have broken out in many parts of the world, and even within Russia, there are strong anti-war voices.
 
We can also foresee that if Russia succeeds militarily, the likelihood of such a grand alliance will be even greater. And we should note that if this alliance actually comes into being, it will take on a different meaning, as Russia itself is not important enough.”
 
 
Translation
 
This is an important moment that will profoundly affect the future course of history, but the picture that presents itself is confusing. To see through the doubts and suspicions, and especially to grasp the future impact of this event, we may need two concepts: the small chess board and the big picture.
 
The Small Chessboard: No Matter How Big It Is, It Is Still Small
 
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the biggest events in international politics since the end of the Cold War. It is undoubtedly a huge event, but in a larger perspective it remains a small chess game. It is the big picture that will determine the future.
 
We can start by looking at how Putin and the pro-Russian faction tell the story of the game.
 
For them, the affair started with the eastward expansion of NATO. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union's Eastern European satellite states, as well as the independent countries that evolved out of the former Soviet republics, fell to the West one after the other. Many of these countries either joined NATO or expressed the desire to do so. NATO's border with Russia crept closer and closer. This is NATO's eastward expansion. This is where what we call Russia’s security anxieties come from, or at least the Russian security anxieties that Putin has put on the table.
 
Many people disagree with Putin's claims about his security anxieties. Some suspect that what is at play here is actually a much smaller personal calculation on Putin's part. This smaller calculus, in turn, has two different levels. One is to get out of a difficult domestic situation and create the conditions for re-election. The other is to restore the Tsarist Russian Empire or the Soviet Union to its former glory. In fact, the two are not contradictory, and both can be true.
 
Let's not discuss Russia's motives for sending troops to Ukraine, because no one really knows, and it has little to do with the issue we are discussing. Also, should Russia suffer a crushing defeat, there will be a lot of questions that we won’t need to discuss.
 
Let's just assume that Russia's high-sounding justification holds up, and let's also assume that Russia will be able to conquer Ukraine as it wishes and realize its need for so-called security, which means that Putin will have won this game completely and is an outright victor, and what will happen then? From the looks of things, the possibility of a stalemate is greater, and should that be the case, perhaps the following discussion is more meaningful. 
 
Let's discuss the issue on the basis of this assumption. The trap has been set, and nothing else matters.
 
The Big Picture: Where the Real Key Lies
 
A few days ago, I brought up the concept of a “double post” era, meaning post-epidemic and post-globalization [see here, for example]. This will be an era of great reorganization of the international order, and is the basic backdrop against which many things are happening today.
 
If we look at this big picture, Russia may well be the Ukraine in today’s small chess game. Even if Russia wins this small game, it ultimately will not be able to escape the fate set for it by the big picture.  Even biggest chess game is still small.
 
In fact, there is increasingly no place for Russia in the big picture of the double-post era. The basic pattern of the double-post era will be confrontations between major powers, and Russia is no longer a major power. In the current Russia-Ukraine conflict, what is revealed is not so much Russia's concern for security as Russia’s unhappiness at losing its sense of being a great power. But history will show that there is nothing to be done, and Russia is no longer a protagonist on the world stage, but at best a pawn in the grand scheme of things.
 
Some say that this war in Ukraine will allow Russia to regain its position as the number one rival of the United States. This claim has no basis. As I have said all along, the United States will not take as its number one adversary a country whose economic power is merely equal to that of the province of Guangdong. This might also explain why the U.S. and the West are not engaging in direct military intervention at this time. Suffice it to say that if the world ever finds a way to deal with nuclear weapons, or to ground them completely, Russia will become completely irrelevant to the world.
 
To put it unkindly, this fellow who some have dubbed "the great emperor" may not know what he is up to, whether he is helping Party A in the big picture to weaken Party B, or helping Party B in the big picture to swallow up Party A…But in either case, the decline of Russia will be unstoppable. When the time comes, Russia may well become a buffer zone between the great powers, just like Ukraine is today.
 
From a long-term perspective, this war in Ukraine may be a flashback to Russia's imperial dream. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor might be summed up in the two terms “tactical winners” and “strategic losers.”  Russia may well be facing a similar scenario now.
 
Possible Future Evolution: Determining the Winner in a War of Attrition
 
There are different judgments about the future course of the world’s big picture. The war in Ukraine has added new variables to such calculations.
 
There are various arguments about this, which are particularly noteworthy and relevant to our discussion.
 
One is that the U.S. and the West are happy to see the outbreak of the war in Ukraine because, on the one hand, it will strengthen U.S. solidarity with Europe and its dependence on the U.S. for security, and on the other hand, it will be an opportunity to weaken or even dismantle the Russian economy. Second, it is argued that, if handled well, the war in Ukraine can be used to distract the U.S. and Europe from their focus and pressure on the Asia-Pacific, because they will be tied up with Russia, thus opening a period of strategic opportunity for China. Third, there are cautious people who warn that China must absolutely not get involved, should not shed blood in this war of attrition, and not fall into the potentially unfathomable traps involved.
 
I have said before that any confrontation between China and the United States is strategic and any détente is tactical. This is the basic starting point for our consideration of any major international issue.
 
And perhaps the confrontation between the two nuclear powers, China and the United States, will take on more the form of an economic war of attrition. Focusing on their own development, attempting to contain the other party, and allowing the other party to deplete its resources and strength are all part of this confrontation. And the crisis in Ukraine is likely to become a mechanism leading to the depletion of the resources and strength of the major powers, and perhaps a mechanism used with this intention. Some say that the U.S. and Western sanctions against Russia will not really work. Take oil and natural gas, for example, which are the main sources of Russia's foreign exchange. If China were not involved, Western sanctions could be fatal for Russia, but given the amount of China’s purchases, the impact of the sanctions will be greatly reduced. In fact, this argument is full of traps and misinformation.
 
What we should pay most attention to is the possibility of the formation of a major world-wide anti-Russian alliance.
 
Some say that the Russian offensive against Ukraine was carried out simply and directly. Although Putin gave two speeches, neither of which was short, he did not invent elaborate explanations, but instead stayed close to the naked logic of power:  “Because of my security needs, I have to attack you.”  Even his language was straightforward. Some people are wondering whether the world will hence enter an era of power without morality and justice.
 
But we must understand that this time Russia is undoubtedly on the low side of the moral high ground. Because even if you face a genuine threat, this is not a reason to invade a sovereign state by force, because why should another sovereign state become your strategic buffer zone? This disregard for international law and justice could well provide the moral basis for the formation of a global anti-Russian alliance. Thus we have seen the UN Secretary General make a clear statement, most countries have condemned Russia, popular demonstrations against Russia have broken out in many parts of the world, and even within Russia, there are strong anti-war voices.
 
We can also foresee that if Russia succeeds militarily, the likelihood of such a grand alliance will be even greater. And we should note that if this alliance actually comes into being, it will take on a different meaning, as Russia itself is not important enough.

Notes

[1]孙立平, “小棋局与大格局：大格局中的俄罗斯也许就是小棋局中的乌克兰,” originally posted on Sun’s WeChat feed here on February 27, 2022, but taken down by authorities (the first few sentences are still visible).  Subsequently reposted here.  There is also a version on Youtube, where someone reads the text out loud.